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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of my dissertation is to offer an alternative view on the impact of the army on the Italian 
economy with particular focus on the second century, the period between the end of the Second Punic 
War and the age of the Gracchi, a period of crucial importance for the Roman Republic. 
This dissertation is divided into eight chapters focused on three main topics:  
a) The introduction and development of military payment during the Republic, and what role it 
played on the Roman economy both in terms of cost for the state, and income for its citizens involved in 
military service;  
b) How the recruitment system of the army was organized, and progressively evolved from the 
origins of Rome to the end of the second century and the age of Marius. This will facilitate the analysis 
of the scale of military service and its burden on Roman citizens;  
c) The relationship between the army and the economy during the second century, and the strategies 
employed by the Roman citizens and their families in order to find a balance between military service 
and their economic cycles. 
Contrary to traditional research, it is my intention to demonstrate that the army not only was an essential 
part of Rome’s economic system, but it is also possible to suggest a positive impact at both a macro and 
micro economic level; indeed, the legions were not simply a cost for Rome’s finances, but represented 
one of the main sources of income and allowed a massive circulation of money. Furthermore, by 
involving citizens directly and indirectly, the military service was the most important source of 
alternative income and occupation. 
 
All the dates reported in this thesis are intended as B.C. unless otherwise indicated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“There can surely be nobody so petty or so apathetic in his outlook that he has no desire to discover by 
what means and under what system of government the Romans succeeded in less than fifty-three years 
in bringing under their rule almost the whole of the inhabited world, and achievement which is without 
parallel in human history.”1 
 
Passage from the introduction of Polybius’ Histories 
 
 
The subject of this dissertation is the relationship between the Roman army and the economy of Italy 
during the expansion of the Republic. The main purpose of this research is to offer a better understanding 
of the role and impact of the army and military service on the Roman economy and population; our main 
focus will be the period from the Second Punic War to the end of the age of the Gracchi. 
 
It is our intention to question the model of decline of the Roman economy and population – and the role 
of the military service therein – elaborated by Peter Brunt and Keith Hopkins.2 We are going to challenge 
this model by arguing against the generally accepted negative function attributed to the army during this 
period, mainly against the argument that heavy recruitment rates - due to the wars in the East and Spain 
- caused a peasant emigration and the immiseration of the country-dwellers. 
 
In recent years, important contributions by John Rich, Lukas de Blois, Dominic Rathbone, Elio lo Cascio, 
Luuk de Ligt and Saskia Hin, have highlighted weaknesses of the previous model and the complexity of 
the Gracchan issue.3 Their inputs range from re-examining the census figures to offer a better and more 
                                                 
1 Polybius, I. 1; he is referring to the years between 220 (shortly before the Second Punic War) and 167 (the end of the Third 
Macedonian War). 
2 Peter Brunt, Italian Manpower, 225 B.C. – A.D. 14 (Oxford, 1971) and Keith Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves (Cambridge, 
1978) 
3 John Rich, ‘The Supposed Roman Manpower Shortage of the Later Second Century B.C.’, in Historia 32 (1983); Lukas de 
Blois, The Roman Army and Politics in the first century before Christ (Amsterdam, 1987); Dominic Rathbone, ‘The 
Development of Agriculture in the “ager Cosanus” during the Roman Republic: problems of evidence and interpretation’, in 
JRS 71 (1981); Elio Lo Cascio, ‘The Size of the Roman Population: Beloch and the meaning of the Augustan census figures’, 
in JRS 84 (1994) and ‘Recruitment and the size of the Roman population from the third to the first century BCE’ in ed. 
Scheidel, W., Debating Roman Demography (Leiden, 2001); Luuk De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers: studies in the 
demographic history of Roman Italy 225 BC – AD 100 (Cambridge, 2012); Saskia Hin, The Demography of Roman Italy: 
population dynamics in an ancient conquest society 201 BCE – 14 CE (Cambridge, 2013) 
8 
 
complete understanding – due to the improvements in the field of survey archaeology – of the 
archaeological data. Finally, new interpretations on the overall impact of military service have been 
suggested by Paul Erdkamp and, in particular, Nathan Rosenstein.4 All of these new models serve as a 
starting point in developing an alternative, more optimistic view and also highlight the positive 
importance of the relationship between the army and the economy of the Roman Republic. 
 
Though our main focus is going to be the second century, the changes we see during this period were 
likely underway earlier. In the sections dedicated to the recruitment system, we are going to show the 
scale of military involvement of the Roman and Italian peoples. Although we can trace this process more 
easily in the second century, the payment of the stipendium from the late fifth and the gradual extension 
of Roman colonisation likely brought direct rewards to the Roman people from military engagement 
which would both act as an encouraging factor behind aggressive imperial expansion (see Harris) and 
boost the Roman economy through the distribution of resources.5 From the mid-third century, this also 
likely provoked the progressive monetisation of the economy and fed economic development and 
increasing economic sophistication. 
 
Furthermore, the evidence in the chapters on recruitment suggest that the benefits of military service, 
which were at a basic level in the stipentium, were significantly boosted by the distribution of post-
campaign resources, were widespread and should have encompassed what might be termed the “upper 
peasant classes”. It is these relatively small farmers who are present in a surprisingly resilient form in the 
archaeological record alongside the growing villa sector, as showed by the results of both the South 
Etruria surveys and the more recent Tiber Valley Project.6 
 
Regarding the second century, although recruitment remained at considerable levels, we will argue that, 
in spite of the connection of high-recruitment levels and peasant immiseration in our sources and 
secondary literature, the effects of military service were likely much more complex (we might even say 
that they became even more complex during the second century). By combining archaeological surveys 
with the arguments offered by Harris, Erdkamp and, more recently, Philip Kay, we might look at the 
army as a potential source of income for Roman citizens and Italian allies, not necessarily only as a 
                                                 
4 Paul Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword: warfare and food supply in Roman republican wars (264-30 B.C.) (Amsterdam, 
1998); Nathan Rosenstein, Rome at War: farms, families, and death in the Middle Republic (Chapel Hill/London, 2004) 
5 William Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, 327-70 B.C. (Oxford, 1979) 
6 See Timothy Potter, The Changing Landscape of South Etruria (London, 1979) 
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burden.7 Contrary to what we might expect, peasant immiseration actually encouraged military service, 
since it guaranteed incomes and even provided opportunities for enrichment, and Roman citizens were 
most likely aware of this, thus, it is hard to keep looking at military service as a burden. 
 
Military service on this scale likely continued to transmit economic resources from the state to the lower 
orders in Roman society, supporting the peasantry. Connected with this is the overall appeal of military 
service: as we will show, alluring campaigns with real chances of enrichment attracted numerous citizens 
who joined the legions willingly. As suggested by Kay, we believe that the expansion of the Republic 
not only enriched the elite, but also the common citizens. By contrast, unpopular campaigns had the 
opposite effects (following the example of Rich, we will see that the wars in Spain are the primary 
examples of this), and were the prime factor behind decreasing registration rates for the census. 
 
At the same time, we are not denying the general immiseration of the Roman peasantry, as it likely raised 
some political pressures and one means of combatting those pressures and of increasing manpower 
available to the legions, was to lower the census requirement for military service. By allowing poorer 
citizens to join the army, we have to rethink the impact of the benefits offered by military service, as they 
surely became more important. The army operated as a distributive network, pumping money into the 
Italian economy at several levels (both directly and indirectly): in support of the soldiery in the form of 
their stipendia, in the distribution of booty and war indemnities, but also through the contracts and 
business opportunities provided in supply of the army. 
 
Consequently, we will suggest that the army is also partly responsible for the rise and development of 
the whole villae system. Recent contributions by Stephen Dyson, Annalisa Marzano and Alessandro 
Launaro, make possible to challenge the traditional model, usually known as the "villa schiavistica".8 
Their surveys’ results show that, while villae have always been part of Roman society, they weren't really 
prevalent before the late second century. We are going to suggest that the expansion of the villae is 
connected with the expansion of the army. The expansion of the army - in terms of legions recruited by 
the Republic - from the mid-third century, and, as a consequence, the growing demand for food and 
supplies to be commercially distributed, likely provided an important stimulus for the capitalistic 
                                                 
7 See Philip Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution (Oxford, 2014) 
8 Stephen Dyson, The Roman Countryside (London, 2003); Annalisa Marzano, Roman Villas in Central Italy: a social and 
economic history (Leiden/Boston, 2007); Alessandro Launaro, Peasants and Slaves: the rural population of Roman Italy (200 
BC to AD 100) (Cambridge, 2011) 
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development of Roman agriculture. This development likely focused on the estates of the wealthy, who 
had the resources to supply the legions and make a healthy profit. 
 
This process was dramatically accelerated by the Second Punic War due to the unprecedented (and 
unmatched until the great conflicts of the first century) number of troops recruited by the Republic. This 
conflict also was responsible for the birth of what we might call the economy of war: the production and 
distribution of military and non-military requirements that became a prevalent fraction of the Roman 
economy, and involved cities and villae alike. 
 
The thesis starts with a chapter on the sources. Much of the analysis depend on the numbers suggested 
by our literary sources (mainly Polybius and Livy, but also Appian) and so it is necessary to examine the 
reliability of the figures in the histories and consequently whether we can use the sources to produce 
meaningful estimates of numbers of soldiers under arms, casualties, population, and, as a result, military 
participation. 
 
After the section on the sources, the thesis will be focused on three key topics:  
 
a) Military Payment 
b) The recruitment system and the proportion of the Roman and Italian population drafted into the army 
c) Economic effects of military service 
 
The second chapter of the dissertation covers the stipendium, the payment that Roman soldiers received 
from the state. Chronologically, it covers the topic of military pay from its introduction until the changes 
made by Caesar, the last variation reported by the sources dated to the Republic. It examines the 
development of the stipendium and how it might have been affected by monetary reforms using as main 
source the detailed research by Michael Crawford.9 Briefly - mainly because of the lack of sources - it 
also tries to understand the payment of the allied contingents who served in the Roman army, and how 
the consequences of the Social War changed the impact of military payment for Rome's finances. The 
final part of the chapter is focused on the meaning of regular state payments for the soldiers, which is 
directly connected with issues of taxation (tributum). By looking at the obvious costs for the Republic, it 
                                                 
9 See Michael Crawford, Coinage and Money under the Roman Republic: Italy and the Mediterranean economy (London, 
1985) 
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suggests a more positive aspect to this system for both the Roman economy - as, for example, Roman 
coinage was distributed by military expenditure -, and the individual Roman (and Italian) citizens. 
 
The central body of the thesis is concentrated on the Roman recruitment system. The main focus of these 
sections is on methodologies of recruitment, and the social and economic consequences of recruitment. 
Also, these chapters will offer a quantification of military service by suggesting plausible rates of 
recruitment. These data will allow to truly understand if they were as high and unbearable as it is usually 
believed, and it is very important in the later part of the thesis. 
 
The first of these sections covers the period from the Regal Era to the third century exploring the origins 
of the Roman army and the recruitment system up until the Second Punic War. It also offers a discussion 
on the much debated Polybius II. 24 passage in which he describes a great levy and the manpower 
capabilities of Rome and the Italian allies at the time of the last great Gaul invasion of 225. 
 
The second recruitment section offers a detailed analysis of the Second Punic War. It examines the 
number of men recruited and deployed by Rome year after year in order to assess the demographic impact 
of the war. This section is followed by a chapter focused on the economic impact of the conflict. Contrary 
to the more accepted theories, it highlights the different regional effects of the war, identifying key 
differences between Central and Southern Italy, and suggests that local differences make it impossible to 
generalize as to the impact of the war. We can even suggest that the massive amount of cash produced 
and spent by the Republic may have actually boosted aspects of the economy. Finally, we have to 
consider the role of the military industry as a source of employment and wealth for the civilian population 
not directly involved in the war, and also a look on the role of war refugees to counterbalance the loss of 
labour due to heavy recruitment. 
 
The next chapter, the final recruitment section, is focused on the second century from its beginning to 
the end of the age of the Gracchi, a period of economic and institutional changes. It starts from the 
aftermath of the Second Punic War and the first changes to the recruitment system. I will argue that the 
population recovered rather quickly from the damages of the Hannibalic War, contrary to traditional 
scholars such as Brunt, and, from a military point of view, that during these decades the Roman army 
started a process of transformation from a force of conscripts to one of volunteers (first steps towards the 
professionalization of military service). The next step is to analyse the central decades of the century in 
12 
 
order to fully understand the real impact of military service during these much discussed years; for this 
reason, I will offer a more detailed analysis of the wars fought by the Romans during the second half of 
the century. I regard these conflicts, as suggested by Rich and, more recently, by De Ligt, as the main 
causes of the fluctuations in the census figures. At the same time, however, we will analyse other 
conflicts, like the Third Punic War (149-146), that offer an opposite scenario. Our military study will 
allow us to offer an updated list of the legions in service during this period from which we will be able 
to understand the burden of military service. Also, this section highlights the importance of the 
attractiveness of military service, a factor that should be consider in the discussion of the under-
registration, a well-known problem in the study of Roman census. By combining all of this data, this 
chapter will suggest that there was no manpower shortage in the Gracchan period. 
 
These sections will thus offer a different perspective on Roman military service. Contra the more 
traditional negative approach, we are going to show that recruitment was very variable and, for the most 
part, kept at tolerable rates. Furthermore, we will argue against the connection between the growing 
poverty among Roman citizens and recruitment. In fact, we are going discuss that military service was 
one of the strategies adopted by Roman families to make their livelihoods: it is possible that the army 
was part of the solution to poverty, rather than a problem during the mid-second century. It seems 
possible that the Romans of the period (as opposed to those of the two centuries later) realised this and 
responded allowing for voluntary recruitment and the lowering of the minimum census requirement. The 
direct benefits of military service can be assessed alongside the indirect benefits (the flows of money into 
the system; the demand for supplies; the demand for weapons and other equipment) to suggest that to a 
much greater extent than merely the inflow of capital and slaves, the Roman economy benefitted from 
the military expansionism of the period. 
 
The next step of this thesis, and its final chapter, is to offer a detailed discussion on the overall economic 
effects of military service. This chapter is divided into two parts: the first part is focused more on the 
economy of the second century, and how scholars like Lo Cascio, Erdkamp, Kron, Rosenstein or Kay 
have all suggested alternatives to the traditional negative view offered by Brunt and Hopkins.10 An 
important part of the chapter will be dedicated to a discussion on the villae supported by literary and 
archaeological evidence. It is our intention to support the new theories against the standardization of the 
                                                 
10 Geoffrey Kron, ‘The Much Maligned Peasants. Comparative Perspectives on the Productivity of the Small Farmer in 
Classical Antiquity’, in eds. De Ligt, L. and Northwood, S., People, Land and Politics (Leiden, 2008) 
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"villa schiavistica" model. This section will end with our suggestion that the army and its growth from 
the mid-third century played a crucial role in the development of the villae. We will also offer a brief 
discussion on agricultural production that will lead to the very complex demographic debate between 
"high" and "low" counts, and the possible third way. 
 
The second half of the chapter is focused on the impact and role of the army in the Roman economy. We 
will examine the plausible different strategies adopted by Roman families to counterbalance the absence 
of their men due to service in the legions from a more important contribution of free labour, involvement 
of family members (women in particular), and a more widespread ownership of slaves. We will then 
analyze the direct impact of military service by suggesting that the army was an alternative source of 
income of particular importance as it absorbed surplus labour. Next we will highlight the importance of 
the indirect impact of the army. A significant portion of the Romano-Italian population was employed in 
order to produce the military and non-military supplies of the legions, very important in terms of 
employment, circulation of goods and cash. The production of equipment - military (weapons, armors, 
etc) and non-military (clothing, etc) was probably concentrated in towns and may have been an important 
source of employment for the population. The final section of the chapter looks at colonization and its 
connection to military service, as well as a strategy for poverty alleviation. 
 
I believe that this project will strengthened the new and alternative view on the role of the army in the 
economy of the Republic, in particular during the second century. 
 
The first step in changing the general perception of the impact of the army is to demonstrate that military 
service was not necessarily negative for recruits. First of all, new survey evidence seems to suggest the 
existence and endurance of a moderately wealthy Roman peasantry; it is plausible that this class was 
partially maintained by the rewards of service. Second, the progressive reduction of the census 
requirement for service in the legions allowed more citizens to become eligible for military service. These 
new recruits, who came from the poorer classes of Roman society, were actually interested in service as 
it was a concrete source of income for them. It offered regular if low payment - which was better than 
unemployment and/or wage labour, usually their only options. While the stipendium was not the most 
attractive benefit offered by the army, booty and other post-service rewards provided opportunities to 
improve the economic status of poorer citizens. Next, the army, throughout military spending, is likely 
to have been central in the development and spread of Roman coinage, and the subsequent monetization 
14 
 
of the Roman economy. The stipendium allowed for a massive circulation of cash, the booty brought 
back by the legions at the end of victorious campaigns was also a crucial source of income. 
 
Alessandro Launaro, referring to the villas and the relation between free peasants and slaves, says: "It 
was Roman expansion throughout the Mediterranean - with all its political, economic, social and cultural 
implications - that triggered and sustained this process..."11 With this thesis it is our intention to go even 
further, and suggest that Roman expansion, during all its phases, from Latium to the Mediterranean, 
triggered and sustain the whole process that was the Roman economy. 
  
                                                 
11 Launaro, Peasants and Slaves, 176 
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Chapter 1 
SOURCES 
 
 
This preliminary chapter of this dissertation addresses the nature of the literary sources and how we may 
use them. The discussion is in three sections: an introductory part on our sources in general and their 
significance for our topics, followed by an analysis of Polybius, Livy and Appian, the three main sources 
for this dissertation. The next, and final section will be focused on the matter of numbers in the sources, 
as it is a topic of crucial importance for this thesis. Our main focus will be their reliability and whether 
we should accept, trust and use the figures suggested by Livy, Polybius and Appian. 
 
The foundation of Roman historical tradition is usually attributed to Fabius Pictor – portrayed as Rome’s 
first historian, though he wrote in Greek – who lived and worked during the mid-late third century.12 He 
was the first of many who wrote to preserve the memory of Rome and to transmit to future generations 
the exploits and characters of her famous men.  
 
Although the supposed beginning of Roman historical literary tradition was during the third century, it 
seems likely that Romans were already transmitting their history. Warrior suggests that: “…the Romans 
already had a sense of identity and curiosity about their origins before their “history” was put into 
writing.”13 Cicero suggests that: “…at banquets it was the custom of our ancestors for the guests at table 
to sing one after the other to the accompaniment of the flute in praise of the merits of illustrious men.”14 
Thus the records of aristocratic families can be seen as a source of information on early Rome. As noted 
by Oakley: “History was of vital importance to a Roman aristocratic family: the gloria […] came largely 
from the achievements of its ancestors, and these had to be remembered and jealously guarded. Each 
gens or stirps had an acute consciousness of how its prestige compared with that of its rivals.”15 The most 
common way to glorify the gens was by the ritual of the laudatio funebris, funerals in which the virtues 
                                                 
12 Pliny, NH, X. 34. 71 tells an anecdote regarding Fabius Pictor during some operations against the Ligurians. Donald 
Baronowski, Polybius and Roman Imperialism (London, 2011), 43 suggests that he took part to the war of 238-233 between 
Romans and Ligurians. 
13 Valerie Warrior, Livy, The History of Rome, Book 1-5 (Indianapolis/Cambridge, 2006), xv 
14 Cicero, Tusculan Disputation, IV. 2. 3 
15 Oakley, A Commentary on Livy, 28 
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of the decease (and thus of the family) were celebrated together with the achievements of his ancestors. 
Funerals appear to have been also important on a public level: as described by Polybius, funeral 
processions of distinguished individuals involved not only their families and relatives, but the whole 
community. Particularly emphasized by Polybius is the impact of such processions on Roman youths, as 
he believed that they would be inspired to greatness by the examples of such prominent figures.16 Such 
procedures points to families keeping archives.17 Some of this material may have entered the annalistic 
tradition, as suggested by Oakley: “…it is indeed quite possible that some of the numerous variants in 
the consular lists are the result of bogus claims by individual families…”18. Cicero and Livy both suggest 
that a good deal of the evidence regarding early Roman history (for the regal and early Republican period 
in particular) may have been distorted by exaggerated funerary records.19 For this reason, and considering 
that magistrates of the Late Republic maintained memoranda and commentarii of their magisterial acts, 
it seems plausible that family archives were a quite old tradition. Due to the lack of public administration 
during the Regal and Early Republican period, it seems that the only alternative for maintaining records 
was preservation within households, and, as suggested by Pliny, such records were accessible. 
 
Fabius Pictor and his successors were probably also able to draw on some prior annalistic material. It 
seems likely that the keeping of annals was established relatively early in Roman history. Annalistic 
sources are one of the primary potential sources for early Rome. The annales maximi, the annual records 
kept by the pontifices maximi up to the pontificate of P. Mucius Scaevola (130-115) mentioned every 
major event of each year (such as triumphs, treaties, wars, the building of temples, eclipses, plagues, 
earthquakes, or other portents), and were clearly a source of information on early Rome.20 Their content, 
                                                 
16 See Polybius, VI. 53 on the whole procession. On the role on young Romans, see Polybius, VI. 53-54 
17 See Pliny, NH, XXXV. 2. 7: “The archive-rooms were kept filled with books of records and with written memorials of 
official careers.”; Gellius, AN, XIII. 20. 17 and Dionysius, I. 74. 5 
18 Oakley, A Commentary on Livy, 31-32 
19 See Cicero, Brutus, 62: “Yet by these laudatory speeches our history has become quite distorted; for much is set down in 
them which never occurred, false triumphs, too large a number of consulships, false relationships and transitions of patricians 
to plebeian status, in that men of humbler birth professed that their blood blended with a noble family of the same name, 
though in fact quite alien to them…” and Livy, VIII. 40: “I believe that historical record has been marred by funerary eulogies 
and false inscriptions on ancestral busts, with the various families all illegitimately appropriating to themselves military 
campaigns and public offices.” 
20 See Cicero, de Oratore, II. 12. 52: “For history began as a mere compilation of annals, on which account, and in order to 
preserve the general traditions, from the earliest period of the City down to the pontificate of Publius Mucius, each High Priest 
used to commit to writing all the events of his year of office, and record them on a white surface, and post up the tablet at his 
house, that all men might have liberty to acquaint themselves therewith, and to this day those records are known as Pontifical 
Chronicles (annales maximi in the Latin text)” 
17 
 
however, was likely restricted and probably had only limited narratives of events.21 Even if the annals 
went back to the origins of the Republic, it is possible that some of the earlier entries were reconstructed 
or that there was judicious tampering with the record in later times. As with all of the early material, 
doubts abound.22 
 
The confluence of this material allowed Purcell to argue that the development of the Roman historical 
consciousness started at least by the end of the sixth century (despite the absence of extended 
historiographic texts). Rome had active cultural contacts with history-writing cultures already by the 
fourth century and it seems improbable that the Romans were not interested in their past long before they 
started writing history.23 As Wiseman puts it in reference to early Rome: “It is ludicrous to imagine that 
during the previous half millennium the Romans never reflected on the origins and nature of their 
community…”24 
 
Other records may also have survived and found their way into our historical traditions. By the first 
century, for example, Romans had a record of all the consuls for every year of the Republic, called fasti 
consulares, the purpose of which may have been mainly chronological, but which may have given some 
chronological framework for early Roman history. 
 
Cornell, while discussing the connection between Livy’s narration of early Roman history and the 
archaeological facts, says: 
 
“That evidence from the archaic age survived into the late 
Republic and was accessible to historians and antiquarians is 
beyond doubt. This evidence consisted of monuments, buildings, 
institutions, and customs that were preserved as relics of the 
distant past; most important of all were written documents, which 
we know survived to the late Republic and beyond. The earliest 
evidence of literacy at Rome dates from the seventh century, and 
                                                 
21 See also Gellius, AN, II. 28. 6: “His [Cato] words in the fourth book of his Origins are as follows: “I do not care to write 
what appears on the tablet of the high priest: how often grain was dear, how often darkness, or something else, obscured the 
light of sun or moon.” Of so little importance did he consider it…” 
22 Andrew Lintott, ‘Roman Historians’, in eds. Boardman, J., Griffin, J., Murray, O., The Roman World (Oxford, 1988), 
227; also see Oakley, S., P., A Commentary on Livy books VI-X, volume I (Oxford, 1997), 24-27 
23 Nicholas Purcell, ‘Becoming Historical: the Roman Case’, in eds. Braund, D. and Gill, C., Myth, History and Culture in 
Republican Rome, Studies in honour of T. P. Wiseman (Exeter, 2003), 12-34 
24 Peter Wiseman, Remus, a Roman Myth (Cambridge, 1995), 129 
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public documents that could be used by historians were preserved 
from before 500.”25 
 
This, however, clashes with the opening statement in Livy’s second introduction to his Ad Urbe Condita 
regarding the status of sources on early Rome: 
 
“The events covered are unclear because they lie far in the past, 
rather like objects seen only with difficulty at a great distance. But 
there is also the added factor that writing, the only thing that keeps 
a reliable record and other public and private papers was for the 
most part destroyed when the city burned down. The city was then 
reborn, from its original roots, as it were, with greater vigor and 
fecundity, and from that point on, from its second beginning, its 
history on the home front and in the military field will be presented 
with greater clarity and certitude”26 
 
Of course we have to consider the possibility that, as mentioned by Livy, the Gallic invasion of 390 
caused the loss of any type of written and archival material that predates that event, but, as Stouder 
suggests: “after the Gallic disaster […], the sources are henceforth more reliable. His narrative should be 
more trustworthy for both internal and external affairs.”27 We have thus a dilemma regarding the status 
and availability of the sources that pre-date the fourth century. We should consider that modern 
historiography tends to reduce the effects of the Gallic invasion, so there is the possibility that damages 
to public documents/records were not as severe as claimed by Livy.28 Nevertheless, the very fact that 
Livy was of the view that few written records of the period before 390 survived should imply that the 
sources available from that early period were scanty, whether or not this lack of evidence was a 
consequence of the Gallic sack.  
 
Given the lack of obvious sources, the richness of the narrative account for early Rome that we find in 
Livy is problematic. It is evident that much of the narrative of early Rome, certainly that of the regal 
period, had grown through a process of rationalization and accretion of stories, some of which were 
                                                 
25 Timothy Cornell, ‘Livy’s Narrative of the Regal Period and Historical and Archaeological Facts’, in ed. Mineo, B., A 
Companion to Livy (Chichester, 2015), 253 
26 Livy, VI. 1 
27 See Livy, VI. 1, also see Ghislaine Stouder, ‘From 390 BC to Sentium: Diplomatic and Military Livian History’, in A 
Companion to Livy, 329 
28 See Timothy Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, Italy and Rome from the Bronze Age to the Punic Wars (c. 1000 – 264 
BC) (London, 1995), 318 
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probably Greek, over the centuries.29 I place little faith in the stories of the regal period, for instance, as 
one can see that information such as that relating to the early organization of the army or the census or 
the constitution were attracted to Servius Tullis, whenever the institutions came into being. Nevertheless, 
there do seem to be some ghosts in the early accounts, such as the various stories relating to military 
organization which cannot easily be explained as later rationalizations. Similarly, the introduction of 
military pay and the associated reforms of the army and the development of Roman colonization would 
seem to rest on more than the speculations of later historians, suggesting that for the period sometime 
around 400 the sources available to later historians began to improve. 
 
Most of the material in this thesis concentrates on the period after the fifth century. For the period from 
c. 400 until the mid-second century, we have the accounts of Livy and Polybius. Their detailed studies 
provide us with the bulk of our material for the Roman army of the Republic, its deeds, its organization 
and its evolution. It is no coincidence that the loss of Livy’s chronicle that follows the end of the Third 
Macedonian War, as we will explore more into detail soon, is a major problem in our analysis of the 
second half of the second century. 
 
Both Polybius and Livy provide considerable detail for much of the third and second centuries BC. 
Polybius was an eye-witness to some of this history and appears to have access to both records and key 
individuals during his time in Rome. It is evident that Livy also makes use of Polybius, meaning that 
they cannot be seen as independent sources. Yet, Livy clearly had other sources since he provides 
numerous facts not in Polybius:  in particular for many of the years under consideration, he details of the 
number of legions raised, where they were stationed, and war losses. These are an essential starting point 
for this research, and our analysis of the recruitment system of the Republic. Livy or his source likely 
found these in some official record, perhaps an annalistic source or records of senatorial decisions, but 
the regularity with which this material is provided points to a non-literary origin. 
 
It is similar with the demographic records: Livy is our primary source for the census and its returns. We 
will discuss in more detail the reliability of these figures as demographic data, but it seems likely that 
Livy (and the references scattered elsewhere in the historical tradition) relate to a report of the census 
which was recorded somewhere in Rome. The census procedure in itself must have generated significant 
                                                 
29 See Oakley, A Commentary on Livy, 85 on the use of Greek stories/materials to a Roman context. 
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volumes of information and the records must have been available for administrative and legal purposes. 
It seems also very likely that the religious functions of the census ensured that a report was made 
publically of the overall number of citizens and that this could be consulted by magistrates at some 
distance from the original census. The existence of records is different from those records being easily 
available and properly maintained and ancient historians were not renowned for their archival researches 
but the transmission of the figures to and within the annalistic record is further evidence of the availability 
of a body of source material and perhaps documentary material to historians in Republican Rome. The 
census figures have their problems, and the textual transmission of numbers may be more difficult than 
that of words, but it seems likely that most of the figures that have come down us were those recorded in 
the various censuses. 
 
For all their imperfections, these figures are of fundamental importance for this project as they offer us 
an idea of how the Roman population was changing during the key period of the late third and second 
centuries (Livy’s figures cover Rome’s citizen population more or less regularly from 207 to 115). These 
figures are our starting points in the understanding of Rome’s demographic history, but they became 
even more interesting and important if combined with the number of soldiers in service reported by Livy. 
Together, this information allows us to suggest plausible recruitment rates, and thus to understand if 
military service was a burden for Roman citizens or if its negative role might have been overrated. 
 
The third main source I exploit is Appian of Alexandria. He was writing in the later first and early second 
centuries AD, much later than the events studied in this dissertation. He is, however, our only or most 
detailed source for many events such as the Spanish wars and the Third Punic War. 
 
Appian forces us to consider the nature of the sources available to him. He was certainly using Polybius.30 
It seems probable that Appian worked by compiling and rationalizing earlier historians. Rich suggests 
that Appian began his history of Rome: “to enhance his own comprehension, and only then decided that 
others might welcome such an account and accordingly set about writing it up as a history.”31 We are 
                                                 
30 See Oakley, A Commentary on Livy, 13: “…we possess excerpts from the parallel narrative of Polybius: this was used 
extensively by Livy as a source, and comparison of the two versions tells us much about Livy’s techniques…” on Appian see 
Richardson, J., S., Appian: the Wars of the Romans in Iberia (2000), 4 
31 See John Rich, ‘Appian, Polybius and the Romans’ War with Antiochus the Great: a study in Appian’s sources and 
methods’, in ed. Welch, K., Appian’s Roman History, Empire and Civil War (Swansea, 2015), 70 
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thus dependent on Appian’s editorial choices and the quality of the largely unknown accounts he relied 
upon. We also have little idea how many sources were available to him. 
 
There were, of course, a range of sources available to any historian of the Republic and far more than are 
available to us. The thesis will draw on, just to mention some, Cicero, Cato, Velleius Paterculus, Plutarch, 
Sallust, Valerius Maximus and Orosius. It is evident that the modern historian must be critical of those 
sources and the data within the tradition. It may well be that our sources sometimes have simplified or 
completely misunderstood some of the information that has come down to them. Certainly for the later 
periods, it seems unlikely that there was a high level of invention in the later sources. Narratives may 
have been adjusted to suit the moralizing purpose of historians or for dramatic effect. But much of this 
thesis relies on the transmission of numbers, which might be less liable to plain falsification. Sources 
may have misinterpreted the numbers that came down to them by, for instance, making assumptions 
about the size of legions. They may also have exaggerated numbers in certain instances by, for example, 
assuming that a defeat meant the loss of all soldiers rather than part of an army. Sources might be careless 
about statistics, caring more about the rhetorical and literary value of a number than its accuracy, which 
seems particularly the case in the accounts of Cannae (see below). They may also have failed to 
understand the particular dynamics of loss and recruitment in long campaigns and the balance between 
Romans and socii in the various wars. Nevertheless, where we can compare sources, they are not widely 
divergent. There is good reason to believe (mostly from Livy) that the Romans cared about the numbers 
of troops and the numbers of legions and reported losses with some degree of accuracy, and that those 
reports were preserved. We can, I think, be cautiously optimistic about at least some of the numbers that 
have come down to us. 
 
For the narrative of our sources, there is again reason to be positive. Undoubtedly, there are specific 
problems, such as with Polybius’s account of the Roman constitution in Book VI, or with Appian’s 
sometimes confused and confusing account of the wars in Spain, and our knowledge of the later second 
century suffers from an absence of Polybius and Livy, but whereas one would be wise not to put too 
much weight on a particular anecdote, and I shall discuss the treatment of anecdotal information in 
relation to the supposed crisis of the mid-second century, the outlines of historical development and the 
trends exploited in this thesis are not such as to be seriously reliant on particular stories or instances. We 
can, I think, work with our material. 
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The following section of this chapter offers a brief analysis of our three main sources. 
 
* POLYBIUS 
 
Born in Achaea towards the end of the third century, Polybius’ career as an historian was strongly 
influenced by the events that followed the defeat of Macedonia in the battle of Pydna (168). Polybius, 
together with other Achaean political detainees, was taken to Rome where he became mentor and close 
friend of Scipio Aemilianus. This unique position allowed him to observe Roman affairs and politics, 
and he aimed to write a pragmatic political and military history in order to describe and explain: “…by 
what means and under what system of government the Romans succeeded in less that fifty-three years in 
bringing under their rule almost the whole of the inhabited world…”32 
 
As a source on the Roman Republic and its rise as the main power of the Mediterranean world, Polybius 
is very interesting for various reasons: first of all, the central theme of his Histories was the rise of a 
foreign empire, quite unusual for Greek historiography. Polybius’ work was not intended for the Romans, 
but for the Greeks. The main purpose of the Histories, in fact, was to offer practical help and suggestions 
to, we might suppose, Greek leaders and to educate them in the nature of Roman power.33 The purpose 
of the work may have shifted after the events of 146 which probably put an end to any hopes of the 
Achaean states pursuing an independent policy with regard to Rome.34 
 
Any such didacticism co-existed with the broader endeavor to explain and understand the rise of Rome. 
In many ways, Polybius set his discussion not just in Greek terminology, but in a Greek religious and 
philosophical context. In Book VI, his description of the Roman constitution owes much to Aristotelean 
political analysis, importing to Rome a vocabulary used to analyse the varied histories of the Greek 
poleis. The emphasis on Tyche (Fortune) also brings a fundamentally Greek idea to play in the 
historiography of Rome.35 
 
                                                 
32 Polybius, I. 1 
33 See Arthur Eckstein, Moral Vision in The Histories of Polybius (Berkley and Los Angeles, 1995), 234 
34 Walbank, F., W., Polybius (Berkley and Los Angeles, 1972), 27-28; also see Brian McGing, Polybius’ Histories (Oxford, 
2010), 164-167 
35 See Baronowski, Polybius and Roman Imperialism, 151-152 
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For the earlier part of his Histories (book I and II, focused on the events prior to 220) there are historians 
who receive special mention, like Aratus Phylarchus on the events in Greece, or Fabius Pictor and 
Philinus on the Punic Wars. From book III, Polybius appears to have used a greater range of sources and 
in the case of the Second Punic War is at least aware of Carthaginians as well as Roman sources.36 
 
He may also have consulted official archives; the passage regarding the controversy between Zeno and 
Antisthenes suggests that he consulted documents himself.37 He may have engaged in some archival 
work in Rome: his controversial account of Italian manpower, to be discussed at length below, looks to 
be based on documentary sources. Finally, Polybius gave a great deal of importance to eyewitnesses: 
“…the only thing left for an historian is to inquire from as many people as possible, to believe those 
worthy of belief and to be an adequate critic of the reports that reach him.”38 
 
Polybius wished to write what he called πραγµατική ίστορία (pragmatic history), the military and political 
history of his time enriched with his own practical experience, which would be, above all, useful. Thus, 
a mere factual narrative was not sufficient: in Polybius’ view, the ideal historian should not only search 
for the truth, but he should be exceptionally well prepared for his task. The historian should have political 
experience, geographical knowledge and should not rely exclusively on earlier sources, but personally 
examine archives, inscriptions and treaties. 
 
For these reasons, when he says: “Truth is to history what eyesight is to the living creature.”39 We can 
fully understand his value as an historian and, as a consequence, as a source for us. After all, his role for 
this thesis is very important because of his narration up to the mid-second century or the Roman military 
system, while the more “philosophical” part of his Histories, absorbed on the rightfulness of the Roman 
rule, is less relevant for the purposes of this project. 
 
 
                                                 
36 See Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius, 28-29: on the Carthaginian side famous are the cases of Sosylus of 
Sparta and Chaereas, whose commentary is defined by Polybius, III. 20 as “…they possess none of the elements of order or 
of authority which are proper to history, but are pitched at the level of the common gossip of the barber’s shop.” Another 
mention to Silenus of Caleacte, who followed Hannibal’s expedition together with Sosylus. On the Roman side, other than 
Fabius Pictor, Polybius also used the history wrote by L. Cincius Alimentus, praetor of Sicily in 210/9 and was captured by 
Hannibal (see Livy, XXI. 38), or the histories of C. Acilius (see Dionisius of Halicarnassus, III. 67. 5) among others. 
37 See Polybius, XVI. 15. 8; also see McGing, Polybius’ Histories, 93 
38 Polybius, XII. 4c 
39 Polybius, I. 14. 6 
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* LIVY 
 
Born in Northern Italy in the city of Patavium, Livy lived during the turbulent and violent period of the 
Civil Wars and the following reorganization of the Roman world by Augustus. He did not pursue a 
political career, but devoted himself to writing the history of Rome from its foundation to the age of 
Augustus. 
 
Livy wrote in the annalistic tradition. He had an eye to the moral, as made clear in the Preface, and the 
accounts have exemplary qualities.40 History, to Livy, was a monumentum, literally a “memorial” 
(contrary to the Greek term historia that connotes research or enquiry), as he clearly explains in the 
Preface of his Ab Urbe Condita: “The special and salutary benefit of the study of history is to behold 
evidence of every sort of behaviour set forth as on a splendid memorial; from it you may select for 
yourself and for your country what to emulate, from it what to avoid, whether basely begun or basely 
concluded.”41 
 
Andrew Lintott portraits Livy as a conservative historian: 
 
“His approach to his subject was conservative, as had probably 
been traditional among annalists: in war he was patriotic, in 
politics he supported senatorial authority against the demagoguery 
of tribunes. Although he shows some sympathy with the plebs in 
his account of their struggle with the patricians, he shows an 
immense fascination with aristocratic hardliners who resisted 
inflexibly any concession to the plebs or deviation from tradition. 
It is likely that he retained this attitude in his lost books on the fall 
of the Republic and saw a reason for that fall in the failure of such 
men.”42 
 
But as with many Roman historians, the absence of an editorial voice in the long accounts of deeds and 
events means that it is very difficult to detect any overall ideological purpose. Further, since Livy must 
have worked primarily as a compiler of accounts rather than a composer, the ideological content of the 
                                                 
40 See Livy, Preface: “My wish is that each reader will pay the closest attention to the following: how men lived, what their 
moral principles were, under what leaders and by what measures at home and abroad our empire was won and extended; then 
let him follow in his mind how, as discipline broke down bit by bit, morality at first foundered; how it next subsided in ever 
greater collapse and then began to topple headlong in run […].” 
41 Livy, Preface 
42 Lintott, Roman Historians, 235 
25 
 
stories he reports may well have predated his version of Roman history. What seems clear is that his 
history was not meant to be read as a single work, with a beginning, a middle, and a conclusive end, but 
was intended to be dipped into and extracted from. It was in itself a monumental work, the reading of 
which would have been a monumental act. In such a context, we are rather safer in exploiting Livy as a 
source, dipping in and out for our key pieces of information and less at risk of misrepresenting an overall 
narrative, since there was likely no overall narrative scheme for the work. 
 
Livy’s sources were likely quite similar to those of Polybius, although he rarely quotes them.43 From his 
text it seems likely that Valerius Antias and Fabius Pictor were influential for the accounts of third 
century and earlier Rome.44 Claudius Quadrigatus, Puplius Rutilius Rufus, and Polybius also get 
mentions, but of these only Polybius survives in any quantity.45 Yet, there are differences between Livy 
and Polybius where we can compare, for instance in the accounts of the Hannibalic War. Livy was clearly 
not reliant on Polybius for his figures and frequently offers more detailed accounts of numbers. For the 
early history of Rome, Livy appears to have been generally skeptical, but whereas a modern historian 
might exclude material about which there was significant doubt, Livy appears to have taken an inclusive 
approach.46 
 
Livy’s numbers are often detailed: he reports census figures, number of soldiers recruited for a campaign 
or casualties after a certain battle. On certain occasions he even mentions differences between citizens 
and socii.47 It seems probably that either Livy or one his key sources took the time and the trouble to 
                                                 
43 On Livy’s sources also see Oakley, A Commentary On Livy books VI-X, 13-20 
44 As an example, see Livy, XXII. 7 on the battle of Trasimene: “Statistics for the fallen on both sides are many times greater 
in other authors. Apart from my aversion to the unfounded exaggeration to which historians are all too prone, I have myself 
accepted Fabius [Pictor] as my main source, since he was contemporary with this war.”. Regarding Valerius Antias, Livy 
openly criticizes him on different occasions: see Livy, XXVI. 49; also see Livy, XXXII. 6 on the episode about Publius Villius 
in Macedonia. 
45 See Oakley, S., P., ‘Livy and his Sources’, in eds. Chaplin, J., and Kraus, C., Livy (Oxford, 2009), 450-451 for Polybius’ 
influence on Livy. 
46 See Livy, Preface, 6: “The intent is neither to affirm nor refute the traditions that belong to the period before the foundation 
of the city or the anticipation of its foundation, for these are embellished with poetic tales rather than based on uncorrupted 
records of historical events.” 
47 See Livy, X. 18: “…the consul Lucius Volumnius had already set out for Samnium with the second and third legions and 
fifteen thousand allies…” and his chronicle of the Second Punic War has different references to the socii and even their 
numbers: during the recruitment of 218 at the beginning of the war (see Livy, XXI. 17), on the strength of the Roman army 
at the battle of Trebia (see Livy, XXII. 36) and Cannae (see Livy, XXII. 36), when troops were moved from Campania to 
Spain after the fall of Capua (see Livy, XXVI. 18) or on the army at the battle of Ilpia (see Livy, XXVIII. 13). Also, Livy, 
when describing the number of legions required for military campaigns at the beginning of each year, usually mentioned that 
the socii were recruited as well, and, on certain occasions, how many of them. 
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consult archives. In turn, this also suggests that some form of archival record was maintained from the 
mid Republic onwards. 
 
Naturally, there is an unknown yet inevitable margin of uncertainty in relying on Livy’s figures. Census 
figures might accurately reflect the number of men appearing at the census, but as demographic data, we 
must have significant reservations about them. Levels of under-reporting in any modern census are high 
and even if we assume that Rome’s bureaucracy was unusually efficient for an ancient state, one would 
expect very high levels of under-reporting in Rome’s census. As the Roman state grew larger, the material 
difficulties in conducting a census over a significant territory increased. Further, the material interest in 
men presenting themselves at the census was probably not great. Consequently, one may expect 
variations in the rate of under-reporting, but that the rate of under-registration would always be 
significant. It is not clear how we can account for this. It renders comparative studies of recruitment rates 
difficult: one could not safely compare the rates of recruitment in the Hannibalic War, for instance, with 
European mobilization rates for World War I. We are, therefore, always looking at rates of mobilization 
of available manpower, and perhaps manpower that chose to make itself available, rather than rates of 
mobilization of total manpower. 
 
For the period after 167 (from the aftermath of the Third Macedonian War), we rely on the Periochae, 
these often brief summaries, are not nearly as informative as the detailed analysis offered by Livy in his 
complete books, and we are forced to rely on other sources, such as Appian.48 For this period, we are in 
danger of seeing an absence of evidence as conclusive evidence of an absence, as for example in the 
matter of colonization after the 160s.49 
 
* APPIAN 
 
Appian was born in Alexandria, Egypt, but later moved to Rome. He is best known for writing a 
comprehensive history of the world from the foundation of Rome to the reign of Trajan, but much of that 
is lost. Richardson comments that: “Appian has mostly been treated as a source of historical information 
and as a means of access to the lost works of earlier historians rather as a historian in his own right.”50  
                                                 
48 On the Periochae, see Yann Le Bohec, ‘Roman Wars and Armies in Livy’, in A Companion to Livy, 122-123 
49 See Fiona Tweedie, ‘The Case of the Missing Veterans: Roman Colonization and Veteran Settlement in the second century 
BC’, in Historia 60 (2011), 465-466 
50 Richardson, J., S., Appian: Wars of the Romans in Iberia (2000), 1 
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Of great importance for this thesis are especially his chronicle of the wars of the second century, in 
particular the account of the Spanish Wars (Iberike); his narrative on the Third Punic War (Libyka) is 
also of great importance, being the only surviving source on these events, and especially because he 
probably used Polybius’ lost eye-witness account (as he accompanied Scipio Aemilianus, he witnessed 
the destruction of Carthage). Appian’s Civil Wars, concerned with the internal strife that afflicted Rome 
between 133 and 30, is also partly significant to us in our discussion on the economy of the second 
century and the impact of the army and military service. 
 
The main issues regarding Appian is, of course, the fact that his history was written much later than the 
events that are the core of this dissertation. As Rich says: “Appian was, like most ancient historical 
writers, almost entirely dependent on earlier historians for his material, and the questions who his sources 
were and how he used them remain of fundamental importance for understanding his work.”51 On 
Appian’s history of the Republic, Rich concludes that he used mainly two authors: Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus on the Roman expansion and wars in Italy down to 265, and Polybius on the events 
between 200 and 146 (and probably a bit later – considering the dating of the chronicle of the wars in 
Spain).52 On the events of the Late Republic narrated in the Civil Wars, there was probably a wider range 
of available sources.53 
 
The negative view on Appian – traceable back to Schwartz in the late nineteenth century – as a mere 
compiler has been progressively refuted.54 Probably one of the most important issues in using Appian as 
a source is understanding his mentality; after all, as remarked by Richardson: “He was also very much a 
man of his own time, whose understanding of how the Roman empire come to be was shaped by his own 
experience of it, as an official of the imperial system as it was in the second century AD.”55 He had access 
to sources and, as noted by Rich, was well able to use them, but, ultimately, he was a man of the second 
century AD trying to understand and explain events of the third and second centuries BC. 
 
                                                 
51 Rich, ‘Appian, Polybius’, 65 
52 Rich, ‘Appian, Polybius’, 66-67 
53 See Kathryn Welch, ‘Appian and the Roman History: a reappraisal’, in, Appian’s Roman History, Empire and Civil War, 
10 
54 Rich, ‘Appian, Polybius’, 68: “…there is no reason whatever why we should not conceive of Appian himself as capable 
both of reading Polybius and Dionysius as his primary sources and of using them with a good deal of freedom.” 
55 Richardson, Appian, 1 
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The next and final section of this chapter will be focused on a topic of central importance for this 
dissertation: the numbers offer to us by the sources, the matter of their overall reliability and how we are 
able to use them in order to have a better overall picture of the military activity of Rome – especially in 
terms of soldiers in service or casualties. 
 
One way to approach this question is through direct comparison of the numbers in different historians 
for the same event. The Second Punic War is probably the best testing since it is one of the few instances 
when we have multiple sources for single events. For the battle of Cannae, Polybius, Livy and Appian 
offer different figures for the strength of the Roman army before the battle, and also for casualties. 
Nevertheless, as we shall see, the numbers are broadly compatible. Here, we look at three other episodes 
of the Second Punic War: Metaurus (207), Ilpia (206) and Zama (202). 
 
For the battle of Metaurus: none of our sources mention the strength of the Roman army, while Appian 
indicates the size of the Punic army (48,000 infantrymen plus 8,000 cavalrymen).56 According to Livy 
the Roman and allied casualties were around 8,000 while 54,000 Carthaginians were killed and 5,400 
were captured.57 Polybius, on the other hand, says that the Carthaginians (and allies) lost no less than 
10,000 men while the Roman losses amounted to 2,000.58 While we might consider Livy’s bulletin on 
Carthaginian losses exaggerated, and prefer Polybius’ report simply on the grounds of a reluctance to 
accept the more dramatic statistic, such losses are not out of scale with  the catastrophic losses at Cannae 
and  Livy claims that the battle had an enormous resonance and importance: “At no time in that war were 
so many of the enemy killed in a single battle […], the Carthaginians seemed to have been repaid for 
Cannae with a disaster of equal magnitude.”59 Even Polybius writes: “When the news of the victory 
arrived in Rome, the people at first could not believe it […], then the whole city was plunged into 
transports of joy,” which is perhaps a surprising response to a battle in which 10,000 enemy were killed.60 
 
Furthermore, we have to consider Appian, whose figure of 56,000 is not far from Livy’s combined figure 
of 59,400. There is an obvious and unlikely relationship between the casualties suffered by the 
                                                 
56 Appian, VI. 8. 52 regarding the Roman forces at Metaurus simply says that consuls Salinator and Nero combined their 
forces before intercept Hasdrubal’s army, so we may estimate that their army was similar to the Carthaginians’ in terms of 
strength. 
57 Livy, XXVII. 49 
58 Polybius, XI. 3 
59 Livy, XXVII. 49 
60 Polybius, XI. 3 
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Carthaginian army (which one might think to be an estimate) and the number of prisons, which could 
have been based on a count. But there is no obvious way in which Appian’s figure could be derived from 
Livy. Polybius’s figure is the outlier and on historical grounds (the perceived importance of the battle) 
one might prefer the other figures. 
 
The next case is the battle of Ilpia of 206. Livy offers two different figures for the Carthaginian army and 
says: “On the number of mounted troops there is pretty much agreement amongst the sources; some, 
however, record a total of 70,000 infantry being brought to the city of Ilpia.”61 On the number of Roman 
soldiers under Scipio’s command, they are basically the same: 48,000 men according to Polybius, while 
Livy offers a total of 45,000 men (between citizens and allies – a distinction absent in Polybius’ 
chronicle).62 Polybius gives a total for the Punic army of 70,000 infantrymen, 4,000 cavalrymen and 32 
elephants. Appian’s record is different: while he mentions a major battle during this year, he says that it 
was fought at a place called Carmone. If we look at his account, however, there are strong similarities 
with Ilpia, especially in terms of scale, and his description of the Carthaginian army is basically the same 
of Polybius (75,000 men).63 Very different, however, is the strength of Scipio’s army: “That of Scipio 
was not one-third of the number…” suggesting that the Romans were 25,000 or less.64   
 
If we look at the reports of casualties, Livy says that only 6,000 Carthaginians survived the battle – 
meaning that Punic losses, between dead and prisoners, were between 48,500 and 68,500 –, offering the 
best sense of how important this victory was for Rome, and the disaster for Carthage.65 While Polybius’ 
figures for losses have been lost, he resumes his narration by saying: “…everyone congratulated Scipio 
on having driven the Carthaginians out of Spain…” highlighting the importance of the victory of Ilpia 
and its aftermath for the war.66 Appian, on the other hand, offers completely different casualties: 800 
Romans and 15,000 Carthaginians. Appian consistently uses the name Carmone instead of Ilpia – and 
we might postulate some confusion in the narrative. Of course, the coincidence of the numbers for the 
Carthaginian army does not mean that they are accurate, but merely suggests that they were working 
                                                 
61 Livy, XXVIII. 12 offers two figures for the Punic army: one of 54,500 men, and a second of 74,500 men. 
62 Polybius, XI. 20 and Livy, XXVIII. 13 
63 See Appian, VI. 5. 25: “Now this Hasdrubal collected all the remaining Carthaginian forces in Spain […]. The total strength 
of the enemy was 70,000 foot, 5,000 horse, and 36 elephants.” Polybius, XI. 20 
64 Appian, VI. 5. 25 
65 Livy, XXVIII. 16: “After that it was no longer a battle; it was more like animals being slaughtered […]. No force of any 
significance in terms of numbers or strength now remained.” 
66 Polybius, XI. 24a 
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from the same body of source material. The differences in Appian’s account suggests that we should at 
least be cautious even when our sources agree. 
 
Our final example, is the case of the battle of Zama (202). While none of the sources mention the strength 
of the Roman or Carthaginian armies before the battle, we can notice interesting similarities and 
differences on the casualties. 
 
Livy seems to clearly draw from Polybius on this occasion – both report the same losses. Appian offers 
a slightly different figure, and, perhaps for the first (and only) time, a more detailed account.67 He has a 
larger number of casualties (for the Romans – from the 1,500 suggested by Polybius and Livy to 2,500 
– and for the Carthaginians– from 20,000 to 25,000). Very unusually for him, he mentions the Numidians 
(and that their losses were higher than those of the Romans). Secondly, he discusses the number of 
prisoners: in his account only 8,500 Carthaginians were captured while both Polybius and Livy suggest 
around 20,000. Finally, he also mentions deserters, who are completely absent from both Polybius and 
Livy. 
 
Generally, Livy’s numbers seem detailed, and thus have a degree of plausibility. His reports of 
recruitment and numbers of casualties (mostly from the Second Punic War onwards) suggest a 
documentary and bureaucratic origin. It seems possible that Roman commanders reported the outcome 
of a battle, a list of casualties and a list of enemy killed and captured to the senate, and these figures were 
recorded. On the reliability of these numbers, Hammond suggests that the literary sources could have 
been close to reality.  
 
He looks at the case of the battle of Pydna (168) in which two Roman legions under the command of the 
consul L. Aemilius Paullus crushed the Macedonian army.68 According to Livy, Roman losses were 
fewer than 100 dead with more, although he does not say how many, wounded while 20,000 enemies 
                                                 
67 Livy, XXX. 35: “More than 20,000 of the Carthaginians and their allies lost their lives that day, and about the same number 
were taken prisoner […]. On the winning side there were about 1,500 casualties.” and Polybius, XV. 14: “The Romans lost 
over 1,500 men, but of the Carthaginians more than 20,000 were killed and almost as many were taken prisoner.” Also see 
Appian, VIII. 8. 48: “such was the result of the engagement between Hannibal and Scipio, who here met in combat for the 
first time. The Roman loss was 2,500 men, that of Masinissa still more. That of the enemy was 25,000 killed, and 8,500 taken 
prisoners. 300 Spaniards deserted to Scipio, and 800 Numidians to Masinissa.” 
68 Livy, XLIV. 38 doesn’t give the numbers of the Roman army, but says that they were outnumbered by the Macedonians, 
whose, according to Plutarch, Aemilius Paullus, 13 and Livy, XLII. 51, were of 40,000 infantrymen and 4,000 cavalry, the 
greatest Macedonian army ever deployed since Alexander the Great. 
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were killed and 11,000 were captured.69 Hammond reminds us that when their phalanx formation was 
broken apart, the individual Macedonian soldiers were exposed to the Romans’ weapons and fighting 
skills – very effective at close quarters – making plausible such a slaughter.70 Additionally, regarding 
Pydna – but we might expand this to ancient warfare in general –, Hammond states that “It is a mistake 
to dismiss the numbers as “incredible” or “propagandistic”. One should take into account the nature of 
the body-armor, the effectiveness of the weaponry and the advantage of men in formation over broken 
or fleeing opposition.”71 
 
The numbers in Livy are sufficiently varied that they cannot stand for “a lot” or “a few”. Polybius’ figures 
are often less precise than Livy, as with the account of the battle of Metaurus, though evidently he had 
some access to documentary material and does at times take pains to present detailed numerical material, 
even if not always very clearly, as in the discussion of Italian manpower in II. 24 which we will discuss 
in the recruitment section. This passage is difficult to reconcile with Polybius’s own description of the 
Roman army in Book VI, which suggests that the army continued to be composed of four legions annually 
when in 225 the Romans had more than four legions in the field. 
 
Appian’s figures should be used more carefully compared with those in Polybius and, in particular, Livy, 
as there is a general sense of vagueness in his numbers. Though there are a surprisingly high number of 
figures in his histories, he may sometimes have simplified numbers, being fond of certain numbers – 
6,000 in particular – when he is stating casualties. He used 6,000 as a standard number of soldiers per 
legion in the Roman army for the Late Republic. Casualties of 6,000, as, for example, when he says that 
Calpurnius Piso was defeated by the Lusitanians and lost 6,000 men, suggest the loss of a legion.72 
Finally, and most importantly, Appian barely mentions the allies. For the most part, when discussing 
soldiers, he simply says ΄Ρωµαίων (Romans), making it difficult for us understanding if he is talking 
about Roman citizens only, Romans and Italian allies, or Romans, Italians and auxiliaries. 
 
We can conclude this preliminary section of the thesis by saying that we are going to trust the sources, 
while always considering the margin of uncertainty that we have mentioned before. There are three main 
                                                 
69 Livy, XLIV. 42; Plutarch, Aemilius Paullus, 22 
70 Nicholas Hammond, ‘The Battle of Pydna’, in JHS 104 (1984), 39; also see Plutarch, Aemilius Paullus, 20 and his 
description on how the Roman soldiers overpowered the Macedonians in close-ranged combat. 
71 Hammond, ‘The Battle of Pydna’, 41 
72 See Appian, VI. 10. 56 on the beginning of the Lusitanian War (155) and the defeat of Calpurnius Piso. 
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reasons that, after having analyzed our main sources, should be highlighted, especially regarding 
Polybius and Livy: i) Their figures appear to be based on documents and archival material. The level 
precision occasionally showed when describing number of soldiers or casualties can only be achieved 
through access to government sources. Obviously we can argue about the level of precision of Roman 
data gathering – specifically in the case of the census figures, as we will see in much more detail later – 
but, after all, even nowadays we are far from having flawless data; ii) From the sparse occasions in which 
we were able to compare different sources regarding the same event, we can see that, when dissimilar, 
the figures they are offering are not conflicting with each other and offering completely dissimilar data 
(e.g. the case of Metaurus); iii) It seems evident that both Polybius and Livy clearly care about numbers 
and their precision (contrary to Appian). After all, there are cases when Livy openly criticizes other 
historians for giving wrong or unbelievable figures. 
 
For these reasons we are going to maintain a more positive attitude when analyzing the sources and the 
figures they are offering, distancing ourselves especially from Brunt and his model, clearly skeptical 
about the figures in the sources – Livy in particular.73 
  
                                                 
73 Tim Cornell, ‘Hannibal’s Legacy: the Effects of the Hannibalic War on Italy’, in eds. Cornell, T., Rankov, B., and Sabin, 
P., The Second Punic War, a Reappraisal (London 1996), 104 on Brunt’ skepticism on the sources. 
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Chapter 2 
ROMAN MILITARY PAY 
 
 
In this chapter it is my intention to examine the stipendium, the payment of the Roman soldiers from its 
origin and to highlight how it changed over the centuries. I start by analyzing the controversial 
introduction of the military stipendium. Extending my analysis, I will highlight the events that changed 
the stipendium after its introduction to the Punic Wars and, after these conflicts, I will concentrate on the 
Late Republic period, in particular on Caesar, who introduced the last modifications to military payment 
documented by the sources that will last until the reign of emperor Domitian. 
 
The origin of the Roman army dates back to the foundation of the city and the Regal Era, but there are 
many doubts on when it was decided to introduce a form of payment for the service of the soldiers. Both 
Livy and Diodorus, two of our main sources for this period, agreed that the stipendium, the military 
payment, was introduced during the siege of Veii (406 – 396).74 This date is generally accepted by 
modern historians – such as Parker, Keppie, Crawford, Cornell, Erdkamp and Sage – and it can be 
connected to the beginning of the gradual transformation of the army from a Greek-style hoplite army to 
the new manipular army. This new army required less expensive equipment and this allowed the Romans 
to recruit from a broader social base (we will explore the recruitment system in the next chapter).75 
 
Strictly connected with military pay is the introduction of coinage to Rome, but Roman coinage 
considerably post-dates 406. Our earliest source on how much Roman soldiers actually received is 
Polybius, but he describes a fully monetized system which cannot have been applied to early Rome. 
 
The production and the use of coinage in Italy had been mainly limited to the Greek poleis and their 
chorai in Magna Graecia since the sixth century. It is likely that bullions circulated prior to the 
                                                 
74 On the connection between the war against Veii and the introduction of military payment, see Livy, IV. 59-60; and Diodorus, 
XIV. 16, 5 and Plutarch, Camillus, II. 7 
75 Henry Parker, The Roman Legions (Oxford, 1928), 11; Lawrence Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, from Republic 
to Empire (London, 1984), 18; Crawford, Coinage and Money, 21-24; Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 187; John Rich, 
‘Warfare and the Army in the Early Republic’, in ed. Erdkamp, P., A Companion to the Roman Army (Malden, 2007), 18; 
Michael Sage, The Republican Roman Army, a Sourcebook (New York, 2008), 139 
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introduction of coinage in various parts of Italy; it required a trust in the purity of the metal, a set of 
scales, and a relatively standardized system of weights. In archaic and early classical Etruria, for example, 
the main form of mobile wealth was uncoined copper. Coinage, as a form to measure value, store wealth 
or facilitate exchange, is a more sophisticated tool in comparison to bullion; it is also a simpler way to 
allow the circulation of precious metals. Furthermore, coinage represents authority, as its weight was 
regulated, and had a design stamped on one side or both. The stamp on a coin indicated that the issuing 
authority, normally a state or its representative(s), would accept it as the legal equivalent of some value 
previously expressed in terms of other objects, including metal by weight. This remained a Greek 
phenomenon until areas of Italy like Etruria, Latium and their neighbours (Umbria, Picenum and the 
Oscan areas) began to produce their own coinage, but not earlier than the end of the fourth century.76 
Furthermore, it was only as a result of the Roman conquest of Italy that many communities began to mint 
coins while existing mints continued to operate, but under Roman influence.77 
 
Therefore, regarding the stipendium, various alternatives have been offered: Sage suggests that payment 
could have been given in kind; Rich suggests that soldiers received weighed bronze which would seem 
an obvious explanation of the use of the word ‘stipendium’ for military payment.78 This system 
presumably depended on a weight of bronze being offered for a term service and there may or may not 
have been a fixed daily rate in the earliest period. Such a system required very limited institutional and 
technological expertise and could fulfil many of the exchange requirements for the Roman state and 
people. As the demands on the Roman state expanded, however, with the expansion of military 
operations in the second half of the fourth century, the system probably started to seem cumbersome and 
probably open to dispute and thus in need of reform.79 
 
It is likely that bullion circulated in Latium before coinage was adopted. Crawford describes Rome as a 
state without a coinage, but, as he adds, ‘a state without coinage is not a state without money’.80 The 
sources normally attribute the introduction of coinage to the Regal Era. Pliny is probably the most 
interesting: he states that the beginning of the production of bronze coinage started with king Servius 
                                                 
76 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 1 
77 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 3 suggests that coinage in Etruria really began to spread during the third century, after most 
of its territory was occupied by the Romans 
78 Sage, Republican Roman Army, 139; Rich, ‘Warfare and the Army’, 18 
79 See Rich, ‘Warfare and the Army’, 18 
80 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 17 
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Tullius, and that, before him, the Romans accumulated masses of bronze without measuring it.81 Roman 
tradition associates much of the major political development of the regal period to Servius Tullius.82 
Varro claims that Servius Tullius introduced silver coinage to Rome and that the introduction of coinage 
dated back to Numa Pompilius, the second king of Rome.83 Livy seems to assume coinage in the 
campaign against Pometia (502), when the Romans auctioned their war prisoners.84 Also, he tells that in 
475, after a war against Veii, grain was imported from Campania and he mentions that T. Menenius was 
fined 2,000 asses.85 The version of the Twelve Table of 450 transmitted to us, mostly through later 
sources, mentions a pecuniary penalty for the punishment of the crime of iniura, the infliction of 
injuries.86 People guilty of crimes such as the breaking of a limb (membrum ruptum) or the fracture of a 
bone (os fractum) had to pay a penalty of 300 asses if the victim was a free man or 150 asses if the victim 
was a slave.87 Gaius adds that for any other iniuriae – like blows such as do not result in serious injury – 
the penalty was of 25 asses.88 However, Festus attests that the word asses did not appear in the text of 
the Twelve Tables and it seems likely that Gaius, writing in the late first century AD, or some of the 
sources on which he relied interpolated the term into their accounts.89 These references suggest that 
ancient historians of early Rome found it difficult to conceive of a relatively complex state which did not 
have money. There is an accumulation of evidence (slight though it is) for Rome having some sort of 
monetary system by the mid-fifth century probably based on copper bullion. 
 
The introduction of payment for military service at the end of the late fifth century did not necessitate 
the introduction of coinage. The payment system was probably rudimentary and dealt with quite small 
sums of bullion. Rome fought mainly short, local campaigns, but with the long campaigns against the 
Samnites, the demands on the soldiers and the state increased. It was probably as a result of the increased 
                                                 
81 Pliny, NH, XXXIII. 42-44: “King Servius was the first to stamp a design on bronze; previously, according to Timaeus, at 
Rome they used raw metal.” 
82 Livy, I. 41 says Servius Tullius became king after the death of his predecessor Tarquinius Priscus. Livy, Per., 1-2 states that 
Servius was killed after forty-five years and Tarquinius Superbus took his place, and ruled for twenty-five years until he was 
overthrown in 509 by a group of aristocrats led by Brutus. Taking the foundation of the Republic as main reference, Servius 
Tullius became king in 579 and died in 534, but, as we said, there is a heavily fictional element in the sources regarding this 
period of Roman history. 
83 See Crawford, Coinage and Money, 18; however, Pliny, NH, XXXIII. 42 says: “The Roman nation did not even use a 
stamped silver coinage before the conquest of King Pyrrhus.” 
84 Livy, II. 17 
85 Livy, II. 52 
86 Gaius, Institutiones, III. 223-225 
87 Herbert Jolowicz, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (Cambridge, 1932), 174 
88 Gaius, III. 223 
89 Michael Crawford, Roman Statutes vol.2, in Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies (1996), 606 
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level of payments (though not necessarily the rates paid to the soldiers) that the state required the 
introduction of regular coined bullion. It is also possible that with increased economic contact with 
monetarized societies, such as the Etrurians and the Greeks of Campania, the advantages of coined money 
were more apparent. 
 
From the late fourth century, Rome started to mint its own coinage. Crawford writes: “…the earliest 
Roman coinage consists of silver and token bronze fractions on the Greek model and cast bronze coins 
based on an as or unit weighing a Roman pound or thereabouts.”90 Cornell suggests that these early coins 
were not even minted at Rome, but at Naples after the treaty between the two cities of 326.91 Pliny, on 
the other hand, dates the introduction of silver coinage to 269, though it is likely that he is talking about 
the didrachms, rather than the denarius.92 
 
The introduction of military pay c. 406 is likely to be associated with a thorough reorganization of the 
Roman army and the recruitment system. The stipendium was intended as a form of compensation. It 
made it possible for poorer citizens to remain in the army for longer periods. It allowed the state to 
mobilize greater numbers of its citizens for military service. The association of the stipendium with the 
war with Veii makes sense since the war supposedly placed Rome under heavy military pressure and the 
need to increase manpower was imperative. The war with Veii was just the first of a long series of 
conflicts fought by the Republic: it was soon followed by the Gallic invasion, more campaigns in Latium, 
and in Campania. 
 
The recruitment system is closely associated with the census which introduction is usually attributed by 
the sources to Servius Tullius. It seems likely that later Romans could not imagine a developed city state 
without a census system and consequently the census was attracted to the regal period and to the 
establishing of a constitutional system by Servius Tullius. 
 
                                                 
90 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 28 
91 Also see Cornell, Beginnings of Rome, 394 
92 Pliny, NH, XXXIII. 44: “Silver was first coined in the 485th year of the city, in the consulship of Quintus Ogulnius and 
Gaius Fabius, five years before the First Punic War. It was decided that the value of a denarius should be worth ten pounds 
of bronze, that of a half-denarius five pounds, that of a sesterce two pounds and a half. The weight of a standard pound of 
bronze was however reduced during the First Punic War, when the state could not meet its expenditure, and it was enacted 
that the as should be struck weighing two ounces.” 
37 
 
The Servian system divided the Roman citizens into classes according to their wealth. It further divided 
the citizenry into smaller groups called centuries and then subdivided these by age into iuniores (between 
17 and 45) and seniores (between 45 and 60).93 The main purpose of this reform was to organize the 
population for war. The logic of the timocratic division was to ensure that the citizens could arm and 
equip themselves at their own expense. The iuniores probably formed the core of the army that fought 
on the front while the seniores were a sort of reserve that defended the city in case of emergency.  
 
According to Livy and Dionysius, the hierarchy of the Roman classes can be summarized in the following 
way: 
 
CLASS PROPERTY RATING (in asses) 
1st 100,000 
2nd 75,000 
3rd 50,000 
4th 25,000 
5th 11,000 (Livy) / 12,500 (Dion.) 
 
It is generally agreed that this system was not introduced by Servius Tullius.94 Cornell suggests that the 
introduction of the five classes should be linked to the introduction of military payment and in particular 
with the introduction of taxation to meet the wage bill: 
 
“Is it possible to date this reform? The most probably answer is 
that it occurred at the end of the fifth century, and that it is 
connected with an innovation recorded by Livy under the year 
406 BC. That was when the Roman state first began to pay wages 
to its soldiers, to compensate them for loss of income during 
prolonged campaigns, and it was then that the tributum was first 
imposed.”95 
 
Previously, the Roman state probably needed to know how many men it had capable of bearing arms and 
of equipping themselves so to do. It is possible that there was some form of early census, but the earliest 
figure in the sources, the 80,000 male citizens reported from Fabius Pictor by Livy, is difficult to believe 
                                                 
93 Livy, I. 42-43; Dionysius, IV. 16-18 
94 Cornell, Beginnings of Rome, 180 
95 Cornell, Beginnings of Rome, 187 
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(although Coarelli suggests to be not too hasty in ignoring it).96 For the earliest army (presumed to be a 
hoplite force), there was no need for the complexities of the Servian system. But the introduction of 
military pay and a probable reorganization of the army (see below) it seems likely that the proportion of 
the citizenry on which the military could draw would be increased. Consequently, the state needed a finer 
division of the citizenry. It is also likely that taxation required more detailed information and division of 
the citizen body into broad wealth bands. For such reasons, it seems likely that the Servian system related 
closely to the reforms of c. 406 BC.  
 
This seems to be the view of most historians and the tributum does seem to be linked closely to military 
adventures.97 Crawford argues that taxation in Rome began with the introduction of pay.98 Cornell links 
taxation to the census.99 According to Peter Brunt ‘the annalists suggest that the burden of conscription 
was augmented by the simultaneous levy of taxes’.100 Livy suggests that those citizens who were not in 
the army were liable to pay the tributum.101 Nicolet, however, suggests that stipendium and tributum 
were incompatible since it is unreasonable to pay the soldiers from the tax levied on their families. Yet, 
if the tributum was an alternative to service, it would reflect the general obligation on all men to serve, 
and a reform whereby some paid money rather than serving themselves. 
 
After the Pyrrhic War and the fall of Tarentum (272), Rome became the undisputed ruler of peninsular 
Italy; by this time Carthage, the powerful merchant city on the Bay of Tunis, was the only other major 
power left in Western Mediterranean. Roman military ascendency in the West was assured by the battle 
of Zama in 202. The fiscal strains of the Second Punic War led to reform of coinage in Italy: Crawford 
                                                 
96 Livy, I. 44; see Filippo Coarelli, ‘Demografia e Territorio’, in eds. A. Momigliano, A. Schiavone, Storia di Roma vol. I 
(Torino, 1988), 318-319 and 322-323 
97 On the introduction of the tributum see Varro, On the Latin Language, V. 181 and Dionysius, IV. 19, 1 – 4, however, this 
passage by Dionysius is anachronistic at least because it dates the introduction of the military pay to the sixth century. 
98 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 21 
99 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 187 
100 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 641 
101 Livy, V. 10: “But the increase in the number of soldiers necessitated an increase in expenditure to pay them. Tribute was 
being collected for this purpose, but those remaining at home proved unwilling contributors, since in defending the city they 
had to discharge obligations both to the military and to the state. […] the senators had instituted military pay so that they 
might crush some of the plebs by military service, the rest by taxation.” Claude Nicolet, Tributum: Recherches sur la Fiscalité 
Directe sous la Republique Romaine (Bonn, 1976), 33: “Cela confirme ce que nous avons dit: les mobilisés, ceux qui ont été 
choisis dans le dilectus, et qui vont recevoir le solde, ne payent pas. Solde et tributum sont, dans un sens, incompatibles.”; 
Nathan Rosenstein, Rome at War (2004), 54: “More important, the tributum was a kind of transfer payment owed by those 
assidui who did not serve to those who did.” 
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writes that ‘the complete collapse of the Roman monetary system was followed by the creation ex novo 
of the denarius system, which lasted with minor modifications until the third century AD’.102 
 
Military payment per se was not altered however and was almost certainly organized as described by 
Polybius (see below).103 The Republic faced several financial vicissitudes and the spread and confusion 
of coinage made the situation more complicated for Rome. In 215 the tributum was imposed twice by 
the senate, and, at the same time, the soldiers in service in Spain had to find a way to seize money from 
the Spaniards to maintain the army and its operations.104 Over the next years, as an emergency procedure, 
it was decided that wealthy individuals should assist the state in the payment of the stipendium of the 
sailors of the fleet.105 
 
With the surrender of Carthage, Rome was left as the only major power in the Western Mediterranean. 
Subsequently, Rome extended her power eastwards, bringing vast wealth and territory to the Roman 
state.106 As a consequence, the denarius became the most important silver coin in the entire 
Mediterranean.107 Nevertheless, bronze coinage continued to be important. Most of the hoards from the 
Late Republic are late third- or early second-century asses suggesting that the first half of the second 
century saw a peak in bronze production, almost certainly for military pay.108 In 157, the exploitation of 
the silver mines of Macedonia allowed the production of large quantities of silver coinage. This was 
followed by the retariffing of the ratio between as and denarius to 16:1 instead of the previous 10:1 as 
recorded by Pliny.109 
 
The new wave of silver coinage also influenced military pay. At some point, the soldiers started to receive 
their stipendia in denarii, though it was still computed in asses. Pliny, NH, XXXIII. 46, notes that even after 
the change in the denarius ‘in the pay of soldiers one denarius has always been given for ten asses’.110 This 
                                                 
102 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 57-58 
103 See Polybius, VI. 39 
104 On the double taxation, see Livy, XXIII.  31; Livy, XXIII. 48 reports the letter of the Scipios regarding the difficulties in 
Spain in terms of payment and supplies. 
105 Livy, XXIV. 11 
106 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 84 
107 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 144; 53-55shows that the legend ROMA begun to disappear from the denarii from 179 
onwards: ‘The coinage of the ruling power no longer needed to be identified’. 
108 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 72 and 260-261 
109 Pliny, NH, XXXIII. 45: “…it was enacted that the exchange-value of the denarius should be sixteen asses, of the half-
denarius eight and of the quarter-denarius four; by this measure the state made a clear gain of one half.” 
110 Pliny, NH, XXXIII. 46 
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rather odd regulation shielded soldiers from the consequences of the changed tariff. It suggests that at 
the point of change the soldiers were already being paid in denarii and consequently the changed tariff 
had the potential to considerably reduce military pay. It further suggests that the daily rate (in asses) was 
such as to allow an annual rate to be paid in an exact number of denarii. According to both Tacitus and 
Suetonius, the stipendium was still computed in asses during the age of Tiberius and Domitian.111 Pliny, 
however, never mentions how much Roman soldiers were actually paid. For this, we have to rely on the 
problematic and much discussed description offered by Polybius for the third or second century: 
 
“For his pay the infantryman receives two obols a day, the 
centurion twice this amount, and the cavalryman a drachma. An 
infantryman’s grain allowance is about two-third of an Attic 
medimnus of wheat per month, and a cavalryman’s seven 
medimni of barley and two of wheat. An allied infantryman 
receives the same as his Roman counterpart, while an allied 
cavalryman’s ration is one and a third medimni of wheat and five 
of barley. These rations are provided free to the allies, but in the 
case of Roman troops the quaestor deducts from their pay the 
cost, at the stipulated rate, of their grain, clothing and any 
additional weaponry they may need.”112 
 
As agreed by most historians, we have to assume from this passage that Polybius assumes that the Roman 
denarius (of 10 asses) had the same value of the drachma.113 However, an element of discussion 
regarding this passage has been what type of drachma Polybius is referring to, due to the different ratios 
when compared with the Roman denarius. Mattingly, for example, argued that Polybius was talking in 
terms of Aeginetic drachmae, the currency used by the Achaean League.114 
 
An Aeginetic drachma weighted 6.3 grams against the 4.5 of a Roman denarius (meaning that this 
drachma was equal to one denarius and a quarter), plus, Mattingly suggests that 2 obols were equal to 4 
libral asses, we could translate Polybius’ figures as in the following table. 
 
 
                                                 
111 Tacitus, The Annals, I. 17 specifically says that the pay of the soldiers during the Julio-Claudian period was ten asses a 
day: “Indeed a soldier’s life was hard and unrewarding, he said. Body and soul, he was worth ten asses a day…”; Suetonius, 
Domitian, 7 
112 Polybius, VI .39 
113 George Watson, ‘The Pay of the Roman Army, the Republic’, in Historia 7 (1958), 113; Crawford, Coinage and Money, 
146 
114 Harold Mattingly, ‘The Property Qualifications of the Roman Classes’, in JRS 27 (1937), 102 
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Category Payment in Greek currency Payment in Roman currency 
Infantryman 2 obols per day 4 asses per day 
Centurion 4 obols per day 8 asses per day 
Cavalryman 1 drachma per day 12 asses per day 
 
These figures are, however, criticized by Watson, who suggests that the ratio of 2 obols = 4 libral asses 
was retariffed to 2 obols = 5 sextantal asses.115 Thus the fraction of the denarius would be simplified to 
5, 10 and 15 asses (0.5, 1 and 1.5) suggesting the following pay for the army: 
 
Category Payment in Greek currency Payment in Roman currency 
Infantryman 2 obols per day 5 asses per day 
Centurion 4 obols per day 10 asses per day 
Cavalryman 1 drachma per day 15 asses per day 
 
Such complex models work on the perhaps unlikely possibility that Polybius was using Achaean currency 
rather than the more standardized Attic drachma.116 Crawford simplifies this matter by highlighting the 
conventional equivalence between the Attic drachma and the Roman denarius.117 As 2 obols are one third 
of a drachma, we should apply the same process the its Roman counterpart, thus that soldiers received 
one third of a denarius per day, so 3 asses.118 
 
Category Payment in Greek currency Payment in Roman currency 
Infantryman 2 obols per day 3 asses per day 
Centurion 4 obols per day 6 asses per day 
Cavalryman 1 drachma per day 9 asses per day 
 
The first variation mentioned by the sources is that of Caesar who, according to Suetonius, doubled the 
stipendium of the soldiers.119 Tacitus’ reports that one of the demands of the mutineers of AD 14 was a 
stipendium of one denarius per day instead of ten asses. This produces an annual rate of 225 denarii per 
year.120 At some point, pay must have moved from a 10:1 as to denarius ratio to the normal 16:1, but this 
                                                 
115 Watson, ‘The Pay of the Roman Army’, 114 
116 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 146 
117 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 147: “I continue in the meanwhile to regard a third of a denarius as what Polybius meant.” 
118 Also See Dominic Rathbone, ‘The Census Qualification of the assidui and the prima classis’, in eds. H. Sancisi-
Weerdenburg, R. J. Van der Spek, H. C. Teitler, H. T. Wallinga, De Agricultura, in Memoriam Pieter Willem de Neeve 
(Amsterdam, 1993), 151-152 
119 Suetonius, Julius Caesar, 26: “Legionibus stipendium in perpetuum duplicavit.” 
120 Tacitus, Annales, I. 17; also see Richard Alston, ‘Roman Military Pay from Caesar to Diocletian’, JRS 84 (1994), 114 
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can only have happened at the moment of a pay increase (that is under Caesar).121 It seems likely that 
Caesar’s reform not only tripled the daily rate, but it also standardized the payment, as it established the 
standard imperial system of 3 stipendia (of 75 denarii) per year. The effect was move annual pay from 
108 denarii to 225 denarii, a complex reform that Suetonius can be forgiven as simplifying as 
‘duplicavit’.122 
 
There are contrary views: Mattingly suggests that the revaluation might be dated to the age of the Gracchi, 
and even to Gaius Gracchus’ tribunate (123); Crawford dates it earlier to the 140s when the mark XVI 
started to appear on the denarii.123 The reform could be linked to Gaius Gracchus’ lex militaria.124 This 
law provided soldiers clothing free of charge from the state, which might have allowed some recoup of 
costs. Nevertheless, moving the 3 asses per day to the 16:1 ratio would have entailed a politically 
unpopular reduction of annual pay to 67.5 denarii. On 4 asses per day, the annual pay would be the more 
comfortable 90 denarii. On the lower rate, we would need to assume a failure of Suetonius’ arithmetic. 
The higher rate does not translate neatly into the known Caesarian rate either. 
 
Up until now we have discussed and analyzed the payment of Roman soldiers, but Roman armies were 
also made by contingents of allied troops recruited among the Latin and Italian communities. Polybius 
is the only source who actually mentions remuneration of the allies, which was in terms only of 
supplies.125 This strongly suggests that Rome did not pay these troops and any payment they did receive 
would have been from their home communities.126 It is possible that ‘the Roman model’ was adopted, 
which would be an incentive for various communities to mint coins on the Roman weights.127 Of course, 
the role of the allies in the Roman army, and their payment, changed after the Social War.128 
 
* The stipendium and the economy 
                                                 
121 Pliny, NH, XXXIII. 45 
122 Alston, ‘Roman Military Pay’, 114 
123 Harold Mattingly, ‘The Retariffing of the Denarius at Sixteen Asses’, in Numismatic Chronicle (1934), 86-90; Crawford, 
Coinage and Money, 144-145 
124 Plutarch, Gaius Gracchus, 5 
125 Polybius, VI. 39: “An allied infantryman receives the same as his Roman counterpart, while an allied cavalryman’s ration 
is one and a third medimni of wheat and five of barley. These rations are provided free to the allies…” 
126 Livy, XXVII. 9, on the occasion of the twelve colonies that refused to support the military need of the Republic during the 
Second Punic War in 209, says: “…for they had neither soldiers for conscription, not money to be given as soldiers’ pay.”; 
also see Claude Nicolet, Le Stipendium des Allies Italiens, in Papers of the British School at Rome vol. XLVI (1978), 2-3 
127 Livy, VIII. 8 states that, by the time of the Latin War, the Latins fought in maniples just like the Romans. 
128 See Crawford, Coinage and Money, 187 
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It is likely that the introduction of military pay in Rome had fiscal and economic consequences. Most 
obviously, the state needed to meet the costs of pay; paying for the soldiers likely became the main 
expense for the Republic. It may have encouraged Roman generals to seek cash from conquered 
communities in part to meet the pay bill. Further, the administrative requirements of providing significant 
bullion to large numbers of soldiers led Rome to finally adopt coinage, centuries after its introduction 
into Italy. The distribution of a simple means of exchange would have had economic effects, easing trade 
and exchange in ways which allowed the development of economic complexity.129 It is likely that the 
stipendium was set at a very low level, compensating soldiers for their time in service and perhaps 
rewarding them at a level above subsistence. The stipendium was the most basic benefit offered by the 
army to the potential recruits, perhaps alluring to the poor or very poor. If soldiers were to accumulate 
wealth from service, it would come through booty or through land. It was this last which had potentially 
the most significant potential for improving the lot of the Roman poor. Colonisation, of course, depended 
on victory. This is an issue to which we shall return towards the end of the thesis.  
 
The macro-effects of military payment depend largely on the numbers of soldiers recruited (both in 
relative and absolute terms). It is this issue that we now turn. 
  
                                                 
129 See Paul Erdkamp, The Roman Army and the Economy (Amsterdam, 2002), 7-8 
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Chapter 3 
THE RECRUITMENT SYSTEM OF THE ROMN ARMY 
Part 1: from the origins to the third century 
 
 
In this chapter of my dissertation, it is my intention to analyze the recruitment system of the Roman 
army, how it was organized until the third century BC and the period immediately before the Second 
Punic War and finally, to try to understand the extent of the burden on Roman citizens. 
 
In order to do this, I will examine the constant changes in the structure of the Roman army, focusing on 
the recruitment process, from its earliest days. At first, the Roman army was a force organised around 
the tribes and it was progressively transformed into a civic army especially after the reforms attributed 
to Servius Tullius. Those reforms introduced a hoplite organisation, drastically changing the army and 
the political ordering of the entire of Roman society. The siege of Veii and the Gallic invasion, appear to 
have triggered a further series of changes that led to the progressive abandonment of hoplite warfare and 
the introduction of the manipular system which required a completely different recruitment system. 
 
In the second part of the chapter, I focus on an estimate of the actual Roman military manpower and 
relate that to population levels using mainly primary sources, especially the census figures and other 
literary evidence, but also some estimates of population drawn from the capacity of the territory in order 
to understand the burden of military service on Roman citizens and what proportion were actually 
recruited in the army. In order to do this, we will also briefly examine the actual census practice by 
looking at how it was planned, how was included – the matter of assidui and proletarii, but also the 
position of the freedmen. This is key information for assessing the economic importance of military 
service in the third century BC. 
 
The third section of this chapter analyzes the passage of Polybius on Roman military organization 
focusing on recruitment in order to understand how it worked. Polybius provides us with one of the best 
descriptions of the army during the Republic. I also analyze the recruitment system for the allies and 
conclude this part with a discussion on the much debated passage Polybius, II. 24 regarding the 
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manpower of Rome and its allies in the late third century. I argue that this passage is a useful beginning 
from which to calculate manpower on the verge of the Hannibalic War. 
 
The final part of this chapter will be briefly focused on the ratio between Romans and allies in the army. 
 
* The army of the monarchy and the Early Republic 
 
In the earliest days of the regal era – eighth, seventh century –, the Roman army was probably little 
different from those of the other communities in Latium. Calling these forces “armies” is possibly to give 
them a greater sophistication that they deserve since, as suggested by Keppie, they were probably more 
like armed bands of a few hundred men raiding their neighbours’ territory.130 
 
All the armies in ancient Latium were influenced in their equipment and tactics by their more powerful 
northern neighbours: the Etruscans, the dominant force in central Italy at the time.131 According to literary 
tradition, in which we can place very little value, from the reign of Tullus Hostilius the Romans tried to 
assert their supremacy over the other Latin communities. We may suppose that conflicts occurred most 
years and that the military situation, as well as political organisation, was fluid. Tradition suggests that 
war was a regular – annual – occurrence for the Romans: rituals were held in March, at the beginning of 
the campaign season, and in October, to celebrate its end. These wars were not necessarily a means of 
expansion (and we may wonder whether these early cities had the political sophistication to control 
extended territories), but for seventh and sixth century Rome, wars were probably one of the more 
important – though not only – source of moveable wealth: Livy, Dionysius and Cicero suggest that the 
great temple on the Capitol was built thanks to the spoils from the capture of Pometia, later known as 
Satricum.132 
 
The army of the regal period was supposedly, according to our much later sources, organized around the 
three tribes – the Ramnes, the Tities and the Luceres133 – and divided into thirty smaller units called 
                                                 
130 Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, 14 
131 Livy, I. 8 says that the Romans adopted many customs from the Etruscans, so we can suppose that also the army was 
influenced by them. 
132 Livy, I. 53; Dionysius, IV. 50. 4 and Cicero, Rep., II. 44 
133 It is commonly believed that the three tribes represented the three major ethnic groups who formed the population of early 
Rome (Romans, Sabines and Etruscans), however, Tim Cornell, ‘Ethnicity as a factor in early Roman History’, in eds. Cornell, 
T. and Lomas, K., Gender and Ethnicity in ancient Italy (London, 1997), 15-17 casts doubts on the importance attributed to 
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curiae, ten to each tribe. Each of the curiae supplied the army with a centuria, a force of 100 men for a 
total of 1,000 for tribe under the command of a tribunus, a tribal officer.134 The whole strength of the 
army was of 3,000 infantry soldiers who formed the legio – levy or levying – while the aristocrats formed 
a force of 300 equites, knights. Finally, the troops were recruited only among male citizens who had 
sufficient means to equip themselves for service. It was, it seems, a relatively aristocratic army, probably 
drawn from a fairly small proportion of the Roman male population. 
 
Varro suggests that Roman territory was divided among Romans, Sabines and Etruscans, the groups who 
formed Rome’s population, but it seems unlikely that Rome, and especially the army, was organised on 
ethnic lines.135 Cornell says that: “The idea that three different ethnic groups each formed ten curiae, and 
that the army consisted of equal units of Romans, Sabines and Etruscans is absurd”136. There is no 
discernible trace of ethnic division in the accounts of the early empire. The tribal organization of the 
early army, if not entirely mythical, is likely to reflect an early civic structure in which the population 
was divided into three units. There is, however, a trace of possibly an alternative or even an earlier mode 
of military organization in the account of the Fabii and their role at the battle of Cremera of 475.137 
 
This episode, almost certainly embellished by Roman historians and perhaps even invented by a later 
pro-Fabii writer, is confusing in military terms because it seems completely out of place: at the time of 
the episode of the Cremera, perhaps around the 470s, the Roman army should have been already reformed 
by the Servian constitution, but the action of the Fabii appear more like an event from the archaic period, 
reflecting “heroic” warfare in which one can imagine raising a band of aristocrats and their retainers. 
 
The gentes (clans) were certainly important in the early Roman society, as suggested by Smith, although 
the sources are not clear on the nature of these gentes.138 They are mentioned in the Twelve Tables, where 
                                                 
ethnicity by modern scholars. Also see Guy Bradley, ‘Tribes, States and Cities in Central Italy’, in eds. Herring, E., and 
Lomas, K., The Emergence of State Identities in Italy in the first millennium BC (London, 2000), 117 
134 Livy, I. 13 and Dionysius, II. 7 
135 Varro, LL., V. 55; he also says that the names of the tribes are Etruscan words that suggests the strong Etruscan influence 
over archaic Rome. 
136 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 115 
137 Livy, II. 50, Dionysius, IX. 15 and Diodorus, 11. 53. 6; also see James Richardson, The Fabii and the Gauls (Stuttgart, 
2012), 81-83 
138 Cristopher J. Smith, Early Rome and Latium, Economy and Society c.1000 to 500 BC, (Oxford, 1996), 189; on the gentes 
and their role in Roman society see Nicola Terrenato, ‘The Clans and the Peasants: reflections on social structure and change 
in Hellenistic central Italy’, in eds. van Dommelen, P. and Terrenato, N., Articulating Local Cultures: power and identity 
under the expanding Roman Republic (Portsmouth, Rhode Island, 2007), 16-21 
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they are not an extended familia since there is no pater in a gens. It seems possible that in archaic central 
Italy, two ways of organising military forces co-existed: one around aristocratic warlords and one around 
city organisation. Although it is commonly assumed that these methods of organizing an army were not 
contemporary and the evidence from central Italy would seem to point to the war-band being a more 
archaic form of military organisation there seems little reason why such military bands could not be a 
latent social and military organization even once a civic tribal system was in place. The example of the 
Fabii might suggest that such war-bands could co-exist, to some extent, with city (tribally organised) 
armies. 
 
Such a dual organisation would reflect the power of certain aristocratic gentes in the early Republican 
period, for which we find evidence both in the dominance exercised by the Fabii over the consular lists 
and in the late regal and early Republican evidence for warlords who could extend their influence over a 
number of cities and territories.139 Aristocratic warlords, accompanied by armed followers – called 
clientes (clients) or sodales (companions) –, were important figures of the societies of archaic central 
Italy.140 There are cases of these warlords also among the Romans: the Lapis Satricanus, an inscription 
dated around 500 from Satricum, is dedicated to Mamars by the sodales of Popilius Valesios. Mamars is 
an archaic form of Mars and that Popilius Valesios is the archaic form of Puplius Valerius, possibly 
Publicola, one of the founders of the Republic.141 It is interesting that these men identified themselves 
not as citizens, but as companions (retainers) of a single leader. Many of the conflicts occurred between 
the Romans and their neighbors, especially in the regal era, were probably mainly raids and reprisals, 
and one can imagine an uneasy co-existence of private and state warfare. 
 
The case of the Fabii could therefore have a kernel of truth, though undoubtedly Roman tradition 
transformed the story into a sort of epic. Rome and Veii, at the time, were associated with numerous wars 
and the episode of the Cremera would appear to be a battle in a sequence of legends and stories and 
possible historical events. Diodorus 11.5.3 clearly found the legend difficult to incorporate into his 
understanding of early Roman history and rationalized the event as a regular battle (fought between civic 
armies), in which the Fabii, for some reason, suffered heavy losses, though such a conclusion would in 
itself presuppose that the gentes formed a distinctive element of the army. The episode of the Fabii may, 
                                                 
139 See Nicola Terrenato, ‘The Versatile Clans: archaic Rome and the nature of early city-states in Central Italy’, in eds. 
Terrenato, N. and Haggis, D., C., State Formation in Italy and Greece (Oxford, 2011), 241-243 
140 Howard Scullard, The Etruscan Cities and Rome (London, 1967), fig.100, 222 
141 Rich, ‘Warfare and the Army’, 15 
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therefore, represent a memory or myth of how warfare had been conducted, even though at the time of 
its historical setting it was already an archaism.142 
 
We thus have two poorly attested possible organizational structures for the early Roman army, one 
associated with gentes and the other with the three tribes. The traditions of early Roman history provide 
evidence for a third system developing within the late regal period with the reforms of Servius Tullius. 
This monarch was, of course, associated with many of the civic reforms and traditions of the early Roman 
state and it is thus natural that the establishing of a civic army would be attracted to his reign. The so-
called ‘Servian constitution’ introduced the census as a means to order the population on the basis of 
wealth and had a strong military character: the class division determined the recruitment system and what 
kind of military equipment a citizen would provide in time of war. 
 
In military terms, the Servian reforms would appear to have corresponded with the adoption of hoplite 
warfare by the Romans. The connection between the introduction of timocratic divisions and citizen 
registration is familiar from the early poleis of Greece. Rich suggests that the characteristic hoplite 
panoply, and, as consequence, the close formation fighting style (phalanx) were imported to Central Italy 
from Greece by the Etruscans.143 It is not clear when it spread among the Romans, but, by looking at 
Diodorus, we might suggest that the Romans adopted this type of warfare from the Etruscans in order to 
fight them on equal terms.144 Therefore, it is plausible that hoplite warfare in Latium was introduced 
around the same time or soon after its introduction in Etruria. 
 
In the 1930s, Fraccaro observed that the structure of the legion corresponded to that of the centuriate 
assembly and focusing on Livy’s and Dionysius’ description of the census, he postulated a recruitment 
model for the Servian period.145 In Fraccaro’s view, the legion was formed by sixty centuries of heavy 
infantry of iuniores raised from the first three classes (class I: 40 centuries, class II: 10 centuries, class 
III: 10 centuries), and twenty five centuries of light-armed infantrymen raised from the two last classes 
of citizens (10 centuries from class IV and 15 from class V). The Roman legion as described by Fraccaro 
was thus composed by 3,000 heavy-armed infantrymen supported by 1,200 light-armed troops called 
                                                 
142 Christopher Smith, The Roman Clan, 291-295 on the episode of the Fabii. 
143 Rich, ‘Warfare and the Army’, 17 
144 Rich, ‘Warfare and the Army’, 17; Diodorus XXIII, 2: “The Etruscans, who fought with round shields of bronze and in a 
phalanx formation, compelled the Romans to adopt similar arms…” 
145 Plinio Fraccaro, ‘Ancora sull’Età dell’Ordinamento Centuriato’, in  Athenaeum 12 (1934), 57-58 
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velites for a total of 4,200 men – the normal force of a legion according to Polybius.146 Additionally, the 
Roman army of the Republic was always formed by more than one legion: the two legions of 4,200 men 
described by Polybius would seem to be (according to Fraccaro) the result of the division of a single 
legion of 6,000 men and 2,400 velites into two halves when the Romans started to elect two consuls 
instead of a king. 
 
Yet, although it seems possible that the Servian centuriate assembly, as a division of men of military age 
into units that was reproduced in the structure of the army, was introduced during the monarchy and 
before the creation of the consulate, as already discussed in the previous chapter, the reform associated 
with Servius Tullius was probably much simpler than that reported by Livy or Dionysius. The 
Livian/Dionysian version of the Servian constitution was probably a reflection of a later adaptation of an 
earlier ‘Servian’ system, as I shall argue below.147 Instead of five different classes, the only distinction 
in the early Republican – and late monarchic – army was probably merely between those who could 
enroll as heavy-armed hoplites, the core of the army, and those who could enroll only as velites. Of 
course, the association of this early system with Servius Tullius remains a matter of conjecture as does 
the historicity of any such person. 
 
This primitive bipartite organisation is described by Aulus Gellius seems a more plausible model for the 
relatively simple structures of the Roman society in the sixth and early fifth centuries: 
 
“The so-called classici were not all the men in the five 
classes, but only those of the first class, who were 
assessed at 125,000 asses or more. The term infra 
classem, on the other hand, was applied to those of the 
second class and the rest of the classes, who were 
assessed at less than the amount stated.”148 
 
Classici would seem to refer only to those who were members of the first class who could afford the 
hoplite panoply and who would thus be those “called upon” – classici could derive from calare: to call 
or summon –, while the infra classem were those “below the class” who could not afford the complete 
hoplite equipment. 
                                                 
146 Polybius, VI. 20 
147 Livy, I. 42-43 and Dionysius, IV. 16-18 
148 Gellius, Attic Nights, VI. 13 
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Further, Gellius tells us that the Twelve Tables of c. 450 maintained a division of Roman society into 
two classes called adsidui and proletarii.149 
 
“For an assiduus an assiduus is to be guarantor. For a 
proletarian citizen whoever wishes is to be guarantor.”150 
 
Cicero suggests that these terms were instituted by Servius, though it is not clear on what grounds he 
believed this.151 It seems possible that the distinction between classici and infra classem and between 
adsidui and proletarii was the same. Cornell, however, denies this since, in his view, classis and infra 
classem were two different levels of the adsidui.152 The infra classem, after all, could contribute to the 
military effort by being recruited as light armed infantry while the proletarii, on the other hand, were 
completely excluded from military service. 
 
The origin of the name adsiduus, although identified as “permanent settler”, by Gellius and Cicero is 
also connected with the word as – the currency –, also mentioned in the Twelve Tables – see previous 
chapter –, and with their capacity to give money or pay taxes.153 Cicero says that the word comes from 
“as (a coin)” and “do (I give)”. The proletarii were citizens with little or no property and both Cicero 
and Gellius said that the etymology is proles, offspring/children: when the value of the property of a 
citizen was inferior to the minimum census requirement, the only possible contribution to the state for 
him was producing offspring, the country’s next generation.154 Cornell suggests that, at the time of the 
Twelve Tables, the proletarii were few in number while the plebs were concentrated in the ranks of the 
infra classem.155 
 
The divisions of citizens between classici and infra classem and between adsidui and proletarii, even 
though different, are evidence for a two class system: those who were eligible for military service and 
                                                 
149 Gellius, XVI. 10; on the Twelve Tables see Michael Crawford (ed.), ‘Roman Statutes’ vol. II, in BICS supplement 64 
(1996), 556-557 
150 Table I.4; also see Crawford, ‘Roman Statutes’, 589-590 
151 Cicero, Rep., II. 40 
152 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 289 
153 Gellius, XVI. 10, Cicero, Rep., II. 40 
154 See Gary Forsythe, A Critical History of Early Rome (Berkley and Los Angeles, 2005), 217 
155 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 289 
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those who were not. The classici furnished the heavy-armed infantry centuries, while the infra classem 
the light-armed troops. The aristocrats, finally, provided the cavalry. 
 
As said before, the early Roman army may originally have been formed by 3,000 men recruited among 
the Romulean tribes, and, by looking at Fraccaro’s model, by the introduction of the Republic it counted 
a total of 8,400 men that was then divided into two legions of 4,200 men each (3,000 heavy infantry plus 
1,200 light-armed velites) due to the presence of the two consuls instead of one king. This model of 
military organisation might actually reflect the situation around the second half of the fourth century, 
while it is difficult to accept it for the late sixth/early fifth centuries.  
 
We can postulate that the army of the early Republican period was still composed by a single legion of 
3,000 classici armed as hoplites, but that it gradually grew during the fifth century until, at the time of 
the war against Veii (406-396), it reached 6,000 men. After this point, but no later than 362, a second 
legion was permanently introduced. 
 
Sumner suggests that the increase in the manpower of the army is connected with the role of the tribuni 
militum and the progressive increase in their numbers during the fifth century, as it reflects the growth 
of men in the army.156 A tribunus, as suggested by Varro, was originally the commander of 1,000 men 
because the etymology of the word milites – soldier – comes from the original tribal legion that was 
composed by three milia (thousand) men: one milia of milites from each individual tribe.157 Aspects of 
the military role of the tribuni is explained by Polybius who says that the selection of the men during the 
annual levy was still done by them (and we should consider that Polybius was writing much later than 
the fifth century).158 
 
When first mentioned by Livy in 444, the number of tribuni elected was three, thus suggesting that the 
army still counted 3,000 men.159 This practice continued until Livy reports that in 425 a fourth tribunus 
was elected, suggesting that the legion was increased to 4,000 men.160 The number of tribuni did not 
                                                 
156 Graham Sumner, ‘The Legion and the Centuriate Organization’, in JRS 40 (1970), 72 
157 Varro, LL., V. 89 
158 See Polybius, VI. 19-20 
159 However, Sumner, ‘The Legion’, 78 suggests that the hoplite legion was already composed of 4,000 men by the time of 
the battle of Mount Algidus (458, see Livy, III. 28) because the Comitia Centuriata was adjusted so that the iuniores of the 
classis were divided into 40 centuries. 
160 See Livy, IV. 6 on the election of the three tribuni, and Livy, IV. 35 on the election of four tribuni. 
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change until 405, when six were elected – and it remained the practice until 367 –, so that, by the time 
of the war against Veii, the Roman army was furtherly increased to 6,000 men.161 
 
Regarding the number of legions in service during this period, while Fraccaro argues that the introduction 
of the Republic brought the division of the army between the two consuls – so the legion was divided 
into two – it seems from our sources that it is difficult to accept a second legion so early. As said before, 
its introduction should not postpone the events of 362 – war against the Hernici –, but we have sporadic 
signs of a second legion in service before these events: Livy mention the possibility of a second legion 
in 378 during conflict against the Volsci, but it’s not very clear; also, there is a plausible presence of a 
second legion during the campaign of 465.162 We might suggest that Rome was able to form a second 
legion when necessary by the mid-fifth century although the common practice was still the recruitment 
of one legion. During the first half of the fourth century (before 362), the recruitment of two legions 
progressively became the norm. 
 
Yet, even if the pressures on the Roman military were rising steadily through the fifth century, it seems 
clear that what changed the military requirements of Rome was the war against Veii of 406. Because of 
the high demands of this conflict, the number of tribunes and hoplites was further increased and, for this 
reason, it is attractive to date a change in the census to create further classes and boost recruitment to that 
war.163 I would thus suggest that it was only during the Veietine War that the infra classem were divided 
into four groups according to wealth: the classici, now called class I, and the newly formed classes II and 
III. This reform saw an increase from forty to sixty centuries since classes II and III added twenty 
centuries to the original forty supplied by class I. We can see that this is actually the “Servian” 
organisation described by Livy and Dionysius. 
 
Since Livy says that, in the year following the conquest of Veii, six tribunes were elected again, it is 
likely that the army maintained a structure of 6,000 men.164 A reform of Rome’s political organization 
was made necessary and possible by the progressive expansion of the city and, although an accurate 
                                                 
161 Livy, IV. 61 on the election of six tribuni; before that we have several suggestions that their number was kept at four after 
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dating of this reform is impossible, it tempting to associate the introduction of the ‘new Servian’ system 
and the subsequent increase in troop numbers with the military pressures at the end of the fifth century 
and the cluster of other reforms, such as the introduction of pay in 406 (see previous chapter).165 This 
last reform in particular would appear to reflect a decision to enlarge the recruitment pool to include less 
wealthy groups in Roman society since the increased scale, range and complexity of warfare imposed 
new requirements in terms of manpower and provisioning. 
 
If this reconstruction is correct, there was a further stage in the development of the recruitment system 
when soldiers were recruited from all five classes according to their age, not economic status. At this 
point, military service came to be identified with citizenship with virtually all male citizens being 
required to serve. As with much else in early Roman history, establishing a date and context for this 
reform is difficult. One could associate the reform with developments c. 406 (in which case one would 
have to modify the above reconstruction), but it is perhaps better to relate recruitment from all five classes 
to a change in military arrangements that came with the adoption of the manipular army. 
 
This step saw the abandonment of the hoplite tactics in favor of a looser formation called maniples (from 
manipuli, handfuls), small units capable of more independent action. Livy gives us a description of this 
change: 
 
“The Romans had formerly used round shields; then, 
after they began to serve for pay, they changed from 
round to oblong shields; and their previous formation 
in phalanxes, like the Macedonian army, became a 
battle line formed by maniples…”166 
 
This passage is placed about 340 at the time of the Romano-Latin War (341-338), but, like all previous 
military reforms, it is difficult to date exactly the conversion from the phalanx to the maniples. Livy 
suggests that the new formation was adopted after the introduction of payment, while Diodorus says that 
the Romans imitated the Samnites who fought in maniples before them, so dated the introduction of the 
maniple formation at the time of the Samnite Wars.167 
                                                 
165 Livy, I. 30 says that the number of citizens doubled after the conquest of Alba Longa and this fact could be considered the 
first serious increase in Rome’s military manpower. 
166 Livy, VIII. 8 
167 Diodorus, XXIII. 2 calls the Romans: “Pupil who always outstripped their masters”. 
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It seems possible that what triggered the transformation from the hoplite legion to the manipular one was 
the Gallic invasion of 390 and the disaster of the river Allia, a turning point for the early Roman army. 
It is possible that this humiliating defeat pushed the Romans to adopt a new formation for their army. 
We can thus date the introduction of the manipular reform of the army in a period from 390 to 360s, the 
same period when, as we have suggested, the second legion was introduced. Surely, this reform of the 
army had to take place before the Romano-Latin War of the mid-fourth century, since, as mentioned by 
Livy, maniples were already the standard units of the army on both sides.168 
 
The change of military units and formation, however, was not the only alteration which brought about 
the manipular legion: strictly connected with this transformation is a development in military equipment 
and recruitment system. Both Livy and Diodorus marked the passage from phalanx to maniples with a 
shift in equipment from round shield to oblong, but, more notably, with the introduction of the pilum 
(javelin) in place of the thrusting lance (hasta) – although the last was still used by the triarii.169 
 
Although Keppie suggests that the pilum was not introduced at the time of the First Samnite War – due 
to the fact that Livy cited the pilum in action for the first time only during the battle of Aquilonia (293) 
– an anecdote related by Plutarch, dated to 367, suggests that Camillus ordered the soldiers to use their 
“heavy javelins” as thrusting spears to ward off the Gallic attack.170 Though this may, of course, be an 
interpolation into the historical account, the anecdotal nature of the reference at least allows the 
possibility that this was something ‘remembered’ about Camillus.171 
 
The evidence would seem to suggest the development of a manipular legion during the early fourth 
centuries and from this point onwards, recruitment would appear to draw on all five classes of Roman 
men since it was not anymore a division between those who could afford the equipment and those who 
could not. I believe it also marked the passage to a citizens’ army. From then on, soldiers of the legions 
                                                 
168 Livy, VIII. 8 states that not only the Romans, but the Latins as well fought in maniples: “They knew that not only must 
section meet section in battle, the whole line of hastati face hastai, principes face principes…” 
169 On the passage from phalanx to maniples see Livy, VIII. 8 and Diodorus, XXIII. 2. Polybius, VI. 23, while describing the 
equipment of the different units of the legions says that the triarii were armed with a thrusting spear – hasta – rather than the 
pilum. 
170 Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, 20; on the battle of Aquilonia, see Livy, X. 39. Plutarch, Camillus, 40. 4 mentions 
the episode the involved the pilum. 
171 As suggested by Bishop and Coulston in Roman Military Equipment (London, 1993), 50 
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were recruited ex classibus – as suggested by Sallust172 –, from all five classes, and all citizens who 
possessed the minimum property qualification for membership of the fifth class. With the introduction 
of the new units of hastati (hasta-users), principes (the foremost, perhaps in the sense of being the best 
fighters) and triarii (the third liners), distinctions in equipment and tactical function were based on age 
– citizens were now divided between iuniores and seniores –, not by economic status, although there was 
the exception of the velites, described by Polybius as the youngest and poorest citizens.173 
 
The introduction of the manipular legion ended the military role of the comitia centuriata, which 
continued to exist, but lost its military and tactical function since the army was not its armed version 
anymore as in the past. However, Polybius says that when Roman citizens were recruited, they were still 
divided into tribes, then four groups of military tribunes – because at the time of Polybius’ passage the 
army was already formed by four legions174 – who progressively chose the men to recruit.175 I believe 
that this process was purely traditional: tribes and centuries had lost their military function. 
 
If this reconstruction is correct, it is possible to date the manipular reform of the Roman army in a period 
between 390 – after the Gallic invasion – and 360s since, as we noted, that maniples were already the 
standard units of the legions at the time of the Latin War (340-338).176 
 
I would, however, suggest that the manipular army came into being towards the beginning of this period 
and that it was the deployment of this army that led to the rapid expansion of Rome after the debacle of 
the Allia, through a series of successful military campaigns in Etruria, against the Aequi and the Volsci.177 
These victories were usually followed by the foundation of colonies, an event probably reliably recorded 
in the annalistic sources. This fact is one of Cornell’s main arguments against historians who believe that 
victories of the early fourth century onwards were later interpolations into the tradition or, at the very 
least, exaggerated.178 Furthermore, the foundation of colonies from the early fourth century may also be 
further and positive evidence for a change in the nature of the army (and not just evidence of military 
                                                 
172 Sallust, Bellum Jugurthine, 86. 2 
173 Polybius, VI. 21 
174 Although Fraccaro suggests that the four legion were introduced in 311 at the time of the Samnites Wars, Livy, VII. 23 
already mentioned them in 350. 
175 Polybius, VI. 20 
176 Livy, VIII. 8 
177 Livy, VI. 4 says that Camillus returned to Rome in triumph for his victories in three wars against Etruscan, Aequi and 
Volsci. 
178 Cornell, The Beginnings of Rome, 319 
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success): the program of colonization would appear to represent a reward for service for the poorer 
elements in Roman society. In itself, the development of a program of colonization would seem to suggest 
that the poor had a certain political authority and it would be convenient to associate that political 
authority with military service. Coincidentally or not, the colonial settlements provided Rome with the 
institutional capability to control extended territories as the changes in military service appear to have 
established a political need for new territories. 
 
To conclude this section, we can summarise the evolution of the Roman army and its recruitment system, 
strictly connected with changes in society: 
 
• From the eight century and the sixth century, we have a description of a tribal army, a reflection 
of Rome’s tribal society. This changed when the reforms attributed to Servius Tullius introduced 
the census and deeply changed Roman society and thus the army. 
 
• The primitive bi-partite pre-Servian constitution marked the adoption of the hoplite warfare by 
the Romans and the creation of an aristocratic army: citizens were divided between those who 
could afford the hoplite panoply and those who could not. 
 
• At the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the fourth, however, because of the 
requirements of the war against Veii, the army went through important changes: the enlargement 
of the recruitment pool, which caused an expansion of the census classes, and the introduction of 
military payment. 
 
• During the first half of the fourth century, in a period after the Gallic invasion of 390 and before 
the Latin War of 340, both the army and the society were transformed: the hoplite legion was 
abandoned for the manipular legion and the citizens were recruited mainly by age – property 
qualification was still present, but less important than before. This marked a passage from the 
aristocratic army of the late monarchy and early Republic to a citizens’ army that will last until 
the reforms of Gaius Marius of the late second century. 
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* Manpower and Recruitment 
 
In this next section, I will focus on the evidence for the numbers of troops. The first step, however, is to 
examine the matter of the census figures, starting from their procedures, and then looking at who was 
included. 
 
When a census was held, all adult men of citizen status had to be registered by representatives of the 
government.179 Different sources (including the Tabula Heracleensis) mention that the citizen had to 
make a professio, an official declaration.180 In this report the citizens stated under oath “their gentile 
names, their praenomina, their fathers or patrons, their tribes, their cognomina, their age, and a statement 
of their property…”181 The census was then followed by the rite of the lustrum, a purification ritual with 
deep religious connotations, since it symbolized a rebirth of the city. 
 
It is generally accepted, following Beloch and Brunt, that all adult male Roman citizens (both assidui 
and proletarii) were included in the census. Based on the fact that Rome counted its citizens for military 
recruitment, collection of taxes, and recognition of voting rights, Saskia Hin suggests: “…there must 
have been several lists derived from the census. No total figure could fulfill the threefold purpose of the 
census, for the obvious reason that these diverse functions did not coincide.”182 
 
While a plausible suggestion, no report provides us with these three different numbers for the census 
figures, nor is there ever any clarification as to which of the three numbers is reported. The most plausible 
solution is that the reported census figures represent the total male citizen population as registered by the 
censors and if other numbers were reported by class or by military availability, these are not recorded. It 
is plausible that further sub-divisions of the citizens (in terms of age and property – determined by the 
professiones – for recruitment and taxation reasons) took place for administrative purposes. 
 
                                                 
179 De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 84 suggests that Republican census were probably focused on all adult male 
citizens rather than citizens sui iuris only: “…it seems likely that the Roman authorities would have been more interested in 
a figure that revealed Rome’s military strength.” 
180 On the professio see Cicero, De Legibus, III. 3. 7; Dionysius, IV. 15; Claude Nicolet, The World of the Citizen in Republican 
Rome (London, 1980), 61 suggests that the Tabula Heracleensis is a quite late source. 
181 CIL, I2 593, 1.142; also see Nicolet, Citizen in Republican Rome, 62 
182 Saskia Hin, ‘Counting Romans’, in eds. De Ligt, L. and Northwood, S., People, Land and Politics, 214 
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Our main problem is establishing the ratio between assidui and proletarii, a challenging – probably 
unsolvable – matter due to the lack of data. Estimates range from proletarii being 50% of the citizen 
population to assidui being up to 90%.183 We have only the thinnest grounds for making such an estimate, 
but given the low level of the census requirement – as suggested by both Rathbone and De Ligt - already 
at the outbreak of the Second Punic War membership of the fifth class, and thus eligibility for service in 
the legion, was guaranteed by the possession of relatively small land allotments184 – it seems to me 
preferable to opt for a high percentage of assidui in the census population, perhaps as high as the 90% 
suggested by Rosenstein.185 Also, we have to consider the fact that during the mid-second century, as we 
will see, the minimum census limit for membership in the fifth class – and thus for service in the legions 
– was furtherly reduced. As a result, we have to consider the simple, yet likely fact that it would have 
been hard for citizens who owned less than this already very low minimum census requirement to survive. 
 
Overall, it is improbable that the capite censi were a high proportion of the total registered population. It 
also seems intuitive that under-registration rates – that we will examine later – would increase in the 
poorer citizen groups.186 Consequently, it seems unlikely that using the census population as our guide 
seriously under-represents the pressures that fell on Rome’s population of assidui. For this reason, when 
in the course of this dissertation we will try to estimate the military participation rates, and thus the 
burden of military service on the Roman population, we will use the census figures offered to us by the 
sources. 
 
Another aspect that we have to consider regarding the census figures are the freedmen. Keith Bradley 
highlights the fact that the presence of “freedman Roman citizen” was already mentioned by the Twelve 
Tables: “…it reveals that the capacity both for a slave to be set free and to become part of the citizen 
community had been created at an early date.”187 Suggesting that both the presence of freedmen and their 
inclusion in the citizen body have always been part of Roman society since the early Republic. Thus, 
once enfranchised, former slaves could become citizens and be included in the census. The real difficulty, 
                                                 
183 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 64-66; Nathan Rosenstein, ‘Marriage and manpower in the Hannibalic War: assidui, proletarii 
and Livy 24.18.7-8’, in Historia 51 (2002); Luuk De Ligt, ‘Roman Manpower resources and the proletarianization of the 
Roman army in the second century BC’, in eds. Lo Cascio, E. and De Blois, L., The Impact of the Roman Army (200 BC – 
AD 476), 18 
184 Dominic Rathbone, ‘Assidui and Prima Classis, 145; De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 102 
185 Rosenstein, ‘Marriage and Manpower’, 171 
186 See De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 98 
187 Keith Bradley, Slavery and Society at Rome (Cambridge, 1994), 17 
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however, is trying to estimate the proportion of freed slaves (especially if we consider that we don’t know 
how many slaves there were in the first place), and their annual impact on the census figures. 
 
Frank guesses that, between 81 and 49, around 500,000 slaves were manumitted, so about 16,000 per 
year, but also adds: “A large part of these would, of course, have been old – especially after the dole was 
increased in 63 – and the death rate of these liberti would accordingly be very high.”188 Nicolet, on the 
other hand, gives great importance to manumission: “…slavery was perhaps a more transitory condition 
than we tend to think, and the grant of freedom a normal expectation for a high proportion of slaves, 
maybe up to a third.”189 His suggestion is that a significant part of the population of Italy and Rome itself 
was composed by freedmen: perhaps 200,000 out of the 600,000 – 800,000 people in Rome in the period 
58-45 were freedmen, meaning a few more than 15,000 every year. More recently, Scheidel has argued 
in favour of an overall low manumission rate mainly focused in Rome and other urban centres, while 
lower in the countryside.190 
 
The data that we have been analysing is focused on the late Republican and early Imperial period; such 
information, however, might help us trying to estimate on manumissions and the number of freedmen 
during the mid-Republic. 
 
First of all, we have to consider the fact that slavery, although always present, was not as widespread as 
during the late first century: “All we can claim with reasonable confidence is that slaves were more 
numerous at the end of the Republican period than at the beginning.”191 Additionally, we have to take 
into account Scheidel’ suggestion that cities had a higher rate of manumission in comparison with the 
countryside, but also the fact that, by the early second century, cities were smaller than during the late 
Republic. Then we have to add Frank’s position on slaves’ age and life expectancy after manumission 
                                                 
188 Tenney Frank, An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome (Baltimore, 1933), 384 
189 Claude Nicolet, ‘Economy and Society 133-43 BC’, in eds. Crook, J. A., Lintott, A., Rawson, E., The Cambridge Ancient 
History volume IX (Cambridge, 1994), 605 
190 Walter Scheidel, ‘The Demography of Roman Slavery and Manumission’, in eds. Bellancourt-Valdher, M., and Corvisier, 
J. N., La Demographie Historique Antique (Artois, 1999), 110: “…we know that scenarios of self-sustained growth do not 
apply to Roman Italy. On the contrary, we have reason to suppose that as in number of more recent slave societies, the slave 
population of Italy could not fully reproduce itself, and that imports therefore did not only contribute to net increase but also 
served to maintain the existing servile population. […] Even a relatively low rate of manumission can render a biologically 
reproducing slave population socially non-reproductive. This is likely to have been the case in Rome.” and especially 114: 
“…in the Roman Empire overall, manumission must have been confined to a minority of all slaves. If the rate of manumission 
was high in some areas, for example in the city of Rome or in wealthy urban households in general, it must have been quite 
low in other environments, above all in the countryside.” 
191 Scheidel, ‘Roman Slavery and Manumission’, 108 
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combined with Brunt’ suggestion that female slaves were freed at advanced age, so they had few 
children.192 Finally, due to the fact that we are looking at the census figures, and these counted Roman 
citizens only, we have to consider slaves located in Roman territory proper (so most of Central Italy), 
and not in the rest of Italy. 
 
We can thus speculate that, by the beginning of the second century, between 4,000 and 6,000 slaves were 
freed per year. This rate most likely grew during the second century due to the increase in the number of 
slaves, but it probably followed the same patters with a more numerous and generally younger population 
of former urban slaves and less numerous and older countryside freedmen. 
 
It is possible to argue that freedmen, once they joined the citizen community, shared a similar connection 
to military service as the proletarii as both classes were normally not admitted in the legions. While it 
seems that proletarii could be enlisted for service in the fleet, we may argue that freedmen, although 
there is no mention of them in Polybius’ passage, were accepted as crewmembers as well.193 
 
It is possible that, when necessary, proletarii were accepted for service in the legions, and freedmen as 
well could have been recruited in case of emergency (as a reserve manpower). We could look at the case 
of the volones during the Second Punic War: in this instance slaves – not even freed – were assembled 
into two legions and sent against the Carthaginians. Nevertheless, later, even after the disaster of Arausio 
(105), we have no mention of mass recruitment of freedmen. 
 
We can thus conclude this section by saying that freedmen were most likely included in the census 
figures, but their impact was probably quite limited due to the fact that they were not very numerous. 
 
Having a better idea on how the census worked, and how was counted, we can look at Rome’s population 
from the time of Servius Tullius onwards. The figures are given in the following table: 
 
DATE/PERIOD CENSUS SOURCE 
Servius Tullius 80,000 Livy, I. 44 
508 130,000 Dionysius, V. 20 
498 150,000 Dionysius, V. 75 
                                                 
192 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 143-146 
193 On proletarii in the fleet see Polybius, VI. 19 and Brunt, Italian Manpower, 22-23 
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493 110,000 Dionysius, VI. 96 
474 103,000 Dionysius, IX. 36 
465 105,000 Livy, III. 3 
458 117,000 Livy, III. 24 
393 152,500 Pliny, NH, XXXIII. 16 
340 166,000 Euseb. Ol, 110.1 
323 250,000 Livy, IX. 19 
 
The credibility of these numbers depends on the probable territory and population density of early Rome. 
According to Beloch’s estimate, the Roman state around 500 had an extension of 822 km2 – which 
corresponded to 35% of Latium – with a population of 50,000 people, of which 10,000 of these lived 
inside the city while the rest were in the countryside suggesting a population density of 50 people per 
km2.194 It is possible, however, that Roman territory, at the end of the fifth century, was considerably 
smaller: Livy comments that Veii had a territory larger than that of Rome, and it was the conquest of 
Veii (396) that represents Rome’s first major expansion.195 According to Alföldi, Roman territory in the 
fifth century occupied an area of roughly 250 square kilometers on the right bank of the Tiber.196 
 
If we were to take the census figure of 150,000 as possible, we would be looking at a total population 
(allowing for women and children) of 525,000 and population densities of 2100 per km2 on 250 km2 or 
half that on 500 km2. Given the modern population density for Italy is 201 persons per km2, the figures 
do not appear plausible. Robert Witcher, in his Regional field surveys and the demography of Roman 
Italy, suggests population densities in the environs of Rome of 41 persons/km2 to 106 persons/km2.197 At 
the very upper end of that spectrum for densities and area of land, we would have a rural population of 
53,000 to which we must add an urban population for which we have no viable estimate. The earliest 
census figures would seem to make no sense. 
 
It seems very unlikely that we can place much trust in the figures for the early census: Livy’s account of 
80,000 citizens during Servius Tullius’ reign, for example, is clearly not in any historical way true.198 
Census figures, after all, are particularly susceptible to corruption and we cannot be sure that the correct 
                                                 
194 Karl Julius Beloch, Römische Geschichte bis zum Beginn der punischen Kriege (Berlin, 1926), 217 
195 Livy, V. 24: “The latter’s (Veii) territory was more extensive than that of Rome.” 
196 Andreas Alföldi, Early Rome and the Latins, 303; he describes Roman’s territory as: “Very modest, but it can stupefy only 
the believers in a huge Rome under the Tarquins.” 
197 Robert Witcher, ‘Regional Field Survey and the Demography of Roman Italy’, in eds. De Ligt, L. and Northwood, S., 
People, Land and Politics (Leiden/Boston, 2008), 273-303 
198 On the possibility of defending this early census figures, see Coarelli, ‘Demografia e Territorio’, 318-319 and 322-323 
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figures are transmitted. We might posit a pontifical recording of the census figures and the transmission 
of those figures into the annalistic tradition, but the evidence for such a recording and transmission is 
slight. Further, we may wonder whether a census of all Roman citizens before the introduction of the 
manipular army would make much sense and whether any early census would be remotely accurate. 
 
Brunt takes the minimalist position that: “It… seems best to accept the census figures from 225 – and 
perhaps from a little earlier – as based on good authority and dependable in principle…”,199 dismissing 
all early figures. Saskia Hin, on the other hand, suggests more exhaustive analysis on these early 
figures.200 Yet, even if we can place no trust in the fifth and fourth century figures, we might be able to 
take the early third-century figures more seriously. 
 
We might be able to triangulate our evidence for population size against the date we have army size. 
Dionysius, in a passage dated almost at the same time of the battle of the Cremera (475), says that those 
who were qualified for military service, were 1/3 of the total male population.201 If we take this figure 
seriously then the census figures from the fourth century (Pliny suggests a total population of 150,000 in 
393, and Livy of 250,000 in 319) suggest that the proportion of men recruited for military service was 
quite small: our sources for this period suggest armies from 6,000 to the 18,000 men suggested by 
Polybius.202 Taking the fourth-century census figures seriously, we might suggest rates of recruitment 
between 4% and 7.2% of Rome’s manpower, far below the 1/3 suggested by Dionysius. 
 
We could, however, also work backwards from Dionysius’ figure. In this presumption, we would assume 
that an army of 6,000 would be recruited from a pool of about 18,000 men and a total citizen body of 
about 60,000. Similarly, an army of 18,000 would be derived from a total 54,000 eligible men and a total 
population of about 180,000. This figure is clearly just a rule of thumb employed by Dionysius. 
Nevertheless, we can set these figures in the context of the evidence for pressure being placed on Rome’s 
                                                 
199 Peter Brunt, Italian Manpower, 33 
200 Hin, ‘Counting Romans’, 206 
201 If this were true, the census figures at the beginning of the fifth century (498) suggesting a male population of 150,000 
(Dionysius, V. 75) would mean that Rome had a population of at least 50,000 male citizens eligible for military service. This 
would suggest that the Romans would actually have able to raise armies of 30,000 men or even larger in the fifth century. 
Unsurprisingly, our evidence points to much smaller numbers. We have two possible conclusions: i) The census figures (which 
seem implausible in the extreme on other evidence) are wrong; ii) The Romans actually recruited much smaller proportions 
of the population that Dionysius suggests. 
202 On the census figure of 393 see Pliny, NH, XXXIII. 16; Livy, IX. 19 for the census figure of 319. On the strength of the 
Roman army during this period see Polybius, VI. 20 
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military resources in the fourth century by the various conflicts. It was these demands that led to Rome 
establishing new systems of military recruitment that enabled the less wealthy in Roman society to serve. 
Such reforms would seem unlikely in the context of total recruitment being substantially under 8% of the 
male population, even if recruitment was from a limited sector of Roman society. We have, thus, a 
reasonably straightforward choice between accepting low recruitment rates as measured against total 
population and the high fourth-century census figures, or a much lower population and comparatively 
high mobilization rates. 
 
Although there is considerable margin for error, one would favour population estimates for Rome in the 
late fifth and early fourth century far closer to a total of 180,000 than Pliny’s 150,000 males and c. 
495,000 total population. This first figure would still be a population three times larger than our highest 
feasible estimate for the population of Rome and its territories in 500 BC. The period of conquest in the 
fourth century would see a very rapid expansion in Roman territory and increase in Rome’s population.  
 
The data are imperfect and the statistics cannot be trusted. We are thrown back on plausible estimates 
and imaginative reconstructions from the annalistic tradition. I suggest that the pattern of reforms that 
we see in the late fifth century, perhaps continued into the fourth, would fit better a model of a highly 
militaristic and expansionist state, and a state which sought to maximize its potential for military 
deployment. 
 
* The recruitment system of the third century Roman Republic 
 
Our key source for the third century army is Polybius. He describes the process of recruitment in a key 
passage which we can attribute to the second half of the third century – if we accept Polybius’ claim that 
he was writing a history that reflected the conditions of the Mediterranean world in that period.203 
 
“On the appointed day, when those who are liable for 
service have arrived in Rome and assemble on the 
Capitoline Hill, the fourteen junior military tribunes 
divided themselves into four groups […]; this is because 
of the original division of the Roman forces is into four 
legions. […] After they have selected the total number 
required, that is, when the strength of each legion had 
                                                 
203 Polybius, VI. 19 
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been brought up to 4,200, or in time of especial danger 
5,000, it was the custom in the earlier time to choose the 
cavalrymen; but in our day these are enrolled first of all. 
The censor selects them on a property basis, and 300 are 
posted to each legion… 
 
When the enrollment has been carried out in this fashion, 
the tribunes who have been assigned to this duty then 
parade the conscripts, and each of them selects from the 
whole body one man whom they consider the most 
suitable […]. Then the rest of the conscripts come 
forward […]” 
 
Each year the dilectus, the choosing or levy, was held on the Capitol in Rome. This process was 
conducted by the tribunes and it allowed them to select among all men of military age between 17 and 
46. This continued until all four legions reached the required manpower. Roman citizens had an 
obligation to serve in the armed forces when required and Polybius gives the length of service as 16 years 
for infantrymen – that could be prolonged to 20 in case of emergency – and 10 years for cavalrymen.204 
Keppie asserts that these figures are the maximum length of service in the legions and suggests that, 
normally, soldiers were not expected to serve for such a long time.205 Since during the Republic there 
was not a standing army, service was generally limited to a single campaigning season, though discharged 
soldiers would be liable in the next dilectus. Such soldiers may have been called evocatii – from evocatus, 
“to call out” –, but our sources on the evocatii are all later – Caesar and Appian206 – and this suggests 
that it was a late republican term.207  
 
Military service was part of the expectations on citizens and, for this reason, the penalties against those 
who refuse to serve in the army were severe. Livy says that, during the early Republic, defaulters were 
usually stripped and whipped in order to humiliate them before their fellow citizens.208 Later, Cicero says 
that those who refused to serve could be sold into slavery since their conduct showed that they were not 
worthy of being free men.209 Suetonius, finally, says that those who tried to avoid military service could 
be sold at auction together with their property.210 Nevertheless, the sources also tell us that there were 
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certain categories and individuals who enjoyed exemptions from military service called vacationes – 
which could be suspended in cases of emergency.211 
 
Conscripts were not necessarily unwilling soldiers. Brunt suggests that until the third century, Rome 
fought mainly defensive wars and patriotic sentiments perhaps played a role during the dilectus.212 This 
is certainly suggested by a passage of Valerius Maximus who says that men often came forward and gave 
their names before they were called by the tribunes.213 A more prosaic explanation for this enthusiasm is 
that recruits wished to secure the stipendium and the possibility of land or any other personal gains from 
war. Furthermore, if recruits were assumed to be willing, then a process of conscription was simply the 
easiest way of raising an army. 
 
While describing the process of recruitment, Polybius gives us the strength of a legion and his passage 
and makes it possible to estimate the size of the Roman citizen army in the third century.214 Normally, a 
Roman legion was composed by 4,200 infantrymen, which could increase to 5,000 in case of danger, 
plus a standard force of 300 cavalrymen. Since the Roman army was divided into four legions, we can 
assume that in the third century – certainly for its first half – the Romans deployed armies of 18,000 to 
21,200 men. 
 
The accounts of the wars fought during the third century offer narrative evidence for the strength of the 
Roman army before the dramatic and unprecedented increased demand for manpower caused by the 
Second Punic War. According to Dionysius, in the Pyrrhic War the Romans deployed an army of more 
than 70,000 men – 20,000 of whom were Roman citizens.215 Frontinus, a much later source, says that the 
Roman army at Asculum (279) had a strength of 40,000 men.216 Dionysius, who provides us one of the 
few descriptions of the socii during a battle, is calculating the Roman forces as four legions (20,000) plus 
                                                 
211 Vacationes were usually given to: i) Seniores (Appian, BC, II. 150); ii) Men who had served the required stipendia (Livy, 
XXXIV. 56); iii) Infirm; iv) Some priests, officials, and their attendants; v) Citizens in the maritime colonies (Livy, XXVII. 
38 and XXXVI. 3 for suspensions in 207 and 191); vi) Individuals who received immunity for various reasons. 
212 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 392 
213 Valerius Maximus, II. 3: a clear reflection of the political values and contrasts of the late first century than the sentiments 
of the fourth and third centuries. 
214 Polybius, VI. 20 
215 Dionysius, XX. 1. 8 
216 Frontinus, Strat., II. 3. 21 
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allies – more than double in this occasion.217 Frontinus, on the other hand, does not make any distinction 
between Romans and Italians in the army – typical of later sources. There is obviously a significant 
difference here and this may be related to an assumed ratio of allies to Romans, with Frontinus simply 
assuming that there were as many allies and Romans, but that is an assumption we need to test against 
other evidence. 
 
The other major conflict of the first part of the third century is, without a doubt, the First Punic War (264-
241). Polybius says that in 263 the Romans decided to send 40,000 men to Sicily.218 In 260, at the battle 
of Mylae, a Carthaginian fleet of 130 ships was defeated by a Roman fleet, possibly of a similar size. 
One hundred and thirty quinqueremes may have been crewed by about 8,840 men and may have carried 
10,400 soldiers.219 The fleet was commanded by the consul Gaius Duillius.220 He was later honored for 
his victory, the first major naval victory in Roman military history, with a column erected in the forum, 
the columna rostrata, decorated with the bronze rams of the captured vessels. The army with which 
Regulus invaded Africa in 256/5 was possibly a consular army of two legions not at full strength, plus 
allies, since it was composed of 15,000 infantrymen and 500 cavalrymen.221 Finally, in 250, during the 
siege of Lilybaeum, the last major land-battle of the war, the Romans deployed a combined consular 
army and a fleet of 200 ships in order to isolate the last Carthaginian stronghold in Sicily.222 
 
These great conflicts demonstrate that Rome could put large forces into the field. The Roman armies 
were always supported by the contingents of the socii – allies – recruited from the Latin colonies and 
allied Italians. The allied contribution will have changed with the First Punic War mainly because of the 
introduction of the fleet, described by Polybius as the greatest in history, whose crews were recruited 
mainly from maritime Italian cities, but also, as suggested by Miles, from poorer Roman citizens.223 It is 
possible that this long and intense war forced the Romans to deploy more than their traditional army of 
four legions: when Regulus’ invaded Africa, Roman forces were fighting in Sicily. 
                                                 
217 Dionysius, XX. 1. 5: “The Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volscians, Marrucini, Pelegini, Ferentani and their 
other subjects they divided into four divisions and mingled them with the Roman legions, in order that no part of their lines 
might be weak.” 
218 Polybius, I. 16 says that each legion had 4,000 infantry and 300 cavalry. 
219 Michael Pitassi, Roman Warships (Woodbridge, 2011), 100, says that a third century quinquereme had a crew of 364 men 
divided between 68 crew members and 296 rowers. Also, a quinquereme was able to transport a centuria of 80 men. 
220 Polybius, I. 23 
221 Polybius, I. 29 
222 Richard Miles, Carthage Must Be Destroyed, the Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization (London, 2010), 190 
223 See Polybius, I. 63. Miles, Carthage Must Be Destroyed, 181 
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The role of the socii in the army was extremely important and was the result of the custom of the Romans 
to impose treaties to the defeated people of Italy, a custom that went back at the time of the battle of Lake 
Regillus (493) and the introduction of the foedus cassianum.224 This treaty reflected common interests 
and enemies since the fifth century was dominated by continuous wars against Aequi and Volsci.225 
Erdkamp, for this reason, suggests that Rome was not the leading power of this alliance, but just one of 
its members – though a very powerful one.226 
 
After the conquest of Veii and the defeat of Aequi and Volsci, cooperation between the Latins diminished 
and the result was the Romano-Latin War of 340-338. This war marked as the turning point in the 
relationships between Rome and its allies with the establishment of a hierarchy among the allies: first of 
all, there were the Roman citizens, then the citizens sine suffragio, the people of Latin citizenship, and 
finally the other allied communities who had bilateral treaties with Rome. Yet, the various hierarchical 
relations within Italy established through Roman conquests and annexations were all expressed in terms 
of the provision of manpower to Rome’s armies.227 
 
The result of this policy of demanding troops from allied and associated communities was an enormous 
increase in Rome’s military manpower since, just like their Roman counterparts, the inhabitants of the 
Italian cities were required to send troops to Rome each year. Polybius describes the recruitment process 
of the allies: 
 
“At the same time the consuls send out orders to the 
magistrates of the allied cities in Italy from which they 
wish to raise troops stating the numbers required and 
the day and the place at which the men selected for 
service must appear. The authorities then choose the 
men […], appoint a commanding officer and a 
paymaster and dispatch the contingent to Rome.” 228 
                                                 
224 Dionysius, VI. 95 and Livy, II. 33; Cicero, Balb., 53 describes a bronze table that was on public show and contained the 
terms of the treaty. On the importance and high number of treaties between Rome and the Italian communities see John Rich, 
‘Treaties, allies and the Roman Conquest of Italy’, in eds. De Souza, P., and France, J., War and Peace in Ancient and 
Medieval History (Cambridge, 2008), 54 
225 Livy, II. 22 suggests that Aequi and Volsci were already a problem at the time of the battle of Lake Regillus. 
226 Paul Erdkamp, ‘War and State Formation in the Roman Republic’, in ed. Erdkamp, A Companion to the Roman Army 
(Malden, 2007), 100 
227 See Rich, ‘Treaties’, 58 
228 Polybius, VI. 21 
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So we can clearly see that local Italian magistrates were responsible for the dilectus in the Italian cities.229 
Each town provided a contingent of infantrymen plus one or more turmae of cavalry. The allies were 
supervised by twelve praefecti nominated by the consuls and called praefecti sociorum.230 The socii 
usually occupied the left and right wing of the army and, for this reason these formations are called by 
modern historians the alae sociorum, though this term is never used by our sources explicitly for the 
allies. 231 One task of the praefecti sociorum was the selection of the best soldiers among the allies, called 
the extraordinarii, an elite force composed of 1/5 of the allied infantry and 1/3 of the cavalry.232 Finally, 
at the time of the First Punic War, as suggested by both Livy and Polybius, coastal cities were required 
to furnish ships and crews.233 
 
Polybius says that the allies contributed the same number of infantrymen as the Romans, but three times 
more cavalrymen.234 With the addition of the allies and their manpower, the standard Roman army would 
have increased to between 38,400 and c. 45,000 men.  
 
The dating of this discussion is, as with much else in book VI, problematic: Livy says that at the battle 
of Sentium (295), the Latins and allies outnumbered the Roman legionaries.235 Although there are no 
surviving sources that can tell us how these contingents were armed or fought, we can assume that they 
were similar to their Roman counterparts since Livy states that when Romans and Latins fought against 
each other in 340, they were impossible to distinguish since their equipment and tactics were exactly the 
same.236 Yet, our sources rarely mention the socii. Dionysius offers one of the earliest descriptions of 
cooperation between Romans and allies in the army at battle of Asculum against Pyrrhus (279).237 Livy 
                                                 
229 The Greek text says ‘the cities’, but earlier had mentioned archousi translated in Latin as magistrates. It is clear that 
Polybius is talking about local authorities. 
230 Polybius, VI. 26 
231 Polybius, VI. 26; Gellius, AN, XVI. IV. 6 mentions the terms “alae”, but he is referring to the cavalry, not the contingents 
of allies. 
232 Polybius, VI. 26 
233 Polybius, I. 20 and Livy, XXXVI. 42 
234 Polybius, VI. 26 
235 Livy, X. 26 
236 Livy, VIII. 8: “They knew that maniple would fight maniple, the whole line of hastati match hastati, principes against 
principes, while centurions must engage each other…” 
237 Dionysius, XX. 1, says that Latins, Campanians, Sabines, Umbrians, Volsci and Frentani were divided into units posted 
between the legions. 
69 
 
makes no mention of the allies until the Hannibalic War while Polybius mentions the allies for the first 
time at the time of the much discussed mass mobilisation against the Gauls in 225.238 
 
It has been suggested that Polybius regarded the allies as part of the Roman army and made no effort to 
distinguish them.239 An example of this could be the procedure of the Roman army of plundering a city 
and dividing the booty among the soldiers as in the case of the fall of Carthago Nova in 210.240 In this 
case, Polybius describes the army as composed of four stratopeda – legions –, two of Romans and two 
of allies. The division of the booty was organised by the chiliarchs, the tribunes, who: ‘…equally 
distribute the proceeds equally among all’. Roman and allied units appear to have been organized and 
treated equally. 
 
We can see a confused pattern in Polybius’ description of the marching order of the army and its battle 
order.241 When breaking camp, the consular legion usually moved in this formation: at the head of the 
column, as advance guard, there were the extraordinarii who were followed by the first of the two alae 
sociorum, the right one in this case. After them there were the two Roman legions and, at the end, the 
second – left – ala sociorum who acted as the rearguard of the column. Although Polybius says that the 
position of the extraordinarii at the head was a rule.242 In this case, we can see a clear division between 
Romans and allies. The battle order, in contrast, shows homogeneousness: the army advances in three 
parallel columns formed by hastati, principes and triarii; Polybius doesn’t mention Romans or allies. 
 
The same could be said for Livy and his battle narratives. Usually he doesn’t mention the allied units at 
all and just refers to the Romans and their army in general terms. Yet, Livy’s lists of casualties sometimes 
distinguish Romans and allies: between 7,000 and 13,000 Romans and allies were killed in the battle of 
Herdonea (210), 1,700 Romans and 1,300 allies died in a victorious battle in Apulia (209) and only 200 
Romans and allies perished after a great victory in Spain (205).243 
 
                                                 
238 Polybius, II. 24 
239 Paul Erdkamp, ‘Polybius and Livy on the Allies in the Roman Army’, in eds. Lo Cascio, E. and de Blois, L., The Impact 
of the Roman Army (200 BC – AD 476) (Leiden/Boston, 2007), 55 
240 Polybius, X. 16 
241 Polybius, VI. 40 
242 Pat Southerm, The Roman Army: A Social and Institutional History (Santa Barbara/Oxford, 2006), 94; Southern adds that 
in case of an attack to the rear, the extraordinarii could be moved to the rearguard. 
243 On the losses at Herdonia, see Livy, XXVII. 1; Livy XXVII, 14 on the losses after the engagement in Apulia. Finally, see 
Livy, XXIX. 2 on the losses in Spain in 205. 
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The ratio between Romans and allies varies in different sources: while Polybius suggests an almost 1:1 
ratio – a standard Roman army of four legions counted 18,000 Romans plus 20,400 allies that could be 
increased to 21,200 and 23,600 in case of emergency –, Livy says that the allies were double the number 
of the Romans in the early third century and suggests that this ratio applied for the rest of the century 
(see below). 
 
* Manpower in the third century, Romans and allies in the army 
 
The following table shows the census figures for the third century: 
 
DATE CENSUS SOURCE 
293 262,321 Livy, X. 47 
280 287,222 Livy, Per., 13 
264 292,234 Eutropius, Brev., II. 18 
241 241,212 Livy, Per. 19 
241-219 270,212 Livy, Per. 20 
204 214,000 Livy, XXIX. 37 
 
These figures, to which we can add the 250,000 of 323, vary from a low of 214,000 in the Second Punic 
war to a high of 292,00, but there is a clustering of figures at c. 250,000. These variations can, I believe, 
be explained by three crucial factors: the expansion of Roman territory, the migration to Latin colonies 
and finally with the 214 figure, war losses.244 The figures provide a base-line for the male population of 
between 250,000 and 290,000 for much of the third century. 
 
If these figures are to be taken seriously, then the consular armies would be between 6.8% and 8.3% of 
the available manpower before the Second Punic War. Although these figures seem not particularly high, 
it is possible, as we saw above, that other legions were kept under arms apart from the consular armies. 
In particular, the First Punic War may have required longer service and multiple armies, including 
garrisons, to be maintained for extended periods. The data is, however, simply not good enough to reach 
firm conclusions. Nevertheless, when we come to Polybius’ extraordinary register of Rome’s military 
                                                 
244 The foundation of colonies also had an important part in the census figures since we may assume that the average number 
of settlers was nearly 4,000 – and 3,000 of these were Romans – causing an important movement of people. Livy, XXVII. 9 
in this passage, regarding the twelve colonies during the Second Punic War, the consuls remind to the delegates that they were 
Romans of Roman descent. War losses also had effect on population, but until the First Punic War, we have no data to evaluate 
mortality in war. The census figures of 241 and 204 – shown in the table – indicate the strong decrease due to the casualties 
in the two Punic Wars. 
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forces on the verge of the Second Punic War, we see that in addition to the consular armies, there were 
another 30,300 troops under arms. If this figure were standard, we would be looking at proportionately 
higher rates of mobilization. 
 
The key data for the number of allied soldiers in the Roman army comes in the much discussed passage 
Polybius II, 24 on Rome’s manpower at the moment of the Gallic invasions of 225. This is an 
extraordinarily difficult and complicated section, and I summarise it below. 
 
MEN UNDER ARMS (infantry and cavalry) 
ROMANS ALLIES 
22,000 (in consular armies) 32,000 (in consular armies) 
8,800 (in Sicily and Tarentum) 54,000 (Sabines and Etruscans) 
21,500 (reserve at Rome) 20,000 (Umbrians and Sarsinates) 
 20,000 (Veneti and Cenomai) 
 33,000 (reserve at Rome) 
Total Romans: 52,300 Total allies: 158,000 
GRAND TOTAL: 210,300 
 
MEN REGISTERED FOR SERVICE (infantry and cavalry) 
 PEOPLE  NUMBERS 
Romans and Campanians 273,000 
Latins 85,000 
Samnites 77,000 
Iapygians and Messapians 66,000 
Lucanians 33,000 
Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani and Vestini 24,000 
TOTAL: 558,000 
 
The total number given by Polybius is 768,300 men (infantry and cavalry) in arms and capable of bearing 
arms. Problematically, some major groups are missing from Polybius’ list, especially the Greeks of 
Southern Italy and the Bruttians, while the Veneti and the Cenomani, who were not under direct Roman 
control – even though, as suggested by Polybius, there were some forms of military cooperation – are 
included.245 
 
Brunt suggests that the Polybian list relates only to allies who were actually obliged to furnish troops ex 
formula togatorum while the Greeks and the Bruttians, as socii navales, did not furnished troops, but 
                                                 
245 Polybius, III. 23: Veneti and Cenomani agreed to furnish military cooperation. 
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ships and crews.246 Walbank agrees on the Greeks but says that the Bruttians’ contribution was so much 
less important that it was not necessary add them to the list.247 Yet, according to Livy, some Greek cities 
did furnish infantry and, regarding the Bruttians, it would have been odd to require them to provide naval 
units or that they were not needed.248 Toynbee suggests that Fabius Pictor omitted the figures for the 
Greeks and the Bruttians in error.249 
 
If we want to add these people to the list, we have to try to figure out their numbers and Toynbee proposes 
a potential military force of 15,000 Bruttians and 8,700 Greeks, but these figures are clearly too low.250 
I believe that it is hard to believe that the Bruttians were able to raise only half of the manpower of the 
Lucanians. Both people were well-established regional powers in Southern Italy before the Roman 
conquest, and, for this reason, they were probably capable of raising considerable numbers of soldiers. 
 
Part of a larger Oscan koine, these people became more prominent in Central-Southern Italy especially 
from the fifth century when they started to put pressure on the Greek cities.251 Their movements caused 
a chain reaction that deeply influenced the entire Italian peninsula: in Magna Graecia the effects of these 
migrations were clearly negative as the Greek cities were attacked by Lucanians, Brutii and Iapygians 
while in Campania, the Campanians and Samnites progressively occupied the entire area overthrowing 
the Etruscan and the Greeks – Capua in 423 and Cuma in 421 – until Naples was the only Hellenic city 
on the Tyrrhenian coast.252 At the end of the fifth century a vast part of Italy, that included Samnium, 
Lucania, Bruttium, northern Apulia and Campania, was inhabited by people who spoke the same Oscan 
dialect and shared common religious beliefs, social customs and political institutions. 
 
                                                 
246 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 50 
247 Frank Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius (Oxford, 1957-1979), 199 
248 Livy, XXIII. 1 and XXIV. 13 
249 Arnold Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy (Oxford, 1965), 492; also see Virgilio Ilari, Gli Italici nelle Strutture Militari Romane 
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250 Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy, 494-495 
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Lucanians and the Brutii, with the first being the archegetai and the latter the apoikoi. 
252 Herodotus, VII. 170, reports the disastrous defeat of Tarentum by the Iapygians in 473. 
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After a rebellion against the Lucanians, the Brutii quickly formed a powerful confederation capable of 
defeating their former masters and conquering several Greek cities.253 De Juliis says that the main 
difference between the Lucanians and the Brutii was that the latter were not influenced by Greek culture, 
yet such an assumption seems extreme, unlikely, and unwarranted.254 Dench reminds us that Ennius 
described them as bilingues  since they spoke both Oscan and Greek.255 According to Polybius, the 
Lucanians in 225 could raise 33,000 men (infantry and cavalry); we can assume that the Bruttian forces 
would be similar. Obviously, we don’t have any Bruttian census figures, but we can consider that Livy 
reports that, in 215, the Bruttians raised an army of 15,000 iuniores to attack Croton.256 This force, 
however, is not a representation of the total manpower of the Bruttians since not all their contingents 
were included for this campaign: Livy says that some communities, like Petelia, were still loyal to the 
Romans and, for this reason, it is possible to raise our total for Bruttian manpower.257 
 
Regarding the Greek communities, by 225 the population of cities like Rhegium, Croton, Metapontum 
or Tarentum may have sunk somewhat after three centuries of tribulations: continuous wars, the invasions 
by Syracuse, the attacks by the Italian peoples like the Lucanian or the Bruttians, and finally Rome’s 
conquests.258 In 209, 30,000 people of Tarentum were sold as slaves, a blow from which, one would 
imagine, it would take some time to recover. We may reasonably estimate the pre-war free population 
Tarentum and its territory as having been more than 60,000 people without danger of exaggeration. 
 
Nevertheless, it seems possible that there was a difference between the total male population and those 
available for military service. We can hardly know how the Greek cities judged eligibility and negotiated 
that eligibility in agreement with Rome: Greek cities after all had tended to make extensive use of 
mercenary armies rather than relying on their own citizenry.259 One presumes that Rome imposed a 
military levy on communities having made a judgment on the likely number of troops the community 
                                                 
253 Strabo, VI. 4, says that they were shepherds who served the Lucanians. Even their name indicated their servile origins: 
Brutii was used by the Lucanians to indicate rebel slaves. Diodorus, XVI. 15, makes a list of these cities: Terina, Hipponium, 
Thurii while Diodorus, XII. 22 mentions the fall of Sybaris. 
254 Ettore De Juliis, Magna Grecia: l’Italia meridionale dalle origini leggendarie alla conquista romana (Bari, 1996), 255 
255 Dench, From Barbarians to New Men, 50. On the bilinguism of the Brutii, see Ennius, Ann. 477 
256 Livy, XXIV. 2 
257 Livy, XXIII. 30 
258 Rhegium did not recovered from the massacres and evictions on its male Greek citizens by the “Campanian Legion” in 
282. Half of the area of Croton was uninhabited since the Pyrrhic War (Livy, XXIV. 4) and its population in 225 was of just 
2,000 people (Livy, XXIII. 30). Metapontum was deserted in Pausanias’ time (Pausania, GD, VI. 19). 30,000 people from 
Tarentum were sold into slavery after its fall in 209. 
259 Dionysius, XX. 1 says that Tarentum contributed to Pyrrhus’ army with a force of mercenary infantry and cavalry. 
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could provide, but there may have been some recognition of local traditions of military service. It is thus 
possible that some communities had limited demands placed upon them. 
 
If we make some account for the military manpower of the Greek cities and of the Bruttii to the listing, 
we would be looking to add perhaps another 40,000 men to military resources of Rome. 
 
Much about the Polybian passage is debatable. We would like to know the original source of the statistics 
for instance. It is, however, a very unusual text and the process of enumeration of military resources in 
such detail, though far from unparalleled, is not common among historians. For Rome, this is a unique 
source. The passage clearly has a rhetorical function in that it is meant to portray the intimidating power 
of Rome on the verge of the Punic War, and in this sense it parallels Josephus’ adumbration of Rome’s 
resources on the verge of the Jewish War.260 Nevertheless, the figures are unlikely to have been an 
invention. The most obvious conclusion a reader is to draw from the passage is the massive manpower 
available for military service at the verge of the Second Punic War. At around 800,000 men, Rome had 
an enormous, almost endless, reservoir of soldiers. 
 
In book VI, Polybius describes the Roman army as a single force composed of four legions; even though 
it is difficult to date book VI, it is possible that the Roman army was organised in this way up until the 
early third century. In this passage of book II, however, the legions and the number of soldiers under 
arms is 52,300 men divided into ten legions suggesting the recruitment and deployment of three different 
armies.261 It seems possible that the Polybian portrayal of consular armies of four legions raised annually 
was anachronistic from as early as the First Punic War. 
 
Polybius also provides us with data with which make a comparison between Romans and allies in the 
army. We know from book VI that, during the levy, the number of socii recruited was close to that of the 
Romans (1:1 for infantry, 1:3 for cavalry), but in this catalogue Polybius is suggesting that the allies were 
actually three times more numerous than the Romans since 158,000 were under arms against 52,300 
citizens. However, the socii are divided by Polybius: 65,000 were actually in the army, while the other 
                                                 
260 Josephus, The Jewish War, III. 64-69 
261 Polybius, II. 24: the four standard consular legions, two legions in Sicily and Tarentum and four more legions at Rome. 
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94,000 are other allied troops perhaps relegated to garrison duties.262 The ratio is, however, very similar 
to that of the legions, many of which were in garrison. Finally, this list could be used for trying to estimate 
the enlistment rate for both Romans and allies. 
 
Can we consider Polybius’ numbers of men registered for service – Romans and Campanians – a census 
figure? The closest census figure by date come to us from Livy for the period between 241 and 219: in 
this occasion the Roman population was of 270,000 free male citizens, close to the 273,000 suggested 
by Polybius.263 If, as he said, 52,300 Romans were under arms in 225, this means that 19% of Roman 
male citizens were serving in the army. 
 
For the allies, on the other hand, it is much more difficult. If we exclude Romans and Campanians from 
the list, we have 285,000 people available for service of which 158,000 were actually under arms: 55.4% 
of them were in the army, clearly too many. If we count only those who were in the armies, and not used 
as garrison troops, so 65,000 men, we can see that 22.8% of those available were recruited, still very 
high. We may have to assume that the figures for available manpower provided by Polybius come from 
documentation rather different than the Roman census. 
 
As already mentioned, the foedus Cassianum of 493 was probably the first point at which a formula was 
established for military collaboration between Rome and the Latins (see Dionysius VI, 95) and the 
relative contributions of the various communities. It seems likely that after the war of 340-338 it was 
replaced with the formula togatorum, described by Livy as the instrument that governed the military 
obligations of Roman allies.264 The main function of this document was to prescribe the number of men 
each community must send to Rome. The obligations of the allied cities would have varied from dilectus 
to dilectus since, as suggested by Polybius, during the levy, the consuls informed the allied magistrates 
how many troops each community had to provide and thus a political decision must have been taken in 
Rome, presuming referring to the formula, as to the proportion of available manpower that would be 
                                                 
262 Polybius, II. 25-26, says that when the Gauls invaded Etruria they were reached by: “…the army the Romans had posted 
in Etruria…” near Faesulae, possibly part of the Sabine-Etruscan force of the previous list. After the battle, this force was 
rescued by the arrival of the consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus and his army. 
263 Livy, Per., 20 
264 Livy, XXVII. 10; also see Will Broadhead, ‘Migration and Hegemony: fixity and mobility in second century Italy’, in 
(eds.) De Ligt, L., and Northwood, S., People, Land and Politics, 456 and 468 on the fixed nature of the formula togatorum 
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demanded.265 It seems quite likely that the Romans will have had an agreed listing of the populations of 
various areas who could be called upon to perform military service, but it would seem that these numbers 
were likely established by negotiation rather than by census and it may be these figures which have 
informed the Polybian account. 
 
Before the First Punic War, the Romans regularly mobilized four legions each year and the socii 
contributed sending their own forces: as many infantrymen as the citizens, but three times as many 
cavalry (according to Polybius).266 On the other hand, Velleius Paterculus states that the Italian allies had 
always furnished twice as many soldiers as the Roman citizens.267 Although this argument represents the 
indignation of the Italian rebels at the time of the Social War, Appian seems to confirm this ratio by 
saying that during the Hannibalic War, the allies had to furnish twice as many troops as the Romans, 
though obviously he and Velleius may have been using the same source.268 
 
Livy, in his account, seems to confirm the ratio between Romans and allies of 1:2 for infantry, 1:3 for 
cavalry: in 218 six legions were recruited and divided into three forces.269 Tiberius Sempronius, with two 
legions – 8,000 infantrymen and 600 cavalrymen – and 16,000 allied infantrymen plus 1,800 cavalrymen, 
took command of the operations in Sicily and Africa. Publius Cornelius Scipio, commander of the troops 
in Spain, had a force of two legions with the support of 14,000 allied infantry and 1,600 cavalry. Finally, 
a third army, composed by two legions and 10,000 allied infantry and 1,000 cavalry was sent to Gaul. 
 
This passage is another suggestion of the recruitment and deployment of multiple armies in the second 
half of the third century while, regarding the role of the allies, Livy is suggesting a strong participation: 
almost 45,000 against 25,800 Romans. It is interesting that the ratio is not always the same, but it changed 
– possibly – according to the importance of the front, but, in all cases, the allies were more numerous 
than the Romans. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter, I have tried to understand the close connection between the army and 
Roman society also by showing the proportion of men recruited into the army. The key question that I 
                                                 
265 Polybius, VI. 21 
266 Polybius, VI. 26 
267 Velleius Paterculus, RH, II. 15 
268 Appian, VII. 2. 8 
269 Livy, XXI. 17 
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would like to made – and try to answer – in order to conclude this chapter is how significant was the 
burden of recruitment in the third century, now a well-defined and organised system, on the Romans. 
 
Comparing one more time the census figures with the number of Roman citizens serving in the army, 
could give us a general idea of how heavy was the burden of recruitment on the population in the third 
century. As shown, there were between 18,000 and 21,200 citizens in a typical Roman army of this period 
while the census figures are showing a population eligible for military service from 262,000 free men in 
293, to its peak of 292,000 in 264 to the 214,000 in 204. However, this is doable only for the first half of 
the century, especially before the Punic Wars when the Romans may have started to deploy more than 
one consular army and, consequently, recruit more men: 
 
DATE CENSUS CITIZENS RECRUITED 
293 262,321 6.8% 
280 287,222 6.2% 
264 292,234 6.1% 
241 241,212 7.4% 
 
Of course, all these numbers are nothing more than plausible guesses since they are relying entirely on 
the census figures, but they give an idea of the burden of recruitment and how much of the population 
was affected. Once the recruitment system was perfected, the Romans maintained recruitment at 
relatively low levels and were actually able to recruit more men than those usually deployed in the fields 
as showed by our sources. 
 
The second part of the third century is marked, of course, by the two Punic Wars and the great military 
effort that they required. After all, the deployment of multiple armies suggested by both Polybius and 
Livy that started during the First and became a custom in the Second, changed the level of recruitment 
forcing the Roman citizens to sustain a much stronger burden. 
 
Livy, in his passage about the Roman forces in 218, says that six legions were deployed and 25,800 
citizens were in the army suggesting that 9.5% of them were in the army. But it is Polybius, and his 
description of the army in 225, that is suggesting a really high recruitment level: he says that 273,000 
citizens were available for service and 52,300 were enlisted in the army – divided into ten legions – for 
a total of 19% of citizens recruited. A later source, Appian, suggests that in 217 the Roman army was 
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composed by thirteen legions (5,300 men per legion) for a total of 69,000 Romans in the army.270 If the 
census figures of the period indicates that 270,000 males were available for service, it means that 25% 
of them were in the army.  
 
At the end of the third century, we are looking at potentially very high levels of recruitment, not quite 
the one-third level suggested as a maximum figure. Yet, if we take out the injured and the unfit, the aged 
and those who were immune for various other reasons, then the manpower realistically available to the 
recruiting tribunes is likely to have been very much smaller than the totals given in the census figures. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, the Second Punic War is likely to provide us with a guide to the 
maximum level of mobilization possible in Roman society, but even before that war, we are looking at 
major mobilizations of Roman manpower. 
 
Trying to do the same process for the socii, on the other hand, is a task of enormous, almost impossible, 
difficulty. Even though Polybius, II. 24 gives an idea of the potential manpower of Italy in the second 
half of the third century, it is still very difficult to use it to understand the burden of recruitment for the 
Italian communities.271 It is clear from Livy, Velleius and Appian that allied numbers in the army were 
approximately double those of their Roman counterparts, which would suggest that there was a 
considerably larger recruitment pool. At the very minimum, we would have to assume that the Italian 
population was double that of Rome. We might think it more comfortable to assume that the Italian 
population was considerably larger even than that estimate and that the pressure of recruitment on the 
Italian communities were correspondingly less. 
 
Although the data we can draw from the disparate and far from perfect sources surveyed in this chapter 
presents us with considerable problems, the material does point in the same direction. It seems that from 
the late fifth century onwards (though we cannot be firm about the date), the Romans recruited from a 
broad cross-section of their society. The need to recruit from the poorer elements of Roman society drove 
certain political and institutional changes. These included the introduction of pay, but also are likely to 
be related to the development of colonization as a means of rewarding successful armies. Furthermore, 
the Romans appear to have recruited a large proportion of their population into the army.  
                                                 
270 Appian, VII. 2. 8 
271 In terms of men registered for service, Polybius, II. 24 also presents a major problem: it says that, excluding the Romans 
and Campanians (273,000), the rest of the allies contributed with 285,000 men available for service of which 158,000 (55.4%) 
were already in the army. 
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The earlier we look for data, the less reliable it is, but the military reforms of the fifth and fourth century 
would appear to be designed to generate larger armies and make maximum use of the population 
resource. Although it is impossible to come to a definitive estimate of Roman population in the absence 
of reliable census data, even high estimates of Roman population density, perhaps unrealistically high 
for this period, would entail high recruitment rates. By the third century, we seem to have more reliable 
census data, but there is considerable uncertainty as to whether the consular armies were the only legions 
under arms at any one time. If this were the case, military recruitment would be under 10%, but if the 
number of legions under arms were more than four, as seems very likely after the middle of the century, 
then we would have to assume proportionately higher percentages of the manpower being recruited. 
When we get to the last decades of the century, before the Second Punic War, recruitment appears to 
have been high.  
 
It seems likely that the ability of the Romans to mobilize such a high proportion of their population was 
largely responsible for the military success and it seems further likely that the willingness of the 
population to serve was driven by the economic benefits of military success. The economic effects of 
Roman military service on the Roman population is likely to have been considerable.  
 
The issue with Italians is likely to have been somewhat different. Although Polybius can be read as 
suggesting an enormous military burden was placed on the Italian population, there is good reason for 
regarding his population figures for Italy with great suspicion. It seems likely that the burden on the 
Italian population, though heavy, was less than that placed on the Roman population. We have, 
obviously, to admit to the speculative nature of that supposition.  
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Chapter 4 
THE RECRUITMENT SYSTEM OF THE ROMAN ARMY 
Part 2: the Second Punic War 
 
 
As we have showed in the previous chapter, Polybius’ passage on Roman manpower at the time of the 
Gallic invasion of Italy of 225 describes a manpower of about 800,000 men in service or available for 
service divided between Roman citizens and almost all the Italian allies.272 This passage also showed 
that, at some time since the first conflict against Carthage, the Romans had begun to deploy more than 
the standard four consular legions (see previous chapter). This practice became common during the third 
century and reached its peak during the Second Punic War, and came to be such a typical feature of the 
Republican army that, in the period between 200 and 100, instead of being a standard number of legions 
in service, numbers changed according to the situation and the necessity.273 
 
The Second Punic War tested Rome’s military system to its limit and attests to the capabilities of Italy 
in the third century. The strains on Roman manpower were not to be matched until the great conflicts of 
the first century such as the Social War and the Civil Wars which increased enormously the number of 
men recruited in the army. The ability of Rome to recruit confirms Polybius’ numbers – or at least 
showing that he did not substantially exaggerate Italy’s military resources. Never before had Rome 
required such number of men to serve in the legions, and although the burden of recruitment decreased 
after the war, it never returned to early third century levels – as we will see in the following recruitment 
section. 
 
Despite the strains, the Second Punic War did not bring many actual changes to the military structure, 
with the exception of the property requirement, that was reduced, with consequences on the census 
figures, manpower availability and the impact of military service on the Roman population. 
 
                                                 
272 Polybius, II. 24 
273 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 424 and 432-433. The period from 191 to 188 has the highest number of legions in service since 
the Hannibalic War, while, in some occasion, the number of legions diminished: in 120, for example, only 3 legions were in 
service (two in Spain and one in Macedonia). 
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Initially the number of legions in service was six in 218, but rapidly grew – in spite of the military defeats 
of the first years – until it reached twenty-five in 212-211. Then it stayed around twenty between 210 
and 203, sixteen in 202 and finally fourteen in 201. Theoretically, 112,500 Roman citizens were in service 
in the legions at the peak of recruitment, but this number, based on the strength of Polybian legions, is 
debatable, as I shall argue below. Calculating the number of Italian allies in the armies of the Republic 
is substantially more difficult. Again, using Polybian numbers, it is possible to suggest a total of 127,500 
socii under arms by 212-211. 
 
The Second Punic War can be divided into three main phases: the first part is marked by Hannibal’s 
victories, the second– and longest – part involved Hannibal’s campaigns in Southern Italy and the 
Romans avoiding direct engagement with Hannibal and focusing on the Italian rebels or on other fronts, 
mainly Spain. Finally, the third and final part, is marked by the Roman counteroffensive, and ended with 
Zama. 
 
In 218, at the beginning of the war, Livy states that 25,800 citizens and 44,400 allies were recruited, for 
a total of 70,200 men divided into six legions.274 Roman forces were divided in order to follow a precise 
strategy: to focus the war effort on Carthaginian’s territory, especially in Spain and Africa, to keep troops 
in Sicily in order to avoid any Punic action on the island and finally to maintain a presence in Northern 
Italy, not because they expected an invasion there, but to discourage any uprising by the Gauls in an area 
not yet fully pacified after the completion of the conquest in 225. 
 
For this reason, in 218 – late May or early June, two large colonies, Placentia and Cremona, were founded 
on the territories of tribe of the Boii.275. Both had 6,000 male colonists who were accompanied by a 
praetor with a legion and socii in order to protect them. Having received word that Hannibal had left 
Spain in June and would arrive in Northern Italy to fight the Romans, the Gauls attacked the two colonies. 
In November 218 the battle of Ticinus took place, effectively marking the commencement of the conflict. 
 
• Italian front part 1 (218-216):  from Ticinus to Cannae 
 
- Ticinus (November 218) 
                                                 
274 Livy, XXI. 17 
275 Livy, XXI. 24 
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According to Polybus, Hannibal’s army was enfeebled by the long journey from Spain when it reached 
the Po Valley in 218. Crossing the Rhone, Hannibal’s forces were reported as 38,000 infantrymen and 
8,000 cavalrymen. Almost half was lost when he arrived in Northern Italy, so, probably around 20,000 
men and 6,000 cavalry arrived in Italy.276 
 
In 218, the Roman army was still similar to a standard Polybian force, although, as we know, from the 
First Punic War more legions than the regular four could be recruited. From the original deployment of 
troops described by Livy, the two legions army designated to guard Gaul was stationed at Ariminum 
while the consuls were recruiting forces in order to prepare the invasions of Spain and Africa. 
 
The uprising of the Gauls and the rapidity of Hannibal’s march took the Romans by surprise and forced 
them to change their plans: the praetor Lucius Manlius, moved his troops out of Ariminum in order to 
relieve Mutina, recently attacked by the Boii, but his army was ambushed twice by the Gauls and lost 
1,200 men.277 Next, the consul Publius Cornelius Scipio, who was assigned to fight the Carthaginians in 
Spain, sent one of his two legions, together with 5,000 socii, to Northern Italy in order to support the 
troops and people of Placentia and Cremona and started to recruit a new legion before leaving for 
Massalia, where he failed to intercept Hannibal.278 After deciding to send his army to Spain under the 
command of his brother Gnaeus, Publius returned to Italy and took command of Manlius’ two legions.279 
So, by the time of Hannibal’s arrival, the Roman forces at the Ticinus counted only two legions – plus 
socii – for a total of 19,200 men (infantry and cavalry), minus the losses already suffered. 
 
The battle of Ticinus was a minor event and one of the smallest actions of the war since it was nothing 
more than a large skirmish, but it was the first encounter between Hannibal and the Romans in Italy. The 
most important aspect of this battle was that Rome’s defeat further encouraged the Gallic uprising that 
multiplied Rome’s problems.280 There is uncertainty regarding the losses of the Ticinus. Casualties 
                                                 
276 Polybius, III. 60 
277 Livy, XXI. 25 
278 Livy, XXI. 26 
279 Livy, XXI. 39 
280 Polybius, III. 60: the Gauls joined him even before the battle, after Hannibal defeated the Taurini; Polybius, III, 66; Livy, 
XXI. 48: right after the battle of Ticinus, more than 2,000 Gauls in the Roman army deserted to Hannibal, and later, at 
Clastidium, the commander of the garrison, Dasius of Brundisium, was bribed and gave this important supply center to the 
Carthaginians. 
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probably were not high. Polybius, III. 66 is the only source and says that 600 Romans (not specified 
whether it is citizens or allies) were captured after the battle and one must presume losses higher than 
that. 
 
- Trebia (December 218) 
 
Polybius says that at the battle of the Trebia the Romans deployed an entire army: 36,000 (16,000 
Romans and 20,000 socii) men and 4,000 cavalry.281 Livy’s description is quite similar, though the 
Roman army was a little stronger: it shows an army of more than 38,000 men (18,000 Romans, 20,000 
Latin socii and other auxiliary units of Cenomani) and 4,000 cavalrymen.282 The main difference between 
the two sources is that Polybius is describing four weaker legions of 4,000 men while Livy, on the other 
hand, regular ones of 4,500 men each. Also, both of them are suggesting four stronger alae sociorum of 
5,000 men each, while, usually, the alae had the same number of soldiers as their Roman counterparts 
(4,200).  
 
We do not have any clear figure on the losses, but both Livy and Polybius tell us that, at the end, only 
10,000 Romans managed to break the enemy lines and escape towards Placentia, meaning that 26,000 or 
28,000 men between Romans and allies – both deaths and prisoners – were lost at the Trebia.283 Even 
though the Roman commander, Sempronius Longus, tried to hide the severity of his defeat, in reality, 
the battle of the Trebia was a severe blow to the Roman effort in Northern Italy – not only for the high 
losses – because it persuaded those Gauls yet uncommitted to embrace the Punic cause and thereby 
enhanced Hannibal’s manpower.284 
 
In summary, the Roman armies of 218 amounted to 25,800 legionaries in six legions, two in Spain, two 
in Sicily at first, but then moved to Northern Italy where a total of four were stationed. The number of 
allies was probably 44,400, assuming 15,600 in Spain and 17,800 initially in Sicily – but later moved to 
North Italy, where the other 10,000 were located. 
 
                                                 
281 Polybius, III. 72 
282 Livy, XXI. 55 
283 Livy, XXI. 56; Polybius, III. 74 
284 Polybius, III. 75: Sempronius said that the battle was inconclusive, a missed victory because of the extreme weather 
conditions. 
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Losses at Trebia amounted to 26,000 to 28,000, of whom we would assume 12,000 or so were Roman. 
Ticinius probably added 2,000 to that number at least, including prisoners and we have 1,200 losses from 
the conflicts with the Gauls. Roman losses in 218 probably amounted to more than 14,000 with perhaps 
16,000 Italian allies also falling. 
 
- Lake Trasimene (June 217) 
 
After the defeat at the Trebia, the senate was determined to prosecute the war vigorously. In 217, eleven 
legions were deployed on the various fronts of the war for a total of 105,600 men under arms – divided 
between 49,500 Roman citizens (in legions of 4,500 men) and 56,100 socii (in alae of 5,100 men). Of 
the previous army, two legions were in Spain, but an additional force was sent there later (probably one 
legion, as explained later in the Spanish front section), while four legions were deployed in Cisalpine 
Gaul and then followed Hannibal as he moved to Central Italy. New legions were recruited: two were 
stationed in Sicily, one in Sardinia and two urban legions were raised in Rome. 
 
The newly elected consuls, C. Flaminius – a former tribune of the plebs, described by both Livy and 
Polybius as an aggressive demagogue – and his colleague Servilius Geminus, wanted to confine Hannibal 
in Northern Italy, but Hannibal managed to ambush the consular army as it was marching along the 
shores of Lake Trasimene. The result was a catastrophe: 15,000 citizens were killed – and we don’t know 
how many allies – and between 10,000 and 15,000 were made prisoners, but we don’t have any 
distinction between Romans and allies.285 
 
News of this terrible defeat caused panic in Rome, resulting in the election of a dictator – Quintus Fabius 
Maximus. His plans for the war changed the usual way of how the Romans faced their enemies: the 
Romans moved to a war of attrition. 
 
Although we cannot know how many soldiers were killed in other conflicts in Spain or in the minor 
battles in Italy, we may estimate Roman losses in 217 at more than 20,000 dead while, regarding the 
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allies, we don’t have enough information other than the losses of 13,400 at Trasimene; for the rest of the 
year they are not mentioned by the sources.286 
 
- Cannae (August 216) 
 
Fabius' strategy failed to impress the Senate and the senators decided not to renew his dictatorial powers 
at the end of his term. In 216, after the elections, Gaius Terentius Varro and Aemilius Paullus were placed 
in command of a newly raised army, and directed to engage Hannibal: the result was Cannae.  
 
Livy and Polybius are our main sources for this battle. On numbers, Livy writes, ‘there was also a 
substantial increase in military personnel, but such are the discrepancies in the sources regarding numbers 
and kind of troops involved that I would not venture to give precise information on the size of the 
additions to infantry and cavalry forces’.287 According to his description, each legion was increased by 
1,000 infantrymen and 100 cavalrymen for a total of 5,300 men for each legion while the allies 
contributed with the same number of men and double of cavalrymen for a total of 5,600 men for each 
ala. Furthermore, some of Livy’s sources reported a supplementary force of 10,000 men while others 
that four more legions were formed. Livy’s account suggests different possibilities for the total of the 
Roman forces at Cannae: first, four enhanced legions of 5,300 men each (tot: 21,200) plus four alae of 
5,600 men (tot: 22,400) for a total of 43,600 men that became 53,600 with the 10,000 supplement.288 
Secondly, a force of eight legions for a total of 87,200 men divided between 42,400 Romans (5,300 men 
in eight legions) and 44,800 socii (5,600 men per ala).289 
 
Polybius doesn’t give the same detailed description of the formation of this army, but mentions that the 
Romans, for the first time, deployed eight legions of 5,300 men instead of the usual four and that, on this 
occasion, the number of Romans and allies was the same. In total, Polybius says that at Cannae the 
Roman army counted 86,000 men (although the actual count of eight legions of 5,300 men – 10,600 men 
with Romans and Italians – would be of 84,800 men).290 
                                                 
286 15,000 Romans were killed at the Trasimene. Minor engagements in Campania caused more than 5,000 dead between 
Romans and allies: Livy, XXII. 15-16 and XXII. 24. There are no information regarding the losses in Spain during the 
successful campaign of 217, but these were smaller battles. 
287 Livy, XXII. 36 
288 Livy, XXII. 36 
289 Livy, XXII. 36 
290 Polybius III. 107 and 113 
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Appian, without any description, simply suggests an army of 70,000 foot and 6,000 horse.291 He makes 
no distinction between Romans and allies. 
 
Not only is there confusion about the Roman forces on the field, but on the causalities as well. Hannibal’s 
losses, according to Polybius, were of 5,700 men (4,000 Gauls, 1,500 Spaniards and 200 horsemen)292, 
while Livy says that, in total, the Carthaginians lost 8,000 men.293 The Roman losses, on the other hand, 
are far more complicated: according to Polybius, 70,000 died in battle, 10,000 were taken prisoners and 
only 3,000 managed to escape.294 Appian suggests that at least 50,000 Romans were killed in few hours 
while 7,000 were taken prisoners.295 He does not mention the survivors who, by simple calculation, 
should amount to 19,000. 
 
Finally, we have Livy. His description of the Roman losses is rather more complicated than that of 
Polybius and Appian, especially regarding prisoners and survivors. At the end of the battle, the total 
number of dead was of 48,200 men while 4,500 were captured during the battle and 2,000 more who 
tried to escape unsuccessfully to the village of Cannae. Among the survivors of the battle, 10,000 
managed to flee to Canusium while 17,000 were trapped in the two camps (7,000 in the smaller, 10,000 
in the larger camp) and only 4,500 of these managed to escape to Venusia before the Carthaginians forced 
both camps to surrender. So, the total number of prisoners taken during and after the battle is 19,000 
while the survivors, between those who fled to Canusium those in Venusia, are 14,550.296 
 
Livy’s figures are preferable to those of Polybius, especially because, after the disaster, two legions of 
both Romans and allies were formed with the survivors of Cannae, the legiones Cannenses.297 The sum 
of Livy’s casualties, prisoners and survivors amounts to an army of 82,000 men. We might suggest that 
Livy simply accepted Polybius’ numbers without saying it; after all, he gave different possibilities for 
the strength of the Roman army at Cannae, but does not say which one was correct. Finally, we should 
                                                 
291 Appian, VII, 3. 17 
292 Polybius, III. 117 
293 Livy, XXII. 52 
294 Polybius, III. 117 
295 Appian, VII. 4, 25 
296 Livy, XXII. 49-54 
297 These legions were assigned to Sicily for the rest of the war as punishment for fleeing from the battlefield, described as a 
disgrace. From time to time, however, they received reinforcements from other troops in disgrace. 
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remember that Polybius was one of Livy’s main sources, especially regarding military matters. The first 
table shows the strength of the army deployed by Rome at Cannae according to the different sources. 
 
SOURCE LEGIONS ROMANS ALLIES TOTAL 
Livy 4 21,200 22,400 43,600 
Livy 4 + supplement 31,200 22,400 53,600 
Livy 8 42,400 44,800 87,200 
Polybius 8 42,400 42,400 84,800 
Appian // // // 76,000 
 
The following table, on the other hand, shows the different losses reported by our main sources. 
 
SOURCE DEAD PRISONERS SURVIVORS TOTAL 
Livy 48,200 19,000 14,550 81,750 
Appian 50,000 7,000 19,000 76,000 
Polybius 70,000 10,000 3,000 83,000 
 
These numbers have been subject to discussion: while Goldsworthy and O’Connell claim that the 
Romans deployed eight legions for a total of 86,000 men298, De Sanctis and Brunt accept Livy’s lower 
figures and propose a total force between 45,000 and 50,000 men and deny the eight legions army.299 
 
De Sanctis suggests that one of the main reasons of confusion is a simple, yet important, mistake made 
by the sources: for Greek writers the word stratopeda – legion – meant a force of Roman citizens. This 
force, however, did not include the allied contingent, as this formed another stratopeda, making a legion 
formed by two “Greek legions”, one of Romans and one of allies.300 So it is possible that the eight legions 
at Cannae were actually four legions and Polybius, by using Greco-Carthaginian sources instead of 
Roman ones, made the mistake of counting the four legions and four alae separately.301 
 
A second problem highlighted by De Sanctis in understanding the figures given by our sources is the 
exaggerated ratio between cavalry and infantry. In his view, 6,000 cavalrymen suggested by Polybius at 
Cannae is actually closer to the strength of the cavalry contingent of four legions, thus he believes that 
                                                 
298 Adrian Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars (London, 2001), 200; Robert O’Connell, The Ghosts of Cannae (New York, 
2010), 148 
299 Gaetano De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani vol. III 2, 128; Brunt, Italian Manpower, 419 
300 De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani vol. III 2, 112 
301 De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani vol. III 2, 127 
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the cavalry deployed actually suggested that the number of legions was not eight.302 It is true that an eight 
legions army should have had a stronger cavalry contingent that, in Polybian numbers, would amount to 
9,600 cavalrymen in total (1,200 between Romans and socii per legion), but he also says that, for this 
occasion, the numbers of Romans and allies were the same – making the cavalry contingents of the allies 
weaker than usual (300 instead of 900). 
 
Regarding the cavalry, the other sources are not very different from Polybius and they do not support De 
Sanctis’ argument: Appian’s vague figures actually confirm the 6,000 men while Livy, on the other hand, 
says that the allies had double cavalry at Cannae (so 600) moving their contingent from 2,400 – if four 
legions – to 4,800 men – if eight legions. Adding the Roman cavalry (300 men per legion for a total from 
1,200 for four legions to 2,400 for eight legions), the total strength is from 3,600 to 7,200, showing that, 
in any case, there was a high ratio of infantry to cavalry as was normal in the Roman army, making both 
De Sanctis’ arguments rather weak. 
 
The key factor in establishing the size of the Roman forces at Cannae is the number of casualties. Both 
Livy and Appian are very similar in their figures for the total number of dead (48,000 and 50,000) and 
one may assume that Appian is rounding the same figure that Livy has. Appian may, of course, be 
dependent on Livy and so we cannot treat Appian’s figure as corroborating the Livian figure. Polybius’ 
figures clearly derive from his calculation as to the initial size of the army. 
 
Appian’s number of prisoners (7,000) is very close to Polybius’ while Livy, on the other hand, suggests 
a total of 19,000 prisoners and it is possible that these numbers are to be preferred over the others because 
Livy’s account is the most detailed. Livy’s account not only describes how many soldiers were captured, 
but also when and where, showing that he had sources other than Polybius which allowed such levels of 
precision.303 
 
                                                 
302 De Sanctis, Storia dei Romani, vol. III 2, 127; according to Polybius, VI. 20 and 26 each legion was supported by 300 
Roman cavalry and 900 allied cavalry for a total of 1,200 per legion. Thus, four legions would have been reinforced by 4,800 
Roman and allied cavalrymen. 
303 Regarding the prisoners’ number at Cannae see Livy, XXII. 49: 4,500 were captured during the battle, 2,000 escaped into 
the village of Cannae, but were captured soon after. Also, a total of 17,000 men escaped to the camps, but only part of them 
– 6,400 in the small one and 5,800 in the large one – remained and was later captured, while the rest (600 from the small 
camp, see Livy, XXII. 50, and 4,200 from the large camp, see Livy, XXII. 52) managed to escape to Canusium. 
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Finally, regarding the survivors, the key element is the later formation of the legiones canneneses. Livy, 
once again, is the most persuasive: he suggests that 14,550 soldiers between Romans and Italians 
managed to escape and they were later regrouped in two legions. This is plausible even if it shows that 
these legions were weaker than usual: the normal manpower of two legions was of 19,200 men (divided 
between 9,000 Romans and 10,200 socii)304 while, in this case, these “special” legions were formed by 
just 7,200 men between Romans and allies each. Appian’s number of survivors, although similar 
(19,000), may have been calculated on the basis of the assumed strength of the legiones cannenses while 
Polybius’ numbers are clearly too low – 3,000 survivors are enough for one weakened legion.305 
 
So, by combining Livy’s figures for the losses, we have 48,000 dead, around 19,000 prisoners and 14,500 
survivors for a total of 81,500 men under arms. Hannibal, after the battle, freed all the Italians allowing 
them to go home thus probably changing the total number of prisoners.306 Livy, XXII. 49 says that 
casualties among Romans and socii were roughly the same, so we might estimate that, from the total of 
48,000 dead, 24,000 were Romans and 24,000 Italians. Of the prisoners, the only available solution to us 
is to divide the 19,000; it is possible that more Romans were captured (so perhaps 10,000) while the 
remaining 9,000 allies were later freed by Hannibal. This meant that Rome lost 34,000 dead and prisoners 
and the Italians 24,000 dead.307 
 
Cannae was not the only disaster that struck the Romans in 216. Later in the year, a force of two legions 
plus a strong contingent of allies – that probably numbered 11,800 men (two stronger Polybian alae 
sociorum) – was ambushed and completely destroyed in the Litana forest in Cisalpine Gaul by a force of 
Boii; according to Livy, only 10 men managed to escape.308 This brought Roman losses in Italy in 216 
to 43,000 (between dead and prisoners – and we have no information regarding the losses in Spain). 
 
                                                 
304 Polybius, VI. 20 and 26 
305 We have to consider that, according to Appian, Roman legions during the Second Punic War were already 5,300 men 
strong and suggests a parity between Romans and allies – so one legion counted 10,600 men. For this reason, two legions 
were formed by 21,200 men and the number of survivors of Cannae – 19,000 – is close to two, not very much, weakened 
legions, but still too strong, also because legions with such manpower started to be deployed from the late 180s. 
306 Regarding the Italian prisoners, see Livy, XXII. 58 
307 Regarding the number of dead at Cannae, Livy, XXII. 49 says that casualties among Romans and socii were roughly the 
same, so we can say that, from the total of 48,000 dead, 24,000 were Romans and 24,000 Italians. On the prisoners, the best 
solution is a total of 19,000; it is possible that more Romans were captured (so 10,000) while the remaining 9,000 allies were 
later freed by Hannibal. 
308 Livy, XXIII. 24 
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If to the forces that we have proposed for Cannae (42,400 citizens) we add those in service at the same 
moment in Spain (12,600 Romans) and on other fronts (two legions in Cisalpine Gaul, two in Sicily and 
one in Sardinia for a total of 22,500 citizen), the total count of the Roman citizens in the army increases 
to 77,500 in sixteen legions, certainly a high number, but not one which we can exclude a priori – after 
all, Polybius’ list of 225 suggested that 52,500 citizens were under arms.309 
 
After Cannae, the Romans reorganized their forces in order to keep fighting against Carthage. Although 
Livy does not give a precise list and number of the legions in service, he actually describes all the 
movements of troops which would allow us to reconstruct a list of legions in service. Including the forces 
scraped from the volones – enfranchised slaves, convicts and debtors – and the troops in Spain, there 
were fifteen legions for a total of 63,800 men.310 
 
• Spanish front part 1 (218-215) 
 
The same winter when the Roman army was crushed at the battle of the Trebia, the war also started in 
Spain, the other major theatre of operations. While Hannibal was moving from Northern to Central Italy 
after the battle of the Trebia, the army under the command of Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio disembarked in 
the city of Emporiae – an old Greek colony founded by Massalia – in Northern Spain. According to Livy 
his army was composed by two legions of 8,600 Romans and 15,600 allies, but he also tells us that he 
signed treaties with some local populations and recruited them into his auxiliary units.311 
 
The following year (217), encouraged by Scipio’s successes312, the senate decided to send 
reinforcements: thirty warships and 8,000 men arrived in Spain – although it is not clear how many 
                                                 
309 Polybius, II. 24 
310 On the volones, see Livy, XXII. 57 and XXIII. 14. Regarding the movement of troops after Cannae, see Livy XXIII. 31-
32: two urban legions in Rome were moved to Cales and then to Suessula in order to protect Nola, the two legions of the 
survivors of Cannae were moved to Sicily while the troops there (2 legions) were moved back to Rome and from there they 
were ordered to move to Apulia. Regarding this region, Livy, XXIII. 22 suggests that there were Roman troops after Cannae 
under the consul Gaius Terentius, and, when he left, the praetor Valerius took command of these troops (XXIII. 32). Livy 
also mentions the volones and that a legion was stationed in Sardinia. Shortly before, Livy (XXIII. 14) says that the praetor 
Marcus Claudius Marcellus was in Casilinum, just north of Capua, with his army – so probably 2 legions – and, finally, we 
know that three legions were in Spain at the time – the two sent in 218 and the reinforcements, probably a single legion, of 
217 (Livy, XXII. 22). 
311 Livy, XXI. 17 and XXI. 60 
312 In 218 in Spain: defeat of Hanno (Livy, XI. 60), the victory against the Lacetani (Livy, XI. 61) and the naval battle of 
Onussa (Livy, XXII. 20) although this battle is not widely believed because it is not mentioned by Polybius. 
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Romans and how many allies were part of this force, but probably this was one legion plus socii – under 
the command of Publius Scipio who joined his brother Gnaeus.313 They had a simple strategy: take the 
offensive to prevent Hannibal receiving troops, supplies or money from Spain. So, by the year 216, three 
legions of Romans and socii operated in Spain for a total of 32,200 men, and we can estimate the numbers 
of Romans at 12,600 and the Italian allies at 19,600. 
 
After the first successes, the war in Spain proceeded slowly until, in early 215, Hasdrubal received orders 
to make preparations in order to join Hannibal in Italy.314 The Romans managed to intercept his forces 
near the town of Hiberia: Livy says both armies were equivalent in strength – so we can assume that both 
counted around 30,000 men – and that the battle was fought in a way similar to Cannae, but, at the end, 
the Romans were victorious, and avoided a new invasion of Italy.315 
 
We have no data on the losses in Spain for the period 218-215. Up until Hiberia (early 215), battles on 
the Spanish front were neither frequent nor big. We might suppose that, maybe, up until that encounter, 
losses were a little more than 2,000 men between Romans and allies (so, maybe, around 1,000 citizens). 
After the battle, Livy says that losses were heavy, but he doesn’t mention for whom – Romans, allies or 
Carthaginians – so, maybe, 1,000 more citizens were lost making the total of around 2,000, but this is 
entirely speculative. 
 
- The Aftermath of Cannae 
 
Cannae led to a massive revolt of the Italian communities against Rome:316 cities in Apulia, Samnites 
communities, the Lucanians, the Brutii and Greek cities in Magna Graecia – Tarentum in particular – 
progressively joined Hannibal over the following years. The greatest achievement of the Carthaginians, 
however, was the defection of Capua and other Campanian cities.317 As a result, the number of allies 
available was reduced, further weakening the armies of the Republic. 
 
                                                 
313 Livy, XXII. 22 
314 Livy, XXIII. 27 
315 We know that the Romans, by 216, had 32,200 men in Spain and Livy, XXIII. 29 describes the forces at Hiberia: “In 
numbers or quality of men, one side was not in the slightest superior to the other…” 
316 Livy, XXII. 61 
317 See Michael Fronda, Between Rome and Carthage. Southern Italy during the Second Punic War (Cambridge, 2010), 146-
147 on how local rivalries in Campania undermined Hannibal’s effort in the region. 
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Secondary sources, Brunt in particular, suggest that the legions from this moment until the end of the 
war were under strength, a process that started already from the second part of 216 – the post-Cannae 
legions: the number of citizens started to decrease, and instead of the standard 4,500 men, Brunt estimates 
that each of the legions in service counted 4,100 men, and that, from that moment, the number of troops 
continued to decrease. This was not caused by the lack of soldiers to recruit, according to Brunt, but it 
was a strategic decision made by the Romans: 
 
‘For the rest of the war most of the legions must have been at 
most 4,500 strong and often much weaker. […] In Italy Roman 
strategy required a multiplicity of forces rather than large armies 
that could risk another battle with Hannibal. Some legions 
distant from the main theatre of operations (in Gaul, Picenum or 
Etruria) can have been no more than garrisons and were probably 
not reinforced to compensate for wastage’.318 
 
There is no evidence for smaller legions in the sources, while, on the contrary, there is evidence for larger 
legions, although they were deployed only by the end of the war.319 Other sources on the strength of the 
individual legions are scarce, but, in general, it seems that legions increased their manpower rather than 
decreased it.320 Nevertheless, it is possible that weaker legions were in service, especially in the period 
after Cannae.  
 
The following graphics shows the variations of Roman citizens in the legions estimated by Brunt from 
216 (before Cannae, “216*”, and after Cannae, “216**”, in the graph) to 200: 
 
 
                                                 
318 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 420 
319 Livy, XXIX. 25 describes Scipio’s army for his African campaign (204), and is the first instance that legions stronger than 
usual are mentioned during the Second Punic War. 
320 The most basic information is Polybius, VI. 20 who says that standard Roman legions of 4,500 men could increase their 
manpower to 5,300 men in case of emergency. After the Second Punic War, see Livy, XL. 36 regarding the increase of citizens 
in the legions during the 180s, and Livy, XLII, 31 for the legions of the Third Macedonian War. In all these cases, legions 
increased their manpower. 
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We can see that Brunt suggests that legions in service before Cannae were 5,000 men strong, but that 
same year, after the battle, the number of citizens in service decreased to 4,100 per legion.321 This 
negative trend continued for the rest of the war until it reached the lowest point by 206 when, according 
to Brunt, each of the twenty legions in service counted only 2,750 Roman citizens, a massive drop from 
the standard Polybian number (4,500 men per legion). From this point, the number of Roman soldiers in 
the legions start slowly to grow again (2,900 citizens per legion in 204), but never reached their supposed 
standard number for the rest of the war. Brunt suggests that in 200, right after the war, Roman legions 
increased their standard manpower to 5,500. Nevertheless, we have examples that allow us to question 
the Brunt model. In 216, contrary to his suggestion of 5,000 men per legions, it is plausible that, with the 
exception of the legions deployed at Cannae, the rest of the army was made by normal legions of 4,500 
men, while those in Spain were even weaker (they originally counted 12,600 citizens, so 4,200 each). 
                                                 
321 See Brunt, Italian Manpower, 418 
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Also, in 210, while he is suggesting that each legion counted 3,100 men, Livy mentions legions that, after 
discharging veterans, had 5,300 Romans and 7,300 allies.322 
 
It appears, then, that there is no clear answer on this matter. Weaker legions might be a possibility if we 
consider the combination between heavy losses, the defections of important allied communities, but also 
the fact that Rome was aware that some fronts were more important than others. Of course, there is no 
way to know any variation to the actual strength of the legions, since the only source that actually mention 
the strength of the legions is Livy on the occasion of Scipio’s campaign in Africa. A possibility is that 
the consular legions, as they were the most important and deployed on the main fronts, were kept at 
standard strength (so between 4,500 and 5,300 citizens plus the allies), while the others, especially those 
assigned to less important fronts, might had less men or did not receive reinforcements for long periods 
of time (the Spanish legions were largely isolated from Rome from 216 to 210-209). 
 
The socii were also likely understrength. Their military resources were not endless, as the case of the 
twelve colonies – discussed later – showed. We must assume that the defection of the Southern Italian 
communities crippled recruitment.323 
 
The following table summarizes the number of legions, Roman citizens and Italian allies in service per 
year from 218 to 216: 
 
YEAR 
LEGIONS IN 
SERVICE 
ROMANS IN 
SERVICE 
SOCII IN SERVICE 
218 7 (6+1) 30,300 49,500 
217 11 49,500 56,100 
216 – before Cannae 16 77,500 91,500 
216 – after Cannae 15 63,800 76,500 
 
From this table we can clearly see the progressive intensification of military activity. Regarding the total 
number of citizens in service in 216, with the exception of the three legions in service in Spain (see the 
Spanish section above), and those at Cannae (which were stronger), all the others are estimated to have 
                                                 
322 Livy, XXVI. 28: “Orders were given for the army made up of citizens and allies to be reduced in numbers, with a single 
legion of 5,000 infantry and 300 cavalry formed from the two then in operation, and the men with the longest service records 
being discharged. In the case of the allies, too, only 7,000 infantry and 300 cavalry were to remain operative…” 
323 Polybius, VI. 26 
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been standard Polybian legions of 4,500 Roman citizens. Polybian figures are also employed for the 
number of socii (5,100 per ala) which are estimated to be a little weaker in Spain, stronger at Cannae and 
in the Litana forest, normal in the other legions. These figures are also employed on the forces in service 
in 216 after Cannae, including the two legions of volones. 
 
The next table shows the proportion of citizens recruited in the army compared with the total number of 
male citizens (starting from the 219 census figure), the casualties among Roman citizens and the plausible 
casualties of the socii. 
 
 
Year 
 
Census Figure 
% of citizens in 
service (against 
census figures) 
Casualties (dead 
+ prisoners) 
(citizens) 
Casualties (dead 
+ prisoners) 
(socii) 
218 
270,000 citizens 
(219) 
11% 
14,000 (Ticinus, 
Trebia) 
16,000 
217 
256,000 (270,000 
– 14,000 losses) 
19% 
18,000 (Lake 
Trasimene)324 
13,400 
216 
238,000 (256,000 
– 18,000 losses) 
37.5% 
34,000 
(Cannae)325 
24,000 
216 (after 
Cannae) 
204,000 (238,000 
– 34,000 losses) 
27.5% 
9,000 (Litana 
forest) 
11,800 
216 (after Litana) 
195,000 (204,000 
– 9,000 losses) 
32% // // 
 
In order to estimate a census figure for the years after 219, we have to consider the following issues: 
 
i) War losses: since the beginning of the war, roughly around 75,000 Roman citizens were lost in 
combat between dead and prisoners.326 We can only have estimates regarding the allies, and they 
suggest that their losses were equally severe. 
                                                 
324 On the losses of the battle of Lake Trasimene see Livy, XXII. 7: he states that 15,000 Romans were killed while 10,000 
soldiers were captured (between citizens and allies). Flaminius’ army counted four (Polybian) legions for a total of 18,000 
Romans and 20,400 socii; if 15,000 citizens were killed and, between Romans and socii, 10,000 men were captured, it means 
that the remaining 3,000 citizens were among the prisoners while the rest of the casualties are those of the allies: 13,400 dead 
and 7,000 prisoners – who were freed by Hannibal so they can be counted as survivors. 
325 Livy, XXII. 49 says that casualties among Romans and socii at Cannae were roughly the same, so, from the 48,000 dead 
and 19,000 prisoners, we can simply say that 24,000 citizens were killed and 10,000 captured while the losses of the socii 
were of 24,000 dead and 9,000 prisoners later freed by Hannibal. Finally, two legions and, as suggested by Livy, stronger 
contingents of allies were destroyed in the Litana forest for a total of 9,000 Romans and 11,800 socii. 
326 Up until 216, Roman – only – causalities were: 14,000 in 218, 18,000 at Trasimene (dead and prisoners), probably 34,000 
at Cannae (dead and prisoners) and 9,000 in the Litana forest. 
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ii) We know nothing regarding the injured – though those who survived injury and capture might 
have been few. 
iii) Defections of the allies: Livy, XXIII, 5 reports that 34,000 Campanians were available for 
service in 216 when they joined Hannibal’s cause. They are important and must be considered as 
“additional losses” since Campanians were included in the census figure (see Polybius II, 24) 
iv) Livy, XXII, 57 says that 17,000 younger men (“17 or over”) were recruited. Are they included 
in the census figures? According to Polybius, 17 was the minimum age for eligibility in the army, 
but 20 may have been more of a norm for the commencing of military service. We might expect 
that such youths were underrepresented in the census of 219. If Livy is right, 3 more age cohorts 
were made available in the crisis. 
v) New iuniores: every year since 219, while many citizens were killed or captured in battle, 
others reached the requirements – age, property, etc…– to be included in the census figures as 
iuniores, thus becoming available for military service. By 216, between war losses and defections, 
the total number of citizens lost was 109,000, however, every year new Roman males turned 17 
and entered into the census figures.327 The relation between natural growth and war losses is a 
central topic in the studies of Roman demography. We don’t have enough data in order to estimate 
a precise natural growth rate – that probably changed every year –, but it has been proposed that 
there was a high fertility among Roman women.328 
vi) Normal death rates: the normal shedding of population through disease did not stop simply 
because so many were being killed on the field of battle 
vii) The volones: those serving with the volones were from the least privileged and most marginal 
in Roman society. It seems quite possible that many of these men did not register in the census. 
 
                                                 
327 Roman losses only: 14,000 in 218, 18,000 in 217, 34,000 at Cannae and 9,000 at the Litana Forest. Also, Livy, XXIII. 5 
mentions the defection of 34,000 Campanians who joined Hannibal’ side. Model life tables based on material from Roman 
Egypt have suggested that life expectancy at birth was 25, and that mortality strongly decreased after infancy. Saskia Hin, 
The Demography of Roman Italy, (Cambridge, 2013), 108 has suggested that life expectancy in Roman Italy was several years 
higher because of the very different geography compared to the harsher ecological environment of the Fayum region, making 
the life expectancy at birth in Italy probably around 30. Combining a higher life expectancy at birth, lower mortality after 
infancy and a high fertility rate, it is possible to suggest that Rome had a moderate growing population for a pre-industrial 
society. 
328 Saskia Hin, The Demography of Roman Italy, 198 and Luuk De Ligt, ‘Poverty and Demography: the Case of the Gracchan 
Land Reforms’, in Mnemosyne series 4, vol.57 (2004), 749  
97 
 
Allowing for the enormous uncertainties, I think it is possible trying to make a hypothetical census for 
the year 216: if we start from the 270,000 citizens registered for the census of 219, then removing the 
war losses and the defections of the years 218 and 216, we have a population of 161,000 male citizens. 
 
The recruitment of the two volones legions composed by emancipated slaves and debtors might suggest 
that Rome was facing a manpower crisis; Livy suggests that the volones were recruited because there 
was a shortage of free men.329 Rosenstein, however, claims that there was no scarcity of assidui or 
citizens: 
 
“Rome still had far more potential recruits to draw on than did 
Hannibal, a large and relatively prosperous citizenry whose 
wealth it could tap, and many years of practical experience in 
raising, training, and supplying armies […]. It was not a shortage 
of assidui that compelled recourse to these sorts of men, but 
rather the urgency of the situation.”330 
 
It is undeniable that Rome needed soldiers fast; as we will see in the next chapter, Livy suggests that the 
regular dilectus was a slow process.331 Slaves, debtors and criminals formed an easily accessible 
manpower. Also, it was almost planting season, and men would have been reluctant to leave their farms. 
The period immediately after Cannae was critical because there was the fear of an attack against Rome, 
so soldiers were needed as quickly as possible, hence the recruitment of the volones. If after Cannae there 
was an actual dramatic shortage of regular manpower, the Romans would have probably formed more 
legions of volones. 
 
The recruitment of slaves, criminals, etc, happened only once during the war, and after they were lost in 
212, new legions of volones were not raised, even though the military requirement on the population in 
those years reached its peak. It seems likely that Rosenstein is right and that there was manpower 
available. 
 
                                                 
329 Livy, XXII. 57: “There was also a novel form of recruitment occasioned by the shortage of free men, and by the crisis: 
they bought and armed, at state expense, 8,000 studry young men from the slave population…” 
330 Nathan Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, the Imperial Republic (Edinburgh, 2012), 149 
331 As suggested by Polybius VI. 20-21, the necessity of gather in Rome all the citizens recruited and wait for the arrival of 
the allied contingents surely required time. Livy, XLIII. 15 states that the levy of 169 took two weeks, and that was considered 
faster than usual. 
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We also have to consider Cannae’s impact on the socii and their role. After the battle, the Republic was 
forced to impose on its remaining allies burdens heavier than usual and it is clear that this policy of 
increasing demands on the allies was dangerous since it could incite further defections: after 212 an army 
had to be stationed in Etruria, not really to defend the area from attacks, but to prevent any rebellions.332 
In a meeting between the senate and the representative of the Latin colonies though, the Latins 
supposedly not only claimed that their men could meet their obligations, but that they were ready to 
provide even more if needed.333 
 
In order to understand how losses and defections altered the manpower resources of the allies, we have 
to look back at Polybius’ list of 225. It tells us that, between men under arms and those available for 
service, the allied communities could furnish 463,000 men. Between 218 and 216, 65,200 socii were 
killed in the war, and at least 16,000 were the prisoners freed by Hannibal.334 Rome lost part of Samnium 
and Apulia, all of Lucania and Bruttium. A total of 133,000 men became unavailable for service in the 
Roman army (33% of the 397,800 available after the losses of 218-216).335 We do not know whether 
soldiers from the allied communities now in revolt who were serving in 216 in Spain, Sicily, Sardinia or 
Northern Italy became problematic.336 
 
• The climax of the Italian war: from the aftermath of Cannae to Capua (215-211) 
 
Rome, between 215 and 211 strongly increased its military effort by recruiting new legions every year. 
After Cannae the main war front was Campania: in 215 the Romans managed to defend successfully 
                                                 
332 Livy, XXVIII. 10 
333 Livy, XXVII. 10 
334 Losses of the socii: 16,000 in 218, 13,400 in 217, 35,800 in 216. We know that 7,000 were freed by Hannibal after the 
battle of Trasmiene and at least 9,000 after Cannae. 
335 Plausible numbers of socii who joined Hannibal: part of Samnium, not all of it, defected, and with it probably 40,000 of 
its 77,000 men from Polybius’ list. The same for Apulia: not all of it defected so, from its original 66,000 men, probably 
30,000 became unavailable to Rome. Lucanians and Bruttii were those who defected the most, so probably all their manpower 
(33,000 Polybian Lucanians, and probably around 30,000 Bruttii) did the same. Tarentum did not offer important or relevant 
numbers. 
336 Roman strategy after 216 was also focused on preventing more rebellions plus the ability of deploying multiple armies 
provided the means to prevent or suppress any defection. See Martin Frederiksen, Campania (London, 1984), 241; he 
highlights the case of Nola, city of strategic importance for the control of eastern Campania that played an important role 
during the operation in the aftermath of Cannae. On the operations in Campania: Livy, XXIII. 14-15: after his failure at 
Neapolis, Hannibal focused his attention to the conquest of Nola, whose internal situation was similar to that of Capua with 
the population favourable to join his cause. The senators of the city, however, sent a request of help to praetor Marcus Claudius 
Marcellus who rapidly got hold of the city in order to avoid any defection. After three years of fighting and three defeats – 
Livy, XXIII. 16: first battle of Nola (216); Livy, XXIII. 44-46: second battle of Nola (215); Livy, XXIV. 17: third and final 
battle of Nola (214) – Hannibal decided to abandon the conquest of Nola and moved to Tarentum. 
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Nola for the second time against Hannibal.337 That same year, however, the famous treaty between 
Hannibal and Philip V of Macedonia was signed. Livy’s chronicle regarding the number of legions in 
service is not very clear: he mentions numerous movements of troops which suggests a total of fifteen 
legions.338 Livy reports that the senate decided to hold double taxation that year, so that the income from 
the first taxation would have been used to pay the soldiers – with the exception of the legiones 
cannenses.339 
 
The following year (214) six new legions were recruited. Livy gives us a detailed description of the 
disposition of the troops: the two consuls received two legions each, two legions were assigned to Gaul 
(Northern Italy), Sicily, Sardinia and Apulia, while Gracchus continued his command of the two volones 
legions. One legion was stationed in Picenum, and another one was sent to Brundisium, and finally, two 
more legions remained in Rome as reserve.340 Livy omits the three Spanish legions; with their inclusion, 
the total number of legions in service in 214 was twenty-one. 
 
This was a positive year for Rome on the Italian front: at the River Calor, in Campania, a Carthaginian 
army with a strong contingent of Brutii and Lucanians was destroyed.341 Also, for the third time, Hannibal 
was defeated outside Nola.342 Finally, in 214, the Romans began the siege of Syracuse that occupied their 
forces in Sicily for two years, and moved one legion in Greece to support their allies against the 
Macedonians. 
 
Livy’s list of legion of 213 is incomplete; he mentions that two new legions were recruited while the rest 
of the army was the same as the previous year for a total of twenty-three. Four legions were assigned to 
the consuls, two in Apulia, Gaul, Campania and Sardinia, one was stationed in Picenum, and one more 
in the east for the operations against Macedonia. Sicily was assigned to Marcellus who continued his 
command. Finally, we have to add the two volones legions, and the three in Spain.343 
                                                 
337 Livy, XXIII. 16 
338 Livy, XXIII. 31-32 on the army of 215: six legions (the volones were among these) were deployed in Campania, two in 
Apulia and Sardinia, the two legiones cannenses were moved to Sicily, and finally there were the three Spanish legions. 
339 Livy, XXIII. 31: “The senate decreed double taxation for that year, with the regular taxes levied immediately so that from 
them a cash payment could be made to all soldiers, apart from those who had served at Cannae.” 
340 Livy, XXIV. 11 
341 Livy, XXIV. 15-16: the Carthaginian army, between Brutti, Lucanian, Numidians and Moors, counted 18,200 men; at the 
end of the battle only 2,000, mainly cavalrymen, managed to survive. 
342 Livy, XXIV. 17 
343 Livy, XXIV. 44 
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In 212 the war in Italy reached its peak. Livy reports that four legions were assigned to the consuls, two 
legions were in Apulia, one in Picenum, two in Etruria, two in Lucania (although he doesn’t say it, he is 
talking about the two volones legions, so he is not omitting them on this occasion), two in Gaul, probably 
four in Sicily, one in Greece, two in Sardinia, the Spanish legions and, finally, two new urban legions.344 
In total in 212 the Roman army had twenty-five legions in service. 
 
Additionally, we have to consider the fleet. The standard battle-ship of the Roman Navy during the Punic 
War era was the quinquereme. It had a crew of 364 men –296 rowers plus 68 crewmembers (divided 
between officers, sailors and marines) – and could also transport a century of 80 soldiers.345 According 
to Livy, in 218, at the beginning of the war, the Roman fleet counted 220 quinqueremes in service for a 
total of 15,000 crewmembers (rowers excluded).346 Usually crews for the fleet were provided by the 
allies, but it is possible that after the defections of 216 of the Southern Italians, Rome started to recruit 
its own citizens for the fleet as well – although most of the crews were still composed by socii.347 We 
know that in 218, when the war started, there were two-hundred and forty ships in service (divided 
between two-hundred and twenty quinqueremes and twenty cutters), we might suggest that by 212, when 
the war reached its peak, the naval effort was increased, but, in terms of crewmembers, it is plausible that 
the majority of them were still composed by allies, although Roman personnel was increasing – so we 
might suggest that 1/4 or 1/2 of the crews were citizens. 
 
In total in 212 the Roman army had twenty-five legions in service. In standard Polybian numbers (so 
legions of 4,500 Romans), it would mean 112,500 Roman citizens under arms, but we know that both 
the Spanish legions and the legiones cannenses (five legions in total) were not at full strength, the two 
legions of volones counted 8,000 men (instead of 9,000 like two full strength legions). With these 
considerations, we can slightly reduce the number of citizens in service to 108,800. 
Not having a census figure during this period makes it difficult to understand the burden on the Roman 
population. We can try to use the figure of 207, the closest official census. In this occasion, Livy reports 
                                                 
344 Livy, XXV. 3: we might suppose that the two legions in Lucania are the volones because they were under the command 
of Tiberius Gracchus who kept his command there. It is possible that there were four legions (divided between two regular 
ones and the two legiones cannenses) in Sicily because the command of both Publius Lentulus and Marcellus was extended 
345 Pitassi, Roman Warships, 100 
346 Livy, XXI. 17 
347 Polybius VI. 19 suggests that naval service was reserved for citizens with the lowest census requirement – 400 drachmae. 
Also see Brunt, Italian Manpower, 65 
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a total of 177,000 citizens, but, as we will argue later, we should increase this figure because many 
legions were stationed outside peninsular Italy. The next census figure is the one of 204 which includes 
the soldiers in service overseas. On this occasion Livy reports a total of 214,000 citizens. Of course, in 
212 the number of citizens was not the same as 204, but this figure would give us a better understanding 
of the massive military effort undertaken by the Roman Republic. If 108,800 citizens were in service in 
the legions, that would mean almost 51% of a population of 214,000; so we can say that, without a doubt, 
by 212 more than half of the Roman male population was under arms. 
 
Though it appears as an extremely high proportion of the population, we have to consider the fact that 
some legions might have been weaker than normal – not only when formed, but also due to losses –, just 
like the volones and the legiones cannenses were perhaps smaller. Also, the legions in Spain had had few 
reinforcements or support from Italy. It is possible that some legions stationed on secondary fronts (like 
Etruria, Gaul and probably Sardinia – though not fully pacified, the main revolts on the island ended in 
215348) were used as garrisons with reduced manpower.349 Even if we can slightly reduce it, there is no 
denial that Roman mobilization by 212 appears to have been extreme. 
 
In 212, the Carthaginians persuaded Tarentum, to join them.350 But Rome captured Syracuse, and in 211, 
Capua was recaptured by the Romans. Syracuse’s capture helped solve the financial difficulties faced by 
the Republic: due to the deployment of so many legions, Rome’s fiscal system was at a critical level.351 
The capture of Syracuse may have encouraged the reform of the monetary system with the introduction 
of the silver denarius. The following conquest of Capua also contributed to ease financial difficulties, as 
2,070 pounds of gold and 31,200 of silver were brought to the treasury.352 
 
Livy’s list of legions of 211 has several omissions, but it seems that there weren’t many changes from 
the previous year, as most of the text is focused on extensions of commands, so we can say that there 
                                                 
348 For Sardinia, Livy, XXIII. 40 
349 See Brunt, Italian Manpower, 420 
350 Appian, VII. 6, 32; Livy, XXV. 7 
351 Livy, XXIII. 21: in 215 there was no money to pay the soldiers and sailor in Sicily and Sardinia; Livy, XXIV. 11 says that 
in 214 it was decided that people with property between 50,000 and 100,000 asses were required to supply a single sailor and 
six months of his pay. Anyone above 100,000 and up to 300,000 three sailors and one year of their pay; above 300,000 and 
up to one million five sailors and above a million seven sailors. Senators, finally, had to supply eight sailors and one year of 
their pay. Livy XXIV. 18 says that equites and centurions even refused to be paid until the end of the war. 
352 Livy, XXVI. 14 
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were still twenty-five legions in service.353 The Spanish front was destabilized by the defeat of the Upper 
Baetis – in which both the Scipios were killed –, but the fall of Capua allowed the Romans to send 
reinforcements to Spain for the first time.354 
 
In 210, twelve of the thirty Latin colonies claimed to have exhausted their military resources.355 This was 
not a revolt, but shows that military burdens on the allies were heavy, especially on the Latins – who 
according to Polybius, II. 24 were the most significant suppliers of men. 
 
The military obligations of the Latin colonies were fixed by the formula togatorum, but it is possible that 
they were increased during the war.356 Nevertheless, five years later, when they were forced to furnish 
even more troops as a punishment, they fulfilled the requirements.357 
 
The following table summarizes the number of legions and Roman citizens in service between the period 
immediately after Cannae and 211: 
 
YEAR LEGIONS IN SERVICE CITIZENS IN SERVICE 
216 (after Cannae) 15 63,800 
215 15 63,800 
214 21 90,800 
213 23 99,800 
212 25 108,800 
211 25 108,800 
 
• Spain part 2: from Hiberia the death of the Scipios to Ilpia (215-207) 
 
The defeat at Hibera forced Carthage to send more troops to Spain.358 The Scipios had probably had to 
recruit from the Spaniard tribes in order to increase their forces given that reinforcement from Italy was 
impossible.359 After Hiberia Livy’s description of the operations in Spain becomes confused. The Scipios 
                                                 
353 Livy, XXVI. 1 
354 On the defeat of the Upper Baetis, and the death of the Scipios, see Livy, XXV. 36-37, regarding the reinforcements sent 
from Campania to Spain, see Livy, XXVI. 17 
355 Livy, XXVII. 9; also see Broadhead, ‘Migration and Hegemony’, 465-466 
356 From 444,000 socii in service or available for service, 287,000 were still available to Rome after the war losses and 
defections of 218-216, and 85,000 of these were Latins. On the formula togatorum see Brunt, Italian Manpower, 545-547 
357 Livy, XXIX. 15 
358 Livy, XXIII. 32 
359 Also, scandal involving army contractors for Spain in Livy XXV. 3 
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campaigned south of the Ebro until the capture of Saguntum at the end of 212.360 Then, at the beginning 
of 211, the Romans recruited 20,000 Celtiberians probably increasing the strength of the army to around 
50,000 men.361 At the battles of the Upper Baetis, the Romans were defeated and both the Scipios 
killed.362 
 
The fall of Capua allowed troops to be moved from Campania: 6,300 Romans and 6,800 socii were sent 
to Spain while the Senate recruited new troops and a commander. Livy states that: ‘after the recovery of 
Capua, the Senate and people felt as much concerned about Spain as they did about Italy’.363 
 
By 210, Roman forces in Spain included maybe around 10,000 men of the original 32,000, the 13,100 
men from Campania and 11,000 fresh troops for a total of 34,100 men divided between citizens and 
allies.364 Scipio attacked New Carthage in 209 and the conquest of this important city provided the 
Romans with a vast booty.365 After the fall of New Carthage, Scipio engaged the enemy on several 
occasion, until he obtained a decisive victory at Ilpia (206).366 For Ilpia Polybius and Livy nearly agree 
on the strength of Scipio’s army: Polybius suggests 45,000 infantrymen plus 3,000 cavalry while Livy 
45,000 men in total between citizens, socii and Spanish auxiliaries.367 
 
• The final decade of the war (210-201) 
 
From a military point of view, the period between 210 and 208 is marked by a stability in the number of 
legions in service until the events of 207 (Hasdrubal’s invasion) forced one last intensification of military 
activity. The final years of the war, from 206 to 201, are marked by a decrease in the number of legions 
in service. 
 
                                                 
360 Livy, XXIV. 41 suggestion for the 214 campaign; Livy XXIV. 41-42: from the defeat of Castrum, to the victories of Munda 
and Auringis and the liberation of Saguntum. 
361 Livy, XXV. 32 on the recruitment of the Celtiberians. 
362 On the defeat of the Upper Baetis and the death of the Scipios, see Appian, VI. 3. 16 and Livy, XXV. 33-36 
363 Livy, XXVI. 18 
364 Livy, XXVI. 17 
365 See Livy, XXVI. 47 on the booty gathered by the Romans at New Carthage. 
366 On the siege and conquest of New Carthage see Livy, XXVI. 43-47 and Appian, VI. 4. 20-23. See Livy, XXVII. 18 on the 
battle of Baecula; Appian, VI. 5. 27 on Scipio’s victory at Carmone, and finally Livy, XXVIII. 12-16 on the battle of Ilpia. 
367 Livy, XXVIII. 13; Polybius, XI. 20 
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There is not much to say regarding the fleet, as we don’t have precise information during this period. 
Livy says that, after raiding the coasts of Africa, the Roman fleet managed to gain total control of the 
seas after defeating the Carthaginians in the waters of Sicily securing sea routes important for the 
movement of troops and especially supplies.368 It is possible that, during the war, the Romans tried to 
maintain at least 200 quinqueremes in service for a total of 13,600 crewmembers and we might suggest, 
as we did before, that 1/2 or 1/4 of these were actually Roman citizens (so between 3,400 and 6,800). 
 
After the fall of Capua, Spain – as we have seen – and Sicily became the two main fronts. At the beginning 
of 210, Rome deployed an army of twenty-one legions: the new army in Spain was four legions strong, 
the consuls, with two legions each, were assigned to Sicily (where the two legiones cannenses were still 
serving), and Apulia (together with other two legions). One legion was stationed in Campania, two urban 
legions raised the previous year were moved to Etruria, and replaced by two newly formed legions left 
in Rome.369 
 
The fall of Syracuse in 212 did not conclude the war in Sicily.370 Operations continued until 210, when 
Valerius Laevinus conquered Agrigentum, the last Carthaginian stronghold on the island. This event was 
followed by the surrender of several other cities.371 The pacification of Sicily was followed by its 
reorganization: 
 
“The consul [Valerius Laevinus] meted out to the leading men 
of these communities […], and forced the Sicilians finally to lay 
down their arms and turn their attention to farming the land. His 
policy was design not only to make their island sufficiently 
fertile to support its inhabitants, but also to have it alleviate 
problems of the grain-supply of the city of Rome and Italy…”372 
 
In 209 Rome maintained twenty-one legions.373 The following year (208) there were still twenty-one 
legions in service, and the imperium of most commanders was extended.374 In 207 Rome increased the 
                                                 
368 Livy, XXVII. 4 
369 Livy, XXVI. 28 on the legions in service in 210. 
370 Livy, XXV. 41 
371 On the fall of Agrigentum and the end of the campaign in Sicily, see Livy, XXVI. 40: he states that only six cities needed 
to be captured by the Romans, forty surrendered while twenty were sold to them. 
372 Livy, XXVI. 40 
373 Livy, XXVII. 7 
374 Livy, XXVII. 22 on the legions in service in 208. 
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number of legions in service due to the arrival of a new Carthaginian army in Northern Italy. Livy tells 
us that there were four consular legions, four Spanish legions, two legions in Sicily, Sardinia, Gaul, 
Etruria, Bruttium and Apulia, while only one was stationed at Capua. Finally, two new urban legions 
were formed, increasing the total number to twenty-three.375 
 
The victory at Metaurus may have allowed a reduction in the number of legions to twenty for 206, while 
operations in Spain ended after the great victory at Ilpia.376 In the following year (205) Scipio was consul, 
and received Sicily as his province. He began preparations for the African campaign by recruiting 7,000 
volunteers and amassing material in Etruria and Umbria before leaving for his province.377 In Sicily he 
discharged some soldiers and reinforced his two legions until they numbered 6,500 citizens each. Livy, 
the only available source on the expeditionary force, gives three possibilities for its size: 10,000 infantry 
and 2,000 cavalry; 16,000 infantry and 1,600 cavalry; 35,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.378  
 
If these legions were 6,500 men strong and were supported by the same numbers of socii, the total number 
of soldiers of Scipio’s army would have been between 26,000 (if the number of Romans and allies were 
the same) to 30,000 men (if the allies were more numerous than the citizens. Appian reports an army of 
17,600 men.379 
 
The total number of legions in service decreased once again, this time to eighteen; they were divided 
between four sent to Gaul in order to face Mago’s invasion, two in Etruria, one in Sardinia, four in 
Bruttium against Hannibal, two in Greece against Philip – after years of inactivity on this front, as 
mentioned by Livy himself –, one in Campania, and finally, the two in Sicily under the command of 
Scipio.380 
 
In 204, Scipio’s two legions landed close to Utica. The rest of the army was distributed in the following 
provinces: four legions were kept in Gaul and Bruttium in order to fight against Mago and Hannibal. 
                                                 
375 Livy, XXVII. 36 
376 On the battle of the Metaurus, see Livy, XXVII. 48-49 
377 Livy XXVIII. 45-46 regarding the gathering of material and volunteers. 
378 Livy, XXIX. 25 
379 Appian, VIII. 3. 13 
380 On the inactivity against Philip V see Livy, XXIX. 12; regarding the number of legions in service and where they were 
stationed see Livy, XXVIII. 45 
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Two legions were stationed in Etruria, Sicily and Spain, while Campania and Sardinia received one 
legion.381 In total that year there were nineteen legions in service.382 
In 203, Rome maintained eighteen legions in service. Gaul and Bruttium still had four legions each, two 
were stationed in Etruria, Spain, Sicily and Africa, while Sardinia and Liguria received one legion 
each.383 
By 202 the war was almost over, and the main front was of course Africa. The number of legions in 
service was reduced to sixteen divided between Etruria, Gaul, Bruttium, Sicily, Spain and, as said, Africa 
(two each). Also, Sardinia and Liguria kept the legion already there, while two were held in reserve in 
Rome.384  
By 201, with the end of the war, more legions were disbanded. Fourteen were left in service: two 
legions were left in Gaul, Etruria, Lucania/Bruttium and Sicily, while two more urban legions were 
recruited. Sardinia was guarded by one legion, while it was decided to station one legion in Spain, now 
a new Roman province.385  
 
We summarize in the below table the number of legions in service during the period 210-201, and 
estimate the number of Roman citizens under arms. 
 
YEAR LEGIONS IN SERVICE CITIZENS IN SERVICE386 
210 21 91,500 
209 21 91,500 
208 21 91,500 
207 23 100,500 
206 20 87,000 
205 18 85,000 
204 19 89,500 
203 18 85,000 
202 16 76,000 
201 14 67,000 
 
                                                 
381 Livy, XXIX. 13 on the assignation of the legions in 204; it is not clear if Tarentum received one or two legions. 
382 Livy, XXIX. 35 on Scipio being forced to lift his siege of Utica. On the first battle of Croton see Livy, XXIX. 36 
383 See Livy, XXX. 1 on the deployment of the legions in 203. 
384 Livy, XXX. 27 
385 See Livy, XXX. 41 on the deployment of the legions in 201. 
386 Regarding the number of citizens in service we have to consider a couple of factors: between 210 and 206 the four legions 
in Spain under the command of Scipio counted roughly 17,000 Romans. After he left (so from 205 to 201), the province was 
left with two standard legions. From 205 we should also stop including the two legiones cannenses as they were incorporated 
in Scipio’s army for the invasion of Africa that counted two legions of 13,000 Romans. Other than these exceptions, the rest 
of the army is looked as standard legions of 4,500 men to simplify the process. 
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• Military service and population during the Second Punic War 
 
The Hannibalic War showed one of the most important characteristic of the armies of the Republic of 
the third century and, as we will see in the next chapters, of the second century: even though the Romans 
lost battles, they ultimately won the wars. The key element of this success was the capacity of Rome to 
exploit the vast manpower offered by the third century Italian communities, and Rome itself. 
 
After the campaign of 218-216 that inflicted terrible losses to the Roman armies – and population –, the 
conflict changed radically: the great battles that have characterized this first part of the war were replaced 
mainly by raids and sieges or minor engagements. This deeply changed the war effort and the impact of 
the conflict on the population. 
 
The proof of this is when, for the first time in a decade, Livy offers us a war-time census figure (the last 
one was before the war). He states that in 207 the citizen population counted 177,000 citizens, of course 
a dramatic drop from the 270,000 that he suggested in his previous census.387 During that year, because 
of Hasbrudal’s invasion, Rome had 100,700 of its citizens in service between twenty-three legions, 
meaning that 57% of the census population was likely in the army.  
 
However, there are reasons to modify this percentage. For the aftermath of Cannae, we have suggested a 
plausible census population of 161,000, which is within range of a census figure of 177,000 for 207, the 
population having been boosted by 10 years of new adult males. Yet, for the census of 204, Livy says 
that ‘the five-year purification ceremony took place later than usual because the censors sent agents 
through the provinces to report on the number of Roman citizens who were in the armies in the various 
locations. With these included, the census numbered 214,000 souls’.388 If that did not happen in 207, 
then we have to include the citizens in the army outside Rome. Of the twenty-three legions in service in 
207, ten were stationed outside Italy (42,000 citizens between Spain, Northern Italy, Sicily and Sardinia). 
Adding these, the census would increase to 219,000 citizens, close to the figure for 204, but surprisingly 
high considering the war losses. We should accept this reconstruction since: 
 
                                                 
387 On the census of 207 see Livy, XXVII. 36 
388 Livy, XXIX. 37 
108 
 
i) The war was completely different during the period 216-207 to that of the first years. This was 
reflected in much lower casualty rates. 
ii) Polybius suggests that the census requirement for military service was lowered, and we might 
advise that this happened probably in the period after Cannae.389 
 
The reduction of the census requirement for service in the army is attested by Polybius who states that 
citizens who had less than 400 drachmae (4,000 asses) of property were assigned to naval service, with 
the presumption that those above that level were in the fifth class and went to serve in the legions. This 
was a significant reduction from the 11,000 asses given by Livy as the Servian level.390 Of course, all 
those citizens who owned between 11,000 and 4,000 asses were now eligible for service in the legions; 
this surely increased the census base that allowed the expansion in the census figures that we have 
suggested in occasion of the census of 207. This growth in its military population allowed Rome to keep 
recruiting soldiers and surely helped to absorb the losses of the previous years. 
 
The table shows the changing of the census population, the number of legions in service and the 
percentage of citizens under arms over a period of 25 years, from 219 to the first census reported by Livy 
after the war (194). Also, it shows how many legions were in service outside of Italy and how, possibly, 
those soldiers could have altered the total number of citizens in the census figures – with the exception 
of 204 since, as said, they were included by the censors on that occasion. 
 
YEAR 
CENSUS 
POPULATION 
LEGIONS 
IN 
SERVICE 
% 
RECRUITED 
POPULATION 
+ SOLDIERS 
OVERSEAS 
% 
RECRUITED 
219 270,000 7 11% // // 
216 161,000 15 37% // // 
207 177,000 
23 (10 
overseas) 
57% 219,000 46% 
204 214,000 19 39% // // 
194 244,000 
8 (4 
overseas) 
14.7% 262,000 13.7% 
 
                                                 
389 Polybius, VI. 19 
390 On the original minimum property requirements see Livy, I. 42-43; see Emilio Gabba, Esercito e Societa’ nella Tarda 
Repubblica Romana (Firenze, 1973), 11-13 
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These figures suggest that citizen population displayed signs of recovery during the war, a recovery that 
continued during the first half of the second century until, by 174, the population reached the pre-war 
levels with 270,000 citizens registered in the census. It took a single generation (42 years from 216 to 
174) for the Roman population to recover.391  
 
What were the long run demographic effects of the Second Punic War? It has been argued that this 
conflict must have undermined Rome’s manpower resources causing a demographic decline of the Italian 
population. Yet, as noted by Luuk de Ligt, the Roman army was divided into age groups so that losses 
were probably concentrated on particular generations.392 Furthermore, it is important to consider the 
relation between paternity/marriage and military service: Bagnall and Frier’s research, based on Roman 
Egypt, suggests that paternity was high between 25 and 40, with a peak during the early 30s. Saller 
suggests that Roman men usually married in their late twenties while De Ligt suggests a very high fertility 
rate due to the tendency of Roman women to marry early.393 
 
Polybius indicates the military age for Roman males was between 17 and 46 years of age; the manipular 
system, however, also made age an essential factor in terms of both role and membership of the army. A 
typical Roman legion consisted of 1,200 velites, 1,200 hastati, 1,200 principes and 600 triarii: that than 
half of the legion was composed by younger soldiers who served as velites and hastati. Men between 23 
and 35 formed the heavy infantry and served as the principes in the typical triplex acies formation. 
Finally, the last part of the legion was formed by the triarii, the oldest and most experienced soldiers, 
whose age probably varied from 35 up to 46, and, not surprisingly, formed the smallest part of the legion 
with only 600 men.  
 
It seems likely that unmarried men were the largest part of the losses to Rome and despite this may have 
had an eventual effect on the fertility rates of the Roman population, those effects were likely delayed. 
The Roman population would likely maintain fertility and produce young men to begin to fill the gap left 
by the dead of the years of Cannae. If the losses were to have a demographic effect, it would be delayed 
                                                 
391 Livy, XLII. 10 for the census of 174. 
392 Luuk De Ligt, ‘Roman Manpower and Recruitment’, in ed. P. Erdkamp, A Companion to the Roman Army (Malden, 2007), 
120 
393 Roger Bagnall and Bruce Frier, The Demography of Egypt, (Cambridge, 1994), 146; Richard Saller, ‘Men’s Age at 
Marriage and its Consequences in the Roman Family’, in Classical Philology 82 (Chicago, 1987), 31-33; De Ligt, ‘Poverty 
and Demography’, 749 
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since new fathers would not enter the reproductive cycle in the years after Cannae. We would thus expect 
a depression of the census figures perhaps 20-30 years after Cannae. That does not seem to happen. 
 
We should also consider the overall effect of the war on the socii. The defection of numerous 
communities in Southern Italy surely influenced the manpower availability of the Italian allies; proof of 
that is the episode of the twelve colonies. Using the figure for the alae sociorum offered by Polybius 
(5,100 men per ala), we can try to estimate the military participation of the socii: 
 
YEAR ALAE SOCIORUM IN SERVICE SOCII IN SERVICE 
218 7 49,500 
217 11 56,100 
216 16 91,500 
216 (after Cannae) 15 76,500 
215 15 77,800 
214 21 108,400 
213 23 118,600 
212 25 128,800 
211 25 128,800 
210 21 100,700 
209 21 100,700 
208 21 100,700 
207 23 110,900 
206 20 95,600 
205 18 94,600 
204 19 99,700 
203 18 94,600 
202 16 84,400 
201 14 74,200 
 
Regarding the allies, we have to consider the fact that many Italian communities fought against Hannibal 
on their own account, meaning that defections from Rome did not automatically translate into manpower 
for Hannibal’s army.394 
 
                                                 
394 See Livy XXIII. 17-20 for the case of Casilinum defended mainly by socii; Livy, XXIII. 20 on the case of Petelia; Livy, 
XXIII. 14-16 on the Neapolitan cavalry; Livy, XXIII. 35-39 on the defense of Cumae. While the case of the battle at the river 
Calor of 214 shows an army composed by Lucanians, Bruttii, Numidians and Moors (see Livy, XXIV. 15), the treaty between 
Capua and Hannibal (Livy, XXIII. 7) says that no Carthaginian officers would have command over Capuan soldiers, 
suggesting that they were independent from the Carthaginians. 
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Polybius, II. 24 in his description of the great levy of 225 states that the allied communities were able to 
gather 463,000 men between those under arms and those available for service. Among these, 133,000 
came from regions that defected to Hannibal after the military events of 216, a figure that grows to 
167,000 if we add the 34,000 Campanians mentioned by Livy (so 36% of the total allied manpower).395 
 
By keep using the figure suggested by Polybius, we may suggest a recruitment rate for the socii who 
were still fighting alongside the Romans. After the defections, 296,000 men were still available for 
service in the Roman army, and by 212 the number of allies under arms was 128,800, so 43.5% of their 
available manpower. These figures, however, do not take into account war losses. In the previous sections 
of this chapter we have suggested plausible casualties for both Romans and allies, although, when it 
comes to allies, losses, there is even more uncertainty. We might suggest that, by 215, a total of 54,400 
Italians had been killed in action, decreasing the number of men available for service in the Roman army 
to 241,600. Thus, the 128,800 in the alae in 212 would increase to the 53.3% of the available allied 
manpower. In any case, there is no question that, just like their Roman counterparts, the socii were under 
strong military pressure. 
 
* Conclusions 
 
The most appropriate way to conclude this chapter is with a discussion on the population recovery that 
followed the war. In his Rome at War, Nathan Rosenstein looks at the growth rate of the Roman 
population and says: 
 
‘Surprisingly, therefore, the great many deaths of young Roman 
men between 218 and the last third or so of the second century 
are very likely to have made a significant contribution to the 
dramatic rise in population that took place following the defeat 
of Hannibal. By increasing the availability of land and its overall 
productivity and profitability, by enhancing opportunities for 
occasional paid labor and the bargaining position of those in a 
position to supply it, by improving diet, by fostering a reduction 
in the age when women married, and by increasing couples’ 
willingness to have and raise more children, the era’s high 
military mortality helped set in motion the cultural and social 
                                                 
395 Livy, XXIII. 5 on the Campanian soldiers. 
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changes that brought about a rapid, dramatic growth of the 
Roman population.”396 
 
In Rosenstein’s view, the deaths of many young men opened vast amounts of land to the Roman citizens 
which allowed a fertility boom.397. In analyzing Rosenstein’s position, De Ligt wonders why ‘did no 
similar population explosion occur after the Samnite War or the First Punic War?’398 In the census of 
340, 166,000 citizens were registered. In the census of 289, just a couple of years after the end of the 
Third Samnite War (298-291), the Roman population had supposedly increased to 272,000 citizens.399 
Of course, as we have mentioned in the previous chapter, the census figures of the early third century are 
not completely reliable, and the incorporation of populations may have increased the population during 
this period, but they can still offer us an idea of the population’s development: it suggests that the Samnite 
Wars may have led  to an increase in population.400 
 
By 264, on the eve of the First Punic War, Rome’s citizen population was supposedly 292,234. By the 
end of the war, it had decreased to 241,212, but it progressively recovered to 270,212 and 273,000.401 It 
seems that although the wars may have temporarily suppressed the population, in the medium term they 
did not hamper growth and might perhaps even have encouraged it through the redistribution of 
resources.402 
 
De Ligt is probably asking the wrong question. We should actually ask what the difference was between 
the aftermath of the Second Punic War in comparison with the Samnite Wars or the First Punic War. The 
Hannibalic War was not followed by a sudden population explosion but by a slow and constant recovery 
that started already during the war. The recovery that we have identified in census of 207 and 204 appears 
to have continued as attested by the census of 194. 
 
                                                 
396 Rosenstein, Rome at War, 154 
397 De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 143 
398 De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 143 
399 On the census of 289 see Livy, Per. 11 
400 See Livy, VIII. 11 
401 Eutropius, II. 18 on the pre-First Punic War census, while see Livy, Per. 19 on the number of citizens registered during 
the period 251-241; Livy, Per. 20 covers the period between 241-219; Polybius, II. 24 states that 273,000 Romans and 
Campanians were available for military service in 225. 
402 See also Saskia Roselaar, Public Land in the Roman Republic (Oxford, 2010), 148 
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The Second Punic War was undoubtedly devastating in many ways and the population losses of the early 
years of the war were astonishing, but the recovery of the Roman population suggests that neither in 
economic nor demographic terms was the war a major setback. The ability of Rome to mobilise such a 
high proportion of their manpower and still continue to function economically also suggests that military 
service was not felt as a significant burden on the ordinary soldier. Where we see strain is in the fiscal 
system, at least until the captures of Syracuse and Capua. In fact, the vast numbers of soldiers who were 
paid during this war must have entailed a redistribution of resources and a monetarization of the Italian 
economy. If I am right in associating the reduction in the census with the Hannibalic War, many of the 
poorest in Roman society would have had access to the stipendium. Soldiers had denarii in their pockets 
to spend and much more money must have been in circulation. Perverse though it may seem, the war 
may, in the medium term, have boosted economic activity and improved the economy of the poor. 
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Chapter 5 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE SECOND PUNIC WAR 
 
 
In the previous chapter we have analysed in detail the Second Punic War in terms of recruitment and the 
manpower required by the war. In this chapter we are exploring the economic impact, and trying to 
understand how much damage the war actually caused to Roman Italy. 
 
Any discussion on the economic effects of the Second Punic War should start with Arnold Toynbee and 
his Hannibal’s Legacy. Although published in 1965, and subject to criticism – to the point that Cornell 
dismisses it as “…no longer accepted today”403 –, Toynbee’s scheme is still influential and is the basis 
of subsequent models of decline. The effects highlighted in Hannibal’s Legacy may be summarized as 
follows: 
 
- Devastation of South-Eastern Italy 
- Removal of the Italian peasantry by military service during and after the war 
- Change for the worst in Rome’s relations with the allies 
- New economic opportunities, spread of new types of land use and plantation agriculture 
- Growth of slave economy 
- Urbanization and growth of industry 
- Increasing influence of Hellenism on Roman cultural, social and intellectual life 
 
Toynbee offered an emphasis on the Second Punic War as the main cause of change that undermined 
Roman society: the price paid to defeat Hannibal would backfire against Rome triggering the social 
problems that will cause the fall of the Republic, and, in the end, of the Roman world itself. Also, the 
magnitude of these changes is brought to the extreme as they are at the origin of the very complex socio-
economic differences between the Northern and Southern part of present-day Italy. 
 
                                                 
403 Tim Cornell, ‘Hannibal’s Legacy: the effects of the Hannibalic War on Italy’, in eds. Cornell, T., Rankov, B., Sabin, P., 
The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal (London, 1996), 104 
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I believe that it is possible to offer a different interpretation of the impact of the war; although the more 
traditional negative interpretation of the war offered by Toynbee, but also Brunt or Hopkins, that portrays 
an Italian peninsula devastated by the war, the war, actually, could have offered a positive input for 
Rome’s economy as a form of early military Keynesian stimulus. The effects of the war changed from 
region to region, and, for this reason, we will look at specific cases that will offer a general idea of three 
different economic models of impact. We will argue that the money Rome spent on the war in military 
pay, military production and supply, caused an unprecedented circulation of cash into the economy. It is 
also possible to mark the Hannibalic War as a cause of the intensification of the agriculture of Roman 
Italy, and thus for the development of the villa-system and the capitalistic Catonian villae (as we will see 
into more details later in the thesis). 
 
Our detailed study of the conflict highlighted the fact that after 216 the war effort was focused on 
Southern Italy, while key regions of Central Italy – Etruria and Latium in particular, but also Umbria and 
Picenum – were far less involved in military actions. Central Italy was able to sustain Rome and its 
enormous military effort during the most critical years of the war. It seems likely that the effects of the 
war were regionally differentiated. 
 
1) Etruria 
 
A very important corn supplier to the Roman armies, this region played a crucial role in the food supply 
during the war. The fact that this region witnessed hardly any military activity after 217 was also helpful. 
When Hannibal’s army marched through the region it surely caused damage to the fields, farms and 
communities, as described by Livy, but, at the same time, the Carthaginians stayed only for a short period 
of time, insufficient to inflict heavy or permanent damage.404 Further Carthaginian operations, such as 
Hasdrubal’s invasion of 207 or Mago’s one in 205 did not involve Etruria; the first moved through the 
ager Gallicus before his army was crushed at the Metaurus (Picenum), while the other was confined to 
the Po Valley the entire time.  
 
                                                 
404 Livy, XXII. 3; he also describes this area: “…the Etruscan plains lying between Faesulae and Arretium, was amongst the 
most fertile in Italy, well blessed with grain, livestock and all other commodities.”; also see Cornell, ‘Hannibal’s Legacy’, 
107 
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Etruria became one of Rome’s main food suppliers during the hardest and crucial years that followed the 
defeat of Cannae; there are several reports in Livy’s chronicle of corn shipments from Etruria to various 
Italian locations.405 Therefore, it is understandable why the Romans stationed a garrison in Etruria from 
212 to the end of the war: not only to protect it from any attacks from the north, but especially to prevent 
any trouble to such a key region.406 
 
Other regions that had traditionally supplied food, Campania in particular, but Apulia as well, were both 
war-zones. After 211, Campania and Sicily were returned to the Roman sphere and probably quickly 
began to supply Rome with food.407 
 
The war with its high demands for large amounts of corn may have stimulated production and the 
financial benefits of meeting state contracts may have offered opportunities for enrichment. At the same 
time, in order to ensure the intensification of agricultural production or extension of the area under 
cultivation, it was essential to gather labour. This requirement contrasts with the very high recruitment 
rates for the period, but while a large part of the Roman and Italian workforce was in the legions, women, 
minors, slaves and, especially, migrants might have supplemented the labour of those men remaining on 
the land. 
 
There is no reason to exclude women from the labour force, especially since, as suggested by De Ligt, 
the Roman female population survived the Second Punic War more or less intact.408 The same argument 
should be extended to minors. Livy reports that in 216, right after Cannae, a total of 17,800 younger men 
who were at least 17 years old were recruited in the army, but it is possible that this was an emergency 
procedure, as we don’t know if it was repeated.409 However, boys who were younger than 17 should be 
included in the workforce. Slaves were probably not as numerous as in later centuries, but even if free 
smallholders were still the majority of the workforce, slaves likely made a contribution.410 Migrants may 
                                                 
405 Livy, XXV. 15 says that Etrurian corn was sent to Tarentum; XXV. 20 describes that large quantities of corn were 
stockpiled in Etruria itself, while more was transported to Ostia before being shipped elsewhere. Also Livy, XXV. 22 mentions 
that soldiers were waiting for corn from Etruria. Finally, Livy, XXVII. 3 shows that more corn was transported from Etruria 
to Tarentum. 
406 Livy, XXV. 3; also see Fronda, Between Rome and Carthage, 289-290 on Hannibal’s failure to lure towards his cause 
communities in Central Italy – Etruria in particular. 
407 On the aftermath of the fall of Capua, see Livy, XXVI. 15-16; Livy, XXVI. 40 on the reorganization of Sicily in order to 
sustain the food production. 
408 Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 115; De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 144 
409 Livy, XXII. 57 says that these younger men were organized into four legions (16,800 infantrymen) and 1,000 cavalry. 
410 Livy, XXII. 57 on the volones. 
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also have supplemented the Roman workforce. Those who were displaced by the war would need to find 
work and the fields of Central Italy may have provided opportunities. Together with the rest of the Roman 
population, these refugees made available more than sufficient labour to allow the intensification of 
agriculture and the extension of the area under cultivation. 
 
As we will see later, it is probably during these years that we can locate the expansion of the villae system 
as the war offered the possibility for great landowners to expand their properties and make profits mainly 
by selling their products to the state and the army.411 
 
It is possible that other regions of Central Italy experienced a very similar situation, like Umbria and 
Picenum, and Latium, which experienced similar changes to Etruria.412 
 
Central Italy – Latium and Rome in particular – was also the centre of the Roman weapon production, 
surely another essential part of the economy of war. Also, the coastal regions of Central Italy (Latium, 
Etruria and Picenum) were surely very important for the manufacture and maintenance of the fleet. 
 
Overall, we can suggest a positive impact of the war on the regions of Central Italy.  
 
2) Campania 
 
After Capua defected to join Hannibal, the region became one of the major war zones of the conflict. The 
continuous plundering and ravaging by both sides devastated the ager Campanus, and especially the area 
of Capua until the fall of the city in 211.413 The conflict may have led to a significant wave of migration 
from Campania.414 
 
                                                 
411 See Marzano, Roman Villas, 125 
412 Latium was briefly attacked by Hannibal in 211 – see Livy, XXVI. 7-11 –, but his purpose was to lure the Roman forces 
that were sieging Capua. 
413 Livy, XXIII. 46 on the Roman attacks against the Capuan farmlands in 215. Livy, XXV. 13 on the situation at Capua by 
212; Livy, XXV. 18 on new Roman raids. Also see Fronda, Between Rome and Carthage, 100-147 on the importance of 
political rivalries between Campanian communities. This factor determined who joined Hannibal and who remained loyal to 
Rome, and we might add it was also important for the post-war years. 
414 On the hardships of the people of Capua, see Livy, XXV. 13; although not mentioned by Livy, we might suppose that 
refugees from the countryside experienced the same, if not worse, conditions. 
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Recovery started after Capua was recaptured and was prompted by the continuing demand for corn by 
the army: the Senate knew the importance of an adequate and secure corn supply for the large armies of 
the Republic. For this reason, Campania had to become once again a major supplier for the Roman army, 
a role it occupied before the war. The demand for labour probably explains Roman policy towards Capua 
and other rebel towns: they were not destroyed, and the population was not killed or enslaved because 
their lands and labour were needed. The land of Capua, however, became property of the people of Rome, 
and for some time, the Campanians lost their political privileges, as they were excluded from the census 
until 189.415 The Romans reorganized Capuan land; according to Livy, the property of the leading citizens 
was sold off, while newly acquired farmland was rented out, but that, in all cases, payment was made in 
grain.416 Exceptional measures were taken in order to preserve the agricultural potential of the area: farm 
animals that were captured had to be returned to their owners, like slaves and all property described by 
Livy as: “…not attached to the ground.”417 
 
Other regions of Campania had remained with Rome but their contributions to the war effort were 
probably hampered by raids and more prolonged warfare.418 During the second part of the war, it is 
possible that the Roman armies were able to capture more prisoners in Southern Italy, but, as Erdkamp 
notes, these numbers should not be overestimated.419 Rome encouraged the Campanians to return to their 
land and restore its productivity. The confiscations of land allowed an expansion of the ager publicus 
that was soon sold to those were able to invest, and profit from the demands for agricultural goods. These 
conditions allowed the ager Campanus to regain productivity, though it probably required some time 
before it returned to pre-war levels of production. 
 
                                                 
415 See Livy, XXVI. 16: “The question of the city and its lands remained to be discussed, and some people were advocating 
the destruction of a particularly strong city that was so close by and hostile to Rome. But immediate utilitarian considerations 
prevailed, and it owed its salvation to its agricultural land, which was widely recognized as the foremost in Italy for its overall 
productivity – the city would be a home to the people farming that land. To keep the city inhabited, its population of resident 
foreigners, freedmen, traders, and craftsmen was kept on, and all the farmlands and buildings became the public property of 
the Roman people.” 
416 Livy, XXVII. 3 
417 Livy, XXVI. 34; regarding the slaves, Livy says that adult male slaves were not to be given back to their owners – so they 
became Roman property. 
418 Livy, XXIII. 46 states that supplies from Nola and Neapolis were brought to the troops at Suessula.; Livy, XXIV. 13 says 
that Hannibal in 214 raided the land of Cumae, city that remained loyal to the Romans. See Livy, XXIII. 16 on the first battle 
of Nola (216), Livy, XXIII. 44-46 on the second battle of Nola (215), and Livy, XXIV. 17 on the third and final battle of Nola 
(214). At this point Hannibal decided to abandon the conquest of Nola and moved to Tarentum. 
419 Paul Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, Warfare and Food Supply in Roman Republican Wars (264 – 30 BC) (Amsterdam, 
1998), 285 
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Campania offers a double case in terms of impact of the war. At first, obviously, it was influenced 
negatively, but from 211 we might suggest a progressive transformation: the region was not threatened 
by the Carthaginians anymore as fighting moved to Apulia, Lucania and Bruttium. From this moment 
Campania was able to start the same process that was going on in Central Italy, although later, and, 
especially after years of intense combat, Rome created favorable conditions for a fast recovery. 
 
3) Samnium 
 
This region was hit very hard by the war especially after 216 when defections divided Samnium into two 
parts: those who joined Hannibal and those who stayed loyal to the Romans. This situation caused great 
destruction because both sides regularly ravaged enemy territories.420 This caused levels of ruin and 
depopulation no less severe than the worst areas of Campania. 
 
Recovery in Samnium happened very differently from Campania, and was much slower: first of all, this 
region is not as fertile as Campania or as Apulia, so its economic recovery was less urgent. Secondly, by 
the time the region was pacified, demand for corn was less high. The combined production of Etruria 
(and the rest of Central Italy), Sardinia, Campania and Sicily was enough to satisfy the demands of the 
army and civilian market leading to a fall of prices.421  
 
Samnium was also unlikely to have attracted refugees from the war and may, indeed, have lost 
population. Although it wasn’t the region where fighting was most intense, as Lucania and Bruttium in 
particular resisted Rome for longer, it was traditionally a rather poor region, especially if compared with 
Etruria, Latium or Campania. It is probably no coincidence that this region, together with Apulia, was 
chosen as the settlement for at least 50,000 of Scipio’s veterans in a viritane distribution right after the 
war.422 In 180, 40,000 Ligurian men followed by their wives and children were forced to move to 
Samnium by the Romans who allocated plots on ager publicus and even provided them with money to 
                                                 
420 Livy, XXIII. 41 on Romans’ raid against the Samnites in 215; Livy, XXIV. 20 on the Roman operations in Samnium in 
214. 
421 Livy, XXX. 26 states that 203 was a year of particular cheapness of grain mainly because of massive imports from Spain 
into Italy. Also, Livy, XXX. 38 says: “At about that time [202] supplies from Sicily and Sardinia made the price of grain so 
low that the merchant would leave his cargo of wheat to the crew to pay the cost of its transport.” Also, Livy, XXXI. 4 notes 
that a large quantity of grain was brought from Africa by Scipio, and Livy, XXXI. 50 remarks that corn was still cheap by 
200. 
422 See Livy, XXXI. 4 on the distribution of land to Scipio’s veterans. 
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commence farming.423 These allocations suggest that at the end of the war, and in the following decades, 
there was spare land in Samnium. 
 
These three cases offer us an overall impression of the economic impact of the war. The rest of peninsular 
Italy followed similar patterns: the situation in Central Italy was probably very similar to the one we have 
described for Etruria, while the rest of Southern Italy (Apulia, Lucania and Bruttium), more or less had 
the same problems as Samnium. Campania, because of its economic importance, was an exception. 
 
We have excluded from this analysis Northern Italy, as it was not Roman territory. By 218 Rome had 
been beginning the occupation of the Po Valley through the colonies of Placentia and Cremona; the 
arrival of Hannibal immediately started an uprising that lasted until the late 190s. Only with its defeat 
were the Romans able to complete the conquest of the Po Valley, and initiate a major colonization 
programme. 
 
In the following section, I will examine whether we can estimate more closely the differential effects of 
the war on the populations of the various regions of Italy.  
 
Our analysis should look at how the population was geographically distributed, and we can begin from 
Northern Italy. This region should be divided into two parts, the Po Valley in the north – Cisalpine Gaul 
–, and the ager Gallicus south of the colonies of Placentia and Cremona. The differences between these 
two parts are vast and very important in the overall impact of the war on the economy and the population. 
The Po Valley, by the time of the Hannibalic invasion, had been recently invaded and partly occupied by 
the Romans who established the colonies of Placentia and Cremona in 218. These two cities were 
constantly threatened by the Gauls and sustained great difficulties, at the point that many left their land 
and were almost compelled to return and, in 190, both colonies received large reinforcements – 6,000 
new settlers each. It was only with the defeat of the resistance of the Boii in the late 190s that the Po 
Valley was secured allowing the demographic, urban and economic development of this area. 
 
                                                 
423 Livy, XL. 38 on this episode; he says that Rome gave them a total of 150,000 sesterces (so 37,500 denarii – 375,000 
asses). They were moved to ager publicus that was previously owned by the Taurasini, so we might suggest that this was 
vacant land already equipped for farming. 
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The rest of the Roman Northern Italy did not see a lot of military activity with the exception of the 
passage of the Punic armies between 218 and 217, and 207. Magus’ invasion of 205 was limited to the 
Gauls’ territories before he was defeated and called back to Carthage. The Gauls themselves, never 
operated more southern than the Po Valley itself or Mutina during the war and even during their following 
uprising in the 190s. 
 
Roman population in this area varied: while the Romans were starting their occupation of the Po Valley 
in 218, it was only after the war and the subsequent defeat of the Boii that the region started to be more 
intensively occupied. The ager Gallicus was probably more densely populated and probably less 
involved in the military operations against the Gauls in Cisalpine. Brunt suggests that this area played an 
important role in the overall recovery of the population. As we have argued already, the Hannibalic War 
should be divided into different phases. After Cannae the war is characterized by less great battles (thus 
less war losses) and a slow, but general recovery of Rome’s population. This was possible because the 
new generation of citizens, those born between the mid-230s and the early 220s, who was coming into 
military age during the second phase of the conflict was stronger than the previous one.424 
 
This was the result of distribution of land to citizens in Roman territory after the First Punic War, within 
the period 240-219, that promoted an increase of fertility; the only agrarian scheme recorded was that 
effected under Flaminius’ agrarian law of 232.425 Sons born to the colonists under his scheme would not 
have been old enough to be enumerated in 219 (a child born in 231, for example, was only 14 in 218 
when the war started; he reached military age – 19 years of age – by 212). The generation rising during 
the first part of the Second Punic War should have been larger than the previous one – the one who had 
been decimated by the war – as it was the result of the settlement in the ager Gallicus and Picenus. 
 
Central Italy, on the other hand, saw only three moments of military activity: in 217 during Hannibal’s 
passage, briefly in 211 when Hannibal tried – and failed – to lure legions away from Capua by marching 
into Latium, and for a short time again in 207 at the time of Hasdrubal’s invasion when he was intercepted 
in Picenum. All of these, however, did not cause long-terms effects, and for the rest of the war these 
regions (Etruria, Latium, Umbria and Picenum) were not war-zones, so their production and population 
did not sustain serious damages. 
                                                 
424 See Brunt, Italian Manpower, 62 
425 See Brunt, Italian Manpower, 28 and Roselaar, Public Land, 148 
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It is possible that the population of these regions was very high before the war; Latium and Etruria were 
probably two of the most populated regions of Italy together with Campania. In terms of population, 
Campania sustained war losses and suffered from both sides.426 Soon after the war, four colonies were 
established in Campania (Salernum, Puteoli, Volturnum and Liternum), probably because land was 
available.427 A full recovery in Campania would have taken time, but it was likely achieved relatively 
early in the second century. 
 
Other regions of Southern Italy were affected by the war. The situation described for Samnium was 
probably very similar in Apulia: both regions were seriously damaged by the war. After the war, 
considerable amounts of land were confiscated by the Romans and became ager publicus and large Latin 
colonies, Thurii Copia (193) and Vibo Valentia (192), were estabished.428 Considering the size of the 
land allotments suggested by Livy, it seems that land was available. The colonies were probably intended 
to boost the population of these areas and as a military presence to secure the region.429 
 
Overall, regarding Southern Italy, the economic and demographic recovery was hampered by events of 
211 and 210. By this period, both Campania and Sicily were under full Roman control, and the 
government adopted measures to motivate production and investments so that, by combining their 
productivity with that of Central Italy and Sardinia, and later even Spain, both the civilian population 
and the army were now able to receive ample supplies. The number of legions in service started to be 
reduced after 207, making the military demand less pressing, and, as a consequence, this led to a decrease 
of the prices of corn, making commercial farming less appealing than before. On the other hand, if regions 
like Samnium, Lucania or Bruttium were not attractive for large landowners, conditions were now more 
favorable for a demographic expansion of the peasantry: land – both private and public – was available. 
 
                                                 
426 Livy, XXIII. 35 mentions that the Capuans took the initiative and attacked Cumae – loyal to Rome. 
427 On the foundation of the Campanian colonies, see Livy, XXXIV. 45 
428 Regarding the foundation of Vibo see Livy, XXXV. 40: it counted 4,000 settlers, and 15 iugera of land were assigned to 
each infantrymen, while each cavalrymen received 30 iugera. At Copia, see Livy, XXXV. 9, the 3,300 settlers received 
allotments of 20 iugera for pedites, and 40 iugera for equites. 
429 Livy, XXIV. 15 on the strong presence of Lucanians and Bruttians in Hannibal’s army; also see Kathryn Lomas, ‘Rome, 
Latins and Italians in the Second Punic War’, in ed. Hoyos, D., A Companion to the Punic Wars (Chichester, 2011), 345 and 
348 
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There is no doubt that the population declined during the war as the defeats of 218-216 caused a 
demographic shock: we have suggested a hypothetical census figure for 216 dramatically lower than that 
of 219.  Also, the prolonged heavy recruitment rates delayed the recovery, as many men of marriageable 
age were in service in the army. Brunt suggests that the return of peace might have stimulate birth-rates, 
so more new citizens were coming to maturity in the penultimate decade of the third century (210s) rather 
than in the 230s or 220s.430 Very high birth-rates need to be counterbalanced by high level of military 
participation, and the consequent absence of men. Secondly, we have to consider the more peaceful 
conditions of the regions of Central Italy (after brief exceptions) and its northern part – the ager Gallicus 
–, while the Southern part of the peninsula was progressively pacified; Hannibal ceased to be a serious 
threat in 207 until, by 203, he left Italy. The census figures of 207 and 204 suggest that the population 
was recovering; as Dyson writes: ‘Certainly, a generation was decimated during the Second Punic War, 
but many of those losses would have been rapidly replaced by the maturing of younger males spared by 
the war’.431 
 
The gravity of the population decline probably varied from region to region. The economic survey that 
we have offered suggests that the weakening of the Southern part of the peninsula, Lucania and Bruttium 
in particular, was balanced by the recovery of Campania while land availability in Samnium and Apulia 
favored allotments of large quantity of people (the case of Scipio’s veterans, colonial foundations in 
Apulia, the case of the Ligurians). The central regions – Latium, Umbria, Picenum and Etruria – were 
the ones that suffered the least during the war, especially from an economic point of view. Migration 
from the Southern regions may have partly balanced war losses and the high demand for labour in the 
fields and towns, Rome in particular, would have provided migrants with a living. As we will argue in 
the later chapters, military service was an alternative form of employment and of income.  After the 
census requirement for service was lowered to 4,000 asses, a new and large part of the Roman and Latin 
population became able to access the benefits of service. 
 
To conclude this part on the demographic impact of the war connected with the economy, I discuss the 
availability of labour. While many Roman males were recruited into the legions, a still considerable part 
of the population was not involved in the military operations. Above, we suggested a census figure of 
161,000 citizens for 216. At that time, fifteen legions, a total of 63,800 Roman citizens (39.6%), were in 
                                                 
430 See Brunt, Italian Manpower, 62 
431 Stephen Dyson, Community and Society in Roman Italy (Baltimore and London, 1992), 28 
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service. This would leave 97,200 men free from military service. In 207, the census figure as reported by 
Livy was 177,000 Roman citizens.432 If, as we have suggested, we include the soldiers stationed overseas 
and increase the total population to 219,000 citizens, the number of those not in the army would rise to 
118,500. De Ligt suggests that the Roman female population (between 17 and 45) was 230,000 by 225; 
since they were not directly involved in the war, we might suggest that their figure remained stable or 
slightly higher so that, by 207, we might suggest a total population of 250,000 free women.433 Women 
were likely an important part of the workforce, but it is possible that their role in the production of food 
increased in the absence of their menfolk. The same argument can be applied to minors.  
 
Finally, we have to consider the role of the migrants. As Erdkamp says: ‘…migration was a crucial factor 
in determining the economic conditions in war-time and post-war Italy’.434 Migration is hardly attested 
but it seems likely that many people were displaced from regions like Campania or Samnium to more 
peaceful regions like Etruria, Latium or Picenum. We cannot distinguish between permanent or 
temporary migration.435 Because of the recruitment levels, work was likely available, in the fields (like 
the cases of Etruria and the other regions of Central Italy), and probably in towns as well (weapon 
manufacture) or in the coastal regions (ship building). 
 
* The role of the army: the war economy 
 
This section of this chapter is focused on what we can call the economy of war. Of course we have to 
consider the cost for Rome in maintaining so many legions for so many years, but, contrary to the more 
traditional view, we are going to suggest a more generally positive impact of the army during the Second 
Punic War. First of all, we will discuss the role of the military ‘industry’ in terms of weapon manufactory, 
and how this can be considered the beginning of mass state production and the first step towards 
standardization of military equipment. Also, we should consider ship building and maintenance, as Rome 
kept a large fleet in service during the entire war. We will also analyse the importance of war indemnities, 
and finally, we will conclude with the key argument in terms of the connection between the army and 
                                                 
432 On the census of 207 see Livy, XXVII. 36 
433 De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 144 
434 Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, 280 
435 Livy, XXVI. 10 on the people fleeing into Rome in 211 during Hannibal’s brief attack on Latium. Livy, XXVII. 11 says 
that in 206 the consuls were instructed by the senate to convince migrants to leave Rome as, by now, it was safe to return to 
the countryside. 
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the economy: the money spent by Rome in order to pay its soldiers during the war, and considering the 
actual meaning of this immense economic effort. 
 
The Hannibalic War is a plausible starting point for seeing the Roman state taking the place of small 
craftsmen in the production and supply of military equipment. Hilary and John Travis, on different 
occasions, highlight the reforms of Marius as the likely beginning of mass state production of weapons 
and equipment since the abolition of the census requirement for service in the army produced the need 
to equip poor soldiers.436 Contrary to this model, we should focus our attention to the Second Punic War 
which also was a moment of crisis in which the state might plausibly have become involved in the 
production of equipment.   
 
a) The reduction of census requirement for military service from 11,000 asses to 4,000 asses 
meant that less wealthy citizens required equipment.437 The costs of production may have 
retrieved from the stipendium of a soldier. 
b) With the increase of men under arms, the legions required unprecedented levels of equipment. 
One also presumes that much equipment was lost during the disastrous early years of the war: 
Polybius tells us that Hannibal re-equipped his soldiers with Roman weapons and armour.438 
 
These conditions probably made it impossible for local craftsmen to meet the demand for equipment. 
The state likely became involved in the production of military equipment. Since Rome formed new 
legions every year, the demand for equipment was regular and sustained and whatever the mechanism 
by which these needs were met, it entailed a significant level of work (and income) for smiths and their 
suppliers. 
 
Our main source on the standard equipment assigned to the soldiers of the Roman army is Polybius439: 
 
                                                 
436 Hilary and John Travis, Roman Helmets (Stroud, 2014), 52 and 159 
437 See Livy, I. 43 on the 11,000 asses minimum census requirement; see Polybius, VI. 19 on the plausible reduction to 400 
drachmae/denarii (so 4,000 asses). 
438 Polybius, III. 87: “He also rearmed his African troops with Roman equipment, selecting the best weapons for the purpose, 
since he was now in possession of huge stores of captured arms.” 
439 Polybius, VI. 22-23 
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a) The youngest and poorest recruits, who formed the ranks of the velites, were equipped in a simpler 
fashion: they had swords, javelins and the parma (a small, round shield). 
b) The bulk of the legions was composed by the hastati and principes, both equipped in the same way: 
the gladius (short thrusting sword) was their main offensive weapon, but they also had two pila (javelins). 
Their protective panoply included bronze helmets, a large oval shield (scutum), a brass breast-plate 
(pectorale) – which could be upgraded to a lorica (chainmail) that offered better protection, but was more 
expensive440 – and bronze greaves. 
c) The triarii had the same equipment, but instead of the throwing spears they were equipped with the 
longer thrusting spears (hastae). 
d) Regarding the equipment of the cavalry Polybius is vaguer; he states that, at first, Roman cavalrymen 
fought with minimal protection in order to increase mobility, but they started soon to employ ‘Greek 
equipment’, so probably increasing the protective equipment.441 
 
This different kind of equipment, combined with the large quantities required by the numerous legions 
levied by Rome surely made weapon manufactory a very large business. It is plausible that in order to 
sustain the request of military equipment, the Republic had to buy from large contractors probably 
located in towns, Rome in particular, but we should presume that other medium-size towns were able to 
sustain weapon production. An interesting case is when, after the conquest of New Carthage in 209, 
Scipio made all the artisans of the town – 2,000 according to Livy442 – work for Rome; he promised them 
freedom in exchange for their work.443 It is likely that smiths and others adapted their production to meet 
military demands, but the extent and regularity of the demand for weapons from the outbreak of the 
Hannibalic War onwards almost certainly affected the market, providing reliable and regular paid work. 
The production of military equipment required resources (notably the metal ore) and this likely triggered 
an expansion in mining.444 Large scale warfare generated industrial demands that in themselves are likely 
                                                 
440 Polybius, VI. 23 says that only soldiers whose property was above 10,000 drachmae/denarii could afford the lorica. 
441 Polybius, VI. 25 on the cavalry: “…the Romans began to copy Greek arms, for this is one of their strong points: no people 
are more willing to adopt new customs and to emulate what they see is better done by others.” 
442 On the number of artisans of New Carthage, see Livy, XXVI. 47 
443 Livy, XXVI. 51: “…while the city itself, with the smiths and artisans of all trades shut up in the state workshops, rang 
continuously with the sound of warlike preparation.”; Livy, XXVII. 17: “He [Scipio] had moreover a very large reserve of 
weapons, which included those taken at New Carthage and all he had had made after the capture of the town by the numerous 
workmen he had kept shut up for the purpose.” 
444 William Broadhead, ‘Migration and Transformation in North Italy in the 3rd – 1st Centuries BC’, BICS 44 (2000), 149-150 
highlights that the mineral resources of Northern Italy were well exploited by the Romans. 
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to have had significant economic effects, encouraging artisanal production and also distributing cash 
through Roman society. 
 
Ship building was also part of military ‘industry’. Rome, after all, kept a large fleet in service during the 
entire war that offered a very important advantage over the Carthaginians. Its scale is suggested by Livy 
when he describes the preparations for war in 218 and says that the Roman fleet counted 220 
quinqueremes and 20 cutters.445 This fleet, naturally, needed maintenance and new ships in order to 
replace losses. Ship building and manufacture required various materials: the boats needed the wood and 
metal and rope for their basic manufacture, but also all the fittings. All of this, consequently, required 
(and offered) labour, and this was certainly focused on the coastal regions of Italy, both on the Tyrrhenian 
Sea, but also on the Adriatic Sea – especially after the treaty between Hannibal and Philip and the creation 
of the Macedonian front.446 
 
Nevertheless, the main fiscal pressure was surely the payment of the soldiers. As we have seen in the 
military payment chapter, soldiers received their stipendia in asses. The fall of Syracuse (212) allowed 
the Republic to reform its financial/monetary system and to introduce the denarius as the main currency. 
By this point soldiers were paid in denarii although, as described by Tacitus at the time of Tiberius, they 
computed their payment in asses.447 
 
To summarise Polybius, infantrymen were paid two obols (3 asses) per day for a total of 1,080 asses per 
year; centurions received four obols (6 asses) per day, so 2,160 asses per year; finally, cavalrymen were 
paid 1 drachma (9 asses) per day (3,240 asses per year). With these figures, we can estimate total cost 
of a Polybian legion, by looking at how much its individual parts were paid on a yearly base. A Polybian 
legion counted 4,200 infantrymen and 300 cavalrymen, and this was the standard Roman military unit in 
service during the Second Punic War. The legion was divided between regular soldiers, officers (Polybius 
mentions the centurions, but also the optiones – probably junior officers), and cavalrymen, as each of 
them received, as we have just saw, different money.448 
                                                 
445 Livy, XXI. 17: “…and as great a fleet as could be mustered.” 
446 On the treaty see Livy, XXIII. 33-34 and Polybius, VII. 9 
447 Pliny, XXXIII, 13, 45: “…in the pay of soldiers one denarius has always been given for ten asses.”; Tacitus, The Annals 
(I, 17, 6): “Indeed a soldier’s life was hard and unrewarding, he said. Body and soul, he was worth ten asses a day…”; also 
see Rathbone, ‘Assidui and Prima Classis’, 151-152 
448 Polybius, VI. 24 on the optiones; since he doesn’t say how much they were paid, we have suggested that they received less 
than the centurions, but more than a soldiers, one payment and a half. 
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UNIT PAY (in asses) TOTAL PER YEAR (asses) 
4,080 soldiers 3 per day / 1,080 per year 4,406,400 
60 optiones 4.5 per day / 1,620 per year 97,200 
60 centurions 6 per day / 2,160 per year 129,600 
300 cavalrymen 9 per day / 3,240 per year 972,000 
 
From the data on the table, we can see that a single legion required 5,605,200 asses per year. Knowing 
how much money a single legion required annually, and knowing the number of legions in service year 
after year during the entire war, we can actually attempt to estimate the yearly cost of the war for Rome 
in terms of military payment for the period between 218 and 200 (we are including the first after the end 
of the war, to see the difference between the years of the Second Punic War and when Rome returned to 
a normal military activity). 
 
In the following table, in order to simplify the process, we are counting legions of 4,500 men each (we 
are not considering any possible negative variation to the legions in terms of strength – so no weaker 
legions as suggested by Brunt), and the total annual cost is the result of the payment given respectively 
to infantrymen (both legionaries and centurions) and cavalrymen. Finally, we have to highlight some 
exclusions: a) The two legiones cannenses between 216 and 206 (as Livy clearly says they were not 
supposed to receive payment449). From 205 they were included in the new army under the command of 
Scipio; b) We don’t know if the two legions of volones in service between 216 and 212 were paid, but 
considering their status (they were formed by slaves, former convicts, etc.), we might suppose that they 
fell under the responsibility of their commander; c) Scipio’s two African legions in service between 205 
and 201 because they were partly made up with soldiers from the legiones cannenses450; d) The Spanish 
legions in service between 215 and 211: from Livy’s chronicles we know that Rome was not sending 
supplies and cash to them, at the point that the Senate recommend to the Scipios to gather money from 
the Spanish communities.451 We should re-include them by 210, when reinforcements from Italy started 
to arrive once again. 
 
                                                 
449 Livy, XXIII. 31 
450 Livy, XXIX. 25 on the formation of Scipio’s African legions. 
451 Livy, XXIII. 48: “But, the letter continued, there was need of cash for their men’s pay, and the army stood in need of 
clothing and food rations, and the naval crews in need of everything. If the matter of pay, they said, they would find some 
way of extracting it from the Spaniards, if the treasury were depleted; but everything else certainly had to be sent from Rome 
and, without it, maintaining either the army or the province was an impossibility.” 
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YEAR 
LEGIONS IN 
SERVICE 
CITIZENS IN 
SERVICE 
COST OF LEGIONS 
(in asses) 
218 7 31,500 38,556,000 
217 11 49,500 60,588,000 
216 (after Cannae) 15 63,800 62,337,600 
215 15 63,800 44,064,000 
214 21 90,800 77,112,000 
213 23 99,800 88,128,000 
212 25 108,800 99,144,000 
211 25 108,800 99,144,000 
210 21 91,500 104,652,000 
209 21 91,500 104,652,000 
208 21 91,500 104,652,000 
207 23 100,500 115,668,000 
206 20 87,000 99,144,000 
205 18 85,000 88,128,000 
204 19 89,500 93,636,000 
203 18 85,000 88,128,000 
202 16 76,000 77,112,000 
201 14 67,000 66,096,000 
200 6 27,000 33,048,000 
 
The figures in the table are estimates since, as we have suggested, there are many variables. 
 
The census requirement for the prima classis was 100,000 asses, and the likely average senatorial fortune 
was not necessarily many multiples of that figure. We have no way of assessing the total fortunes of the 
senators, but for the purposes of comparison, if we assume 300 senators with an average census of 
500,000 asses, the total fortune of the senate would be 150,000,000 asses, likely to produce a total annual 
income of no more than 15,000,000 asses. Once one starts thinking of the likely total revenues of the 
Roman state, it becomes very difficult to see how Rome could sustain so many troops in the field for so 
long. On several occasions, Livy reports that the Republic, especially during the difficult years after 
Cannae, lacked funds (inopia aerarii).452 The commanders of the legions stationed in Sicily and Sardinia 
in 216 complained that their soldiers were not paid and did not receive supplies regularly. The senate 
                                                 
452 Livy, XXIII. 5 reports a speech in Campania in 216: “Are we to tell you we are lacking in cash, as if that is all we lack? 
Fortune has left us absolutely nothing that we can even supplement! Legions, cavalry, weapons, standards, horses, men, cash, 
supplies…” Also, Livy, XXIV. 18 says: “The workings of government were as vigorous at home as they were in the field. 
Because of the insolvency of the treasury…” and then he describes some measures adopted by the censors to gather money 
in 214. 
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was forced to pass responsibility back to the generals.453 Similar claims were requested in 215 by the 
commanders of the Spanish legions, but in this instance, the state made an extraordinary levy to furnish 
supplies to that army, while cash was extracted from the Spanish communities.454 In 215 the senate 
imposed double taxation.455 The following year, Rome manned its fleet with crews raised and paid from 
private funds after an edict of the consuls imposed citizens with certain census levels to pay the 
crewmembers of the fleet, a measure repeated in 210.456 The Roman government also auctioned off 
public land.457 
 
The capture of cities then was probably a crucial boost to Rome’s war effort. The fall of both Syracuse 
and Capua, the triumph of Nero in 207, the triumph of Scipio after his campaign in Spain (206) were not 
just military successes but offered the opportunity to replenish the treasury and captured towns might 
expect all their moveable wealth to be seized by Rome. Of course, the most significant influx of income 
likely came at the end of the war with Scipio’s victory.458 
 
Finally, something that is usually not considered in the matter of the economic impact of the war, but 
should be included as it is part of the post-war economy, are the war indemnities forced upon Carthage 
at the end of the war.459 
 
As Livy tells us, Scipio, among other conditions, imposed a payment of 10,000 silver talents to be paid 
in annual instalments over a period of fifty years.460 If we consider that a plausible ratio between denarius 
and talent is 6,000:1, it would mean that Carthage had to pay 60,000,000 denarii. Additionally, after 
having set down the terms for peace, the Romans offered to the Carthaginians a three-months truce – 
                                                 
453 Livy, XXIII. 21: Titus Otacilius, propraetor in Sicily, sent a delegation to Hiero of Syracuse who sent money and six 
months’ supply of grain (this was probably a loan, as Livy, XXIII. 38 mentions that the following year – 215 – Appius 
Claudius received money from the senate to repay Hiero). Aulus Mammula, propraetor of Sardinia, turned to the allied city-
states which contributed “generously”. 
454 Livy, XXIII. 48 on the scarcity of supplies and cash of the legions in Spain. 
455 Livy, XXIII. 31 
456 Livy, XXIV. 11; for the edict of 210 see Livy, XXVI. 35 
457 Livy, XXVIII. 46 
458 Livy, XXV. 31: “Such, by and large, was the capture of Syracuse, and the quantity of booty taken was so great that more 
would hardly have been forthcoming if it were Carthage that had been captured…”; Livy, XXVI. 14 on the wealth taken from 
the Capuan senators. Regarding Nero’s triumph, see Livy, XXVIII. 9: “The money the consuls brought to the treasury 
amounted to 3,000,000 sesterces and 90,000 bronze asses.” Livy, XXVIII. 38 on Scipio’s triumph of 206, and Livy, XXX. 45 
on his second triumph in 201. 
459 On the role of war indemnities see Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution, 37-42 
460 Livy, XXX. 37 on the peace treaty. 
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probably in order to give the respective governments the practical time to work the terms of the treaty 
and, ultimately, accept them – at the price of 25,000 pounds of silver.461 This would mean 11,340 
kilograms of silver, so 351 Roman talents (as one Roman talent is 32.3 kg of silver), thus the equivalent 
of 2,106,000 denarii. 
 
We don’t know if the Carthaginians paid equal instalments every year – it is, however, possible, as we 
will shortly see –, but, to simplify, we may consider that they paid 200 talents each year for fifty years, 
thus Rome’s treasury had the guarantee of an additional annual income of 1,200,000 denarii just from 
war indemnities. As noted by Rosenstein, Carthage recovered fast from the war, and, by 191, while 
gathering the supplies requested by the Romans for the war against Syria, it proposed to pay all of the 
debt in one large instalment, but Rome declined, thus suggesting that the Carthaginians kept paying until 
151 (coincidentally, a couple of years before the Third Punic War).462 The rapidity of Carthage’s 
economic recovery, however, should be noticed, as it seems to suggest a general growth of the western 
Mediterranean post-war economy (considering that this large payment was offered only ten years after 
the end of the war).463 
 
It is undeniable that the cost of the war proved to be a massive burden on Rome’s finances, but the 
expenditure spread cash throughout the Italian economy. The stipendium, the requirements for food and 
military production injected cash into the economy. At the very least, it must have redistributed wealth 
perhaps to the poorer citizens serving in the army and those supplying the material for the war effort. 
Perhaps also there were wealthier individuals who were in a position to bid for military contracts who 
might have benefited from the war effort. Contrary to all the negative theories expressed by Toynbee, 
Brunt or Hopkins, we might even argue that the Second Punic War allowed a restructuring of the 
economy and wealth that was at the foundation of the economic prosperity of the second century.464 The 
monetarization of the economy; the development of commercial farming associated with the so-called 
‘Catonian’ villae, the development of an administrative and fiscal infrastructure for state contracts, the 
                                                 
461 Livy, XXX. 38 
462 Livy, XXXVI. 4: “…and, with a single payment, discharge in full the indemnity which they were under obligation […] 
the response regarding the money was likewise [negative] that the Romans would not accept any before the due date.” Also 
Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 234 adds that Rome wanted to maintain its position of superiority over Carthage 
as long as possible by using this payment as a reminder. 
463 Polybius, XVIII. 35 says that Carthage was the richest city in the world. 
464 See Nathan Rosenstein, ‘Italy: Economy and Demography after Hannibal’s War’, in ed. Hoyos, D., A Companion to the 
Punic Wars, 412-416 
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input of cash to the peasant soldiers and perhaps even the opportunities the came from the mobility and 
loss of population, land availability and later colonization, all could be seen as encouraging development 
rather than an economic and social catastrophe. 
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Chapter 6 
THE RECRUITMENT SYSTEM OF THE ROMAN ARMY 
Part 3: the second century 
 
 
In this section of the thesis we will analyze Rome’s recruitment system and military effort during the 
second century from the end of the Second Punic War to 125. This chapter is divided into two parts: the 
first is focused on the period from the beginning of the second century to the aftermath of the Third 
Macedonian War, while the second part of the chapter will analyze the second half of the century up until 
the late 120s. 
 
The years following the victory over Carthage did not bring peace to the Mediterranean. However, if 
compared with the enormous efforts sustained by the Republic during the long struggle against Hannibal, 
the wars of the second century appeared very different. For the most part they were shorter, they drew 
less heavily upon Rome’s manpower, and casualties were far fewer. As a result, there were less legions 
in service. During the first half of the second century between six and eight legions were usually in 
service annually, with a peak of twelve and thirteen during the years 191-188. From that we will have to 
wait until 149 to see once again more than ten legions in service. 
 
It seems likely, however, that by the late 180s the number of Roman citizens per legion was increased to 
5,500 men between infantry and cavalry. This increase did not affect the legions during the years 192-
188, but came to apply during the later period in which the Roman government was probably trying to 
standardize the number of legions in service. 
 
The real importance of this change, though, was not in terms of burden, but the way it affected the ratio 
between citizens and socii in the army. Although in the early second century, the proportion of allied 
troops probably increased, perhaps as punishment for those allies who defected during the Carthaginian 
invasion.465 With the increase of Roman troops in the legions in the late 180s the ratio of allied soldiers 
                                                 
465 Livy, XXXII. 8 on the army of 198: the consular army in Macedonia was composed by two legions with a supplement of 
3,300 Romans and 5,500 allies (for a total of 12,300 citizens and 15,700 socii); the praetorian armies were reinforced 
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started to decline until, by the 170s, a sort of parity was reached. As we will examine later, the figures 
on the strength of the army show that although there were fewer legions in service after the Second Punic 
War, this was compensated for by a general increase in the number of allies under arms. Between the 
180s and the Third Macedonian War, on the other hand, there was a sort of standardization of the number 
of legions in service, which, at the same time, led to an increase in the number of Roman citizens under 
arms. 
 
Finally, the census figures display an increase in the population during the first half of the second century, 
showing that between 200 and 164 the population was able to recover from the losses of the Second 
Punic War. Also, victorious campaigns were followed by a significant increase in land availability for 
both citizens and non-citizens that allowed a major programme of colonization and land distribution. 
 
* The recruitment system of the second century 
 
For the second century recruitment procedures we still rely on Polybius and his description of the dilectus 
in book VI. Yet, by this period, the citizen body was larger and more dispersed: Roman soldiers not only 
came from Rome itself and its nearby communities, but also from the countryside and colonies in Central 
and Southern Italy, and, later, from Northern Italy. It is difficult to imagine that the men could assemble 
and be deployed tribe by tribe on the Capitol for the very simple reason: there was no space for so many 
men on the Capitoline Hill, a plateau of 25 acres/100 sq. meters – part of it occupied by the temple of 
Jupiter.466 We might suggest that Polybius is describing how recruitment was organized when the army 
was composed by the four consular legions alone. From the second half of the third century – if not 
earlier – the assembly took place on the Campus Martius outside the city.467 
                                                 
exclusively by allied contingents (4,300 socii in Sicily, and 2,200 in Sardinia). Livy, XXXIII. 43 shows that the consular army 
(9,000 Romans) sent to Spain was supported by 15,800 allies. Livy, XXXVI. 2 mentions that both the Spanish province in 
191 received reinforcements for a total of 3,300 men each, but 2/3 of these should have been allies, while 1/3 citizens (so 
4,400 socii and 2,200 citizens in total). Livy, XXXVII. 2: one of the consular armies of 190 was formed by two legions (9,000 
Romans) and 15,600 allies, two legions were sent to Apulia-Bruttium and supported by 15,600 socii; finally, one legion plus 
10,400 socii was stationed in Etruria. 
466 Polybius, VI. 19: “On the appointed day, when those who are liable for service have arrived in Rome and assembled on 
the Capitoline Hill”. Richardson, A New Topographical Dictionary of Ancient Rome (Baltimore, 1992), 68-70 on the 
Capitoline Hill; he reminds us that it is the smallest of the seven hills of Rome. 
467 Dio fr 109. 5 and Varro RR, III. 2. 4; Vegetius, I. 10: “Therefore the ancient Romans […] selected a Campus Martius next 
to the Tiber in which the youth might wash off sweat and dust after training…”; Richardson, Topographical Dictionary, 65-
67 on the Campus Martius. Livy, III. 69 and Dionysius Hal., VIII. 87, on the contrary, indicate that soldiers were gathered in 
the Campus Martius already in the fifth century, but it is clear that they are just assuming that the process of recruitment in 
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The key issue is how many citizens would actually appear at a dilectus. Nicolet reminds us that there 
were two different types of levy in Rome: a regular one adopted in normal circumstances, the normal 
annual dilectus, in which the forms and requirements of the census were followed, and a levy en masse 
(tumultus) in which all the city’s manpower was called up in the event of an unexpected enemy 
offensive.468 This last did not apply in the second century and the dilectus likely became a supplementum, 
replacing those discharged or lost or simply providing reinforcements.469 New legions were recruited for 
new campaigns, but it seems likely that there was considerable variation from year to year in the demand 
for new recruits. For example, Livy shows that total number of Roman citizens who were recruited for 
service in Spain in 182 were 4,200, while the following year (181), only 3,200 were needed.470 
 
If the number of citizens annually involved in the dilectus was limited (or at least was flexible), we can 
try to understand how the process worked in the second century. We can use as an example the levy of 
194: by the end of it, eight legions were ready for duty (meaning that a total of 76,800 men divided 
between 36,000 Romans and 40,800 socii).471 Livy also suggests that the dilectus was a slow process: 
the eleven days long levy of 169 was considered faster than usual, so a regular dilectus could take two 
weeks.472 
 
The dilectus began with a summons in the form of an edict, warning citizens to assemble on a date usually 
fixed 30 days ahead (a trinundinum); Festus (92 L) says that a red flag was flown from the Capitol during 
that interval as a reminder. Once the citizens began assembling, the next step consisted of investigating 
all the exemption claims, the eligibility of the potential recruits, and then the enrolment took place. 
Nicolet suggests that ‘the recruits were not brought on to the strength at once: the consul ordered them 
to report at a given date to their respective enrolment centers, generally in the area where each man was 
                                                 
use during their times was the same as it was in the fifth century, like to suggest that late Republican/early Imperial procedures 
had their origins in the Early Republic. 
468 Nicolet, The World of the Citizen, 93 
469 Nicolet, The World of the Citizen, 97 
470 For 182 see Livy, XL. 1; for 181 see Livy, XL. 18 
471 Livy, XXXIV. 43: “When the matter of the provinces was raised, […] the senate decided that the two consuls should have 
Italy as theirs, since the wars in Spain and Macedonia were now finished. […]. It was decided that no new army be transported 
to Macedonia, and that the army already there be brought back to Italy by Quinctius and demobilized. The army with Marcus 
Porcius Cato in Spain was likewise to be disbanded. The two consuls were to have Italy as their province and were authorized 
to enroll two city legions so that, after demobilization of the legions decreed by the senate, there should be a total of eight 
Roman legions.” 
472 Livy, XLIII. 15 
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to serve’.473 For example, in 193 the new recruits had to present themselves at Arretium within ten days, 
and in 191, for the war against Antiochus, at Brundisium.474 
 
It seems unlikely that all the soldiers were amassed in Rome. Some may have gathered on the Campus 
Martius, but would have departed when ready and in the meantime, more recruits gathered by 
magistrates. Such a diffused system suggests that it would have been extremely easy for soldiers to avoid 
the draft or to disappear having been drafted. 
 
To return to the recruitment of 194, at the end of it Livy lists eight legions in service between Italy, the 
two Spanish provinces, Sicily and Sardinia. Four legions were disbanded (two from Macedonia and two 
from Spain), four were still in service while four were newly recruited. Since Livy says that the consuls 
were authorized: “…to enroll two city legions…”, it is possible that it means that only two legions – for 
a total of 9,000 Roman citizens – were formed by men recruited among the citizens residing in Rome. 
The other two legions may have been gathered elsewhere. 
 
Due to the great distance from Rome at which many citizens lived, decentralized and local enlistment 
became essential during the second century. It seems likely that Rome’s recruiting magistrates entrusted 
local authorities to enlist soldiers or sent magistrates, called the conquisitores, to fix the quotas to be 
drawn from different towns and localities. 
 
The experience of municipia in levying their own troops was probably used to organize the enlistment 
of Roman soldiers from the colonies. In places where citizens were settled without recognised local self-
government, praefecti iuri dicundo (or tribal officials) were usually employed. This procedure is 
explained by Brunt: 
 
 ‘Rome sent out to them to furnish contingents to the 
legions in much the same way as allied cities were 
required to send a stated number of men ex formula 
togatorum. Some of these municipia had in fact been 
socii before, and their incorporation in the Roman state 
should not have deprived them of the machinery for 
raising troops at Rome’s demand. Nor need anything 
                                                 
473 Nicolet, The World of the Citizen, 102 
474 For the case of Arretium in 193, see Livy, XXXIV. 56; for the case of Brundisium in 191, see Livy, XXXVI. 2 
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have changed, when they were later raised to full citizen 
rights’.475 
 
Luuk de Ligt suggests that: 
 
‘We must surely suppose that the same procedure was 
followed in the case of self-governing municipia and that 
the requirement of universal attendance applied only to 
citizens resident in or near the city of Rome. This means 
that the levy involved two stages: a first stage in which 
recruits were enlisted by the local authorities and a 
second one in which the men thus selected were 
distributed among the legions. Polybius’ description 
refers solely to the second stage’.476 
 
The levy of the socii probably followed a process not very different from that described by Polybius.477 
The entire procedure was conducted by their own communities and recruits were assigned to the praefecti 
sociorum sent by Rome whereupon the allied contingents moved to the areas designated places to meet 
the legions.478 
 
Regarding military age, our best source is Gaius Gracchus’ lex militaria that established that citizens 
younger than 17 could not be recruited in the army, suggesting that Roman citizens were normally 
recruited when they were older – probably 19 or 20.479 Livy shows that in the aftermath of Cannae, boys 
(17 or over) were enlisted in the army, but this was clearly an emergency. Boys between 17 and 20 may 
                                                 
475 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 631 
476 De Ligt, ‘Roman Manpower and Recruitment’, 116 
477 Polybius, VI. 21 on the levy of the allies. 
478 The expansion of the Republic also brought a new matter completely absent in Polybius: the recruitment of soldiers in the 
provinces (here recruitment was probably organized in a similar fashion to that of citizens who lived in colonies or the Italian 
allies, and interested both Roman citizens and non-Romans in the same way. They were probably recruited by local 
magistrates nominated by the governors, and perhaps served as garrison troops. Livy, XXXV. 2 regarding Spain, and Livy, 
XXXV. 23 regarding Sicily clearly says in both cases that Romans and non-Roman joined the legions. We have to consider 
that recruiting soldiers in an overseas province, sending them to Rome, and then sending them elsewhere was a waste of time 
and resources). During the course of the second century, migration to the overseas provinces became progressively more 
important, and it is only natural that the military activity of the provinces also involved the Romans and Italians who moved 
there: during the Spanish war between the 150s and 130s, Roman armies were formed by troops recruited in Italy, but we 
should not exclude that some were actually recruited in the provinces. Stephen Dyson, The Creation of the Roman Frontier 
(Princeton, 1985), 196 says that the treaty that Gracchus signed with the Spaniard communities also included military service 
of the locals in the Roman legions as auxiliaries. The chronicle of the following wars, on certain occasions, strongly suggests 
the presence of Spanish auxiliaries in the Roman armies. 
479 Plutarch, G. Gracchus, 5 
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have served as a reserve.480 According to Cicero, all citizens had a period of training called tirocinium 
before their military service.481 There is no indication, however, that the tirocinium, as a rule, started at 
17. 
 
The well-known case of the veteran Ligustinus could give us an insight: when he spoke during the call-
up of the new army to fight the Macedonians in 171, he said he was more than 50 years old, meaning he 
was born around 220 (or before). Since he states that he became a soldier in 200, at the time of the Second 
Macedonian War, it shows that he began military service aged 20 or slightly older.482 
 
The recruitment system appears to have allowed for volunteering, notably from returning soldiers: these 
men could have been still under arms when they were re-recruited.483 Ligustinus had short gaps between 
his campaigns, serving from 200 to 197, from 195 to 194, and from 191. A man who fought numerous 
campaigns would be discharged from his obligation to the state becoming an emeritus, but he could serve 
as a volunteer.484 Ligustinus volunteered for service in Gracchus’ army in 181, though he probably had 
already enough years of service to be exempted. If a veteran who had completed his full service wanted 
to be enlisted again, he was free to do so. As a consequence, returning soldiers and volunteers might 
swell the numbers of men in a legion, as during the Third Macedonian War, but there were no clear rules 
about the size of a legion: previous examples showed that legions slightly larger than usual were 
accepted.485 
 
Polybius tells us that soldiers had to serve between 10 and 16 years before they were “free” of any 
obligation towards the state. But there is no indication that they were forced to serve 16 consecutive 
years; actually, as Nicolet says: ‘During the second century every effort was made to keep the average 
period of service down to six years. This was relatively easy for operations in Cisalpine Gaul or in the 
East, much less for Spain’.486 We also have an example from Livy, who mentions a decree of the Senate 
in 184 regarding the discharge of soldiers in Spain who served for a very long period of time, as if such 
                                                 
480 Livy, XXII. 57 
481 Cicero, pro Cael., V. 11 
482 Livy, XLII. 34 
483 See de Blois, Roman Army and Politics, 8 
484 Nicolet, The World of the Citizen, 97 
485 See Livy, XXIX. 25 on Scipio’s larger legions for the African campaign. 
486 Nicolet, The World of the Citizen, 113 
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long period of service were unusual by the second century.487 In this way, it seems plausible that 
Ligustinus’ case (different, yet short periods of service) would appear to have been more common rather 
than excessively long periods (more common in the Imperial army). Thus, the overall argument that 
prolonged periods of military service were one of the main problems during the Republic starts to 
weaken. 
 
Volunteer enlistment occurred during the Second Punic War in 205 when Scipio, while organizing his 
African expedition, enrolled 7,000 volunteers.488 In 200 the consul P. Suplicius Galba recruited 
volunteers among Scipio’s veterans, 2,000 of whom joined his army.489 In 198, veterans of the Spanish 
and African campaigns enrolled in Flaminius’ army.490 Later, in 190, Scipio enlisted volunteers for the 
campaign against Antiochus: between Romans and allies, 5,000 men joined the army.491 
 
The most important instance of voluntary enlistment during the first half of the second century is the 
Third Macedonian War of 171. Since everyone expected an easy victory and considerable booty, large 
numbers volunteered. The attraction of this war was such that even soldiers and centurions up to the age 
of fifty were eager to re-enlist.492 However, the normal dilectus had taken place, and probably gathered 
the numbers the commanders needed. The volunteers were not rejected since, as Brunt says: ‘Recruiting 
officers must have preferred soldiers who were anxious to enlist, and especially men who had already 
seen service and were well trained and experienced fighters’.493 It may also have been politically 
disruptive to reject those eager to serve. The volunteers were used to slightly increase the manpower and 
the strength of each of the legions to 6,300 citizens each. Livy tells us that all the other legions were kept 
at normal levels of manpower.  
 
Because of the poor conduct of the Third Macedonian War, the initial enthusiasm of the citizens 
diminished; in late 170, the senate organized a commission to look into the condition of the army in 
Greece. When in 169 new forces were needed, no one came forward. We are told that as a consequence 
of this failure to recruit, the praetors re-established the old rigour of the original dilectus, and it was so 
                                                 
487 Livy, XXXIX. 38 
488 Livy, XXVIII. 45-46 
489 Livy, XXXI. 8 
490 Livy, XXXII. 9 
491 Livy, XXXVII. 4 
492 Livy, XLII. 31 
493 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 393 
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efficient that great crowds of men under forty-six joined the army.494 Livy attributes the reluctance to an 
unwillingness to serve under certain ‘politically ambitious’ consuls.495 This instance suggests that the 
magistrates normally relied on voluntary recruitment. 
 
* Legions and manpower from 200 to 164 
 
In terms of manpower, legions in service between 200 and the late 180s were probably the same as 
described by Polybius (so formed by 4,500 Romans and 5,100 socii per legion). Although during the 
later stages of the Second Punic War the sources indicate the presence of larger legions, these were used 
in exceptional circumstance – as in the case of Scipio’s African army.496 From the end of the 180s we 
have the first indications that the standard number of Roman citizens in every legion had been 
permanently increased to 5,500 men.497 
 
One possibility to explain this change might be that the Roman army was already using cohorts rather 
than maniples as their main tactical units.498 Traditionally, the cohortal system is attributed to the reforms 
of Marius, however, the sources mentioned possible formations in battle similar to that of the cohorts, 
especially in operations in Spain.499 Cohorts required more men than maniples, and, tactically, were more 
flexible and thus more suited to the main enemies that Rome was facing.500 Nevertheless, the sources 
still mention the use of the triplex acies formation up until the 130s and even during the Jugurthine War 
                                                 
494 Livy, XLIII. 14-15: once conscription was used for the levy of 169, the draft was completed in only eleven days. 
495 Livy, XLIII. 14 
496 Livy, XXIX. 25 on Scipio’s larger legions. 
497 Livy, XL. 36 
498 Bell, ‘Tactical Reform of the Roman Republican Army’, in Historia 14 (1965), 409; Keppie, The Making of the Roman 
Army (1984), 63 
499 Christopher Matthew, On the Wings of Eagles: the Reforms of Gaius Marius and the Creation of Rome’s First Professional 
Soldiers (Newcastle, 2010), 29-37. On cases of possible uses of cohorts in battle before Marius see Livy, XXXIX. 31 (185) 
and XL. 40 (180). On the tactics used by the Spaniards there are numerous references by Appian: on the case of Mummius in 
155 see Appian, VI. 10. 56; Appian, VI. 10. 58 on the case of Galba (151). Appian, VI. 11. 63 on Vetelius’ army in Farther 
Spain that was ambushed by Viritathus (147). Appian, VI. 11. 64 on the defeat of Caius Plautius the following year (146). 
Appian, VI. 11. 67 on Fabius Maximus’ Servilianus campaign of 142. Also, on the description of the Lusitanians’ fighting 
tactics, see Caesar, BC, I. 44 
500 Matthew, On the Wing of Eagles, 29 and Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, 64 on the strength of maniples and 
cohorts. 
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(112-105).501 Secondly, cohorts imply uniform military equipment among legionaries.502 This would 
have been possible only through state involvement in the production and distribution of military 
equipment, as discussed above.503 
 
Instead, we might simply suggest that the Romans adapted their legions according to the requirements 
of the campaigns, and the enemies they were facing. Increased the strength of the legions would have 
given them more options against the different type of enemies they were facing, from well-organized 
armies to guerrilla forces. There seems to be no reason why a Polybian legion could not operate with 
slightly increased numbers.  
 
The following table shows the number of legions, citizens and socii in service from 200 to 172: 
 
YEAR N°OF LEGIONS CITIZENS SOCII SOURCE 
200 6 27,000 30,600 Livy, XXXI. 8 
199 6 27,000 30,600 Livy, XXXII. 1 
198 8 36,000 40,800 Livy, XXXII. 8 
197 6 27,000 30,600 Livy, XXXII. 28 
196 10 45,000 51,000 Livy, XXXIII. 25 
195 10 45,000 51,000 Livy, XXXIII. 43 
194 8 36,000 40,800 Livy, XXXIV. 43  
193 8 36,000 40,800 Livy, XXXIV. 53 
192 10 45,000 51,000 Livy, XXXV. 20 
191 12 54,000 61,200 Livy, XXXVI. 1-2 
190 13 58,500 66,300 Livy, XXXVII. 2 
189 12 54,000 61,200 Livy, XXXVII. 50 
188 12 54,000 61,200 // 
187 8 36,000 40,800 Livy, XXXVIII. 42 
186 8-10 36,000-45,000 40,800-51,000 // 
185 8 36,000 40,800 Livy, XXXIX. 23 
184 8 36,000 40,800 Livy, XXXIX. 38 
                                                 
501 Sallusts, Jug., 50. 1, 100.  2 and 103. 1 mentions light-armored soldiers, so it is plausible that he is talking about the velites; 
also, Jug. 50. 4 says: “…they were being wounded only from a distance and given no chance of striking back or engaging in 
hand-to-hand combat.” so he is talking about Roman troops without long-range weapons, probably the triarii (as velites, 
hastati and principes were all armed with pila). Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, 63 reports that archeological 
evidence for Scipio Aemilianus’ camps around Numantia seems to show the presence of hastati, principes and triarii. 
502 Matthew, On the Wing of Ealges, 34: “The merging of the maniples into cohorts removed the velites from the formation, 
and subsequently removed a large proportion of the legion’s missile capabilities. To counter this loss, all legionaries were 
uniformly armed with sword (gladius), large shield (scutum) and javelins (pila). The removal of the spear as the principal 
offensive weapon of the triarii indicates that the uniform equipping…” 
503 Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army, 64 argues that the lowering of the financial requirement for military service 
was the main cause for the passage from maniples to cohorts. 
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183 8 36,000 40,800 Livy, XXXIX. 45 
182 8-10 44,000-55,000 40,800-51,000 Livy, XL. 1 
181 8-10 44,000-55,000 40,800-51,000 Livy, XL. 18 
180 8 44,100 (55,100) 54,200 (66,800) Livy, XL.35-36504 
179 // // // // 
178 // // // // 
177 9 49,500 45,900 Livy, XL. 8 
176 8 44,000 40,800 Livy, XLI. 14 
175 // // // // 
174 8 44,000 40,800 Livy, XLI. 21 
173 8 44,000 40,800 Livy, XLII. 1 
172 8 44,000 40,800 Livy, XLII. 10 
 
As a consequence of the increasing range of Rome’s campaigns, more legions were needed in the second 
century than in the third.505 Most commonly, there were eight legions in service, usually divided between 
the four consular legions, two for the two Spanish provinces, and two more deployed where needed. 
When it was necessary, the number of legions was increased, as in the period 191-188. 
 
From the late 180s the number of Roman citizens per legion increased with the addition of 1,000 
infantrymen per legion, increasing from 4,200 to 5,200 men – while the cavalrymen remained 300 per 
legion. In the decade between 182, the first time that this increase is mentioned by Livy, and 172 
recruitment increased from 36,000 to 44,000 men distributed across the normal eight legions. 
 
As in earlier periods, the sources barely mention the allies, and it is not clear if they were involved in 
these changes as well. Velleius claims that the socii were twice as numerous as the citizens by the time 
of the Social War.506 Nevertheless, other sources suggest an increasing Roman presence in the army from 
the late 180s.  Livy shows us that a sort of parity was reached already in the early 170s, while, 
progressively, it becomes more common to see more Roman citizens than allies in the armies from the 
mid-late 170s.507 In the previous table, in order to simplify calculations, we have suggested that the 
                                                 
504 Livy, XL. 35-36 clearly says that in 180 there were eight legions in service, but before he shows the formation of the army: 
each consul received two legions (11,000 Romans and 15,800 socii each), while there were praetors in Sicily and Sardiania 
(so one legion each), then there were complications regarding the veterans in the Spainsh provinces, and the army to be 
assigned there. It was then decided to send one legion (5,600 citizens plus 7,300 allies) in Hither Spain, but the commander 
was free to enlist volunteers among the veterans of the previous army up to two legions of 11,000 Romans and 12,600 socii. 
Finally, although not mentioned, it is possible that one standard legion was assigned to Farther Spain. 
505 Regarding the legions in service in 201 see Livy, XXX. 40-41 
506 Velleius, II. 15. 2 
507 Livy, XLI. 9 on the army of 178-177: both consuls received two legions of 5,500 Romans each plus 12,600 allies, for a 
total of 22,000 Romans and 25,200 socii in the consular armies. Also, one legion (5,500 Romans) supported by 5,250 socii 
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number of socii did not change after 182. It seems likely that the number of allies in the army from this 
moment on was not standardized, but varied according to Rome’s requirements. 
 
The next table continues the previous by showing the number of legions, citizens and allies in service at 
the time of the Third Macedonian War (171-168). 
 
YEAR N°OF LEGIONS CITIZENS SOCII SOURCE 
171 10 56,600 57,600 Livy, XLII. 31 
170 //   // 
169 8 45,600 40,200 Livy, XLIII. 12508 
168 10 56,600 53,400 Livy, XLIV. 
21509 
167 8 44,000 40,800 Livy, XLV. 16 
 
Thanks to Livy, we know exactly the strength of the legions that fought against Perseus, and this allows 
us to count the total number of Roman citizens and socii in service during this period with more precision 
than before.  
 
In 171, with the start of the third war against Macedonia, ten legions were in service across the 
Mediterranean; Livy shows that, because of the initial popularity of this conflict, each of the two legions 
that fought against the Macedonians were stronger than usual, and counted 6,300 citizens and – probably 
                                                 
was sent to Spain. Altogether there were 27,500 citizens and 30,450 allies that year in the legions. Livy, XLI. 21 on the 
recruitment of 175-174: one new legion of 5,300 men (presumably citizens only) was sent to Corsica; both the Spanish 
provinces received 3,150 Roman soldiers and 5,300 allies (so, in total 6,300 Romans and 10,600 socii). Finally, two new 
legions with regular strength (11,000 Romans) supported by 10,600 allies were also formed. On this occasion we can notice 
that there were more citizens under arms (22,600) than socii (21,200). Livy, XLII. 1 on the army of 173: “two new legions of 
Roman citizens apiece and 10,600 men from the Latin and Italian allies…” he probably means that the consular armies were 
formed by four standard legions (22,000 citizens) and 21,200 socii. Also, only Roman citizens were sent to Spain (3,200 men) 
and Sardinia (1,500 men). We can see that, on this occasion, the number of citizens (26,700) once again surpasses the number 
of allies (21,200). Finally, Livy, XLIII. 12 on the levy of 170-169: the first consul received the two Macedonian legions (6,300 
Romans each with the same number of socii, so 12,600 citizens and 12,600 allies), the second consul two standard legions 
(11,000 citizens) supported by 10,600 allied troops, the rest of the army was made by four legions (22,000 Romans) and 
17,000 socii. In total, that year, there were 45,600 Roman citizens in the army compared to 40,200 allies. 
508 “In the case of Macedonia the decision was for 6,000 Roman infantry, 6,000 of the Latin and allies, 250 Roman cavalry, 
300 allied cavalry; the old soldiers were to be discharged so that in each Roman legion there would not be more than the 6,000 
infantry and 300 cavalry.” 
509 “His instructions were to enlist 7,000 Roman citizens and 200 cavalry; to call upon 7,000 infantry and 400 cavalry from 
the Latin and Italian allies; and to write to Gnaeus Servilius, who had Gaul as his province, to conscript 600 cavalry. Licinius 
was told to send this army to his colleague in Macedonia at the very first opportunity. There were to be no more than two 
legions in the province; but they were to be brought up to full strength so that they would have 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry; 
the remaining infantry and cavalry were to be posted in garrisons.” 
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– 8,400 allies for a total of 12,600 Romans and 16,800 socii.510 The rest of the army was likely formed 
by normal-strength units, eight legions of 5,500 Romans and 5,100 socii each for a total of 44,000 citizens 
and 40,800 allies.511 Adding the two larger Macedonian legions, we can see that, in 171, 56,600 Roman 
citizens and 57,600 socii were in service. 
 
In 169 eight legions were in service. Livy states that the number of men in service for the Macedonian 
conflict did not change, so we still have two legions of 6,300 citizens each, and, in this case, two alae of 
the same number (6,300 men each).512 If the rest of the army was formed by six legions and alae, for a 
total of 33,000 citizens and 30,600 allies in service, adding the troops in Macedonia would increase to a 
total of 45,600 Romans and 43,200 socii. 
 
To all these numbers, we need to add the citizens serving with the navy. From the end of the Second 
Punic War, the fleet was reduced, possibly to a total number of crewmembers of 6,800.513 The rowers 
are not included in any manpower count because they were not Roman citizens. As Polybius suggested, 
citizens who owned less than 400 drachmae were eligible for service in the navy, along with proletarii 
and freedmen, but as crewmembers, not rowers.514 Brunt says: 
 
‘The rowers were certainly not merely drawn from Roman (or 
allied) slaves and proletarii. It is attested that Scipio impressed 
captives in Spain – and probably his father and uncle did the same. 
The Sicilians had naval obligations to Rome in terms of furniture 
of men rather than ships. Local recruitment was also 
considered’.515 
                                                 
510 Livy, XLII. 31 says that only the legions in Macedonia were stronger. All the others, including the other two consular 
legions, kept normal manpower levels. 
511 Livy, XLII. 31: the army of 171 was divided between the four consular legions, two in Sicily, two in Sardinia and two in 
Spain. 
512 Livy, XLIII. 12: “In the case of Macedonia the decision was for 6,000 Roman infantry, 6,000 of the Latin and allies, 250 
Roman cavalry, 300 allied cavalry; the old soldiers were to be discharged so that in each Roman legion there would not be 
more than the 6,000 infantry and 300 cavalry.” 
513 Michael Pitassi, The Roman Navy (2012), 61; Johannes H. Thiel, Studies on the History of Roman Sea-Power in Republican 
Times, (Utrecht, 1946), 183 
514 Regarding the recruitment of proletarii and freedmen for the navy, see Livy, XXIV. 11: “This was the first time on which 
a Roman fleet was manned with crews raised from private funds. […] Those who had between 50,000 and 100,000 asses (or 
if it subsequently reached that level) were required to supply a single sailor, along with six months’ pay. Anyone assessed 
above 100,000 and up to 300,000 was to supply three sailors, along with a year’s pay. Above 300,000 and up to a million it 
was five sailors, and above a million it was seven. Senators were to supply eight sailors, with a year’s pay.” For the fleet of 
210 see Livy, XXVI. 35: “The consuls therefore proclaimed that private individuals should (as had been done before) provide 
the oarsmen, along with their pay…”; Brunt, Italian Manpower, 668 
515 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 669 
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Pitassi suggests that during the second century the fleet was changing: it became more common to rely 
on the support of strong contingents from the navies of allied state, such as Rhodes or Pergamum, and to 
recruit from the Eastern Mediterranean. During the Syrian War, 115 ships were in service: 77 of these 
took part in the naval operations against Antiochus divided among 25 quinqueremes in the Aegean, 50 
new ships with Livius, and 2 under the command of Regillus.516 The rest of the fleet was divided between 
18 ships that were protecting the Adriatic (mainly from pirates) and 20 off Sicily to prevent any 
Carthaginian involvement.517 
 
During the Third Macedonian War the fleet was, according to Livy, only 40 Roman quinqueremes which 
were sent to the Aegean, where they were supported by 20 Pergamese “decked vessels” and 5 of the same 
type offered by Prusias, king of Bithynia.518 This fleet was supported by 7 light vessels from the Italian 
towns, and 76 lembi from Western Greece.  
 
Pitassi suggests that these mixed fleets show the Hellenization of the Roman navy by the second half of 
the second century: 
 
‘With the progressive dissolution of the Hellenistic navies, an 
increasing number of Greeks, many of them almost certainly the 
former personnel of those navies and now unemployed, enlisted 
with the Roman navy’.519 
 
The constant reduction of units of the navy is not a surprise since Roman naval supremacy was 
unchallenged in the Western Mediterranean. The Aegean could be controlled by the Eastern allies.520 
 
To conclude this section on the Roman fleet and its crews, we discuss their payment. We have no 
indication regarding the pay of crewmembers. Our only suggestion comes from Livy, and his description 
of the extraordinary measure taken by the Roman government that instructed wealthy citizens to fund 
                                                 
516 Regarding the 25 quinquereme in the Aegean area see Livy, XXXV. 37; for the ships assigned to Livius see Livy, XXXVI. 
42 
517 For the numbers of the Roman fleet during the Syrian War see Thiel, Roman Sea-Power, 258-264 
518 Livy, XLIV. 10; Thiel, Roman Sea-Power, 378 suggests that the numbers were probably very similar the previous years. 
519 Pitassi, The Roman Navy, 61-62 
520 Livy, XXI. 17 
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the formation of the fleet of 214 and 210.521 He says that citizens had to provide supplies and, also, 
payment for the sailors, but he doesn’t mention to how much their payments amounted to. Maybe they 
received as much as infantrymen (3 asses per day). It is possible that the payment of the crews was 
divided among the communities from which they came, and in case of Roman citizens – although, as we 
argued, they were probably a minority – they were simply paid by the state, just like the legionaries. 
 
* Demographic impact of military service 
 
We have a good run of census figures for the early second century.522 Recruitment was at a much lower 
level than in the Hannibalic War: with the only exception of 189, there were less than ten legions in 
service until 146. The table shows the number of both Romans and allies, assuming that the number of 
citizens in the legions increased to 5,500 after 180. 
 
DATE 
CENSUS 
FIGURE 
LEGIONS IN 
SERVICE 
ROMANS IN 
SERVICE 
SOCII IN 
SERVICE 
204 214,000 19 85,500 96,900 
194 243,704 8 36,000 40,800 
189 258,318 12 54,000 61,200 
179 258,294 8 44,000 40,800 
174 269,015 7 38,500 35,700 
169 312,805 8 44,000 40,800 
164 337,022 6 33,000 30,600 
 
From the data on the table, we can notice that in spite of constant military activity, the population 
progressively recovered from the losses of the Second Punic War in roughly one generation. There are 
several qualifications: 
 
i) The Campanians were re-included in the census of 189. According to Livy, in 216 the Campanians 
were able to raise 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry after Cannae and everything else that had 
happened.523 It is possible that by 189, their numbers were somewhat higher than 34,000 (perhaps as 
many as 50,000). 
                                                 
521 See Livy, XXIV. 11 on the private funding for the fleet of 214; regarding the fleet of 210 see Livy, XXVI. 35 
522 Sources for the census figures: for 204 see Livy, XXIX. 37; for 194 see Livy, XXXV. 9; for 189 see Livy, XXXVIII. 36; 
for 179 see Livy, Per. 41; for 174 see Livy, XLII. 10; for 169 see Livy, Per. 45; for 164 see Livy, Per. 46 
523 Livy, XXIII. 5 
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ii) In 188, the Italian communities of Formiae, Fundi and Arpinum were granted full citizenship.524 It is 
possible that other communities also received full Roman citizenship. Formiae, Fundi and Arpinum are 
all located in Latium Novum, and it is hard to believe that more communities of this central area of 
Roman Italy were not granted full citizenship. Regarding their numbers, and consequential impact on the 
census figures, we have no information. It seems possible that these communities altogether counted 
between 10,000 and 15,000 citizens.525 We should believe that they were included in the census of 179. 
 
iii) It seems possible that legions overseas at the time of the census were not counted in the published 
figures. Rosenstein suggests that we use a “corrected count” by adding those missing citizens.526 
 
iv) A persistent problem is the under-registration of citizens. Lo Cascio suggests that up to 70% of the 
adult male population may have remained unregistered, but this seems exaggerated.527 For example, in 
194 the census figures suggested a total number of 243,704 Roman citizens. If these were only 30% of 
the total population, 568,642 citizens did not register that year, meaning that in 194 there were 812,346 
Roman male citizens in total (and we are not considering the Italians). It is very difficult to plausibly 
estimate the level of un-registration which almost certainly varied considerably. 
 
As we will show in the next chapter, the level of under-registration was connected with the popularity of 
specific campaigns. The first half of the second century was characterized by wars against the Hellenistic 
kingdoms, conflicts that allowed soldiers to gather considerable wealth, so we should believe that under-
registration was generally lower than normal.528 Campaigns against the Ligurians or the Spaniards in 
second half of the second century may have not encouraged registration in the census. 
 
The following table adjusts for soldiers overseas. 
 
                                                 
524 Livy, XXXVIII. 36 
525 Formiae and Fundi are both mentioned by Strabo, V. 3. 6, but not in terms of population. 
526 Nathan Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 266 
527 Elio Lo Cascio, ‘Recruitment and the Size of the Roman Population’, in ed. Scheidel, W., Debating Roman Demography 
(2001), 167-168 
528 Livy, XLII. 32: “Licinius mustered veteran centurions and soldiers as well, and large number volunteered since they saw 
that those who had served in the earlier Macedonian War and against Antiochus in Asia had become wealthy men.” 
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DATE CENSUS FIGURES 
LEGIONS AND CITIZENS 
IN SERVICE OVERSEAS 
CORRECTED 
CENSUS FIGURES529 
194 243,704 4 legions (18,000 citizens) 261,704 
189 258,318 7 legions (31,850 citizens)530 297,988 
179 258,294 4 legions (22,000 citizens)531 295,294 
174 269,015 7 legions (38,500 citizens) 307,515 
 
169 
 
312,805 
Between 4 and 6 legions (up to 
26,900 citizens)532 
 
339,705 
164 337,022 2 legions (11,000 citizens) 348,022 
 
The corrected count allows us to estimate the burden of military service between 194 and 164, as 
displayed in the following table: 
 
DATE 
CORRECTED 
CENSUS FIGURES 
LEGIONS/CITIZENS 
IN SERVICE 
% OF CITIZENS IN 
SERVICE 
194 261,704 8 (36,000 citizens) 13.7% 
189 297,988 12 (54,000 citizens) 18% 
179 295,294 8 (44,000 citizens) 15% 
174 307,515 8 (44,000 citizens) 12.5% 
169 339,705 8 (44,000 citizens) 13% 
164 348,022 6 (33,000 citizens) 9.4% 
 
These figures give us a clearer impression for the general military burden of the first half of the second 
century. Pressures were much reduced from the period of the Hannibalic War. Also, as we will see, the 
recruitment rates of this period appear stable, with the exception of the period 191-188. 
 
- Military service and population from 200-160s 
 
                                                 
529 The corrected census figures include not only soldiers overseas, but the crewmembers of the navy (when we have 
information on them), Campanians, new communities who received full Roman citizenship. 
530 Livy, XXXVII. 50 shows that in 189 the soldiers in service in the seven legions (out of twelve) overseas were divided 
among the reinforcements (7,300 men) sent to the Asian legions – still in service since the previous year –, one legion in 
Sicily (4,500 men), two legions in the Spanish provinces reinforced by 2,050 men, for a total of 11,050 Romans in service in 
Spain. 
531 Regarding the year 179, by this point, the number of Roman citizens per legion was 5,500; furthermore, we don’t have 
Livy’s chronicle, so we can assume that four legions out of eight, for a total of 22,000 citizens, were in service overseas – 
probably divided between the two Spanish legions, one in Sicily and one in Sardinia. 
532 Livy, XLIII. 12 says that in 169 of the eight legions in service, between four and six were overseas. Two new legions were 
sent to Macedonia, the two in service in Spain were the same of the previous year, but they received reinforcements for a total 
of 3,300 Romans. Livy mentions that two more legions were recruited, but he doesn’t say where they were deployed 
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All the second century conflicts were much shorter, required fewer legions and, very important, war-
losses were far fewer. The military burden on the population fell from 35-40% of the available manpower 
in 204 to a little more than 13% in 194. Such a reduction of the military activity certainly had 
consequences for the Romano-Italian population and its economy.  
 
Using “corrected” figures – that, as said before, include various elements that probably were not counted 
by the sources: soldiers overseas, crewmembers of the navy, etc… – we can propose a general increase 
in the total number of Roman citizens. This, together with the reduction of military activity after the 
Second Punic War, meant that the burden of military service was very different: in 194 it is possible to 
suggest an increase from 243,704 to 261,704 citizens. This situation continued for the rest of this first 
part of the second century: the census of 189 was taken in the middle of the Syrian War (191-188), the 
period of most intense military activity since the Second Punic War. Not only seven legions (for a total 
of 31,850 men) were in service overseas, but we also have information regarding the fleet (115 ships 
were in service, for a total of 7,820 crewmembers). With all these data we might increase the number of 
Roman citizens from 258,318 to 297,988. 
 
In 179 only four legions were in service overseas (for a total of 22,000 citizens), but during this period 
we also have noticed the inclusion of new communities that received full Roman citizenship. We are not 
sure of their number, but in 188 they probably did not count more than 15,000 citizens altogether. In 174 
the number of Roman citizens registered in the census was 269,015. Since seven legions were in service 
outside of peninsular Italy (38,500 citizens), it is possible to increase the total number of citizens to 
307,015. The census of 169 registered 312,805 citizens, but between four and six legions were in service 
overseas (so, between 15,900 and 26,900 citizens). We also know that, during the Third Macedonian 
War, 40 Roman quinqueremes were in service (so a total of 2,720 crewmembers). The census figures 
could be increased to a maximum of 342,425 citizens. Finally, the census figures of 164 show a 
population of 337,022, and since only two legions were in service overseas (11,000 citizens), the number 
of citizens could be increased to 348,022. 
 
The following graphic displays the development of the Roman citizen population in the period between 
194 and 164 showing the difference between the numbers in the census figures, and how these number 
might change if other factors are added, like soldiers in service overseas, crewmembers of the navy, 
communities that received full citizenship, etc. 
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Although the numbers vary the census figures and the corrected figures are showing the same key 
element: there was an overall strong increase of Roman citizens during these three decades.533 However, 
the period was not marked by constant growth. New populations of perhaps 60,000 account for most of 
the growth, certainly until 169. From 174, we see a moderate increase of perhaps 34,910 citizens. 
 
 
* The second half of the second century 
 
 
After the defeat of Macedonia, Rome did not see any serious warfare for more than a decade. The main 
areas where the legions were employed were in Cisalpine Gaul – mainly against the Ligurians –, but 
occasionally in Dalmatia and Transalpine Gaul, Sardinia on certain occasions, and Spain, but these were 
minor actions. It was only by the mid/late 150s that the Republic faced new challenges when its forces 
                                                 
533 In general, the census figures are showing an even a greater growth in the long term: in thirty years (from 194 to 164) there 
was an increase of 93,318 citizens (from 243,704 to 337,022). The corrected figures are showing an increase of 86,318 citizens 
during the same period (from 261,704 to 348,022). 
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were required on different fronts: after a brief conflict with the Dalmatians in Illyria, a new rebellion 
started in Spain in 153, while, at the same time, from 150, troops were in Macedonia and Greece and, in 
149, in Africa against Carthage for the third and final time. 
 
The new Spanish war proved to be unpopular among Roman citizens. The census figures show a slight 
decline of the number of registered citizens: according to Livy, in the census of 159, 328,316 Roman 
citizens were registered, but, over the following decades, the number of citizens varied until, in 136, the 
census showed that the total number of citizens registered was of 317,933.534 It seems likely that the 
unpopularity of the war in Spain was the main cause of this decline. In 151, troops destined for Spain 
protested and many citizens claiming exemptions, until Scipio Aemilianus gave the lead and was 
followed by other young men in volunteering.535 
 
DATE 
CENSUS 
FIGURES 
LEGIONS IN 
SERVICE 
CITIZENS IN 
SERVICE 
159 328,316 4 22,000 
154 324,000 6 33,000 
147 322,000 10 55,000 
142 328,442 7 38,500 
136 317,933 7/8 38,500-44,000 
131 318,823 5 27,500 
125 394,736 7 38,500 
 
The loss of Livy’s history after 167 deprives us of a detailed account of the events of the second half of 
the second century. We can make no viable estimate for the number of socii employed in this period, 
though it seems likely that the ratio between citizens and allies in the army changed decade after decade 
and likely varied campaign by campaign. 
 
Traditionally, the consuls received two legions each, while a praetor was assigned to a single legion; this 
is a staple of the Roman army. However, by looking to certain campaigns of this period (Spain, in 
particular, but Sicily as well, and also Africa), and to the number of legions and soldiers deployed, it 
appears impossible to explain them by following the classic model of the Roman army. While it is likely 
                                                 
534 Sources for the census figures of this period: Livy, Per. 47 (159); Livy, Per. 48 (154); Livy, Per. 54 (142); Livy, Per. 56 
(136); Livy, Per. 59 (131); Livy, Per. 60 (125) 
535 For the exemptions from military service, see Polybius, XXXV. 4; regarding Scipio Aemilianus and his role in the 
recruitment of new troops for Spain, see Polybius, XXXV, Livy, Per. 48 or Appian, VI. 9. 49. 
152 
 
that, during the levy, legions were still assigned to their commanders in the customary fashion (two per 
consul, one per praetor), the conflicts in Spain, as we will see shortly, led to an accumulation of troops 
that allowed consuls or proconsuls to command armies of up to five legions. 536 The Third Punic War 
represents a clear break from the traditional recruitment system, since the consuls received command 
over an army of seven new legions. 
 
* Spain: Numantia and the Lusitanians (154-133) 
 
The wars in Spain were not a continuous conflict. The Numantine War had two distinct phases: the first 
one (from 153 to 151) ended when the Numantines surrendered after Claudius Marcellus’ successful 
campaign.537 Then, after eight years of peace – and cooperation538 –, the Belli, Titthi and Arevaci were 
convinced by Viriathus to break from their alliance with Rome. From 143 to 133 the Romans fought a 
long campaign characterized by numerous difficulties. The Lusitanian War can also be divided into two 
parts: operations before the rise of Viriathus (155-150) and the campaign against Viriathus (148-140). 
 
Our main – and only – source for the events in Spain during the second century is Appian. As we have 
mentioned earlier in the thesis, one of the main problem of Appian’s chronicle is the absence of the socii. 
There are a couple of exceptions, as we will see, where it seems he is mentioning them, but for the most 
part it appears that Appian did not understand how the army of the Republic was organized (especially 
regarding the role of the allies). As a consequence, the number of men reported in his chronicle are never 
easy to read, and the same argument is extended to the casualties. For the most part, Appian simply says 
΄Ρωµαίων (Romans), so we are not sure if he is talking about Roman citizens only, or to every figure we 
should add the socii or even auxiliaries – as we know that the Spaniards were recruited by the Romans.539 
 
Finally, regarding the number of troops in service, Appian appears to have used a standard legionary 
strength of 6,000 men instead of the 5,500 men suggested by Livy. Being our main source, we should 
use his figures in order to understand better the number of legions in service during the campaigns in 
                                                 
536 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 426-434 
537 Appian, VI. 9. 48-50 for the campaign of Claudius Marcellus of 152 and 151. 
538 Appian, VI. 9. 63: during the campaign of 147 against the Lusitanians, after being ambushed and defeated by Viriathus, 
the Romans retreated to a place called Carpessus. Here they received 5,000 men from the Belli and Titthi who were 
immediately sent against the Lusitanians. 
539 Dyson, Roman Frontier, 196 
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Spain, but we may use Livy’s figures in moving from the number of legions to the number of men in 
service. 
 
An example of the difficulties caused by relying exclusively on Appian can be seen immediately from 
the beginning: in 153 Rome sent to Numantia an army of 30,000 men under the command of consul 
Quintus Fulvius Nobilior.540 Since Appian doesn’t mention the composition of this army, we have to 
suppose that we are probably looking at two, maybe three legions (so between 12,000 and 18,000 
Romans) plus socii (18,000 or 12,000). 
 
The same confusion occurs when we are looking at the casualties: the Romans were ambushed, and after 
two battles were forced to retreat with heavy losses.541 According to Appian, in the first battle 6,000 
“Roman citizens” lost their lives, while 4,000 more “men” died in the second. The first figure would 
seem to refer to a legion, thus we should actually assume that losses were actually higher if we were to 
count in allied casualties. Regarding the losses after the second clash Appian is vaguer, so we should 
assume that, between Romans and allies, 4,000 men were killed. As a consequence, we have a total of 
10,000 losses between citizens and socii, plus more not cited.542 
 
Nobilior was replaced by the new consul Claudius Marcellus, who took command of the army and 
brought reinforcements for a total of 8,000 infantry and 500 cavalry (probably one legion of 6,000 
citizens plus 2,500 allies) to replace the losses of the previous campaign.543 Assuming that the allies were 
included in the initial army, we can reasonably assume that Marcellus’ force was three legions supported 
by socii. He was able to make progress until, by 151, the Belli, Titthi and Arevaci surrendered.544 This 
ended the first part of the Numantine War.545 
 
                                                 
540 Appian, VI. 9. 45 
541 Appian, VI. 9. 46: “This disaster happened on the day on which the Romans are accustomed to celebrate the festival of 
Vulcan. For which reason, from that time on, no general will begin a battle on that day unless compelled to do so.” 
542 On the first clash, see Appian, VI. 9. 45 while for the second clash Appian, VI. 9. 46. The overall losses should be like 
6,000 Romans + a not mentioned number of allies + 4,000 Romans and allies, so for a total of 10,000 men. By increasing the 
total casualties, it would explain better why the Romans cursed this day and forbade to start battle: if to the 6,000 citizens we 
add more losses (Italians and Spanish auxiliaries), and then the 4,000 men (Roman and allies) who died in the following battle, 
this is one of the most serious defeats since the Second Punic War. Finally, we have to mention that the Celtiberians paid a 
high price for their victory: at least 8,000 men – including their commander Carus – were killed by the Romans. 
543 On Marcellus’ arrival and his reinforcements, see Appian, VI. 9. 48  
544 For Marcellus’ campaign, see Appian, VI. 9. 48 
545 Appian, VI. 9. 50-51 
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- Lusitanian War part 1 (155-150) 
 
Shortly before the beginning of the operations against Numantia, raiders from Lusitania started to attack 
Farther Spain. In 155 the Roman garrison (one legions, so perhaps up to 12,000 men between citizens 
and allies) under the command of praetor Calpurnius Piso was defeated, forcing Rome to send 
reinforcements under the command of the praetor L. Mummius.546 He faced the Lusitanians for the 
following years (154-153) with alternating fortune until he was able to win a major victory and, once he 
returned to Rome, celebrated a triumph for his achievements.547 
 
Appian’s description of the campaign of 155-153 is not clear and requires some clarification. First of all, 
regarding losses, we cannot rule out the possibility that when Appian mention 6,000 men he means a 
legion in its entirety, so Romans and allies. So, in the case of Piso, it is possible that his army was 
completely destroyed. More plausibly, he commanded one legion (supported by one ala sociorium) and 
lost half of his troops (between Romans and allies), or it’s Appian’s way of saying that the Romans had 
heavy losses. 
 
When Mummius arrived in 154 with the reinforcements, he was immediately attacked by the Lusitanians. 
He defeated them, but lost 6,000 men in the process and, according to Appian, was left with 5,000 
soldiers.548 This would suggest us that, when he left for Spain, Mummius had a total of 11,000 men under 
his command, so probably one legion plus allies. As in the case of Piso, however, it is possible that the 
6,000 losses refer to a whole legion, implying that Mummius actually was assigned to two legions (but 
this seems unlikely, as we said before). The fact that, according to Appian’s narration, soon after his 
army counted 9,500 men when he counterattacked, might suggest that he had divided his forces before 
the battle, and that 4,500 men of his army were left behind (maybe as a reserve or garrison). These joined 
the 5,000 survivors, forming the force mentioned by Appian, thus suggesting an original army of 15,500 
men (so probably one legion, one ala and auxiliaries). Finally, we have to consider the possibility that 
those 4,500 men were the remains of Piso’s army, and they joined forces under Mummius’ command. 
 
                                                 
546 Appian, VI. 10. 56 on the beginning of the Lusitanian War 
547 On Mummius’ campaign, see Appian, VI. 10. 57 
548 Appian, VI. 10. 56 
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After Mummius’ victory, operations against the Lusitanians continued under the responsibility of 
praetors, first Marcus Atilius, who made positive progresses, and then Servius Sulplicius Galba. He 
defeated the Lusitanians, but also suffered serious losses (7,000 men), and was forced to retreat. He 
gathered reinforcements before he resumed his campaign and then, together with Lucullus from Hither 
Spain, proceeded to invade Lusitania.549 
 
We can reconstruct the manpower as follows: when Atilius became the new commander, he received an 
army that counted between 9,500 to 14,500 men, so it is possible that he brought one legion with his as 
reinforcement, increasing the number of men under his command to 21,500 or 26,500 between Romans 
and socii; this would seem to have been an army of around three legions. After his successful campaign, 
he was followed by Galba who suffered 7,000 losses, but was able to continue his campaign with 20,000 
allies. Because of the large number, and the fact that Appian specifically refers to them as “summachos” 
(allies), the most plausible solution is that Galba recruited Spanish auxiliaries, the fastest way to gather 
reinforcements instead of waiting for new regular troops from Italy.550 So, by the time he resumed the 
operations, Galba’s army counted between 14,500 and 19,500 regular troops (Romans and socii) 
reinforced by 20,000 auxiliaries. 
 
Between 151 and 150, the Romans started a double invasion of Lusitania combining the forces of 
Lucullus from Hither Spain, and those of Galba from Farther Spain.551 After a massacre, military activity 
in Farther Spain decreased for some years.552 
 
By 150 the situation in Spain was relatively quiet, although in a couple of years the rise of Viriathus 
would start new and more challenging war. After five years of fighting in both Hither and Farther Spain, 
we might estimate the number of losses using the figures suggested by Appian. Between citizens, allies 
and Spanish troops, the Romans lost at least 13,500 men during the first campaign against Numantia.553 
                                                 
549 See Appian, VI. 10. 58 for the campaigns of Atilius and Galba, and VI. 10. 59 on the double invasion of Lusitania by 
Lucullus and Galba. 
550 Appian, VI. 10. 58 
551 Appian, VI. 10. 59 on the invasion of Lusitania. 
552 Appian, VI. 10. 59-60; he describes very well Galba’s conduct: “Thus he avenged treachery with treachery, imitating 
barbarians in a way unworthy of a Roman.” 
553 Mainly because of the unsuccessful campaign of Nobilior in 153: 10,000 lost their lives in the defeat of the day of Vulcan 
(probably more since Appian says that 6,000 Roman citizens died in the first clash while he does not mention any casualty 
among the allies and auxiliaries, while on the second battle, 4,000 men – so Romans, socii and Spaniards – were killed). The 
other 3,500 casualties are simply an estimate of the losses caused by the small encounters and the wastage of that winter. 
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The five years of war against the Lusitanians caused the death of 19,000 soldiers.554 So, in total, at least 
32,500 men (between Romans, allies and auxiliaries) were killed in the first five years of the Spanish 
wars. 
 
- Lusitanian War part 2: Viriathus (148-140) 
 
In 148 the Roman commander in Farther Spain was praetor Gaius Vetilius. According to Appian he 
fought a force of 10,000 Lusitanians with an army of the exact same size, but he also says that the praetor 
brought new troops from Italy and that soldiers were already in Spain by the time of his arrival.555 
However, if he had only 10,000 men (so 6,000 Romans and 4,000 allies) it means that he did not bring 
significant reinforcements, and that there were not many troops in that part of Spain by 148. It seems 
more likely that the 10,000 was only a part of the force available to Vetilius and that he had two legions 
at his command. 
 
He supposedly defeated the Lusitanians, but their new leader, Viriathus, managed to flee and reorganize 
his forces.556 He soon ambushed the Romans and kill 4,000 men (Vetilius was among the losses) and 
forced them to retreat.557 Vetilius’ successor, the praetor Caius Plautius, was not more successful: he 
arrived in Spain with an army of 10,000 infantrymen and 1,300 cavalrymen (probably one legion and 
one ala sociorum of 5,300 men), but was defeated by Viriathus on two occasions. Forced to retreat, he 
was unable to stop the Lusitanians from ravaging the region of Carpetania (central Spain).558 
 
The conclusion of the wars in Greece and Africa allowed an increase of the military effort in Farther 
Spain. The new commander was the consul Fabius Maximus Aemilianus who decided to recruit young 
men instead of the veterans of the Greek and African campaigns. He arrived in Spain with an army of 
                                                 
554 The only figures for losses given by Appian regarding the Lusitanian War between 155 and 150 are the following: 6,000 
men were lost in the invasion of 155; Mummius lost 6,000 men when he pursued the Lusitanians in disorder; finally, in 151, 
Galba lost 7,000 men in the same way. 
555 Appian, VI. 10. 61: “…those who escaped from Lucullus’ and Galba’s treachery assembled together, about 10,000 in 
number […] Gaius Vetilius came out against them from Rome, bringing with him another army and taking over the soldiers 
in Iberia, having in all about 10,000 men.” 
556 Appian, VI. 9. 61-62 on the rise of Viriathus. 
557 Appian, VI. 9. 63: the Belli and Titthi sent 5,000 troops to support the Romans, but they were attacked and annihilated by 
Viriathus. 
558 Appian VI. 9. 64 on the invasion of Carpetania and Plautius’ defeats. 
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15,000 foot and 2,000 horse (so probably two legions – 12,000 Romans – and 5,000 socii).559 At the end 
of 145 he began a successful campaign that lasted until the winter of 144 when he returned to Rome.560 
 
In 143 the new Roman commander, the praetor Quinctius Pompeius Aulus defeated the Lusitanians, but 
lost 1,000 men in the process. Viriathus detached the Arevaci, Titthi and Belli from their allegiance to 
the Romans. This marked the beginning of the second phase of the Numantine War that lasted until the 
destruction of the city in 133.561 The campaign of 142-141 was led by the consul Fabius Maximus 
Servilianus who brought to Spain a new army of 19,600 men between Romans and socii (so 12,000 
citizens and 7,600 allies), and required reinforcements from Numidia.562 In 141 Servilianus started a new 
campaign: after initial successes, he pursued Viriathus, but his army was surprised while besieging the 
town of Erisana. The Romans were forced to retreat and then surrendered to Viriathus who imposed 
terms on the troops.563 
 
This settlement, however, did not last long. In 140 the consul Q. Servilius Caepio considered the treaty 
“unworthy of the dignity of the Roman people”, and the war resumed.564 After receiving command over 
the strong five legions army left by Servilianus, Caepio started a new campaign forcing Viriathus to 
retreat.565 The resistance of the Lusitanians, however, started to crumble after the assassination of their 
leader and soon after Caepio mopped up the remaining resistance putting an end to the Lusitanian War.566 
 
- Numantia part 2 (143-133) 
 
                                                 
559 Appian, VI. 11. 67: “He brought two new legions from Rome and some allies…” 
560 On Fabius Maximus, his army and his campaign, see Appian, VI. 9. 65 
561 Appian, VI. 9. 66 
562 Appian, VI. 9. 67 on Servilianus’ campaign: on the road to the city of Itucca he was attacked by the Lusitanians, but secured 
an expensive victory, losing at least 3,000 men. 
563 See Appian, VI. 9. 68-69 regarding Servilianus’ campaign of 141 and the treaty with Viriathus. 
564 Appian, VI. 9. 70 
565 By the time Caepio was nominated commander of the troops in F. Spain (140), the Romans had five legions in the region. 
Consul Aemilianus (145-144) had three legions (Appian, VI. 11. 65); he was followed by praetor Quinticus (143) who 
commanded the same army. In 142 consul Servilianus brought two additional legions increasing the Roman military presence 
in F. Spain to five legions (Appian, VI. 9. 67). He kept his command until 140 when he surrendered to Viriathus and was then 
replaced by his brother Caepio. The key element is that Servilianus’ army was not destroyed by the Lusitanians: the Romans 
ended up being trapped in a really dangerous place, so, to avoid annihilation, Servilianus surrendered and accepted Viriathus’ 
terms (Appian, VI. 9. 69). Appian, VI. 10. 70 further suggests that Caepio’s army was far stronger than Viriathus’: “Caepio 
took the town of Arsa, which Viriathus left, and, having far more forces, caught up with Viriathus himself…” and “Viriathus 
therefore, reckoning that he should not engage because of the small number of his forces…” implying that the Lusitanians’ 
manpower was probably limited at this point because of the continuous warfare. 
566 Appian VI. 9. 74-75 on the end of the Lusitanian War. 
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The second phase of the Numantine War was triggered by the revolt of Viriathus. Appian gives figures 
for the number of troops involved in this war only once before the arrival of Scipio. The first Roman 
commanders in Hither Spain were the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus in 143-142, and his successor Quintus 
Pompeius Aulus (consul in 141); they commanded a well-trained army of 32,000 men (probably three 
legions – one already in the province by the time of Metellus’ arrive, and two brought by the consul – 
for a total of 18,000 legionaries and 14,000 socii). On the other hand, Appian tells us that the Numantines 
were able to raise an army of only 8,000 men.567 
 
After Metellus defeated the Arevaci, the campaign went badly, and Appian’s chronicle becomes vaguer. 
In 134 it was decided to elect Cornelius Scipio as the new commander, hoping that the conqueror of 
Carthage would put an end to this war. He decided to gather only 4,000 volunteers, as Appian explains: 
‘he did not recruit an army by a levy, since there were many wars going on and because there were plenty 
of soldiers in Spain’.568 According to Appian, by the time of the final siege, Scipio’s army counted a total 
of 60,000 men (divided between Roman citizens, allies, Spanish auxiliaries and a contingent of 
Numidians under the command of Jugurtha).569 The previous time that Appian gave us figures for the 
strength of the Roman army in Hither Spain, was when the consul Pompeius took command of Metellus’ 
army of 32,000 in 141.570 It seems likely to think that the Romans had successively reinforced the army 
– as they did against the Lusitanians – when a new consul was assigned to the province. 
 
From Appian’s description of both campaigns, it seems that Rome sent more troops when necessary, but 
not every year. New troops were certainly sent to Hither Spain between 141 (the passage between 
Mummius and Pompeius who, almost for sure, did not bring soldiers with him) and 134 (appointment of 
Scipio as new commander). The most plausible period for this reinforcement was between 137 and 135 
when there were four consular commanders in three years. New legions could have been sent in 137 
when Mancinus was replaced by Aemilius Lepidus, or with Furius in 136 to replace the troops lost by 
his predecessor in the unsuccessful campaign against the Vaccaei. 
 
                                                 
567 Appian VI. 13. 76 
568 Appian, VI. 14. 84 
569 Appian, VI. 15. 92: “The army, together with the native forces, now numbering some 60,000 men…” we have to consider 
the fact that each time a new commander reached the legions, he would probably require troops from the allied communities 
– as expected by Gracchus’ treaty. 
570 For Scipio’s army in 134-133, see Appian VI. 14. 92; on the army of 141, see Appian, VI. 13. 76 
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Probably two new legions were brought to Hither Spain sometime before Scipio’s command (134), so 
that five legions were in the province. The new troops sent to the province between 137 and 135 joined 
the three older legions still in service, and so Appian’s figure of 60,000 men is perfectly clear. In his 
terms – legions of 6,000 men – we are looking at ten units of 6,000 men, simply translated into five 
legions plus alae sociorum supported by the Numidian contingent and native auxiliaries. However, we 
should consider that these legions were not at full strength after years of combat – as we said, part of 
them were in service for a long time –, and also, the strength of the allied contingents is not clear at all. 
 
At the beginning of the chapter, we have argued that, in theory, citizens and socii supplied the same 
number of infantrymen to a legion, while in reality the allied contingents varied according to the situation 
and the needs of Rome. All the armies that we have listed above did not have this perfect balance between 
Romans and socii, so we must suppose that the Latin and Italian allies were less numerous than the 
citizens, and that the auxiliaries were a significant part of this army (of course there is no way to know 
how strong the Numidian contingent was).571 
 
DATE LEGIONS IN HITHER SPAIN LEGIONS IN FARTHER SPAIN 
167-156 1 1 
155 1 1 
154 1 2 
153 3/4 2/3 
152 3/4 2/3 
151 3/4 3 
150 2 2 
149 1 1 
148 1 2 
147 1 2 
146 1 2 
145 1 3 
144 1 3 
143 3 3 
142 3 5 
141 3 5 
140 3 5 
139 3 5 
138 3 5 
                                                 
571 We might look at Appian, VI. 10. 58 regarding the case of Galba: he managed to gather 20,000 Spanish allies to reinforce 
his army, so the Romans were able to recruit large number of auxiliaries when necessary. Also, Dyson, Roman Frontier, 191 
suggests that Scipio’s family had important connections with the local elites in the province, so that his presence as the 
commander allowed the Romans to gather more local troops. 
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137 3 5 
136 5 5 
135 5 2 
134 5 1 
133 5 1 
132 onwards 1 1 
 
* The Third Punic War (149-146) 
 
In 149 the Republic declared war on Carthage for the third and final time. Appian tells us that both 
citizens and allies were eager to enlist in the army, especially because of the prospect of rich booty, thus 
allowing the consuls to command a force of 84,000 men between Romans and socii; if true, this was one 
of the largest army ever deployed by Rome – second only to the army of Cannae.572 
 
These numbers are controversial. We might simply follow Brunt and reject these numbers as too vast, 
on the assumption that the army that besieged Carthage was made up of four legions, being under the 
command of both the consuls.573 Another option is suggested by Goldsworthy: indirectly, he refuses 
Appian’s numbers as well, but says that the only way to accept them is to consider that he included every 
single person who followed the regular army (like servants, camp followers, and probably the rowers).574 
Appian states that the fleet that transported the army to Africa was formed by 50 quinqueremes and 100 
hemiolii (light vessels with one and a half banks of oars; probably called liburna).575 A quinquereme 
counted 68 crewmembers for a total of 3,400 for 50 ships, while the crew of an hemiolia/liburna, 
suggested to be similar to a bireme, varied between 18 and 26 men for a total of 1,800 or 2,600 
crewmembers.576 The total number of men in service in the fleet – excluding the rowers577 – was between 
                                                 
572 As we have seen, both Polybius and Livy suggested a larger army at Cannae (Polybius: 84,800; Livy: 87,200) – see p. 59-
61 of this dissertation. However, Appian, VII. 3. 17 says that the Roman army at Cannae counted 76,000 men, making the 
army that besieged Carthage the largest deployed so far by the Republic. 
573 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 684. Nevertheless, we have to consider that these legions were probably stronger than usual. We 
have seen cases of over strength legions (like Scipio’s African expedition in 204 – see Livy, XXIX, 25 –, and especially 
during the Third Macedonian War – see Livy, XLII. 31 for the army of 171 and XLIII. 12 for the army of 169), and if the 
African legions were as strong as those deployed against Perseus, each of the four legions would have accounted for 6,300 
men for a total of 25,200 Roman citizens. If we include allies, then we reach an army of 50,400 men. We might consider the 
possibility that these legions were even stronger, and suggest a strength of 6,500 men each for a total of 26,000 citizens 
(52,000 men if we include the same number of socii), but still well short of the 84,000 suggested by Appian. 
574 Goldsworthy, The Punic Wars, 340 
575 Appian, VIII. 11. 75 
576 Pitassi, The Navies of Rome, 320-321 
577 On the number of rowers see Pitassi, Navies of Rome, 320-321: a liburna/hemiolia counted from 24 to 34 rowers for a total 
between 2,400 and 3,400 for all the 100 ships; a quinquereme had from 56 to 124 rowers for a total between 2,800 to 6,200 
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5,200 and 6,000, but there is no way to know how many of those were Roman citizens. Finally, this army 
was likely supported by the Numidians, the main enemies of Carthage at the time. It seems that they 
offered their support to the Romans in Spain, but there is no way to know how strong their contingent 
was.578 
 
However, Goldsworthy’ solution should be rejected as well since it does not correspond to Appian’s 
practice elsewhere and it is difficult to know how he could estimate camp followers. As he is the only 
source that gives us figures regarding this campaign, we cannot reject Appian lightly. There is little 
reason to assume that he would be more inaccurate on this campaign than in his description of, for 
instance, the Spanish Wars. In fact, since the war was a single campaign it must have been easier to 
reconstruct how many troops had been sent to the province. 
 
During the chronicle of the Spanish campaigns, Appian mentions Roman armies very often, but, on the 
other hand, only on two occasions does he indicate a distinction between citizens and allies. The first 
case is the army of Fabius Maximus Aemilianus’ army (145) – Appian mentions that he recruited allies 
as well –, and the following one is the army of Fabius Maximus Servilianus (142).579 For the most part, 
Appian simply states the strength of a specific army, thus we have to assume that he is describing the 
total number given by Romans and allies. Also, the wars in Spain showed the variability of the ratio 
between citizens and socii in the legions, and finally, it is difficult to believe that Appian actually included 
crewmembers or camp followers in his figures on the strength of the Roman army. So, regarding the 
Third Punic War we have two options: the most straightforward one is that he simply states that the 
Romans deployed in Africa seven legions (for a total of 84,000 men, adding the same number of socii). 
Alternatively, we might suggest that Roman citizens were more numerous that the allies, thus this army 
was formed by eight legions (so 48,000 legionaries supported by 36,000 socii). 
 
* Macedonia and Greece (from 167 to 140s) 
 
                                                 
for all the 50 in service. The total number of rowers varied from 5,200 to 9,600, but the number of Roman citizens who served 
as rowers was so little that there is really no point in counting and including them. 
578 Regarding the Numidian contingents in Spain, see Appian, VI. 9. 46; VI. 9. 67 and finally VI. 14. 89 
579 On the army recruited by Fabius Maximus Aemilianus see Appian, VI. 9. 65; regarding Fabius Maximus Servilianus’ case, 
see Appian, VI. 9. 65 
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Both Macedonia and Greece required the deployment of troops during the later second century, although 
not as many as those needed in the Western Mediterranean. After the defeat of Perseus, Rome did not 
occupy Macedonia and Greece; instead the senate sponsored local Greek leaders.580 
 
In 150, Andriscus, who claimed to be Perseus’ son, appeared on the scene.581 After gathering support in 
Thrace, he invaded Macedonia and overpowered the republics established by Rome.582 The senate sent 
the praetor P. Iuventius Thalna with one legion to confront Andriscus, but between 149 and 148 he was 
defeated and killed. The senate, at this point, sent a larger force of two legions under the command of 
praetor Q. Caecilius Metellus; his campaign was so successful that he took the cognomen Macedonicus. 
By the end of 149 Macedonia was recaptured, and the situation seemed to be stabilizing, but Metellus 
remained in the province with his army. Soon after, the situation in Greece started to deteriorate.583 In 
the spring of 146 the assembly of the Achaean League gathered at Corinth to declare war ‘nominally 
against Sparta, but really against Rome’.584 
 
Metellus decided to take care of the Achaeans by himself: he attacked Greece from Macedonia and 
crushed the Achaean army on different occasions before he stopped at the Isthmus offering peace to the 
Achaeans.585 In 146 a new commander, Mummius arrived and, after Metellus and his army went back to 
Macedonia, he took command of a new Roman force that amounted to 26,500 men. This army was 
supported by a contingent of Cretan archers and troops sent by Attalus of Pergamum, so we might suggest 
that Mummius’ army counted two legions.586 
 
                                                 
580 Polybius, XXXII. 2. 5; one of these, Callicrates, was referred by Pausanias, VII. 11. 2 as “the most abominable wretch in 
all Greece”. 
581 Polybius, XXXVI. 2. 10; on Andriscus’ revolt also see Livy, Per., 49-50 
582 Polybius, XXXVI. 2. 10; see also Diodorus of Sicily, XXXII. 15. 7 
583 Pausanias, VII. 14. 1 on the Roman delegation and its demand that not only Sparta, but Corinth, Argos, Heraclea in Trachis 
and Orchomenus as well should be free to leave the Achaean League. On the Achaean’s reaction see Polybius, XXXVIII. 3. 
9 
584 Polybius, XXXVIII. 3. 13; on the declaration of war, also see Pausanias, VII. 14. 5 
585 On Metellus’ victories, see Pausanias, VII. 15. 4 on the battle of Scarpheia, and VII. 15. 6 on the battle of Cheronea. On 
the following campaign see Pausanias, VII. 15. 8-9 on the capture of Thebes and VII. 15. 11 on the surrender of Megara and 
Metellus’ final peace offers. Diaeus, leader of the Achaeans, refused any other solution than war as he feared that surrender 
would have brought the dissolution of the League. For this reason, he took emergency measures to keep fighting the Romans 
described by Polybius, XXXVIII. 3. 15 
586 Pausanias, VII. 16. 1; it is plausible that this army counted two legions (12,000 Romans), supported by the socii (probably 
less than 10,000), and the other allies. 
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After the revolt of Andriscus it was decided that Macedonia was not safe without a permanent garrison, 
probably one legion.587 In 143 a pseudo-Perseus raised an army of 16,000 men, but was crushed by the 
army of the praetorian governor Licinius Nerva under the command of the quaestor L. Tremellius.588 
Later, in 135, the praetor M. Cosconius gained success over the Scordisci in Thrace.589 Subsequently, the 
Roman military presence in the Balkans remained limited until 114 when Greece was invaded once again 
by the Scordisci. It is possible that the single garrison legion was reinforced for particular campaigns, 
especially if a consul took the field. 
 
DATE LEGIONS IN MACEDONIA LEGIONS IN GREECE 
167-150 // // 
149 1 // 
148 2 // 
147 2 // 
146 2 2/3 
145 1 2/3 
144 onwards 1 // 
 
* Northern frontier (168-120s) 
 
During the second half of the second century, the Republic constantly maintained troops on its Northern 
borders – Northern Italy, Illyria and Southern Transalpine Gaul. Military operations often fell under the 
responsibility of the legions deployed in Cisalpine Gaul. 
 
- Northern Italy 
 
After the subjugation of the Gallic tribes in the late 190s and the associated campaigns against the 
Ligurians, Cisalpina was not threatened directly. We have notice of consular armies in Northern Italy in 
167 and 166, when both consuls were active in the area.590 After these wars, we have progressively fewer 
                                                 
587 When Arcathias, son of Mithridates, attacked Macedonia in 87, Appian, XII. 5. 35 says that the Roman force was small, 
suggesting that the province was still protected by a single legion. 
588 Livy, Per., 53 
589 Livy, Per., 56 
590 Regarding 167, Livy, XLV. 16 says that both consuls (Q. Aelius and M. Iunius) were assigned to Northern Italy (Iunius 
against the Ligurians, Aelius in Cisalpine) and had two legions of 5,600 men each. In 166, consul Claudius Marcellus subdued 
tribes of Alpine Gauls, while consul Gaius Suplicius Galus defeated the Ligurians (see Livy, Per., 46). Both consuls celebrated 
triumphs for their successes in Northern Italy. 
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consuls active in this region – eight times before the Cimbric War.591 This does not mean that Northern 
Italy remained unguarded. It is plausible that Roman troops were constantly assigned to Cisalpine Gaul 
as garrisons, and moved to the other areas under their responsibility – Illyria and Transalpine Gaul – 
when necessary, and here they might have been commanded by a consul. 
 
Campaigns against the Ligurians are reported by the sources: in 159 consul M. Fulvius Nobilior was sent 
against them – and triumphed in 158 –; M. Claudius Marcellus, consul in 155, triumphed from Liguria 
in 154.592 The main threat to Northern Italy before the Cimbric War was raids from Alpine tribes (like 
the Salassi593, Raeti, etc…), but the legions in Northern Italy also operated in Transalpine Gaul and 
Illyria. For these reasons, it was normal for the Republic to keep troops in Cisalpina. 
 
- Illyria 
 
There was a brief war in Illyria in 167-168 (according to Appian it lasted only twenty days). In the 
meantime, Paulus, after he defeated Perseus, received from the senate the order to visit seventy Illyrian 
towns. He guaranteed to pardon them if they deliver him all the gold and silver they had. Ancius received 
a triumph where he displayed both Genthius and his son, while Livy states that this brief war gathered a 
great quantity of plunder.594 
 
The Roman legions were back in Illyria in 156 under the command of consul Marcius Figulus.595 In 135 
an army of 10,600 men under the command of consul Fulvius Flaccus was dispatched.596 In 129, the 
consul Gaius Sempronius Tuditanus, fought the Iapydes, an Illyrian tribe who lived near the Alps. 
                                                 
591 Certain consular armies in Northern Italy are reported in 162, 159, 155, probably in 148 (because of the construction of 
the Via Postumia, but sources tell us that both consuls were in Africa occupied with the siege of Carthage), 143, 136, 118 and 
lastly in 115 when consul M. Aemilius Scaurus subdued Gallic and Ligurian tribes, and received triumph for these victories. 
592 Regarding Nobilior’s campaign against the Ligurian see Thomas Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic 
(Atlanta, 1986), 445-446 and 448 regarding Marcellus’ campaign. 
593 Dio, XXII. 74: in 143 consul Appius Claudius attacked the Salassi, but was defeated at first. Later, however, he managed 
to defeat them (see Livy, Per., 53). 
594 On the war against Genthius see Appian, X. 2. 9. On the great plunder of this war see Livy, XLV. 43 
595 Regarding the Dalmatian war see Appian, X. 2. 11 
596 On the Illyrian campaign of 135 see Appian, X. 2. 10 and Livy, Per., 56. Fulvius Flaccus probably had command over a 
single legion – despite being the consul of that year: if we use Livy’s figures (5,500 men per legion), his army was made by 
one legion plus 5,100 allies. Using Appian’s figures (6,000 men per legion), would simply suggests 6,000 citizens and 4,600 
socii. 
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According to Livy, Sempronius was defeated at first, but later, assisted by the legate Decimus Iunius 
Brutus, defeated the Iapydes.597 Finally, in 119, L. Caecilius Metellus campaigned in the region.598 
 
 
- Transalpine Gaul 
 
The southern part of Transalpine Gaul was of great importance to the Republic as it was the land-link 
between Italy and the Spanish provinces. Roman had important connections with the city of Massalia 
since a first treaty was signed around 400, and cooperation during the Second Punic War reinforced this 
alliance. 
 
In spite of the progressive conquest of Cisalpine Gaul, during the early second century Rome never 
intervened on the western side of the Alps. Things changed when, in 154, Massalia asked for help against 
the Ligurians living in the western side of the Alps. Two legions under the command of consul Q. 
Opimius were moved from Northern Italy and won a decisive success.599 
 
In 125 Massalia was once again under attack and consuls Fulvius Flaccus (125) and Sextius Calvinus 
(124) were sent against them. By 124 there were probably four legions in the area (two under the 
command of consul Sextius Calvinus, and the previous two legions under proconsul Flaccus), and the 
Ligurians, the Salluvii and the Vocontii were defeated.600 At the end of this campaign Sextius established 
a colony at Aquae Sextiae. The conquest of Southern Transalpine Gaul (later Gallia Narbonensis) began 
in 122-121 under the consul Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (122), replaced the next year by Q. Fabius 
Maximus (121) who put an end to the campaign.601 In 118 the colony of Narbo Martius was established 
on the western side of the new province.602 
 
 
                                                 
597 Regarding the campaign in Illyria of 129 see Appian, X. 2. 10 and Livy, Per., 59 
598 On the Dalmatian war of 119 see Livy, Per., 62 and Appian, X. 2. 11 
599 Polybius, XXXIII. 8-10 and Livy, Per., 47 
600 Flaccus’ campaign is reported by Livy, Per., 60; Appian, BC, I. 34 states that Flaccus was sent to Gaul by the senate so 
that his consulship would expire because of his strong encouragement on opening Roman citizenship to the Italian allies. 
601 On the campaigns of 123-121 see Livy, Per., 61; Valerius Maximum, IX. 6. 3 and Strabo, IV. 1. 11. On the legions in 
service under consular and proconsular command, see Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, 510-512 (for the 
years 125-124), 516, 520-522 (for the years 122-121) 
602 See Velleius, II. 8, Cicero, pro Font., 5. 13 and Pliny, NH, III. 4. 32 
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DATE 
LEGIONS IN 
CISALPINE GAUL 
LEGIONS IN 
ILLYRIA 
LEGIONS IN 
TRANSALPINE GAUL 
167 4 // // 
166 4 // // 
165 1 // // 
164 1 // // 
163 1 // // 
162 2 // // 
161 1 // // 
160 1 // // 
159 2 // // 
158 1 // // 
157 1 // // 
156 // 2 // 
155 // 2 // 
154 // // 2 
153 1 // // 
152 1 // // 
151 1 // // 
150 1 // // 
149 1 // // 
148 2? // // 
147 1 // // 
146 1 // // 
145 1 // // 
144 1 // // 
143 2 // // 
142 1 // // 
141 1 // // 
141 1 // // 
139 1 // // 
138 1 // // 
137 1 // // 
136 2 // // 
135 // // 2 
134 1 // // 
133 1 // // 
132 1 // // 
131 1 // // 
130 1 // // 
129 // 2 // 
128 1 // // 
127 1 // // 
126 1 // // 
125 // // 2 
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Estimating the number of legions deployed on the Northern frontier is not straightforward. Brunt suggests 
that the Republic always kept a consular army in Cisalpine Gaul and that, as a consequence, one consul 
was always assigned to Northern Italy. This lasted until 135; from 134 legions were deployed only when 
and where necessary.603 The next consular army in Northern Italy reported by the sources are the legions 
of M. Aemilius Scaurus in 115, but it is hard to believe that Rome left Northern Italy unguarded for more 
than twenty years.604 
 
Contrary to Brunt, we should consider the possibility that Rome assigned a garrison force of one legion 
to Cisalpine Gaul in most years. Northern Italy was occasionally attacked by Alpine tribes, but they were 
not such a threat that required the presence of a consul every year. Consular campaigns would require 
larger armies, but there was no reason for a constant consular presence in Cisalpine other than the 
occasional brief campaigns in Illyria, and the expeditions in Transalpine Gaul. 
 
* The islands (Sardinia and Sicily) (167-120s) 
 
Finally, we have to look briefly at the deployment of troops in Sicily and Sardinia/Corsica during the 
second half of the second century. 
 
Rome sent legions to Sardinia in order to suppress rebellions on two different occasion: between 163 and 
162, and from 126 and 123. The first commander assigned to this task was consul M. Iuventius Thalna, 
who, however, died shortly after receiving news that the Senate had decreed a supplicatio for his 
successes.605 He was succeeded by the other consul, T. Sempronius Gracchus who maintained 
proconsular command the following year (162) before he was replaced by consul P. Cornelius Scipio 
Nasica.606 Sardinia remained calm until a rebellion in 126 forced Rome to send its legions under the 
command of consul L. Aurelius Orestes, who remained in Sardinia as proconsul until 123 when he 
returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph.607 We can suppose that, on both occasions, both armies were 
composed by two legions plus allies, as these campaigns probably did not need too much manpower. 
 
                                                 
603 Brunt, Italian Manpower, 432-433 
604 On M. Aemilius Scaurus command see Frontinus, Str. IV. 3. 13 and Valerius Maximus, IV. 3. 5 
605 See Valerius Maximus, IX. 12. 3 
606 Valerius Maximus, I. 1. 3 
607 On L. Aurelius Orestes’ campaign, see Livy, Per., 60 and Plutarch, CG, I. 4 and CG, II. 1-3 
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Sicily, on the other hand, did not need Roman troops until 139, when the sources mention the first slave 
uprising under the command of a Syrian slave named Eunus.608 By this time, the island did not have 
garrison troops and a praetor, L. Plautius Hypsaeus tried to stop the slaves with an army of 8,000 
Sicilians, but was defeated.609 After him, other praetors faced the slaves until, in 134, the consul C. 
Fulvius Flaccus received command.610 The first praetor who probably brought a legion was Lentulus 
(137), but he was defeated and the following year praetor Manlius took command (136). What is not 
clear is if Lentulus’ legion was annihilated by the slaves or not. If this was the case, Manlius’ new legion 
might have included the survivors – causing an accumulation as in Spain. After Manlius was defeated he 
was replaced by praetor Popilius Laenas and perhaps by 135 there were three weakened legions in Sicily. 
 
Fulvius Flaccus likely had at least two legions plus socii, but there is the matter of the legions previously 
employed by the praetors. If those legions weren’t destroyed, it is possible that Flaccus incorporated 
them into his army, thus increasing the manpower to five legions. In 133, the command passed to 
Calpurnius Piso, who may not have needed new troops. The following year, under the command of consul 
P. Rupilius, the slave revolt was finally subdued.611 Rupilius earned a triumph, and later reorganized the 
island under the Lex Rupilia. 
 
DATE LEGIONS IN SICILY LEGIONS IN SARDINIA/CORSICA 
163 // 2 
162 // 2 
161-140 // // 
139 // // 
138 // // 
137 1 // 
136 2 // 
135 3 // 
134 5 // 
133 5 // 
132 5 // 
131-127 // // 
126 // 2 
125 // 2 
                                                 
608 On the First Servile War, see Keith Bradley, Slavery and Rebellion in the Roman World, 140 B.C. – 70 B.C. (London, 
1989), 57-65 
609 See Diodorus, XXXIV-V. 2. 18 and Florus, II. 7. 7 
610 After Plautius Hypsaeus, praetor Cornelius Lentulus (137) and Manlius (136) were defeated as reported by Florus, II. 7. 7 
and Frontinus, Strat., III. 5. 3. On the first consular command of the Servile War, see Livy, Per. 56 
611 On the end of the First Servile War, see Livy, Per., 59 and Diodorus, XXXIV-XXXV. 2. 20 describes the sieges of 
Tauromenium and Enna, and Rupilius’ later successful campaign against robbers. 
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* Burden of military service during the period 167-125 
 
Not having Livy makes it difficult to estimate the burden of military service. The following table shows 
the probable number of legions in service on the different fronts. There remains considerable doubt 
around some of the figures and the incomplete nature of the narrative sources for this period means that 
we could be underestimating Rome’s commitments in some years. 
 
DATE SPAIN NORTH EAST AFRICA ISLANDS TOTAL 
167 2 4 // // // 6 
166 2 4 // // // 6 
165 2 1 // // // 3 
164 2 1 // // // 3 
163 2 1 // // 2 5 
162 2 2 // // 2 6 
161 2 1 // // // 3 
160 2 1 // // // 3 
159 2 2 // // // 4 
158 2 1 // // // 3 
157 2 1 // // // 3 
156 2 2 // // // 4 
155 2 2 // // // 4 
154 3 2 // // // 5 
153 4/5 1 // // // 5/6 
152 4/6 1 // // // 5/7 
151 4/6 1 // // // 5/7 
150 4/6 1 // // // 5/7 
149 2? 1 1 7/8 // 11/12 
148 3 2? 2 7/8 // 14/15 
147 3 1 2 7/8 // 13/14 
146 3 1 4 7/8 // 15/16 
145 4 1 3 // // 8 
144 4 1 1 // // 6 
143 6 2 1 // // 9 
142 8 1 1 // // 10 
141 8 1 1 // // 10 
140 8 1 1 // // 10 
139 8 1 1 // // 10 
138 8 1 1 // 1 11 
137 8 1 1 // 1 11 
136 10? 2 1 // 1 14? 
135 7? 2 1 // 1 11? 
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134 6 1 1 // 2 10 
133 6 1 1 // 2 10 
132 2 1 1 // 2 6 
131 2 1 1 // // 4 
130 2 1 1 // // 4 
129 2 2 1 // // 5 
128 2 1 1 // // 4 
127 2 1 1 // // 4 
126 2 1 1 // 2 6 
125 2 2 1 // 2 7 
 
Between 159 and 147 the number of citizens registered decreased from 328,316 to 322,000, a little more 
than 6,000 in a period of 12 years.612 In 142 the census shows that the number of citizens returned to the 
same levels of 159 (so it increased by around 6,000 in 5 years), but then, by 136, it decreased again: in 6 
years the number of registered citizens decreased by 10,500, and stayed on these levels for a decade.613 
In 125, however, the census shows an enormous increase when the number of citizens increased from 
318,823 to 394,736 (almost 76,000 in only 6 years).614 It seems clear that these irregular population 
trends are caused by factors other than natal rates and mortality. 
 
The general but small decline registered between the mid-150s and the late 130s was probably caused by 
the reluctance of citizens to serve in the army in Spain.615 The Lusitanian War started in 155 and the 
Numantine War in 153, and what made these wars unpopular was the fact that not only they were 
dangerous, but non remunerative as well.616 There are few cases of rewards (one of the few times that 
soldiers gathered some wealth is at the end of L. Mummius’ campaign in 153) , but they were rare, and, 
in the case of Mummius, his army suffered heavy casualties before he obtained the decisive victory. On 
other occasions, such as the campaign of 151-150 against the Lusitanians, the soldiers received very little 
while their commander kept all the rest for himself.617 
                                                 
612 For the census figures of 159 see Livy, Per. 47; for 154 see Livy, Per. 48 
613 See Livy, Per. 54 for the census figure of 142, Livy, Per. 56 for the census of 136 and Per. 59 for the census of 131 
614 Livy, Per. 60 for the census of 125 
615 Rich, ‘The Supposed Manpower Shortage’, 317-318: “We hear of no resistance to the levy in the remaining years of the 
second century after the wars in Spain ended”; Luuk De Ligt, ‘The Economy: Agrarian Change During the Second Century’, 
in eds. Rosentein, N. and Morstein-Marx, R., A Companion to the Roman Republic (Malden, 2006), 602 
616 On the beginning of the Lusitanian War (155) see Appian, VI. 10. 56; on the beginning of the Numantine War (153) see 
Appian VI. 9. 44. 
617 Appian, VI. 10. 60: “At this time Galba, who was greedier for money than Lucullus, gave a little of the booty to the army, 
and a little to his friends and appropriated the rest for himself, even though he was already the richest of all the Romans…” 
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In 125, however, the census figures register a drastic increase of almost 76,000 citizens in only six years 
since the previous census (131). It is likely that this “return” was prompted by the reforms of the Gracchi. 
First and foremost, the Lex Agraria offered the possibility of receiving more public land and it surely 
influenced the census after 133.618 Also, Gaius Gracchus’ lex militaria permitted soldiers to receive 
clothing free of charge, slightly reducing the deduction on the stipendium of the soldiers. 
 
If we include the soldiers in service overseas, we can change the face of the census figures.619 The 
following graphs shows the census population, the number of citizens in service in the legions, and an 
adjusted census population level from 159 to 125. These data are presented per year and not per census 
in order to offer a full picture of the movements of the Roman population during this period. Furthermore, 
this will allow us to have a better idea of the impact of military service on the census population. On the 
number of Roman citizens in service during this period, we use the strength of the legions suggested by 
Livy (5,500 citizens per legion), instead of Appian’s 6,000. 
 
                                                 
618 On Tiberius Gracchus’ Lex Agraria see Plutarch, Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, 8; Velleius, II. 2 or Florus, II. 2. 14: the 
law limited possession of public land to the amount set by the Licinio-Sextian law, and provided for assigning the rest to poor 
people through a commission of three people. 
619 Regarding the debate on the exclusion of Roman soldiers stationed overseas from the census figures see Rosenstein, Rome 
at War, 146: “…the number of Roman citizens counted by successive pairs of censors generally increased, […] by adding in 
citizens, mainly men serving with the legions, whom censors are likely to have missed.” Also, if we look at the sources, 
soldiers in service outside of Italy are never mentioned with one exception, and that is the census of 204 described by Livy, 
XXIX. 37, in which soldiers overseas are clearly included: “…the censors sent agents through the provinces to report on the 
number of Roman citizens who were in the armies in the various locations. With these included, the census numbered 214,000 
souls.” However, none other earlier or later census figures mention the soldiers. 
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The graph clearly shows that during the two main periods of intense military activity – between 149 and 
146 and from 136 to 133 – we have in both cases a decrease in the original census figures, though the 
adjusted figures show a much smoother curve. It seems clear that the key to understand these variations 
is the army and military service of Roman citizens. 
 
The adjusted population line gives a better idea of the matter of the under-registration rate.620 Citizens 
who did not present themselves to be registered represented a constant problem for the Republic. It is 
likely that rates of registration varied, and, as we have discussed, one important factor was the 
attractiveness of service in the army at that particular time. 
 
In order to truly understand the impact of under-registration we have to put forward a likely level in 
normal circumstances, and how much is that expected to have varied. Brunt suggests a standard 10%, 
                                                 
620 On under-registration see Elio Lo Cascio, ‘Recruitment and the Size of the Roman Population from the third to the first 
century BCE’, in ed. Scheidel, W., Debating Roman Demography (Leiden, Boston and Koln, 2001), 123-124; Rosenstein, 
Rome at War, 157; De Ligt, ‘Roman Manpower Resources’, 6; De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 81 
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but, as advised by Lo Cascio, I believe it should be higher (15% at least) mainly due to the centralized 
nature of the whole procedure.621 Finally, Rosenstein argues, “The Roman census depended in the last 
analysis on the voluntary compliance of the citizens: if they did not register, there was little the 
government could do to compel them…”622 
 
We can use as examples the low figures of 131 against those of 125. If, as we have suggested, the normal 
under-registration rate was 15%, 59,210 citizens would have been missed by the censors; hence the 
population would increase from 394,736 to 453,964 citizens. Considering that we know that in 125 there 
were seven legions in service (38,500 citizens), we can estimate the military participation rates of that 
year to 9.7% of the census population, but it might drop to 8.4% if we consider the under-registration 
rate. 
 
We can suggest that by 131 the under-registration rate, due to the unpopularity of the Spanish wars, was 
much higher than normal and up to 30%. According to the census figures, the population counted 318,823 
citizens. With a 30% under-registration rate, the number of citizens who did not register would be 95,646, 
and the total population would increase to 414,469 citizens. Regarding the recruitment rates, we know 
that that year only 4 legions (22,000 citizens) were in service, so 6.9% of the citizen population was 
under arms if we are looking at the census figures, and it would decrease to 5.3% if we are considering 
the under-registration rate. 
 
In 147, while the Third Punic War entered its climactic phases, the revolt in Macedonia was crushed and 
the Achaean War was at its beginning. Because of this, a very large number of Roman citizens wanted 
to be enlisted so they could fight in Africa or in the East. The most immediate consequence is the very 
high rate of citizens under arms. The corrected census of 147 shows the potential of the Roman 
manpower. The prospect of great booty from the conflicts in Africa, Macedonia and Greece attracted 
recruits, making it hard to see military service as a burden. 
 
Also, we will shortly see that during the second half of the second century, the property requirement for 
service was probably reduced to allow more poor citizens to enlist. So we should consider that these two 
                                                 
621 See De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 107-112; see Brunt, Italian Manpower, 54 and Elio Lo Cascio, ‘Roman 
Census Figures’, 245-246 
622 On the matter of under-registration also see Rosenstein, Rome at War, 157 
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aspects together – citizens who wanted to be enlisted because of the benefits of military service, and a 
reduction of the census requirement for service in the army – allowed an “explosion” of the census return 
from 133 showing that a shortage of manpower in the mid-second century, and especially during the 
Gracchan period was far from real. 
 
After 142 the major conflict zone was Spain:  we have a drop in the census figures of 142 which continued 
until, by 131, the population registered was of 340,823 citizens. Rather than a sudden demographic crisis, 
this situation was likely the result of citizens being unwilling to serve in the Spanish campaign.623 
 
At some point in the late second century, the census level for the fifth class was further reduced, as both 
Cicero and Aulus Gellius suggest a minimum census requirement of 1,500 asses.624 Compared with the 
11,000 (Livy) or 12,500 (Dionysius) for the archaic period, and the 4,000 asses given to us by Polybius, 
we can see the progressive and consistent reduction of the minimum census requisite for military 
service.625 The reduction fits well with the subsequent abolition of the property requirement for military 
service attributed to Marius. Mattingly and Crawford, however, suggest that by the mid-second century 
property qualifications were not expressed in asses, but in sestertii.626 Crawford asserts that ‘all state 
assessments hitherto expressed as so many asses were now converted to the same number of sestertii’. A 
minimum census requirement of 1,500 sestertii would translate to 3,750 asses, a minimal reduction from 
the 4,000 asses suggested by Polybius. Yet, the stipendium continued to be calculated in asses and Cicero 
and Gellius would seem to suggest bronze coins.627 
 
So, if the minimum census requirement reduced from 4,000 to 1,500 asses (600 sestertii), the main issue 
is to consider that this decrease would have opened military service to more low class citizens for whom 
                                                 
623 See Pierre Cagniart, ‘The Late Republican Army (146 – 30 BC)’, in ed. Erdkamp, P., A Companion to the Roman Army, 
81 and Rosenstein, Rome at War, 157 
624 Cicero, Rep., II. 40: “…qui aut non plus mille quingentos aeris aut omnino nihil in suum censum praeter caput attulissent, 
proletarios nominavit…”; Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, XVI. 10. 10: “Romana tenuissimi pauperrimique erant neque amplius 
quam mille quingentum aeris in censum deferebant, proletarii appellati sunt…” 
625 On the evolution of minimum property requirement for service in the army, see Rathbone, ‘Assidui and Prima Classis’, 
122-125 and 139-142 
626 Mattingly, ‘The Property Qualifications of the Roman Classes’, JRS 27 (1937), 99-107; Crawford, Roman Republican 
Coinage, vol. II (1974), 621; also see Lo Cascio, ‘Ancora sui Censi Minimi delle Cinque Classi “Serviane”’, in Athenaeum 
66 (1988), 295-296 
627 Tacitus, The Annals, I. 17 shows that military payment was still expressed in asses during the reign of Tiberius. Also see 
Rich, ‘The Supposed Shortage’, 313 
175 
 
the army was a source of income, thus being part of the explanation for the jumps in the census figures 
during the second half of the second century. 
 
It is not possible to date the second reduction of the census requirement with confidence. Crawford 
suggests that it falls between 150 (after Polybius wrote his Book VI) and 141 (when the as was replaced 
by the sestertius as the unit of reckoning), but we might look at this from a census – and military – 
prospective.628 A plausible date might be in 154, because, by looking at the “adjusted population” levels 
on the graphs, there is a constant increase in the census return during the following period. The 
requirement for soldiers, and, at the same time, the number of citizens joining the army in order to take 
part to the campaigns in Africa and in the East might suggest that the minimum census requirement for 
military service had been lowered. The key fact is that Roman citizens wanted to be enlisted in the army. 
Another possibility is to postpone the reduction of the census requirement to the Gracchan period, as this 
could help explaining the high return in the census of 125. If we look at the “census population” levels 
on the graphs, we can see that by 133 the citizen population reached the lowest point during this period 
(289,867). However, after only eight years, it reached the highest point yet (394,736), suggesting that 
possibly a combination between a reduction of the property requirement for military service, and the 
interest generated by the land reforms could have increased the number of Roman citizens willing to be 
registered. It is plausible that the census requirement was lowered during the Gracchan period also 
because of Gaius Gracchus’ military law that allowed recruits to receive clothing from the state free of 
charge, suggesting that Rome was now recruiting poorer soldiers. 
 
The subsequent abolition of a census requirement for service by Marius was the completion of a process 
that started towards the end of the third century. 
 
We have analyzed the different wars of the second half of the second century, looked at the number of 
citizens in service during this period, and suggested an adjusted population level. These census figures, 
together with our knowledge of the number of soldiers in the legions allow us to have a complete view 
on the burden of military service, and the proportion of Roman citizens in service in the army during the 
second half of the second century. The following graphs, by using the same values of the previous one 
                                                 
628 Rathbone, ‘Assidui and Prima Classis’, 151 suggests that soldiers were never paid in sestertii. Crawford, Roman 
Republican Coinage vol. II, 625 
176 
 
(in terms of number of men per legion), shows the percentage of Roman citizens recruited in the army 
between 159 and 125. 
 
 
 
 
It appears that rates of recruitment were extremely variable, much more than during the first part of the 
century.629 Recruitment rates were particularly high on two occasions: between 149 and 146, and from 
136 to 133. Even though during both these periods we have very high recruitment levels, they were very 
different from each other. Between 149 and 146, Rome was fighting in Africa and Macedonia/Greece, 
and citizens were eager to join the legions. By 136, on the other hand, the wars in Spain were less popular 
and successful. After 133, the recruitment rate returned to the same levels as before 149 (under 10%). As 
we have mentioned earlier, under-registration may alter the recruitment rates, but, at the same time, we 
don’t have precise data on the actual levels of under-registration. Finally, there is a possibility that the 
efficiency and the importance of the census declined somewhat during this period. We can see that from 
                                                 
629 De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers: “…the surviving evidence, however fragmentary, would seem to contradict the 
notion that conscription and a heavy military mortality rate prompted a demographic downturn.” 
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164 and 125 we have a total of eight census figures, while after 125 we have one more census figure 
regarding the second century (in 114), and we have to wait thirty years for the next one (in 85).630 The 
territorial expansion of Rome and the migration of citizens made counting the people more difficult. 
Further, the abolition of direct taxation removed a function of the census. 
 
We will not cover the final part of the second century mainly because of the lack of census figures – with 
the exception of that for 114. This limits our understanding of the military reforms attributed to Gaius 
Marius, the most important event (for this thesis) of this period. It is plausible that the abolition of the 
property requirement for service in the army may have incentivized the poorest citizens to register at the 
census. It is unclear whether the change brought on-stream a significant number of new recruits, given 
that the minimum census requirement was only 1,500 asses, and, as we have argued earlier, it is difficult 
to imagine huge numbers of people who were able to survive while owning less that the already very low 
minimum property requirement. Allowing the capite censi to join the army, however, permitted access 
to the benefits of service to the very poorest elements in Roman society.631 
 
In the following, and final chapter of this dissertation, we will examine the potential benefits of military 
service as an alternative occupation and/or source of income for Roman citizens. 
  
                                                 
630 Regarding the census figures of the second half of the second century, they are reported in 164, 159, 154, 147, 142, 136, 
131 and 125. 
631 The Jugurthine War can be an example of this: Roman troops plundered Numidia since the beginning of the war, so they 
probably gathered a considerable amount of booty; Plutarch, Marius, 12 describes the rich booty carried during Marius’ 
triumph. Cassius Dio, XXVII. 94 says that after the victory of Aquae Sextiae, Marius sold all the plunder – suggested by 
Plutarch, Marius, 21 to be very large – to the soldiers at a low price. 
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Chapter 7 
THE ARMY AND THE ECONOMY OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to understand the impact of military service on the Romano-Italian economy 
of the second century and to analyze the different strategies employed by the Roman citizens and their 
families in order to find a sustainable balance between the frequent, yet necessary service in the army, 
and their economic cycles.  
 
This is an area which has seen considerable academic controversy, particularly in association with the 
Gracchan crises. The predominant model has been one of economic and demographic decline of the rural, 
peasant class. That decline has been related to increasing pressure (political and economic) resulting from 
the development of villa agriculture and a reduction in the labour available for small peasant holdings 
due to the increasing demands of military service. More recently, the model of decline has been 
challenged by a model of intensification based mainly on the interpretation of archaeological material. 
Survey recoveries indicate that the villae system became a more prominent feature in Roman agriculture 
during the second century, intensified in the first century, but, most important, it existed alongside a 
network of small holdings.632 Such evidence raises considerable methodological issues related to the 
dating of sites, site typologies, and site recovery patterns. Survey recovery rates are the key to 
reconstructing a productive landscape. But recovery rates depend on the spotting, recognition, and dating 
of ceramics (thus on archaeological techniques) and on the presence of datable material in the first 
instance. Participation in a market economy makes the peasantry more visible, while poorer, or more 
isolated peasants would leave less data. 
 
As a result of the new data, we cannot conclude that the Roman peasantry was facing a demographic 
decline during the second century. We certainly cannot suppose that extended military service in this 
                                                 
632 Elio Lo Cascio, Crescita e Declino. Studi di storia dell’economia romana (Roma, 2009), 26: “L’espressione più 
caratteristica di questo sviluppo, quantitativo e qualitativo, dell’economia agraria romana già a partire dal III secolo ma poi 
soprattutto nel II e I secolo a.C. à certo la villa cosiddetta schiavistica…”; also see Jean-Paul Morel, ‘Early Rome and Italy’, 
in eds. Scheidel, W., Morris, I., and Saller, R., The Cambridge Economic History of the Greco-Roman World (Cambridge, 
2007), 504-505 
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period caused a general impoverishment of the country dwellers and their displacement from the land. 
Rather, we argue that the impact of military service on the Roman small farmers was more likely to have 
been advantageous. Service in the legions provided them with incomes additional or alternate to those 
derived from the land, with new land in colonial settlements, or resources that would allow investment 
in existing properties and thus enable more families to remain on relatively small plots. As we will 
demonstrate, a vast amount of civilian labour was required in order to provide food, military equipment 
or any kind of supply (clothing, pottery, etc) to the legions, making the army the largest direct and indirect 
employer in the Roman world. 
 
This chapter is divided into two main parts: the first analyses the Roman economy of the second century, 
while the second is focused on the role and impact of the army on the economy. The initial section opens 
with an historiographical analysis of the model of decline elaborated by Keith Hopkins and Peter Brunt, 
but then moves to challenge some of its key elements. This allows us to revisit the matter of the villae; 
by combining literary and archaeological evidence we are going to reconsider their origins and 
development, discuss their role in the economy and their impact. As a result, we will suggest a co-
existence between them and small farms instead of a necessarily, yet ultimately negative, competition 
that wouldn't benefit neither of them. We will then conclude this section by suggesting a strong 
connection between the growth of the army and the development of the villae. Next, we move to look at 
the impact of the growth of the city of Rome, but also considering the possibility of expanding this 
argument to other Italian cities as well. 
 
The first part of the chapter ends with a section focused on the debate surrounding Roman citizen 
population, its connection with the economy of the second century, and the role played by survey 
archaeology in the discussion between the "low count" and "high count". As already mentioned before, 
recovery rates are a crucial part in understanding the economic involvement of the small farmers. The 
demographic implications, rather than confirming one model over the other, seem to allow us to escape 
from this binary debate and look for new solutions. 
 
The second part of the chapter is dedicated to the role of the army in the economy. It starts with an 
examination on the recent attempts that challenge the general negative view on recruitment and military 
service. We then move to an analysis of different strategies adopted by Roman families to counterbalance 
the absence of their men due to service in the legions. This will lead to a discussion on the direct and, 
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especially, indirect impact of the army. Finally, we will look at colonization as both part of the strategies 
and also as one of the benefits offered by the army. 
 
 
* General considerations on the second century economy and the impact of the army 
 
Rome, like every other ancient Mediterranean state, needed to balance the conflict between warfare and 
agriculture. In the archaic period wars were fought by smaller armies and relatively close to Roman 
territory, and mainly during the summer (when the soldiers’ labour was not needed in their fields). 
However, as Rome progressively completed the conquest of Italy during the late fourth and third 
centuries, soldiers were required for year-round service in the army. Also, the First Punic War caused a 
significant growth of the size of the army increasing the number of peasants withdrawn from agriculture. 
Thus, the warfare that led to the expansion of the Republic risked the sustainability of the farms that 
supplied the soldiers. Rome recruited only citizens who held property and it seems likely that 
smallholders formed the backbone of the legions.633 
 
Some modern interpretations of the Gracchan political crisis link it to a profound crisis in peasant 
agriculture which is in turn linked to the demands of military service. This is what we might call the 
“Brunt-Hopkins model”: a combination of Brunt’s pessimistic scenario on Roman agricultural economy 
and Hopkins’ theory on the formation of the slave society as a consequence of the expansion of the 
Republic after the Second Punic War. 
 
According to Brunt, Roman agricultural productivity suffered from extremely low yields (little or no 
manuring, weeding, or hoeing), biennial fallow, and a concentration on inexpensive cereal crops, grown 
for subsistence, neglecting market gardening, wine, olive oil, tree crops or livestock – even pigs or 
barnyard fowl like chickens.634 This pessimistic position is summarized by Morley: ‘Since Roman 
agriculture remained wholly pre-industrial, non-mechanized and without artificial fertilisers, the 
consensus among ancient historians has been that yields and productivity must have been relatively 
low’.635 What follows from this assumption of a relatively unproductive agricultural system is that the 
                                                 
633 Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 112 
634 Peter Brunt, review of White, K. D., Roman Farming, on JRS 62 (1972), 153-158 
635 Neville Morley, ‘The Transformation of Italy, 225-28 BC’, JRS 91(2001) 
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population that this system could support must also have been relatively low. Further, if the capacity of 
the agricultural economy was limited, relatively small increases in population or increased pressure on 
the land through, for instance, the development of estates that used predominantly imported servile labour 
and which must have occupied an increasing proportion of Italian land, risked some sort of Malthusian 
crisis among the peasant class. It is this peasant-land crisis that was regarded as underpinning the 
Gracchan political crisis. 
 
Hopkins summarized the model in Conquerors and Slaves. He argued imperial conquest ensured a 
constant influx of wealth (in the form of booty, etc) into Italy, but according to Hopkins’ traditional 
model much of this wealth was retained by the Roman elite who invested it in Italian land and established 
slave-staffed estates on the vastly increased ager publicus.636 This led to the development of commercial 
farming as described in Cato’s De Agri Cultura. Appian, with his grim description of the ager publicus, 
is the main source on the decline of the Roman free peasantry and the unrestrained expansion of the 
villae.637 The establishment of moderately large farms on public and other land by the rich for agriculture 
and animal husbandry, is seen as depriving the poor of access to all forms of land. But this competition 
for land is related also, in Appian’s account, to pressures of military service so that in Hopkins’ view 
military service in the second century became a form of peasant emigration which enabled the further 
expansion of large estates.638 
                                                 
636 Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 30: “Like death in war, it helped to create vacancies on Italian land, which the rich were 
only too anxious to occupy.”; Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 261: “…the spoils from those same wars enriched 
Rome’s upper class.”; Roselaar, Public Land, 180: “It is generally assumed that there was fierce competition among the rich 
to acquire ever more land. Because the elite were always eager to acquire more land, the poor were gradually expelled from 
their holdings.” 
637 Appian, BC, I. 7: “As they subdued successive parts of Italy by war, the Romans confiscated a portion of the land and 
founded towns, or chose settlers from their own people to go to existing towns – this being the alternative they devised to 
garrisons. In the case of the captured land which became theirs on each occasion, they distributed the cultivated area at once 
to settlers, or sold or leased it; but since they did not have time to allocate the very large quantity that was lying under-
cultivated as a result of hostilities, they announced that this could for the moment be worked by anyone who wished at a rent 
of one tenth of the produce for arable land and one fifth for orchards. Rents were also set for those who pastured larger and 
smaller beasts. This they did to increase the numbers of the people of Italy, whom they considered exceptionally tough, so 
that they would have their kin to fight alongside them. But the result was the opposite. The rich gained possession of most of 
the undistributed land and after a while were confident that no one would take it back from them. They used persuasion or 
force to buy or seize property which adjoined their own, or any other smallholdings belonging to poor men, and came to 
operate great ranches instead of single farms. They employed slave hands and shepherds on these estates to avoid having free 
men dragged off the land to serve in the army, and they derived great profit from this form of ownership too, as the slaves had 
many children and no liability to military service and their numbers increased freely. For these reasons the powerful were 
becoming extremely rich, and the number of slaves in the country was reaching large proportions, while the Italian people 
were suffering from depopulation and a shortage of men, worn down as they were by poverty and taxes and military service. 
And if they had any respite from these tribulations, hey had no employment, because the land was owned by the rich who 
used slave farm workers instead of free men.” 
638 Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 28-30 
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The flow of imperial capital into the land reflected a moral perception of the land as a worthy investment, 
but also probably an economic reality in which the profits of agriculture were the most reliable source of 
income and the land the best and most obvious investment. In an agricultural economy, the chances are 
that the land is going to be the most important source of wealth and power. In Republican Rome 
agriculture became a commercial investment and is treated as such by Cato and Cicero, who describes it 
as the most profitable and respectable source of income in comparison with trade, industry or any other 
profession.639 
 
Although there are differences, the pattern of an increased commercialization of agriculture, the 
development of slave labour, the displacement of the peasantry, and the increasing pressure of military 
activity has formed a core narrative of the second century in scholars as diverse as Toynbee, Frank, De 
Neeve, Gabba and Morley as well in the work of Brunt and Hopkins.640 
 
The gradual removal of the free population from the fields of Italy has been used to explain the growth 
of urban centres in Italy, particularly Rome. Toynbee portrayed such centres as a destination of last resort 
for the Italian peasantry.641 
 
Such factors are thought to have led to a gradual depopulation of the Italian countryside. This is reflected 
in the stagnant or declining figures for the census, which could be read in relation to the increasing urban 
population, as evidence of depopulation of the countryside. Since it is assumed that the Roman army 
relied heavily on the rural poor for its infantry, issues in recruitment for the Spanish wars could be related 
to the poor census figures (see p. 144). Indeed, in Plutarch’s account of the Gracchan troubles, Tiberius 
Gracchus is supposedly motivated by observing the replacement of the free rural poor with a servile 
                                                 
639 See Cicero, De Senectute, XV. 51, and especially De Officiis, I. 42. 151: “But of all occupations by which gain is secured, 
none is better than agriculture, none more respectable, none more profitable, none more delightful, none more becoming to a 
freeman.” 
640 Richard Frank, ‘Ager Publicus and Latifunda’, in The Ancient World, vol. II, n°2 (1979), 48-49; Paul De Neeve, Colonus, 
private farm-tenancy in Roman Italy during the Republic and the early Principate (Amsterdam, 1984), 79; Emilio Gabba, 
‘Italia Romana’, in Athenaeum (Como, 1994), 105-106 and 155-158; Neville Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland: the City of 
Rome and the Italian Economy 200 BC – AD 200 (Cambridge, 1996), 133; Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 49: “As in most 
other pre-industrial societies, land-ownership was the bedrock of wealth. Generally speaking, both senators and knights 
derived the bulk of their incomes from land. The richer they became, therefore, the larger their land-holdings. But good 
agricultural land in central and southern Italy was already cultivated, much of it by free peasants. The formation of large 
landholdings inevitably involved their expropriation and expulsion.” 
641 Arnold Toynbee, Hannibal’s Legacy, vol. II (London, 1965), 159-160 and 167 
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population in the region to the north of Rome.642 If the population was being swelled by an increasing 
landless proletariat who would be inadmissible to the army, the land reforms of Tiberius Gracchus were 
both a traditional and logical response to the problems of citizen impoverishment, the numerical decline 
of the free peasantry, and the recruitment issues faced by the magistrates.643 
 
This neat model has in recent years come under sustained critique. This has come from two primary 
directions. As we shall discuss below, some historians of the Roman economy, notably Elio lo Cascio, 
have offered more optimistic readings of the demographic situation, notably the Augustan census data, 
which entail a more optimistic reading of the resilience and agricultural productivity of the peasant small 
holders of Italy. The second source of disquiet with the traditional model is the archaeology of the Roman 
landscape which has developed enormously in sophistication and detail since the early 1970s. 
 
The transformation in our understanding of the Italian countryside has resulted from the development of 
survey archaeology. Field walking campaigns in Central Italy (South Etruria in the early 1970s, more 
recently in the Tiber Valley644) have recovered many small sites dated to the second century. These sites 
have been associated with farms and their survival would appear to attest to the resilience and continued 
presence of a substantial free rural population. Potter, looking at the sites and survey recoveries in South 
Etruria suggests that an increasing number of sites is an indication of a growing population, and that ‘the 
countryside […] seems to have supported a very large farming population’.645 More recently, the data of 
the South Etruria Survey – in particular the matter of ceramic chronology – has been re-evaluated by the 
Tiber Valley Project. Of great importance for the results of these studies is the “intimate and inescapable 
relationship”646 between the city of Rome and the Tiber valley that, as Patterson highlights: 
 
“The picture emerging from both the literature and from 
archaeological evidence clearly suggests that the middle Tiber 
valley was a route of major importance for the supply of food and 
other requirements of the city of Rome […] and this inevitably 
must have had a major effect on the economy of the parts of 
                                                 
642 Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus, 8 
643 Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 63 
644 See Helen Patterson and Martin Millett, ‘The Tiber Valley Project’, in PBSR 53 (1998), 1-20 
645 Potter, The Changing Landscape, 120 
646 Helen Patterson, Helga di Giuseppe and Rob Witcher, ‘Three South Etrurian “Crises”: first results of the Tiber Valley 
Project’, in PBSR 72 (2004), 29 
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Sabine, Etruscan and Umbrian territory closest to the river (and 
potentially those further away, too).”647 
 
Crucial for the project is also the progressive transformation of the Tiber valley as the hinterland of Rome 
and the impact of the city’s pressure on it.648 Witcher, focusing on the relationship between Rome and 
its suburbium (the area extending at least 50km from Rome), argues that the suburbium around Rome 
was densely populated and occupied by a large and reasonably prosperous smallholder population 
integrated into the urban market.649 Lo Cascio as well highlights that both the specialization of the 
production and its intensification were directly connected with the growth of the major “consumption 
center”, which was, obviously, Rome. Therefore, the praedia suburbana are the ones the most intensively 
cultivated by a numerous rural population whose settlements strongly increased during the second part 
of the second century, pattern that will continue during the first century and that will reach even higher 
levels during the Imperial age.650 
 
- Villas 
 
New survey techniques also allow us to challenge the negative view of villas. As noted by Launaro, it is 
assumed that: ‘the growth of larger estates centered on slave-staffed villas taking place at the expense of 
small farms owned by free peasants’651 making small farms and the rising villae incompatible. It is, 
however, plausible to reimagine the impact of the villas, as enhancing local agricultural regimes, largely 
through the provision of occasional paid work for local small farmers, but perhaps also through the spread 
and improvement of agricultural technology and marketing systems. 
 
As we argued in previous chapters, the intensification of Roman agriculture that occurred during the 
Second Punic War – when regions of Central Italy (Etruria and Latium in particular, but Umbria as well) 
became the main producers of food that fed both the population and, especially, the large armies deployed 
                                                 
647 John Patterson, ‘City, Territory and Metropolis: the case of the Tiber Valley’, in ed. Patterson, H., Bridging the Tiber. 
Approaches to Regional Archaeology in the Middle Tiber valley (London, 2004), 64 
648 Patterson, di Giuseppe and Witcher, ‘Three South Etrurian Crises’, 29 
649 Robert Witcher, ‘The Extended Metropolis: urbs, suburbium and population’, in JRA, 18 (2005), 123-133 
650 Lo Cascio, Crescita e Declino, 50-51: “Per esempio, la zona più vicina a Roma tra il corso del Tevere e quello dell’Aniene 
(che oltretutto potevano consentire un rapido ed economico trasporto delle derrate a Roma) registra una forte densità di 
insediamenti già in età arcaica; […] c’è una forte ripresa con la seconda metà del II secolo e la prima metà del I a.C. Nei due 
secoli successivi si perviene a un livello di occupazione che non ha eguali sino addirittura ai nostri giorni.” 
651 Launaro, Peasants and Slaves, 157 
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by the Republic during the first part of the war – might be suggested as the origin of what evolved into 
the large estates and the “villa system”.652 Debates on the co-existence of villae and small farms during 
the second century are usually focus on the extension of estates. The lex Licinia of 367 placed limits on 
the land to be held by individuals.653 There is some question as to whether this restriction applied to 
private land, public land or all types of land. Since the nineteenth century it was believed that the law 
concerned exclusively the occupation of the ager publicus, while Rathbone argued that its focus was 
private land only.654 Finally, Hermon, and more recently Rich and Roselaar, have suggested that the best 
interpretation for the lex Licinia is that it covered both public and private land.655 
 
Roman estates would seem to have expanded in the subsequent centuries, probably through the 
accumulation of small Catonian farms and it seems possible that the law lapsed to all practical purposes. 
Appian, writing two centuries after the Gracchan crisis, sees access to public land as a major resource 
for the poor, but it is likely that such access was not through a form of ‘common land’, but through 
distributions of whatever form.656 As argued by Roselaar, there is little reason to believe that aristocratic 
accumulation of property was centred on ager publicus: 
 
‘We would expect that anyone wanting to engage in market 
agriculture would have preferred to use private land, and that the 
spread of large estates mostly occurred on such land. It is therefore 
likely that ager publicus would have been an obstacle to the 
growth of large villae, rather than a stimulus’.657 
 
Cato, in the De Agri Cultura, never mentions ager publicus, but talks about buying land.658 For these 
reasons, it seems more likely that the original restriction was on private land. Nevertheless, by whatever 
                                                 
652 Marzano, Roman Villas, 224 
653 On the lex Licinia see Livy, VI. 35 and Varro, RR, I. 2. 9 
654 Roselaar, Public Land, 104; Dominic Rathbone, ‘The Control and Exploitation of ager publicus in Italy under the Roman 
Republic’, in ed. Aubert, J., Tâches Publiques et Entreprise Privée dans le Monde Romain (Neuchâtel, 2003), 145-146 
655 E. Hermon, ‘Les Lois Licinia-Sextia: un nouvel examen’, in Ktèma 19 (1994), 119-142; John Rich, ‘Lex Licinia, Lex 
Sempronia: B. G. Niebuhr and the Limitation of Landholding in the Roman Republic’, in eds. De Ligt, L. and Nortwood, S., 
People Land and Politics, 545-560; Roselaar, Public Land, 105-106 
656 The importance of access to the ager publicus by free peasants is well emphasized by Appian, as we have seen, and by the 
fact that the Gracchi focused their legislation exclusively on public land (see Appian, BC, I. 7); Rosenstein, Rome at War,  
77-78 says that because of the lex Licinia: “…the use of public land to supplement inadequate holdings began to constitute 
one of the mainstays of small-scale agriculture at Rome”; De Ligt, ‘Roman Manpower Resources’, 7 criticizes Rosenstein’s 
theory: “…it rests on the assumption that access to public land was easy and unproblematic. […] most of the ager publicus 
was controlled by the elite.” 
657 Roselaar, Public Land, 201 
658 Cato, De Agricultura, I 
186 
 
means the land originated, the elite clearly accumulated increasingly large property portfolios over the 
period of imperial expansion so that, by the second century, their wealth greatly increased so that they 
were now able to own multiple properties and buy more land.659 
 
Marzano highlights the fact that, according to archaeological evidence in Central Italy (Latium, Etruria 
and Umbria), large villa estates appear to have been a phenomenon of the first century rather than the 
second, contrary to De Ligt.660 Dyson questions the impact that sites such as Settefinestre might had on 
the adjoining region – in this case, the ager Cosanus –, and if the rise of the villa contributed to the 
decline of the small farmers in the area.661 
 
We do not appear to be looking at a sudden revolution in landholding patterns in the second century, 
more of a very gradual evolution as the villa estates developed over the centuries: survey recoveries 
suggest that smaller villae can be dated earlier than the introduction of the lex Licinia of 367.662  
 
The possible evolution of the villa system can be summarized in this way: Roman aristocrats always 
owned villae, but, due to their limited resources, they were neither very large nor economically significant 
up until the mid-third century.663 It seems likely that the villa developed during the late third century 
alongside the increasing differentiation of the aristocracy from other socio-political groups. Our 
suggestion, as we will see, is that the growing military requirements from the mid-third century, and 
especially during the Second Punic War, proved to be instrumental for the birth and development of the 
                                                 
659 Marzano, Roman Villas, 70 says that a system of “satellite villas” was very common: a dominus owned a large – main – 
villa, but also other smaller ones (in this case divided between villa maritimae and rusticae, but it might be easily applied for 
the countryside alone. 
660 Marzano, Roman Villas, 773, 782 and 791; De Ligt, ‘Roman Manpower Resources’, 5: “…both literary sources and a 
variety of archaeological data suggest that the second century BC witnessed a proliferation of slave-run villae.; also see 
Launaro, Peasants and Slaves, 156 
661 On Settefinestre see Stephen Dyson, The Roman Countryside (London, 2003), 27, and also Marzano, Roman Villas, 125 
662 See Marzano, Roman Villas, 759-767 on villae in Latium dated from the second century; a very interesting case is the 
Auditorium villa (p. 469) one of the first identified on the suburbium of Rome – dated around the sixth century –, that went 
through different phases of occupation. Villa Palazzo at S. Palomba (see Marzano, 455), located next the ancient Via 
Ardeatina, shows elements that can be dated to the fourth century. Back in the suburbium of Rome, Centocelle (or Villa of 
the piscina) has a nucleus dated to the third century, but structures and elements in the tufa plateau might suggest a fourth 
century foundation (see Marzano, 489). The villa in via Togliatti – still in the suburbium – shows remains of previous buildings 
dated up to the sixth century (see Marzano, 559). Regarding Etruria, Le Colonne and Settefinestre themselves are villae from 
the second century, although they progressively changed through the years. More cases of mid-Republican villas are: La 
Provinca, the three villas at Manciano-Marsiliana (Banditella, Casale Vittorio Veneto, Poggio del Ginestraio), the two villas 
at Scansano and Podere Civitella at Talamone; see Marzano, Roman Villas, 768 
663 Lo Cascio, Crescita e Declino, 31 mentions that the site of Auditorium shows traces of occupation that date back to the 
sixth century, and it continued until the second century AD. 
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commercial “capitalistic” villas that, by the second century, were organized according to the Catonian 
model.664 Between the end of the second century and the beginning of the first century the increase wealth 
of the upper classes caused the expansion of their villae, and this is when they started to become 
archaeologically prominent.665 
 
The archaeological data from sites like Settefinestre, that has become the dominant example of “villa 
schiavista”, is focused on one architectural characteristic: the presence of courtyards surrounded by a 
series of room that, according to excavators, housed many slaves. From this the economic model of the 
slave-staffed villas became the dominant one and it has been applied to other villae recovered in Italy. 
However, already from the 1980s, Rathbone has warned us against: “…easy acceptance of a simple 
notion of the villa system being a straightforward slave mode of production.”666 If we turn to the actual 
archaeological evidence, we realize that we don’t know much about the actual function of these rooms, 
and that we have assumed on the presence of slaves although, as reminded to us by Whitehead: “...not to 
argue that slaves were an unimportant part of the rural economy, but merely to stress that archaeologically 
they are invisible…”667 
 
A first example that we may look is the site of Le Verne (Piedmont): here Robino points out that there is 
no certainty regarding the function of the rooms around the large courtyard. She suggests that it is 
possible that this was actually a mansion rather than a villa, and thus the rooms may have been mainly 
bedrooms. If it was actually a villa, Robino suggests that these rooms may have been actually storerooms 
and service areas.668 
 
Another example is the villa of the Volusii Saturnini at Lucus Feroniae (Fiano Romano, north of Rome), 
built probably during the mid-first century. Its courtyard has been regarded as an example of ergastula, 
however, as pointed out by Marzano, a room at the center of the supposed slave quarter is well decorate: 
                                                 
664 Cato, De Agricultura, I. 7 suggests 100 iugera as the best kind of farm; Roselaar, Public Land, 180: “…second century 
villae were usually quite small.” 
665 Marzano, Roman Villas, 131: “It is no accident that the only archaeological evidence (Settefinestre) for the typology of 
slave quarters was discovered in Etruria, the very region indicated in the literary sources for an early diffusion of the extensive 
use of slave labour.” 
666 Rathbone, ‘The Development of Agriculture’, 13 
667 Nicholas Whitehead, ‘The Roman Countryside’, in eds. Malone, C. and Stoddart, S., Territory, Time and State. The 
archaeological development of the Gubbio Basin (Cambridge, 1994), 196 
668 On the Le Verne site see Mirella Robino, ‘Osservazioni sulla cosiddetta Mansio di Rigomagus a Le Verne’, in ATTA 8 
(1999), 249 
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“…there is a lararium, featuring an elegant mosaic floor of sophisticated design, a marble mensa, marble 
busts of members of the gens and a long inscription…”669 suggesting that these rooms were actually used 
for housing or storage.670 
 
Even if we look at Settefinestre itself, the interpretation of the rooms surrounding the courtyards has been 
usually connected with the ergastula described by Columella, the places where chained slaves were 
housed for the night in an agricultural estate.671 We should notice that in both Cato and Varro’s treaties 
there is no mention to the term ergastulum, although they make a clear distinction between restrained 
and unrestrained slaves, nor they predict separate rooms for the two groups. Finally, in Columella’s 
description, the egastulum is an underground room, thus making it hard to believe that those around 
courtyards, clearly not underground, were used for that function. As remarked by Robert Ètienne and 
Elio Lo Cascio, we do not have archaeological remains of underground ergastula in any villas in Italy.672 
 
These examples are not meant to challenge the presence of slaves in villas or in the Roman agricultural 
economy, but rather to point out the difficulties and risks in applying one ambiguous model to an entire 
system. As suggested by Marzano: “…the data offered by one of the best excavated villas are not as 
unproblematic as is often assumed and should be used with more caution when applied to other sites or 
to the elaboration of a general economic theory of Roman Italy.”673 
 
Furthermore, the great expansion in numbers of villas during the first century, as showed by Marzano, 
might suggest that these estates had different roles.674 Various sites in the suburbium of Rome show a 
concentration of villas that, plausibly, were actually used as luxurious rural residences by the urban elite 
from nearby Rome, and, according to Launaro, they had nothing to do with agricultural production.675 
Marzano also remarks the fact that villae might have even been used as inns according to their position, 
                                                 
669 Marzano, Roman Villas, 140-141 
670 Leonhard Schumacher, Sklaverei in der Antike (Munich, 2001), 99 and Marzano, Roman Villas, 143 
671 Columella, DRR, I. 6. 3; he also makes a clear distinction between ergastula and cellae where unchained slaves were kept. 
672 Robert Ètienne, Recherches sur l’Ergastule, in Actes du Colloque 1972 sur l’Esclavage (Paris, 1974), 264 ; Lo Cascio, 
Crescita e Declino, 32-33: “Sembra improprio, perciò, come una lunga tradizione di studi ha fatto, in particolare in Italia, 
considerare generalizzabile il modello di un’unità fondiaria di dimensioni medio-grandi, che utilizza prevalentemente, o quasi 
esclusivamente, schiavi senza famiglia, accasermati negli ergastula […]: in molti siti gli ergastula non ci sono.” 
673 Marzano, Roman Villas, 137 
674 Marzano, Roman Villas, 771 shows that 81 sites were date to the second century, while 218 to the first century. 
675 Marzano, Roman Villas, 95-96 and cites; Launaro, Peasants and Slaves, 127-128 on the site of Collatia in the suburbium 
of Rome, and 156. 
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like, for example, the villa at Matrice (Molise).676 The excavators have hypothesized that this villa, being 
close to the intersection between a north-south tratturo and an east-west road, also functioned as an inn.677 
 
This development is likely to have been regional: each region of Italy experienced different 
economic/population patterns.678 The areas that according to Launaro’ survey of surveys experienced 
either stagnation or decline are exactly those which, according to the literary sources, were 
demographically troubled – and used as the main support for the theory of an overall peasants decline.679 
Other areas appear to show an expansion of settlement during the first and second centuries or no 
significant change.680 
 
Significantly, there is some evidence to suggest that large villas may have been co-dependent on local 
peasantries and small urban centres, the very stuff of the traditional Italian landscape. The large villas of 
Settefinestre and Le Colonne have been re-dated by Dyson to the mid or late second century and their 
prosperity has been tied to that of the small colonial settlement at Cosa. With the decline of the Cosa and 
its port, it seems likely that local agriculturalists lost their outlet to more distant markets and that there 
was some decline in settlements as a result. At the same time, the large villas went into decline and may 
well have been deserted for a period before an Augustan reoccupation.681 
 
By looking at the Albegna Valley, on the outskirts of the economic center of Cosa and its harbor, an area 
that, as suggested by  Carandini, was densely populated by Roman settlers, that, if we look at the study 
by Fentress and Cambi, reached a very high level of production and prosperity.682 They have suggested 
                                                 
676 Marzano, Roman Villas, 131 
677 See J.A., Lloyd and Dominic Rathbone, ‘La Villa Romana a Matrice’, in Conoscenze 1 (1984), 219 
678 See Saskia Roselaar, ‘Regional Variation in the Use of the ager publicus’, in eds. De Ligt, L. and Northwood, S., People, 
Land and Politics, 597 and Launaro, Peasants and Slaves, 162 
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of the cities, its wealth, and, most interestingly, its abundance of men, which was such that Romans there were said to have 
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681 Marzano, Roman Villas, 138 and 217 
682 See Andrea Carandini, La Romanizzazione dell’Etruria: il territorio di Vulci (Milano, 1985), 49-51; also see Fentress, E., 
and Cambi, F., ‘Villas to Castles: first millennium A.D. Demography in the Albegna Valley’, in ed. Randsborg, K., The Birth 
190 
 
a slightly different relationship between villae and small farms in this area, usually identified with the 
“villa schiavilistica” model: “Their owners may have rented allotments to free tenants, as the presence 
in these areas of small farms and villages seems to suggest.”683 Evidence in the ager Veientanus as well 
seems to suggest the presence of free tenants in large estates.684 
 
The archaeological examples that we have discussed have one common element that is what we tried to 
highlight in this section: the difficulty in accepting a standard model for the whole villa system.685 
 
On a final note on our discussion on the villae, we should consider Marzano’ new interpretation of their 
role: according to her, villas can be also viewed as instigators of economic growth or indicators of the 
presence of pre-existing favorable economic conditions. This argument offers an intriguing alternative 
to the standard negative view on the establishment of villas by suggesting a positive economic connection 
and incentives: 
 
“The successful establishment of villas in a region had an effect 
not simply in respect to surplus agricultural produce that was 
directed to regional or extra-regional consumption. Villas acted 
also as stimuli to the local economy by creating a new demand for 
certain good […] that were regularly needed on an agricultural 
estate.”686 
 
Marzano’s view clashes against Cato’s rule on the fact that, ideally, the estate manager should be a seller 
rather than a buyer, and that all that was needed on the estate should be produced internally, but on this 
she argues: “The idea of villas’ self-sufficiency is largely a myth, and the appearance of villas in a region 
meant that craftsmen were needed as well. […] the establishment of villas put in motion a series of 
                                                 
of Europe, Archaeology and Social Development in the First Millenium A.D. (Roma, 1989), 81: “both the quantity and the 
quality of the agricultural production reached a high point. The huge number of amphorae produced in the area, and their 
diffusion throughout the western Mediterranean, are ample testimony of the market for the wine produced in the area.” 
683 Fentress and Cambi, ‘Villas to Castles’, 82 
684 See Lo Cascio, Crescita e Declino, 38-39; on the ager Veientanus see Anne Kahane, Leslie Murray Threipland and John 
Ward-Perkins, ‘The Ager Veientanus, North and East of Rome’, in PBSR 36 (1968) and Potter, The Changing Landscape, 
124-126 
685 Also see Lo Cascio, Crescita e Declino, 31: “In più è stata messa in discussione di leggere davvero, come si era tentato di 
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686 Annalisa Marzano, ‘Villas as Instigators and Indicators of Economic Growth’, in eds. Erdkamp, P., and Verboven, K., 
Structure and Performance in the Roman Economy, Bruxelles 2015, 207 
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economic transactions that ranged from very small-scale and localized ones, to larger ones.” this view is 
also supported by Lo Cascio.687 
 
The following section will conclude our analysis on the villae by exploring the possibility that the army 
was actually one of the main reasons of the development of the estate system, and their expansion. 
 
* Villae and the army 
 
It is generally believed that the production of the villae was focused towards the growing urban market.688 
While we are not arguing this, it is important to consider the fact that there was another growing market 
that was surely targeted by large landowners, as it required vast and constant supplies: the army. 
 
Our suggestion is that the growth of the Roman army, especially from the third century, was one of the 
main factors and stimuli for the intensification and commercialisation of the Romano-Italian agriculture, 
and thus the development of the villae. 
 
From what we have examined in the various sections dedicated to the recruitment, it is possible to suggest 
that this process began during the third century, when the army outgrew the force described by Polybius 
(four legions). We have suggested that the First Punic War was the incentive that lead to the first major 
increase in the number of legions levied by the Republic. Polybius himself, in II. 24, seems to suggest 
that the four legions army was most likely outdated by the second half of third century. The turning point 
was undoubtedly the Second Punic War and the unprecedented number of troops and military 
requirements. After the war the military situation returned to normality, but we saw that, in comparison 
to the pre-war years, the number of legions was furtherly increased – mainly due to Roman expansion. 
The second century was characterized by a fluctuating number of legions due to the different military 
necessities, although the levels of the Hannibalic War were never reached until the first century. To all 
this we have to add the socii: not only Rome had to feed and supply its own soldiers, but, as Polybius 
reminds us, the allied contingents as well.689 
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688 Geoffrey Kron, ‘Food Production’, in ed. Scheidel, W., The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy (Cambridge, 
2012), 160 
689 Polybius, VI. 39 
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As said by Lo Cascio, from the third century Italy witnessed an intensification and expansion of its 
agriculture, mainly due to the increase of the population, of the urban markets – especially Rome – and 
trade towards the provinces.690 To these elements, I believe we should add the army. Our brief summary 
highlights the constant growth of the Roman army, and with that growth, inevitably came demand – for 
food in particular, but, as we will soon discuss, for all kind of materials. 
 
Due to its growth, the army should be considered as one of the main markets of the Roman world; the 
increasing military activity from the third century was sustainable only by an intensification of 
agriculture by large landowners, possibly the only ones with the resources to meet these demands. The 
Second Punic War definitely intensified this process due to the unparalleled war effort sustained by the 
Republic, and laid the foundation for the expansion of the villa system of the second century. 
 
The connection between military expansion and the development of the villa system is also highlighted 
by Launaro: “It was Roman expansion throughout the Mediterranean […] that triggered and sustained 
this process…”691 but we should consider that it was also the other way around, as villae were involved 
in the supply of the legions. Marzano, although referring to the Imperial period, looks at the production 
of villas: “Once their estates started producing wine, part of the surplus was exported to Rome or to 
military forts along the German limes.”692 I believe that this can be easily applied to the Republican 
period, as she mentions the two main markets for villae’s production: Rome (thus the urban market) and 
the army. 
 
Erdkamp and De Ligt suggest that, by the second century, provinces – mainly Sardinia and Sicily – 
started to become more and more important in the process of supplying the army.693 The role of the 
provinces in this procedure is undeniable, especially if we consider the fact that during most of the second 
century Roman legions were regularly stationed outside of peninsular Italy. This most likely increased 
the costs and the complexity of supplying the troops, thus requiring a more active role by the provinces.694 
The prominence of Italy in this process is undeniable until the Second Punic War (included); the 
                                                 
690 Lo Cascio, Crescita e Declino, 34 
691 Launaro, Peasants and Slaves, 176 
692 Marzano, ‘Villas as Instigators’, 202 
693 Paul Erdkamp, ‘Feeding Rome, or Feeding Mars? A long-term approach to C. Gracchus’ lex frumentaria’, in Ancient 
Society 30 (2000), 53-70; De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 33 
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complaints of the commanders of the legions stationed in Sardinia and Sicily reported by Livy are a clear 
indication that Italy was the source of supplies for the troops.695 Throughout the second century – 
especially its second half –, provinces became more involved in this process mainly in order to simplify 
it and reduce the costs. However, Rome stationed garrisons in the provinces, and these were usually 
composed by one legion (plus socii) that were reinforced only when necessary (as we have showed in 
the recruitment sections). As Erdkamp himself noted, this limited the quantity of supplies received from 
local communities.696 Finally, we have to consider the fact that up until the Late Republic, and in 
particular the Civil Wars era, Rome recruited its soldiers (citizens and allies) in Italy; once new legions 
were formed, they were sent where needed.697 Surely, soldiers received enough supplies for this period 
until they reached their destinations. Once the Republic started to recruit regular troops (not auxiliaries) 
in the provinces, a more meticulous provincial supply system was established.698 
 
Finally, we should discuss the possibility of a connection between villae and mobile markets in the 
process of supplying the army. The case of the traders who followed the Roman army at Numantia 
mentioned by Appian shows that the legions attracted all sorts of businesses, but, at the same time, the 
spontaneous nature of mobile markets (they were attracted by a large army). The supply of the army was 
a process organised by the state, and we have argued that villae were part of it, while mobile markets, 
officially, were not. When present, they were probably more involved with the day-to-day activities of 
the soldiers, and while it is possible that villae provided the goods for the merchants who later showed 
up where the legions were stationed, leading to a commercialization of the system, the connection 
between the two is thin – and the lack of evidence does not help. 
 
To conclude our discussion on the villae and moving to the following section of the chapter, our argument 
is not that the army was partially responsible for the birth of the villa system. As we said, villae have 
always been a part of Roman society, although different in size and overall impact, but started to become 
more prominent between the end of the second century and the beginning of the first century. 
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Nevertheless, the expansion of the army, in particular from the mid-third century, was one of the main 
promoter of their development and the intensification and commercialisation of the agriculture of Roman 
Italy. The Second Punic War, in particular, played a crucial role in this, especially because it also allowed 
the creation of what we might call the industry of war, something that we will analyse later. 
 
The purpose of this section is not trying to completely change the general prospective on the Roman 
villas system, but, as said by Marzano: “…to stimulate us to think of villas outside the rigid paradigm of 
the “villa system”.”699 We have showed that there is enough archaeological evidence to argue against, or 
at least cast doubts, on the standardization of the “villa schiavistica” model. The normally ignored 
positive impact of the villae offers interesting alternatives as well, plus the connection between them and 
the army should be considered. 
 
- Economy final part: population, production 
 
De Ligt, Norwood and Hin suggest that almost all new interpretations of the economic, social, political 
and military history of the Middle and Late Republic are fundamentally connected with the theories and 
discussions on Italy’s population.700 This debate has been polarized into two camps, one with Beloch 
(1886), Brunt (1971), and Scheidel, and the other with Frank and Elio Lo Cascio. 
 
A key element of the low count model is a belief in limited land available and used for cultivation, and 
thus limited productivity.701 On the other side, Lo Cascio, Morley and Kron in particular reject these 
figures and suggest that more land was cultivated and, thus, total productivity was higher.702 On both 
cases, however, it seems that Italy’s agricultural capacities – both amount of land available and 
productivity levels – are used as tools in the demographic debate, as highlighted by Launaro.703 
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Geoffrey Kron points to Varro’s assertion that Italy was immensely productive.704 He also questions the 
assumption that smallholders were unable to compete with large capitalist farms: the potential presence 
of numerous animals provided the farmers with manure, which enabled them to obtain excellent yields 
even on small fields.705 Kron’s argument highlights that Roman smallholders were a vital force in Roman 
agriculture and worked a significant proportion of Italy’s arable land.706 Dyson also notes that faunal 
studies suggest the importance of the production and consumption of meat in the countryside.707 
Polybius, after all, reminds us that pigs, reared in Northern Italy, were exported and consumed in large 
numbers every year both by the domestic and military market.708 
 
The continuity of small farms can be seen in the archaeological record. De Caro’s report on the 
excavations at Boscoreale (Campania), shows the presence of small plots varying between 3 and 8 iugera 
planted with vines, fruit and nut trees, a small irrigated garden, and there is also evidence for the keeping 
of some pigs and chickens.709 Both Evans and Keppie argue that operating mixed agriculture families 
could live off small allotments, while Rathbone simply states that farms between 5 and 12 iugera were 
enough to ensure subsistence.710 De Caro suggests that even small farms were able to achieve a certain 
wealth through wine making, clearly a “cash product” (ancient sources stress that even a single iugerum 
of vineyard could be very productive711), while we should add mixed agriculture, and non-working 
animals (like, for example, pigs or barnyard fowl) as an important part of small farmers’ production and 
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off a subsistence farm by exploiting varied foodstuff rather than relying on grains; Laurence Keppie, Colonisation and Veteran 
Settlement in Italy (London, 1983), 124, n.117 cites the testimony of peasants in the Liri valley – ager Fregellanus – that a 
holding of 3 ha/12 iugera would be sufficient to support a family, with part of the ground devoted to crops, part to vines and 
part to vegetables; Rosenstein, Rome at War, 66-68: a family of five needed between 21 and 24 iugera, but they are cultivating 
wheat alone, and it includes work animals; if the son went away for military service, the land required shrank to 15-19 iugera; 
p.232, quoting an unpublished work by Hopkins, says: “Seven or eight iugera worked by hand would suffice to support a 
family of 3.25 persons…” suggesting that working animals were not convenient for small farmers, as they required more land 
and resources. Rathbone, ‘Poor Peasants and Silent Sherds’, in eds. De Ligt, L. and Northwood, S., People, Land and Politics, 
309 
711 On wine production: Columella, De Re Rustica, III. 3. 10 says that the minimum price for wine was of 300 sesterces every 
culleus (= 20 amphorae = 40 urnae). DRR, III. 3. 2 reminds us that “…the return from vineyards is a very rich one” saying 
that according to Varro, RR, I. 2. 7, each iugerum of vineyard yielded up to 15 cullei (600 urnae) of wine, while Pliny, NH, 
XIV. 5. 52 suggests 7 cullei per iugerum. Columella, DRR, III. 3. 11 says that vineyards which yield less than 3 cullei to the 
iugerum should be rooted out. 
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consumption.712 Even though we seem to be able to suggest that small farms were able to achieve some 
wealth, we should consider, contra Kron, the much more realistic possibility that small holders did not 
compete against large estates for the simple reason that it would have been difficult for them.713 Their 
primary aim, on the contrary, was their own survival through the production of what was enough to 
achieve it. If they were able to produce a surplus they could probably sell locally, or save it for 
themselves. Also, as we have just saw, we should consider the possibility that, as suggested by Marzano, 
the establishment of a villa was actually a positive economic input, instead of creating a negative 
competition. 
 
Kron also argues against Scheidel on the fact that high standards of living in the towns of Roman Italy 
created a market for meat, which made it possible for Roman farmers to set up mixed farms based on 
convertible husbandry and the cultivation of grapes, olives, and industrial crops alongside cereals.714 
Furthermore, we have to consider the fact that different sources highly praise Italy’s agriculture and the 
fertility of the land, saying that it was among the best in the world.715 Although we might argue that they 
were maybe exaggerating, such positive worship would suggest that Italian land and agriculture were, at 
least, at good – if not very good – levels. Overall, this optimistic view of the Italian peasant economy 
leads the author to cast doubt on the reality of the agrarian crisis in the Gracchan period. 
 
These different approaches challenge the traditional Brunt-Hopkins model by suggesting that it might 
have been rather easier for rural populations to survive than had previously been assumed. The survey 
evidence, imperfect though it may, points to continuities of settlement. Nevertheless, the archaeological 
evidence is compatible with either continuity or slight decline in the rural population. It seems less 
obvious that it could reflect major and rapid expansion of population. 
 
                                                 
712 Joan Frayn, Subsistence Farming in Roman Italy (Fontwell, 1979), 57-70 stresses the importance of vegetables – wild and 
cultivated – in peasants’ diet (and production); M. Spurr, Arable Cultivation in Roman Italy c.200 BC – c. AD 100 (London, 
1986), 89 focuses on the cultivation of different types of cereals for both human and animal consumption; Rosenstein, Rome 
at War, 69-70 highlights the importance of mixed agriculture by adding legumes, fruit, vegetables, p.230 suggests that 2 
iugera were usually used for mixed agriculture (garden, vineyard, orchard, etc); Kron, ‘The Much Maligned Peasant’, 80 
suggests that Roman peasants “enjoyed a healthy level of meat and/or fish consumption.”, 104 focuses on mixed 
agriculture/production. 
713 Also see Rosenstein, Rome at War, 15 against competition 
714 Scheidel, ‘Roman Population Size’, 46-49; Kron, ‘Food Production’, 160; also see Geoffrey Kron, ‘Archaeozoological 
Evidence for the Productivity of Roman Livestock Farming’, in Munstersche Beitrage zur Antiken Handelsgeschichte 21 (2) 
(2002), 55-59 
715 See Dionysius, I. 36-37; Pliny, NH, III. 39-41 and XXXVII. 201-203; Varro, RR, I. 2. 3-6 and Virgil, Georgicae, II. 136-
176 
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Witcher explores the importance of the interpretation of survey archaeology in the demographic 
debate.716 He argues that the “low count” implies a relatively high recovery rates for sites that, as a 
consequence, point toward a rural population engaged in a market oriented agriculture – rather than a 
subsistence one – that allowed the import and consumptions of fine wares, and a general reasonable 
wealth. By contrast, the low recovery rates, according to the “high counters”, would point to 
impoverished subsistence peasants with minimal economic contact with urban markets. Rathbone 
suggests that lower rates of site recovery might be attributed to poor peasants living in huts built from 
perishable materials, as hinted at in the literary material.717  
 
Surveys attest a large number of reasonable quality stone houses, attesting the presence of a relatively 
prosperous agricultural population to which we have to add those who are archaeologically invisible.718 
It is difficult to accept that the Italian countryside of the second century emptied of its peasantry; it is 
hard also to see it as crowded by masses of poor peasants. There is, of course, the third possibility with 
Saskia Hin’s “middle count” that the population, sustained by increasing economic possibilities in trade, 
non-agricultural labour in the expanding urban market and in the army, was growing slowly.719 
 
The urban expansion should not be looked exclusively in the same negative way as Toynbee or Morely; 
growing cities were also centres of expenditure, which must have provided economic benefits for the 
urban population. Not all the profits of empire were invested in the acquisition and development of 
agricultural enterprises; much was spent on goods and services and on buildings in towns, most obviously 
in Rome itself.720 The growth of Rome created a demand for labour and supplies (food – which itself 
                                                 
716 Robert Witcher, ‘Regional Field Survey and the Demography of Roman Italy’, in eds. De Ligt, L., and Northwood, S., 
People, Land and Politics, 294-297 
717 The settlement of the ager Veientanus in 390 assigned allotments of 7 iugera to Roman citizens; Livy, XXXIX. 44. 10 
says that allotments at Potentia and Pisaurum (184) were of 6 iugera. In 183, at Modena, they were of 5 iugera, 8 iugera at 
Parma, and 10 iugera at Saturnia (Livy, XXXIX. 55. 7-9); at Graviscae (181) settlers received 5 iugera each (Livy, XL. 29. 
1-2), while 6.5 iugera at Luna (177). See Rathbone, ‘Poor Peasants’, 307-308. Also see Roselaar, Public Land, 183 
718 Robert Witcher, ‘Settlement and Society in Early Imperial Etruria’, in JRS 96 (2006), 97-98; Rathbone, ‘Poor Peasants’, 
306; Launaro, Peasants and Slaves, 45-48; all of these offer a scenario in which the results of survey recoveries suggest that 
it would be hard to imagine this group of poor citizens without increasing the overall number of people in the countryside, 
but, at the same time, they also suggest the presence of a reasonably wealthy peasantry. Also see Kron, ‘The Much Maligned 
Peasants’, 105: “Roman coloni could make a respectable income even from a plot of few iugera.”; Kron, ‘Food Production’, 
169-170 highlights the recovery of large range of high quality ploughs probably purchased from nearby urban markets. 
719 Hin, The Demography of Roman Italy, 344-349 
720 Livy, XXXIX. 3: “…even by that time (187) the large number of foreigners was becoming burdensome for the city.”; 
Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 240 and 246-247; John Patterson, ‘The City of Rome’, in eds. N. Rosenstein, N., 
and Morstein-Marx, R., A Companion to the Roman Republic (Malden, 2006), 351; Hin, The Demography of Roman Italy, 
210-211, 218-221 
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required transportation, harbor, warehouse facilities and marketing –, shelter, clothing, shoes or tools721). 
In addition, the requirements of the wealthy elite needed serving and these might include more luxurious 
goods. The availability of work in the city – also provided by the military requirements, as we will soon 
see – encouraged the migration of Romans and Italians from the countryside to the towns.722 
 
This migration was, according to Gabba (later reinforced by Hopkins), focused on Rome, which was 
benefiting from the income of empire, though we may argue that other Italian cities were probably also 
growing, though not at the same level, and received an in-flow migration from the countryside.723 We 
can look at some examples: other than Rome itself, in Latium we have to consider Ostia (considered an 
important target for migration even by Gabba724), but Fregellae as well – especially during the first part 
of the second century, before its destruction.725 We should also consider the Campanian towns (for 
example, Neapolis, Capua, Cuma or Puteoli726) and the major Northern Italian cities as well – Strabo, 
after all, clearly says that Cisalpine Gaul had a large free population, and the towns were large and 
wealthy.727 Cities like Placentia, Cremona, Bononia, Parma, Mutina, Aquileia and Luna not only were 
much larger than simple agro-towns, but were also important communication and trade centres.728 
 
On a final note, Lo Cascio looks at the economic effects of the urban expansion in Roman Italy: 
 
“Quanto alle altre città dell’Italia, è probabile che la maggior parte 
di esse si approvvigionasse di grano nelle zone più prossime. […] 
Quel che è incontrovertibile è che la sempre più spinta 
urbanizzazione, legata al complessivo incremento della 
popolazione anche per effetto dell’importazione di schiavi, deve 
avere rappresentato un potente incentivo all’ampliamento delle 
                                                 
721 See Kron, ‘Food Production’, 161 on the well-known Monte Testaccio site, a dump of a huge quantity of amphorae that 
shows the scale of the distribution and consumption of oil in Rome. 
722 Rosenstein, Rome at War, 145; De Ligt, Peasants, Citizens and Soldiers, 163; also see William Broadhead, ‘Rome’s 
Migration Policy and the so-called ius migrandi’, in Cahiers Glotz 12 (2001), 81-83 and 89 against the ius migrandi. 
723 Gabba, ‘Italia Romana’, 102; Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 68-69; Kron, ‘Food Production’, 161 
724 Gabba, ‘Italia Romana’, 106 
725 Fregellae was located on important communication lines between Latium and Samnium, and for this reason was a very 
important market center, thus it is highly plausible that attracted large number of immigrants from the surrounding areas. 
Livy, XLI. 8 reports the complaints of the Samnites and Paeligni regarding 4,000 of their families who moved to Fregellae. 
See also Strabo, V. 3. 10 on the passed importance of Fregellae. 
726 Morel, Early Rome and Italy, 505 on Puteoli: “…it became Rome’s main sea harbor, retaining this position until the 
expansion of Ostia in the first century AD.” 
727 Strabo, V. I. 12 
728 Luuk De Ligt, ‘The Population of Cisalpine Gaul in the Time of Augustus’, in eds. De Ligt, L., and Northwood, S., People, 
Land and Politics, 156: “We also know that Placentia and Cremona each received 6,000 male colonists, a figure which 
increases to c. 21,000 if women and children are included.” 
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aree coltivate, quanto all’intensificazione e alla razionalizzazione 
delle colture.”729 
 
Growing cities needed wheat and all other varieties of supplies in order to sustain their growth, and, as a 
consequence, rural areas were expanded and production intensified, resulting, plausibly, in a better 
balance between cities and rural inlands – also in terms of migration – than compared to Rome. It seems 
more likely that settlement patterns were developing in different ways in different regions and that there 
was overall a continuous presence of rural smallholders over varying levels of prosperity within the 
Italian landscape.730 If there was no crisis in the rural economy of Roman Italy, we must also reassess 
the impact of military service on settlement patterns and economics. 
 
* The army and economy of the second century 
 
The impact of the army to the economy has also been reassessed in recent years. Rosenstein in particular 
has argued that military service (in terms of levels of recruitment) did not unsettle the traditional peasant 
economy. Both he and Erdkamp have argued that the rural economy of Republican Italy was likely to 
have experienced high levels of structural underemployment. Service in the army could be seen as a 
means of employing that labour and for that labour to be rewarded.731 Military service might have been 
actually beneficial in terms of economic effects. Also, as Harris, and Philip Kay more recently, have 
demonstrated, service in the army was potentially very remunerative because of possibilities of the 
income extra to the stipendium, like donatives or booty.732 Also, the economic impact of the army, was 
not limited to those who were actually serving in the legions, but was much more widespread. 
 
Direct impacts focused on those who were in military service and in receipt of regular payments, 
donatives, booty, and sometimes land. Of course, the risks of service in the legions are also obvious: first 
and foremost, the possibility of being killed or injured. Also, the chance that the soldiers’ families might 
experience economic difficulties during their absence.733 
                                                 
729 Lo Cascio, Crescita e Declino, 52 
730 Witcher, ‘Settlement and Society’, 122; Kron, ‘Food Production’, 161: “Rome was the wealthiest and most important 
urban market in the pre-industrial world, and the demand it created for agricultural produce spawned a dense network of villas 
and horti packing Rome’s suburbium. But Rome was hardly the only megalopolis of the empire, and would have represented 
only a modest proportion of the overall market for agricultural produce.” 
731 Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, 269 and Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 113 
732 Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution, 287-288 and 21-42; William Harris, War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-
70 BC (Oxford, 1979), 93-104 
733 See Valerius Maximus, IV. 4. 6 on the negative effects of service during Regulus’ campaign. 
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Indirect impact is not much discussed; the army was integrated into the Roman economic system. The 
legions required a constant supply of food, and all sorts of military and non-military equipment. All of 
this, starting from the production until the distribution, required labour. In the discussion that followed 
the Second Punic War chapter, we have highlighted the importance of military industry during a major 
conflict as a source of employment, and the movement of resources and cash that it instigated. At the 
same time, we have argued that Rome started a great intensification of its agricultural production in 
Central Italy during the war in order to give food to the large number of legions distributed over the 
Mediterranean, a process that is also connected with the development of the villae system. 
 
By the second century, most of the legions were stationed and served outside of peninsular Italy. This 
made supply more complex and expensive. Roman troops were directly supplied by Italian production 
up until the Second Punic War, but with the deployment of the army overseas during the second century, 
the provinces received the task of sustaining the legions stationed on their territories.734 Lo Cascio 
suggests that the presence of Roman garrisons was a strong incentive for local production, and triggered 
long-range trade, especially during the wars in the East.735 During these conflicts, allied states – such as 
Carthage, Numidia or Pergamum – were involved in the supply of the Roman army.736  
 
Nevertheless, Italy was never excluded from its role of primary supplier of the army.737 By looking at 
Tacitus, we might suspect that, progressively, things changed and that Italy gradually lost this role, but 
by the second century its key position was unquestionable.738 The only difference was that now it was 
not the only supplier, and probably, we might add, it couldn’t be the only one anymore. 
 
                                                 
734 On the shipments of corn from Etruria during the Second Punic War see Livy, XXV. 15; XXV. 20; XXV. 22; XXVII. 3. 
See Alan Bowman, The Vindolanda Writing Tablets, (London, 1994), 33-34 illustrates the importance of supplies of food, 
military and non-military equipment. 
735 Hilary and John Travis, Roman Body Armour (Stroud, 2011), 132 suggest that Caesar, during his campaign in Gaul, 
employed allied Gallic craftsmen in order to improve the quality of his soldiers’ equipment. Elio Lo Cascio, 
‘L’Approvvigionamento dell’Esercito Romano: Mercato Livero o “Commercio Amministrato”?’, in eds. Lo Cascio, E., and 
De Blois, L., The Impact of the Roman Army, 198 
736 On shipment of African supplies during the Second Macedonian War, see Livy, XXXI. 11; XXXI. 19; XXXII. 27. 
Regarding the allied contributions from Carthage and Numidia during the Syrian War see Livy, XXXVI. 3 and XXXVI. 4, 
while see Polybius, XXI. 20 and Livy, XXXVII. 37; XXXVII. 53 on the supplies from Pergamum. On the African shipment 
during the Third Macedonian War, see Livy, XLIII. 6 
737 Morley, Metropolis and Hinterland, 71 says that Campanian wine amphorae have been found on the northern frontiers of 
the empire. 
738 Tacitus, Annales, XII. 43: “But, heavens! Italy once transported her legions’ provisions into distant provinces.” 
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The Second Punic War showed that Italy was able to sustain large armies – much larger than those in 
service during the entire second century –, but the growing distances and complexity of the whole process 
caused by the expansion of the Republic made the participation of the provinces and of the allied states 
necessary. After all, we have to consider the increasing demand of the internal market: cities, Rome in 
particular, but, as we mentioned, others as well, were growing; the rural population as well, as we argued, 
was not declining. So, it is possible to remark that the frequent warfare of the second century was actually 
positive for Italy itself. Due to the fact that the legions operated or were stationed in the provinces or in 
bordering territories, from the end of the Second Punic War, peninsular Italy knew a long period of peace 
until the break of the Social War.  
 
While still essential for the supply of the legions, during the second century Italy was under less military 
pressure, and this allowed a redirection of part of its resources toward the internal market. This period of 
peace allowed the Italian population to save or invest, as suggested by Dyson: 
 
‘Certainly the Roman countryside was not one of total peace, as 
the literary evidence for bandits and the archaeological evidence 
for violent destruction make clear. However, there was 
historically a relatively high level of peace, and that allowed the 
country-dwellers to go about their business, investing, saving 
and spending in a way that would not be possible in less secure 
times’.739 
 
In the following section of this chapter we will investigate the strategies adopted by the Roman citizens 
(and probably by the Italians as well) in order to find a balance between their everyday life and military 
service. 
 
* Military service: strategies and finding balance 
 
A key question that we have been asking throughout the thesis is whether military service was 
problematic for Roman citizens. We need to understand whether the constant absorption of men from the 
countryside by the army progressively weakened the small farming sector. The next part of the chapter 
will explore various strategies employed by the families to counterbalance military service, and showing 
                                                 
739 Dyson, The Roman Countryside, 105 
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that they were not necessarily dependent on the labour of a single adult male. The key possible strategies 
were: 
 
i) Replacing those required for military service with alternative sources of free labour from the extended 
family or wage labour. 
 
ii) Supplementing household labour requirements with slave labour: it is often assumed that ownership 
of slaves was concentrated among the aristocracy.740 This model has been recently challenged by 
Rosenstein and De Ligt who argue that the spread of slave ownership was probably wider than previously 
believed.741 We should consider the possibility that the constant inflow of slaves – especially during the 
second century – made slave owning possible for a moderately wealthy peasantry class. In such 
circumstances, slavery may have had a positive effect on the ‘middling-small’ class of farmers by 
providing them with reliable and flexible additional labour inputs and, of course, by replacing the labour 
of those temporarily absent because of military service.742 
 
We might suggest that citizens of the third class (whose property requirement, according to Livy, was at 
least 50,000 asses) were wealthy enough to be slave owners. It is plausible to include in this middling 
group members of the fourth class as well – who owned property worth between 25,000 and 50,000 
asses.743 The third and fourth classes, were likely an important part of manpower available for the 
military. 
 
We should also consider the possibility that even members of the fifth class were slave owners. Even if 
some in this group were very poor, and constantly struggled for survival, their property requirement 
during the first half of the second century ranged from a minimum of 4,000 asses to a maximum of 
25,000 asses. Further suggestion of the spread of slave-ownership is the Lex Fufia Caninia; not only it 
                                                 
740 See Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 30 
741 Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 115 and Rome at War, 163; also see Luuk De Ligt, ‘The Economy: Agrarian 
Change during the Second Century’, in eds. Rosenstein, N., and Mostein-Marx, R., A Companion to the Roman Republic 
(Malden, 2006), 600-601 
742 Ulrike Roth, Thinking Tools. Agricultural Slavery between evidence and models (London, 2007), 113 highlights the role 
of female slaves in the manufacture of wool and textiles. 
743 On the third and fourth classes census requirements see Livy, I. 43; regarding the third class being considered slave owners, 
see Livy, XXIV. 11 and XXVI. 35 
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highlights the scale of ownership, but also, I believe, how spread it was among citizens of all classes, 
since it covers the freedom by will from one slave to more than five hundred slaves.744 
 
Rathbone and De Ligt suggest that 4,000 asses – the minimum property requirement for service in the 
legions during the first half of the second century – was the value of 5 iugera – the minimum amount of 
land received by Roman colonists during the second century.745 Rathbone also adds the very concrete 
possibility that property values were very variable: “…Romans presumably had some notional scale of 
landholding in mind which corresponded to the cash figures, and minima of 100, 75, 50 and 25 iugera 
for the first four classes seem plausible to me, which would imply a notional 4 iugera for the fifth 
classis.”746 Hence, we can suggest that land was valued at 1,000 asses per iugerum. In this way we can 
see that fifth class citizens had properties valued between 4,000 and 25,000 asses (so between 4 and 25 
iugera), and we can thus categorize them as small farmers. Of course, this is the easiest way to look at 
this as not only, as mentioned by Rathbone, property values were flexible, but we also have to consider 
the difference in the value of land. As we would expect, it is something that we cannot possibly quantify, 
but it is not inconceivable to believe that, for example, land in the suburbium of Rome or in Campania 
was more valuable than land in some remote part of Italy or in the provinces. For this reason, we should 
consider that when the sources mention the extension of plots of land, they are just telling us a part of 
what we should know; maybe 1,000 asses per iugerm was a sort of standard rate, but we might consider 
higher or lower prices depending on the location of the land. 
 
Small farmers who owned at least 20 iugera might have the resources to buy a single slave, and that 
would be enough to supplement and, if necessary, replace the labour of the smallholder.747 It seems 
probable that a person in Roman Italy was able to manage between 7 and 10 iugera.748 Since, as Rathbone 
suggests, farms between 5 and 12 iugera were sufficient for subsistence, those modest size did not require 
high levels of manpower, as they could have been covered by one or two labourers (free or not). Yet, 
labour requirements for a small farm are flexible and they depended on the intensity and type of 
production. For example, vineyards require a higher number of workers during specific parts of the year, 
                                                 
744 See Gaius, Institutiones, I. 43 
745 Rathbone, ‘Assidui and Prima Classis’, 145; De Ligt, ‘Roman Manpower Resources’, 13 
746 Rathbone, ‘Poor Peasants’, 308 
747 We have to consider that the description of the lex Fufia Caninia, which regulated the number of slaves a slave owner was 
allowed to set free it is, mentioned the case of someone who owned also one slave (see Gaius, Institutiones, I. 43) 
748 Pliny, NH, XVII. 215: “In Italy a gang of ten farmhands is enough for a hundred iugera of vineyard”; De Ligt, ‘Agrarian 
Change’, 600: “…it took one slave to work 7 iugera” 
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while mixed farming involves more constant labour. A small farm of 7 iugera could employ additional 
wage labour to meet particular demands or permanent labour (slave or free) to intensify production (see 
the case of Regulus’ farm, below), but could have been worked by a single farmer if required. 
 
Scheidel argues that the number of slaves was increasing already during the third century though both 
Jongman and De Ligt opt for low estimates for the number of slaves employed.749 The gradual 
abandonment of the ‘villa schiavista’ model further suppresses estimates of the demand for slaves; it 
seems likely that during the second century a significant element of the slave population would been 
absorbed in the towns. Although small farms could only have absorbed relatively small number of slaves 
each, cumulatively, this sector might have been a significant user of slave labour and such increases in 
labour may have allowed increases in productivity. Rosenstein warns us that although ‘slaves may often 
have substituted for a master when he went off to war, … it is well to remember that unfree laborers 
require supervision’.750 Yet there was probably a collective interest among Roman agriculturalists in 
disciplining slaves and supervision might have been carried out by the women of the family more easily 
than they could have worked the fields. Large landowners probably had personnel to watch their 
slaves.751 
 
The survey evidence indicates a moderately prosperous countryside, in which, we might expect, 
relatively small farms were generating surpluses sufficient to allow the purchase of slaves. Furthermore, 
we might reasonably expect that small farmers, especially those close to major urban centres would have 
had easy access to slave markets and that returning soldiers would have been able to either invest their 
stipendia or any supplementary rewards in slaves or to have laid their hands on slaves at minimal cost 
following the successful completion of a campaign. Indeed, it might be that soldiers were in a privileged 
position with regard to purchasing slaves. Consequently, it seems likely that slave ownership would 
spread into those classes which supplied the army with its manpower.752 
                                                 
749 Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 9, 55, 102 suggests that there were about 2 million slaves in Italy by the end of the first 
century. Walter Scheidel, ‘The Roman Slave Supply’, in eds. Bradley, K., and Cartledge, P., The Cambridge World History 
of Slavery vol. I (Cambridge, 2011), 294-295 shows the scale of wartime enslavement. Also see Willem Jongman, ‘Beneficial 
Symbols. Alimenta and the Infantilization of the Roman Citizen’, in eds. Jongman, W. and Kleijwegt, M., After the Past, 
Essays in Ancient History in Honour of H. W. Pleket (Leiden/Boston, 2002), 62-70; De Ligt, ‘Agrarian Change’, 600 
750 Rosenstein, Rome at War, 58 
751 Cato, de Agricultura, IV says that owners should control their slaves, but it might suggest a sort of control among neighbors. 
752 A possible case of this can be the plundering of Epirus in 167, as described by Livy, XLV. 34: “…the Senate had granted 
Paullus’ troops the booty from the cities of Epirus…” so, it is possible that the soldiers received some of the 150,000 war 
prisoners mentioned by Livy. 
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We have very little evidence for the price of slaves, which is likely to have varied considerably anyhow 
since large numbers of slaves would have come into the market in short periods following the completion 
of successful campaigns. The total number of slaves is also difficult to estimate. For the third century, 
Scheidel collects figures for the scale of wartime enslavement – although some of the reports regarding 
the numbers of slaves may well be exaggerated. Between 58,000 and 77,000 people were supposedly 
enslaved in the Third Samnite War (297-293). For the Pyrrhic War (280-272) we know of the 30,000 
Tarantines enslaved after the fall of the city although, overall, the total number was probably higher. The 
First Punic War (264-241) generated between 100,000 and 130,000 slaves, and finally, 32,000 were 
captured during the Gallic War (225-222). We can see that between 220,000 and 269,000 people were 
enslaved as a consequence of Roman warfare from the beginning of the third century to the eve of the 
Second Punic War – when, according to the census figures, in 219 the number of registered Roman 
citizens was of 270,000. It is not necessarily the case that all these slaves ended up in Italy: some may 
have been sold on the Mediterranean slave markets, but if Rome’s slave population was 200,000 on the 
eve of the second Punic War, it was still a significant contribution to Italian manpower and it is difficult 
to believe that the senatorial aristocracy absorbed even half that number.753 
 
For the second century, Scheidel’s list is less precise, but this does not change the fact that the inflow of 
slaves caused by the military action remained extremely high.754 During the various campaigns of the 
first half of the second century (between 201 and 168) a total of 153,000 slaves were seized by the Roman 
army. The sack of Epirus of 167 alone generated 150,000 more slaves, while Carthaginian prisoners 
taken during the final phases of the Third Punic War were at least 60,000.755 Finally, when both the 
German tribes of the Cimbri and Teutones were destroyed (102-101), 150,000 of them were captured.756 
These figures suggest that 513,000 people were enslaved by the Roman army during the second century, 
and yet this is only but a part of a larger total. It is clear, as we can see, that a major part is missing from 
our sources: the number of slaves captured during the campaigns of the second half of the second century 
(during the Spanish campaigns between 155 and 133, in Greece, Illyria, Transalpine Gaul, and later in 
                                                 
753 Walter Scheidel, ‘Slavery’, in ed. Scheidel, W., The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Economy (Cambridge, 2012), 
103: “…no need to assume that all war captives were employed by Romans […] slaves may have been sold to Greek or Punic 
traders.” 
754 Scheidel, ‘The Roman Slave Supply’, 294-296 
755 On the pillage of Epirus see also Plutarch, Aemilius Paulus, 29; Appian, VIII. 18. 126 says that 10,000 people were captured 
at Nepheris, while VIII. 19. 130 on the 50,000 people who surrendered at Byrsa. 
756 On the Teutones and Cimbri captured respectively at Aquae Sextiae and Vercellae, see Livy, Per. 68 
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Numidia). These numbers, although they seem very high, should not fool us; as remarked by Scheidel: 
“…imports did not only contribute to net increase but also served to maintain the existing servile 
population.”757 
 
From the third century, we have the well-known and no doubt exceptional case of Atilius Regulus’ farm. 
According to Valerius Maximus, he owned 7 iugera of land in Pupinia, but when on campaign in Africa 
(256-255), the vilicus of his farm died, and a hired laborer stole the farm equipment and escaped, putting 
his wife and children in danger.758 Supposedly, and in spite of his social and political connections, his 
family were reduced to passive starvation before the senate intervened.759 While Regulus was away, his 
farm was managed by two men, perhaps suggesting that this was the necessary labour required for such 
a small farm, one of whom, the vilicus, is likely to have been a slave. The wage labourer, who stole the 
farm equipment, may have been used to replace the labour of Regulus himself. Although this hardly be 
taken as reliable evidence for the staffing of small farmsteads, we might read the anecdote as assuming 
that such farms would have some servile labour. 
 
Somewhere below this economic level, slave ownership would have become impossible. In the second 
half of the second century, the census requirement for service in the legions was furtherly reduced to 
1,500 asses, possibly the nominal value of 2 iugera of land.760 These poorer citizens did not have the 
means to purchase or maintain a slave, so, during periods of absence due to military service, they had to 
fall back on the labour of family members, including women and minors, though the labour necessary to 
farm such tiny plots would also have been comparatively little.761 
 
It seems unlikely that military service placed significant strain on small farms during the third and second 
centuries. Farmers had a range of possible strategies at their disposal which would allow them to manage 
the labour shortages caused by military service. 
 
                                                 
757 Walter Scheidel, ‘Roman Slavery and Manumission’, 110 
758 Valerius Maximus, IV. 4. 6; the term vilicus can be translated as factor, but since it is clear that he was hired by the family, 
also as the administrator/supervisor. Regarding the other hired laborer, Valerius says: “occasionemque nancum mercennarium 
amoto”. 
759 Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 114 
760 Rosenstein, Rome at War, 57 
761 Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 115 
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iii) Military service: in his Conquerors and Slaves, Hopkins offers a very negative view on military 
service during the second century.762 He presents service in the army as a form of emigration that allowed 
rich owners to expand their villae. Yet, as we will suggest on this chapter, service in the legions was 
more likely to have been advantageous for small farmers and poorer citizens. Additionally, the army also 
had an economic impact indirectly through its demands for resources, food and equipment. 
 
- Direct contributions 
 
Military service provided an alternative occupation for many citizens and, as a consequence, removed 
surplus labour from the countryside. Erdkamp notes that: 
 
“The levels of mobilization that became structural in the second 
century BC did not pose a threat to the survival of the 
smallholder. The resources of the empire provided the means to 
sustain a large and permanent military force, which constituted 
a permanent alternative means of subsistence for large numbers 
among the population of Italy. Moreover, while in times of 
relative peace the agricultural labour of these men would provide 
their subsistence, in times of increased military effort the 
withdrawal of their labour would not cause a proportionate 
decline in production.”763 
 
After the reduction of census requirement from 4,000 to 1,500 asses, military service was open to poorer 
citizens whose families owned fields that were too small to sustain or employ all of them, so the army 
became an alternative to underemployment. As Rosenstein puts it, ‘conscripting an adult son did not 
deprive a family of an essential worker, but rather removed surplus labor’.764 
 
The most basic benefit offered by the army was the stipendium. This was likely to have been a lure for 
poorer citizens, perhaps encouraging the tendency to move from a conscript army to a volunteer army 
during the second century. In his description of Spurius Ligustinus’ career, Livy shows that he rotated 
relatively short periods of military service with years of civilian life.765 This pattern would have allowed 
                                                 
762 Hopkins, Conquerors and Slaves, 28-37 
763 Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, 269 
764 Rosenstein, Rome and the Mediterranean, 113 
765 See Livy, XLII. 34: Ligustinus first joined the army for four years (200-197) before his legion was disbanded. Then, after 
two years (197-195), he volunteered for a second period of service under Cato in Spain (195-194) before another pause of 
three years (194-192). He rejoined the army to fight against Antiochus, but returned to Italy when the Syrians were driven out 
of Greece – so he did not take part to the full campaign – (192-191). After that he alternated period of pause from service with 
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citizens to spend time accumulating capital with the legions and also to have years on the farm and with 
the family, tending to the needs of both. The mixing of military and agriculturalist careers may have 
worked to the benefit of the family, provided, of course, the soldier was successful in not getting himself 
killed. 
 
Conflicts such as the Third Macedonian War and the Third Punic War encouraged volunteers to join the 
legions, and the case of Ligustinus suggests conflict between veterans and younger soldiers over access 
to the benefits of service.766 The war against Perseus also emphasizes the role of soldiers who received 
promotions during the second century. Ligustinus, by saying that he was promoted as ‘centurion of the 
tenth company of hastati’ by the end of his first period of service, gives a clear indication of a well-
defined hierarchy in the Republican legions.767 If we look at his description of the army, Polybius 
explains the basic military chain of command of the Roman infantry: hastati, principes and triarii were 
divided into ten maniples, and each of them were under the command of two centurions and two optiones 
(junior officers).768 The first centurion of the first company of triarii was the most important, the second 
of the tenth company of hastati was the least important. We don’t know if there was a difference in 
payment between the different centurions or if they were considered all the same, but they were paid 
more than the optiones, who were paid more than the soldiers.769 Because their stipendia were higher 
compared to regular soldiers, officers (and centurions in particular) had stronger motivations to rejoin 
the army for further campaigns, since even their basic pay was a decent income. Additional benefits, as 
                                                 
two short yearly campaigns. Then he went to Spain for a longer period of service under Fulvius Flaccus and Tiberius S. 
Gracchus (182-178). 
766 Livy, XLII. 34 shows that Ligustinus, at the end of his first service, was promoted: “In my third year, because of my 
bravery, Titus Quinctius Flaminius raised me to the rank of centurion of the tenth company of hastati.” Ligustinus was 50 
when he spoke to the people during the call to arms against Macedonia in 171, and said that he first joined the army at the 
beginning of the Second Macedonian War (200), so when he was 21, thus he was 24 when he was promoted for the first time. 
After the end of the war he continued his career in the army, but as an officer (so with an higher pay), and was promoted on 
other occasions. 
767 Livy, XLII. 34: “…tertio anno virtutis causa mihi T. Quinctius Flaminius decimum ordinem hastatum assignavit.” 
768 Polybius, VI. 24: the first centurions were known as centuriones priores, while the seconds as posteriores. The optio were 
an essential part of the legions as they relieved the centurions of many administrative duties. David J. Breeze and Brian 
Dobson, Roman Officers and Frontiers (Mavors, Stuttgart, 1993), 36 show that being an optio was a fundamental part in a 
military career even in the Imperial army. It is possible that Ligustinus, before becoming centurion of the tenth company of 
hastati, was promoted as optio (after all he served for three years before he became a minor centurion), but maybe it was not 
worth mentioning it during his speech as it was a basic step for a military career. 
769 According to Polybius, VI. 39 centurions received twice as much as normal soldiers (so 216 denarii per year). Breeze and 
Dobson, Roman Officers and Frontiers, 62-63 say that in the Imperial army junior officers received a pay and a half 
(sesquiplicarius). We might consider that during the Republic there was a similar subdivision of payment, so that optiones 
received 162 denarii per year. 
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we will shortly see, made further service more appealing and we might see the case of Ligustinus as an 
early example of semi-professional military career.770 
 
The majority of a legion’s personnel was made up of regular soldiers, and their stipendium was set at a 
low level, probably little above subsistence. The financial benefits of military service were probably 
more in terms of donatives, booty and the possibility of receiving land.771 As Livy notes at the beginning 
of the Third Macedonian War, ‘large numbers volunteered since they saw that those who had served in 
the earlier Macedonian war and against Antiochus in Asia had become wealthy men’.772 The Third 
Macedonian War met these expectations. At the end of the war (167) the soldiers were rewarded with 
100 extra denarii for each infantrymen, 200 denarii for centurions and 300 for cavalrymen.773 
Furthermore, we have to add in the booty from Epirus: according to Livy, each infantrymen received 200 
denarii, while the cavalrymen got 400 – and we don’t know how much was given to the centurions.774 
There may also have been benefits to the soldiers from the slaves taken: a total of 150,000 prisoners were 
supposedly taken from Epirus and at Pydna alone 11,000 Macedonian soldiers were captured.775 The 
soldiers recruited in 169 remained in service until the end of the war (167).776  Soldiers managed to make 
a considerable amount of money in just three years of campaign: an infantrymen earned in total 624 
denarii (324 for three years of service + 200 in Epirus + 100 as donative), a centurion probably a total of 
1,248 denarii (648 for three years of service + probably 400 in Epirus + 200 as donative), and finally a 
cavalryman a plausible total of 2,196 denarii (1,296 for three years of service + probably 600 in Epirus 
+ 300 as donative). Of course, not all military campaigns were as rewarding as this one, but the case of 
167 shows the potential wealth offered by service in the army. Furthermore, we can emphasize once 
again the advantages offered to the officers: not only was their pay was higher, but they also received 
more in terms of donatives, and land – as we will see in the colonization section. 
 
                                                 
770 On the pay of centurions, see Polybius, VI. 39 
771 Also see Edward Bispham, From Asculum to Actium (Oxford, 2007), 137 on the distribution of donatives between Romans 
and allies. 
772 Livy, XLII. 32 
773 Livy, XLV. 40 
774 Livy, XLV. 34: usually centurions received double than infantrymen (as their pay was double), and cavalrymen three times 
more than infantrymen; so, it is possible that, if soldiers received 200 denarii, centurions received 400 denarii and cavalrymen 
600 denarii. 
775 On the number of prisoners at Pydna see Livy, XLIV. 42 and Plutarch, Aemilius Paullus, 22 
776 Livy, XLIII. 12, he also tells us that the legions previously in service there were disbanded. 
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Philip Kay suggests that booty collected during the period 200-157 could have been about 18,250 talents 
(109,500,000 denarii).777 This is a huge sum, especially since it excludes various form of wealth that 
they might have gathered (slaves in particular).778 Also, Kay’s figures don’t include the plundering of 
Carthage in 146 after the Third Punic War, and the parallel looting of Corinth, both actions which must 
have transferred very considerable sums to Italy.779 Some part of the booty would have been deposited 
in the temple of Saturn to fund future public expenditures (temples, roads, aqueducts, military pay, etc). 
Rome probably maintained large capital reserves.780 Nevertheless, the inflow of capital likely boosted 
the monetization of Roman Italy with consequent economic benefits.781 An example of public usage of 
booty is offered by Livy: in 187, Gnaeus Manlius distributed part of the booty from Galatia was used to 
reimburse what citizens had paid in previous tributa.782 
 
We can try quantifying the amount of cash that was moved because of the army: in the first decades of 
the second century (up until the late 180s), we can calculate the pay bill for a standard Polybian legion 
(4,080 legionnaires, 60 centurions, and 60 optiones, and 300 cavalrymen) at 560,520 denarii per year.783 
The annual cost for eight legions would increase to 4,743,200 denarii. After 182, however, as we have 
argued in the previous chapter, the number of Roman citizens in service in the legions was increased, 
thus changing as well their economic impact in terms of costs.  
 
In the second part of the second century, there was a shifting level of military activity; in order to have a 
clearer picture of Rome’s military costs, we can look at two different periods of the second century on 
two tables. On both cases we are using legions of 5,500 Roman citizens each, and we are looking at 
soldiers and cavalry only (we are excluding both centurions and optiones because we are not sure how 
                                                 
777 Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution, 30 
778 Regarding booty, Polybius, VI. 33 reminds us that Roman soldiers took an oath to turn over plunder to the tribunes, just 
like Polybius, X. 12.2-17.5 describes the plundering of cities. 
779 On the army deployed by Rome against Carthage in 149 see (p. of this dissertation). Polybius, XVIII. 35 states that it was 
the richest city in the world, so it is clear that citizens were well eager to put their hands on Carthage’s wealth. On Corinth 
see Polybius, XXXIX. 2 and Strabo, VIII. 6. 28 
780 Pliny, NH, XXXIII. XVII. 56: “Gaius Julius Caesar, on first entering Rome during the civil war that bears his name, drew 
from the treasury 15,000 gold ingots, 30,000 silver ingots, and 30,000,000 sesterces in coin…” 
781 William Harris, War and Imperialism, 70-72 
782 Livy, XXXIX. 7 
783 Regular soldiers were paid 3 asses per day, so 1,080 asses per year (4,406,400 asses for 4,080 soldiers), centurions received 
6 asses per day, so 2,160 asses per year (129,600 asses for 60 centurions), while cavalrymen 9 asses per day, thus 3,240 asses 
per year (972,000 asses for 300 cavalrymen). Regarding the optiones, we don’t know how much their payment was; in the 
chapter we have suggested that they received more than the soldiers, but less than the centurions, so one pay and a half for 
4.5 asses per day (97,200 asses for 60 optiones). 
211 
 
many of them were in a legion after its effectives were increased in the 180s). The first one shows the 
years between 149 and 146, marked by the highest number of legions in service since the Second Punic 
War: 
 
 
YEAR LEGIONS 
CITIZENS IN 
SERVICE 
STIPENDIA 
INFANTRYMEN 
STIPENDIA 
CAVALRYMEN 
TOTAL 
COST 
149 12 66,000 64,800,000 asses 19,440,000 asses 84,240,000 
asses 
148 15 82,500 81,000,000 asses 24,300,000 asses 105,300,000 
asses 
147 14 77,000 75,600,000 asses 22,680,000 asses 98,280,000 
asses 
146 16 88,000 86,400,000 asses 25,920,000 asses 112,320,000 
asses 
 
The second table, on the other hand, it is focused on the period between 130 and 125 that, contrary to the 
previous one, showed a moderate military activity: 
 
YEAR LEGIONS 
CITIZENS IN 
SERVICE 
STIPENDIA 
INFANTRYMEN 
STIPENDIA 
CAVALRYMEN 
TOTAL 
COST 
130 4 22,000 21,600,000 6,480,000 28,080,000 
129 5 27,500 27,000,000 8,100,000 35,100,000 
128 4 22,000 21,600,000 6,480,000 28,080,000 
127 4 22,000 21,600,000 6,480,000 28,080,000 
126 6 33,000 32,400,000 9,720,000 42,120,000 
125 7 38,500 37,800,000 11,340,000 49,140,000 
 
Even though we don’t have the data regarding the officers, we can already have a good idea of the yearly 
expense required to pay for the army, but, at the same time, the massive amount of cash that was needed 
and, as a result, circulated in the Roman economy because of the army. 
 
Part of the money spent on the soldiers’ stipendia actually returned in the form of deductions imposed to 
the soldiers for food, clothes and equipment.784 Allied troops received their food free of charges, but 
Polybius doesn’t mention anything regarding clothing and arms; perhaps they were issued by their 
communities, as they were responsible to recruit and pay the contingents of socii, and thus, probably to 
equip them. 
                                                 
784 Polybius, VI. 39 
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William Harris, in his influential War and Imperialism in Republican Rome, emphasizes the importance 
of booty: 
 
‘It would be a mistake to regard plunder as the only inspiration 
of soldiers. […]. Equally, however, it would be a mistake, an 
anachronism, to suppose that in a relatively primitive society the 
desire for plunder could not be a most important influence in 
driving ordinary citizens to war. This was probably the case in 
the first half of the second century, and there is evidence that it 
remained true in the Marian and post-Marian army’.785 
 
This financial attractions of military service were probably greater the poorer the potential soldiers were. 
When the census requirement for service was lowered, and later abolished, it is likely that it brought into 
the recruitment pool a significant number of eager, but poor, volunteers. Harris also argues that: 
 
‘…many Roman citizens regarded many of Rome’s wars 
primarily as economic ventures. […]. Though evidence is slight, 
it seems likely that some areas which were known, or believed, 
to be sources of extraordinary wealth – the mining districts of 
Spain or the kingdom of Pergamum – were regarded by ordinary 
Romans as especially worth fighting for’.786 
 
It is hard to believe that the common Roman soldier was eager to fight for the Spanish mines or for 
Pergamum, in which others had larger interests (the state itself, traders, etc), but soldiers benefited from 
continuous warfare, and knew when they could benefit most from a military campaign. Thus the 
Macedonian and Carthaginian campaigns saw a rush of volunteers, while the Spanish wars, at least until 
Scipio Aemelianus offered the prospect of a successful conclusion, were rather less popular.787 
 
- Indirect contributions 
 
                                                 
785 Harris, War and Imperialism, 103 
786 Harris, War and Imperialism, 101 
787 Already mentioned Livy, XLII. 32 on the willingness of recruits to join the Macedonian legions, see Appian, XI. 75 
regarding the Third Punic War. 
213 
 
The army also had an important influence on Rome’s economy indirectly. The legions needed to be 
supplied with food, military and non-military equipment (clothing, pottery, etc) and this required labour, 
and capital.788 
 
The first, and most important, form of supply for every army in history is, of course, food. Rome supplied 
food to its legions from Italy, the provinces and allied states. Polybius tells us that Roman soldiers 
received rations from the state, the cost of which was deducted from their pay – while it was free of 
charge for the allied soldiers.789 We can suppose that the constant supply of these standard rations 
required civilian labour. Italy was of central importance: during the Second Punic War, Etruria and 
Latium (but we should include Umbria and Picenum as well) were the main food suppliers for both the 
army and the population until Campania and Apulia were taken back.790 As the number of legions 
increased, a large part of the population was involved in the production and distribution of food for the 
troops.791 
 
By the second half of the second century, Roman legions were stationed from Spain to the Aegean area, 
and, as a consequence, the Republic needed to adapt the supply of its soldiers. If Italy maintained a 
position of primary importance in the production and supply of food, there were other ways to guarantee 
the arrival of provisions to the legions.792 Once they reached a certain province, or were stationed there, 
soldiers received the supplies they needed from Italy, the province itself, or from allied cities, tribes or 
nations.793 When necessary looting enemy territory (a process called frumentatio) was an option. Usually 
                                                 
788 See Paul Erdkamp, ‘The Corn Supply of the Roman Armies during the Principate (27 BC – 235 AD)’, in ed. Erdkamp, P., 
The Roman Army and the Economy (Amsterdam, 2002), 49: “The need to sustain large armies for long periods arose during 
the wars of the third century BC.” 
789 Polybius, VI. 39: “The infantry receive a ration of wheat equal to about two-thirds of an Attic medimnus a month, and the 
cavalry seven medimni of barley and two of wheat. Among the allies, the infantry receive the same and the cavalry one and 
one-third medimni of wheat and five of barley. These rations are provided free to the allies…” also see Jonathan Roth, The 
Logistics of the Roman Army at War (264 BC – AD 235), (Brill, Leiden/Boston, 1999), 224 
790 On the shipments of corn from Etruria see Livy, XXV. 15; XXV. 20; XXV. 22; XXVII. 3 
791 Broadhead, ‘Migration and Transformation’, 156-157 on the strong settlement triggered by important trading posts 
(emporia) in Northern Italy whose function was to supply the army (e.g. Victumulae or Clastidium). 
792 Tacitus, Annales, XII. 43: “But, heavens! Italy once transported her legions’ provisions into distant provinces.” Nicolet, 
The World of the Citizen, 102: “The consul ordered them to report at a given date to their respective enrolment centers, 
generally in the area where each man was to serve.” so it is plausible that soldiers received their supplies during this process 
– between recruitment and relocation. Livy, XLII. 27 says that the senate sent three legati to purchase grain in Apulia and 
Calabria in order to send it to the troops in Macedonia (171). 
793 Roth, Logistics of the Roman Army, 227 by the end of the Second Punic War grain contributions from Sicily, regulated by 
the lex Hieronica, were intended for the army and the fleet. Livy, XXIX. 3: in 205 the Spaniards were required by the Romans 
to furnish clothing and grain for six months to the soldiers. Livy, XLIII. 2 also reports that in 171 the Spanish requested that 
Roman magistrates ceased to sell the so-called vicensimae (5% quota) at an arbitrarily low price or converting the grain tax 
into money, and certainly, the legions stationed there were an obvious recipient for this taxed grain. 
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employed during a campaign, this was actually more complicated than we might imagine, mainly because 
the frumentatores required constant protection.794 Successful attacks on the foragers might have serious 
consequences for the operations, as suggested by certain episodes described by Appian in his chronicle 
of the Spanish Wars.795 
 
Roman soldiers also required all sorts of military and non-military equipment; Koenraad Verboven notes 
that ‘Wherever the Roman army went, a train of merchants, contractors and hangers-on followed’.796 
From the second century, trade, long-range transportation and the number of people involved in such 
activities likely increased. The navicularii, private businessmen who signed contracts with the state in 
order to transport food and supplies by sea, became more and more important. The growing importance 
of sea transportation is attested in the numbers of shipwrecks, which strongly increased during the second 
century before reaching a peak during the first century.797 Transport of soldiers, food and material by sea 
was essential to the Roman war effort, as we can see, for example, during the Spanish campaigns.798 We 
should suppose that contracts with the army, and sea transport of military furniture was a lucrative 
business: Livy reports the indignation of the Roman people on the discovery of a large fraud regarding 
the supplies intended for the Spanish legions during the Second Punic War (212).799 
 
During the Imperial period, permanent military bases attracted canabae: civilian and probably 
commercial settlements serving the camp.800 Some provincial campaigns might have generated similarly 
                                                 
794 On the frumentatio, how it was conducted, and the necessity of protection, see Erdkamp, Hunger and the Sword, 124-126 
795 Appian, VI. 9. 55 on the case of Lucullus during his campaign against Pallantia (151): “…the Pallantians continually 
harassed him with their cavalry while foraging and prevented him collecting forage. As he was running short of food, Lucullus 
withdrew…”. Appian, VI. 13. 77-78 constantly mentions troubles for the foragers during the operations of Quintus Pompeius 
against Numantia (142-140); also, Aemilius Lepidus’ siege of Pallantia (136) failed because his army ran out of supplies, see 
Appian, VI. 13. 82. 
796 Koernaad S. Verboven, ‘Good for Buisness. The Roman Army and the Emergence of a “Buisness Class” in the Northwest 
Provinces of the Romans Empire (1st Century BCE – 3rd Century CE)’, in eds. Lo Cascio, E., and De Blois, L., The Impact of 
the Roman Army, 297 
797 Gabriele de Donato, Mare Nostrum, the Roman Sea (London: 2003), x-xi; also see Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution, 4-
5 
798 Appian, VI. IX. 47-48 on the difficulties of Nobilior’s army during the winter 153-152; he was replaced by Claudius 
Marcellus who brought new troops (and probably supplies). Appian, VI. IX. 65: Fabius Maximus Aemilianus received the 
command against Viriathus; he brought two new legions with him, but relied mainly on local production to supply his troops. 
Livy, XL. 35 says that consul Aulus Postumius announced to the senate that the reauthorization of pay and grain for the army 
in Spain was unnecessary, as the Celtiberian revolt had been defeated (180). Appian, VI. IX. 84: Scipio did not bring any new 
legions with him when he received the command of the war against Numantia in 134. 
799 Livy, XXV. 3 says that the responsible was Marcus Postumius of Pyrgi – how, at first, was fined of 200,000 asses – and 
was supported by other tax-collectors. 
800 Verboven, ‘The Emergence of a “Buisness Class”’, 298: “When permanent army bases were constructed the suttlers settled 
in canabae, forming the nucleus of Roman immigrant communities.” 
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permanent structures, perhaps at Italica, founded in Further Spain during the Second Punic War, or Aquae 
Sextiae established in Gallia Narbonensis in the second half of the second century after the campaigns 
against the Gauls. It is likely though that the mobile legions of the Republic were followed by mobile 
markets which sought to meet the needs and desires of the soldiers. Soldiers with cash were an 
opportunity for traders and in provincial conditions especially, it was likely that businessmen recognized 
the possibilities. Appian suggests that when Scipio assumed command of the operations against 
Numantia in 134, he expelled all those who accompanied the army.801 
 
We must also consider products distributed by the state to the soldiers such as clothing and military 
equipment. Pierre Cosme suggests that ‘sous la République, l’Etat commença probablement par 
remplacer les armes usages ou perdues au combat’.802 State supply of military equipment might have 
started during the Second Punic War, when the increasing number of soldiers recruited created a 
substantial demand and the reduction in the census requirement for military service allowed the 
recruitment of poorer soldiers who might not have had or have been unable to provide a full military kit. 
Travis suggests that the Republic organized arms factories (fabricae) for weapons and military equipment 
and it looks as though much equipment was stock-piled by the state.803 Cicero seems to highlight on 
different occasions, the fact that the citizen body was demilitarized and the need for the state to provide 
arms.804 
 
Roman civilians (and probably Italian as well) were normally without arms, it seems plausible that first-
century soldiers returned their weapons and equipment at the end of their period of service. After the 
Gracchan reforms (see below), it seems likely that any equipment which the soldier had not paid for 
would be the property of the state. Even before the reforms the needs of the army would create moments 
                                                 
801 Appian, VI. IX. 85: “On his arrival, he expelled all the traders, prostitutes, clairvoyants and diviners…” 
802 Pierre Cosme, ‘Les Fornitures d’Armes aux Soldats Romains’, in eds. Lo Cascio, E., and De Blois, L., The Impact of the 
Roman Army, 242 
803 Travis, Roman Helmets, 146, 160 
804 Cicero, Pro Rab. Perd., 20 mentions state-owned armouries and arsenals: “Arms were taken from the public buildings and 
arsenals and, under the direction of the consul, Gaius Marius, distributed to the Roman people.”, and Cicero, Philippics, VII. 
13: “When you ordered levies of troops to be held through Italy and canceled all exemptions, was Antonius not declared an 
enemy then? You see arms factories in Rome…” also, Cicero, Phil. V. 31: “Therefore, members of the Senate, in my judgment 
no mention should be made of envoys. I think that business should be put in hand without any delay and prosecuted at once. 
I say that a state of tumult should be decreed, suspension of business proclaimed, military cloaks donned, and a levy held with 
no exemptions in Rome and in the whole of Italy, Gaul excepted.”. Cicero, Phil. VI. 9: “Which should we have sent to this 
man, envoys or legions? But let bygones be bygones. Let the envoys make haste, as I see they will. You, on your side, get 
your military cloaks ready. For it is so decreed: if he does not obey the authority of the senate, it is military cloaks for us. It 
will be. He will not obey. But we shall be sorry to have lost many days which might have been actively employed.” 
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of high demand for military equipment. Between 197 and 196, for instance, the number of legions in 
service increased from six to ten. This required the recruiting and equipping of 38,400 new soldiers 
(between Romans and socii).805 These new soldiers needed helmets, armour, shields, all their different 
weapons – gladii, spathae, pila, etc). The 4,800 cavalrymen also needed horses.806 Some of that 
equipment may have come with the recruits, since those discharged from previous campaigns would be 
hardly likely to have thrown away their arms, though even in such cases armour would need repair and 
weapons renewal. Such volumes are well beyond the capabilities of local craft production. Similarly, 
between 193 and 190 Rome increased the number of legions in service from eight to thirteen, meaning 
that, between Romans and socii, 48,000 men joined the legions, and needed to be equipped.807 
 
The rapid fluctuation in the number of legions required also entailed fluctuations in the amount of 
equipment needed. One presumes that the standardization of equipment over long periods allowed such 
valuable items to passed from soldier to soldier and from generation to generation. But even if there were 
mechanisms for reuse of equipment, mass recruitments, such as that for the Third Punic War, must have 
triggered a spike in demand. In 150 the main theatre of war was Spain, but that same year the campaigns 
against Numantia and the Lusitanians came to a temporary hiatus, and the following year (149), there 
were only two legions in the Spanish provinces, whereas there had been four or six in service the previous 
year. That same year Rome formed seven new legions for the war against Carthage. Even if the soldiers 
returned their weapons at the end of their periods of service, most of the soldiers discharged between 150 
and 149 were in service in Spain, while the new legions formed in 149 were probably organized and 
prepared in Italy before being transported to Africa. The war may have required arms for up to 36,000 
new recruits.808 
 
                                                 
805 On the number of legions in service in 197 see Livy, XXXII. 30; on the number of legions in service in 196 see Livy, 
XXXIII. 25 
806 We are still using the strength of the legion suggested by Polybius, VI. 19 and 21: each Roman legion was formed by 4,200 
infantrymen and 300 cavalrymen, and was reinforced by an ala sociorum of 4,200 infantrymen and 900 cavalrymen. So, a 
full strength Roman legion (plus socii) counted a total of 9,600 men. Livy, XL. 36 is the first time that larger legions are 
mentioned, and are dated around the late 180s. 
807 One the legions in service in 193 see Livy, XXXIV. 53, Livy, XXXV. 20 for the legions in service in 192, Livy, XXXVI. 
1 for the legions in service in 191 and Livy, XXXVII. 2 for the legions in service in 190. 
808 For the 150s onwards, we are using Appian’ suggested strength for the legions (6,000 men each) being one of our main – 
if not the only – source for this period. As said, in 150 there were between 5 and 7 legions in service, meaning a total between 
30,000 and 42,000 Roman citizens in the army. In 149 the number of legions increased to 11 (66,000 Romans) due to the 
Third Punic War, meaning that the number of men under arms increased of 24,000 (if seven legions the previous year) and 
up to 36,000 (if five legions were in service in 150). 
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As a final example, we can look at the period from 127 to 124, when the number of legions was increased 
from four to nine, and the state had thus to provide equipment for up 30,000 troops. By the last quarter 
of the second century, many new soldiers were recruited among very poor citizens who could not afford 
the full military panoply. The financial pressures this placed on them may have been responsible for the 
Gracchan decision to make state provision for the cost of equipment.809 It is probably during this period 
that military equipment became fully state-supplied, and thus standardized. 
 
Livy shows that supply of clothing for soldiers was controlled by the state before Gaius Gracchus’ lex 
militaria (as this dealt with costs for the soldiers, not the supply chain): in 169 the praetor Gaius Sulpicius 
Gallus let a contract for providing and transporting 30,000 tunics, 5,000 togas and 200 horses for the 
army in Macedonia.810 Similarly, it is clear that Scipio organized the supply of weapons at New Carthage, 
thereby we might imagine that production of both military and non-military equipment was focused in 
towns, and it was a mean that provided employment for the urban population.811 
 
In the section dedicated to the economic impact of the Second Punic War, we have mentioned the 
importance of war indemnities as an alternative source of income for the Republic. Considering the fact 
that Rome imposed heavy indemnities to defeated enemies on several occasions during the first half of 
the second century, they probably became an important part of the economy of this period, thus we should 
include them as part of the indirect impact of the army.812 Between 196 and 188 Rome imposed war 
indemnities to Macedonia, Boeotia, Sparta, Aetolia, Ambracia, Syria and Cappadocia while, at the same 
time, Carthage was paying its fifty-year long debt.813 
 
                                                 
809 Plutarch, GC, 5: “He proposed a number of laws […] Another, on the army, ruled that soldiers were to be supplied with 
clothing at state expense (alia militaris, vestem militi publice suppeditari juben)…” 
810 Livy, XLIX. 16 
811 Livy, XXVII. 17“He (Scipio) had moreover a very large reserve of weapons, which included those taken at New Carthage 
and all he had had made after the capture of the town by the numerous workmen he had kept shut up for the purpose.” 
812 On the importance of war indemnities also see Kay, Rome’s Economic Revolution, 37-42 
813 In 196 Rome imposed an indemnity of 1,000 talents to Macedonia (500 to be paid immediately, the rest in ten yearly 
instalments of 50 talents each) (see Livy, XXXIII. 30 and Polybius, XVIII. 44); furthermore, the Boeotians were forced to 
pay 30 talents (see Livy, XXXIII. 29). The following year (195), Nabis of Sparta was forced to pay 500 talents (100 
immediately, then 50 per year for the next eight year) (see Livy, XXXIV. 35). In 189 Rome imposed a 500 talents payment 
to Aetolia (200 immediately, then 50 per annum for the next six years) (see Livy, XXXVIII. 9 and Polybius, XXI. 30 and 
XXI. 32); this was followed by 150 more talents from the Ambraciots (see Livy, XXXVIII. 9 and Polybius, XXI. 30). In 188 
the Romans demanded an indemnity of 15,000 talents to Antiochus III (3,000 paid immediately, the rest in twelve yearly 
instalments of 1,000 talents) (see Livy, XXXVII. 45; XXXVIII. 37 and XXXVIII. 38; Polybius XXI. 17 and XXI. 42 and 
Diodorus Siculus, XXIX. 10) and 600 talents from the king of Cappadocia (see Livy, XXXVIII. 37) 
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To have a better idea of the economic importance of war indemnities, we can look at some individual 
examples: in 196 Rome received 500 talents from Macedonia, 200 from Carthage and 30 from Boeotia 
for a total of 730 talents (the equivalent of 4,380,000 denarii). In 189 a total of 600 talents (200 from 
Carthage, 50 from Sparta, 200 from Aetolia and 150 from Ambracia) entered the Roman treasury (hence 
3,600,000 denarii). Finally, the following year (188), Rome received 3,600 talents (21,600,000 denarii) 
in indemnities from Syria (3,000), Carthage (200), Sparta (50), Aetolia (50) and Cappadocia (300). 
 
If we consider the overall impact of war indemnities, between 201 and 151 – when Carthage paid its last 
instalment – Rome received a total of 27,480 talents (so an income of 164,880,000 denarii in fifty years). 
This massive quantity of wealth probably circulated in the economy as it was most likely re-invested by 
the Republic: some families might have received compensation for past tributa while others the means 
to purchase land or equipment.814 These funds could have been also used to pay soldiers without raising 
tributa, or to finance colonial initiatives (since, as we will see, this was a period of intense colonial 
activity). Obviously we are not suggesting that Rome simply gave away money, but we should look at 
the case of the 40,000 Ligurians who, in 180, were moved to Samnium, allocated on ager publicus and 
provided money by the state (150,000 sesterces) to start farming.815 If the Republic went through so 
much trouble to relocate its enemies, it would not be absurd to suggest something similar for its own 
citizens and allies, and the indemnities annually paid by defeated enemies would seem like an appropriate 
source of funds. Although there is not mention of this in the sources, it is an interesting alternative to a 
scenario in which this wealth was simply hoarded in the aerarium or “stolen” by the aristocracy.816 
 
By looking at both direct and indirect economic impact of the legions we can see that the army was a 
major source of employment and it generated flows of capital that helped monetized the Roman economy, 
a process that, as suggested by Crawford, Harl and Erdkamp, had its origin during the expansion of the 
Republic.817 Thus, we can see that this process is the result of what started in the fifth century, when 
military payment was introduced. The increase of military activity should not be regarded simply as a 
cost/burden for Rome’s finances, but as an important economic instrument that played a part on all levels 
                                                 
814 Already mentioned Livy, XXXIX. 7 on the distribution of booty to reimburse citizens; it seems thus plausible that the cash 
from war indemnities could have been used in similar ways. 
815 Livy, XL. 38: the land they received was previously occupied by the Taurasini, so it was probably already equipped for 
farming, reducing the costs. 
816 See Astin, A., E., ‘Roman Government and Politics, 200 – 134 BC’, in eds. Astin, Walbank, Frederiksen and Ogilvie, 
Cambridge Ancient History vol. VIII, 187; also see De Ligt, ‘Agrarian Change’, 593 
817 Crawford, Coinage and Money, 29-51; Kenneth Harl, Coinage in the Roman Economy, 300 BC to AD 700 
(Baltimore/London, 1996), 36-37 and 72; Erdkamp, ‘War and State Formation’, 104-106 
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of the economy of Rome, from that of the individual soldier and his family, to the whole system of the 
Roman Republic.818 
 
* Colonization 
 
Colonies have long been understood as a means by which Rome asserted her power in hostile regions, 
thereby consolidating her control of recently subjugated areas. The colonies also functioned as a reliable 
supply of manpower.819 The more traditional view on colonization focused on the military functions of 
colonies, but colonies were also means of relieving poverty among Roman citizens and, probably 
incidentally, a way of spreading Roman government and culture.820 As Bradley writes, ‘As well as 
changing in function over time, colonies probably meant different things to different sectors of Roman 
society’.821 New citizen colonies would have contributed to increase the numbers of assidui available to 
serve in the Roman army, while Latin colonies would have provided more contingents for the allied 
forces. The fact that Roman colonists traditionally received small allotments of land – especially if 
compared with much larger allotments in Latin colonies –, might makes us question the whole efficiency 
of this strategy.822 Rathbone says, ‘it is implausible that the state settled citizens on allotments which 
were below the minimum census qualification for assidui, that is for military service’.823 so, we should 
not be deceived by really small allotments given to Roman colonists, such as the 2.5 iugera per colonists 
at Satricum (385), as they did not count on their tiny fields alone for subsistence.824 During the second 
                                                 
818 Also see Verboven, ‘The Emergence of a “Business Class”’, 309, although focused on the Imperial period, describes this 
connection between the army and monetization: “army pay and expenses constituted the main gateway through which 
currency entered the economy. […] The military market – from retail business to large official orders – was profoundly 
monetized.” 
819 Salmon, Roman Colonization, 15: “Rome was able thus to rid herself of some landless poor, but that was not the main aim. 
The chief purpose of colonies was strategic. […]. It was not until the second century that economic ends came to the fore. 
Before then colonies were founded in order to make the Roman state more secure. There may have been incidental benefit 
that some paupers were removed from the ranks of the indigent Roman proletariat and made eligible for military service, but 
the chief consideration was the defense of Roman soil and the establishment of future bases for military operations.” 
820 Livy, III. 1 on the foundation of Antium (467): the colony was established on recently conquered Volscian territory, but it 
was decided to distribute its land among the colonists (both Romans and Volsci), so that it wouldn’t be necessary leasing or 
selling public land “without disturbing the occupiers of public land”. Also see Dionysius, IX. 59. Appian, BC. I. 7 
acknowledges the military function of the colonies, but he also mentions that conquest led to the acquisition and exploitation 
of land: “As the Romans subjugated the peoples of Italy successively, it was their habit to confiscate a portion of land and 
establish towns on it or enroll colonists of their own in the towns already on it. They intended these for strongholds.” 
821 Guy Bradley, ‘Colonization and Identity in Republican Italy’, in eds. Bradley, G., and Wilson, J., P., Greek and Roman 
colonization: Origins, Ideologies and Interactions (Swansea, 2006), 171 
822 One of the earlier cases is the settlement of the ager Veientanus in the 390s; Livy, V. 30 says that here colonists received 
7 iugera each. 
823 Rathbone, ‘Poor Peasants’, 308 
824 On the case of Satricum, see Livy, VI. 16. Rathbone, ‘Poor Peasants’, 307 suggests that, during early colonization, small 
allotments were given as a form of booty in addition to the already existing farms. J. C Yardley, Livy Books 6-10 Rome’s 
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century, on the other hand, as a consequence of the decrease of the property requirement for military 
service, small allotments of 5 iugera became enough to guarantee membership in the fifth class – as 
suggested by both Rathbone and De Ligt.825 By the beginning of the second century, colonization entered 
a new phase that followed the aftermath of the Second Punic War. The following table shows second 
century colonial foundation, their legal status (if Roman or Latin colonies), and the number of male 
settlers reported by the sources. 
 
COLONY DATE STATUS POPULATION (male 
settlers) 
SOURCE 
Venusia 200 Latin ? (reinforcements) Livy, XXXI. 49 
Narnia 199 // 1,000 (reinforcements) Livy, XXXII. 2 
Cosa 197 // 1,000 (reinforcements) Livy, XXXIII. 24 
Puteoli 194 Roman 300  
Salernum 194 Roman 300  
Volturnum 194 Roman 300  
Liternum 194 Roman 300 Livy, XXXIV. 45 
Buxentum 194 Roman 300  
Croton 194 Roman 300  
Tempsa 194 Roman 300  
Sipontum 194 Roman 300  
Copia 193 Latin 3,300 Livy, XXXIV. 53 
Valentia 192 Latin 4,000 Livy, XXXV. 40 
Placentia 190 // 3,000 (reinforcements)  
Livy, XXXVII. 46 
Cremona 190 // 3,000 (reinforcements)  
Bononia 189 Latin 3,000 Livy, XXXVII. 57 
Sipontum 186 // ? (refounded)  
Livy, XXXIX. 23 
Buxentum 186 // ? (refounded)  
Potentia 184 Roman 2,000 Livy, XXXIX. 44 
Pisarum 184 Roman 2,000  
Mutina 183 Roman 2,000  
Parma 183 Roman 2,000 Livy, XXXIX. 55 
Saturnia 183 Roman 2,000  
Graviscae 180 Roman 2,000 Livy, XL. 29 
Aquileia 181 Latin 3,000 Livy, XL. 34 
Luna 177 Roman 2,000 Livy, XLI. 13 
Aquileia 169 // 1,500 (reinforcements) Livy, XLIII. 17 
 
                                                 
Italian War, 300, n.16.4 comments that, while allotments of 2-4 iugera in colonies were considered normal, settlers relied 
mainly on access to the ager publicus to sustain their families. 
825 See p. 173 of this dissertation. 
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According to Salmon, colonial foundations during this period were also stimulated by military necessity, 
especially fear of attacks from the Hellenistic East, and renewed campaigns against the Gauls in Northern 
Italy.826 In his view, social-economic factors, such as providing new land to the urban (and we might add 
rural) poor or as a reward to soldiers at the end of their service, were secondary. In some ways, however, 
the intention behind the settlements (which cannot be established) is in itself a secondary issue since it is 
how the settlements functioned that matters. Colonies perhaps founded as military settlements also 
fulfilled economic and social roles. 
 
Some, such as the eight citizen colonies founded in 194 seem to have been intended as coastal outposts 
to protect Italian coasts from attacks from Macedonia and Syria, but they soon lost this function.827 
Colonies such as Saturnia (183) or Graviscae (181) in Etruria hardly had any military function while 
even the colonies of Northern Italy, which may have had military purposes at first, were significant 
resettlements of population (possibly Roman, Latin and Italian) with consequent economic and social 
consequences. 
 
The first wave of colonization during the 190s and the eight new citizen colonies established in 194 and 
the first new Latin colony of the following year were still in the shadow of the Punic War. It seems 
possible that the wave of colonization was intended to boost the population and provide land for the 
formation of new families, a process that contributed to the recovery of the Roman population after the 
war. From 194 onwards, the Romans founded or reinforced colonies on a regular basis until 169, clearly 
showing that the availability of manpower for land settlements was not a problem. 
 
From the previous table we can see that colonization moved at least 27,200 male settlers – although some 
population totals are missing – between 200 and 169. Salmon and Broadhead agree that the programme 
ended once the military and strategic need for the colonies was met: ‘With Italy south of the Alps now 
firmly under Roman control, there was no longer a need for the propugnacula imperii that had played so 
important a role in Roman expansion of the previous century and a half’.828 However, it is possible that 
colonization continued after the 170s, as suggested by Tweedie, and we cannot detect such settlements 
                                                 
826 Livy, XXXI. 3 and 7 on the fear of a Macedonian invasion of Italy; Salmon, Roman Colonization, 95 
827 Sipontum and Buxentum were even abandoned by their own citizens before they were re-founded in 186, see Livy, XXXIX. 
23 
828 Will Broadhead, ‘Colonization, Land Distribution and Veteran Settlement’, in ed. Erdkamp, P., A Companion to the Roman 
Army, 157; Salmon, Roman Colonization, 112 
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due to the absence of Livy’s chronicle for these years.829 However, because of the silence between 
171/167 (the last mention of colonial initiative by Livy and the end of his chronicle) and 125 (when 
Velleius mentions new colonial foundations), we cannot say if colonization continued or stopped. Maybe 
it continued in a limited form or in alternative ways, or outside of Italy more connected with the army – 
as we will see –, or maybe colonization actually stopped as there was no need for new state sponsored 
settlements (although less than fifty years later the need would return). 
 
If we make allowance for the missing population figures and add women, children and older people 
(though colonies may have had an abnormally high proportion of adult males in the founding population), 
we might suggest that the colonization program that followed the Second Punic War moved more than 
100,000 Romans, Latins and Italians in less than thirty years. We might also imagine that additional 
mechanisms were additionally employed to provide people with land, like the distribution of land in the 
form of viritane settlements. These were individual settlers who received plots of land in particular 
territory without the foundation of a town or any other organised community.830 Broadhead suggests that 
the option of viritane settlements was taken when the land involved was secure.831 An example of this 
process is the land distribution of 173 in Northern Italy that followed its capture from the Ligurians and 
Gauls; here individual Roman settlers received ten iugera, while the Latins received only three iugera 
each.832 In these instances we might assume that the land distributions had no military purpose. 
 
Some of the Latin colonies, for instance Copia and Valentia (193 and 192), were relative failures.833 It is 
possible that their purpose was to increase Roman and Latin presence in Bruttium – the region that 
resisted the most during the Second Punic War – and Lucania; both cities offered good land allotments 
(15 iugera at Valentia, 20 iugera for infantrymen and 40 for cavalrymen at Copia834), but even these 
larger allotments failed in persuading Roman settlers.835 The same situation occurred when the senate 
authorized the foundation of two new Latin colonies in Northern Italy, but only one – Bononia – was 
                                                 
829 See Tweedie, ‘Missing Veterans’, 465-466 
830 Broadhead, ‘Colonization, Land Distribution and Veteran Settlement’, 154 
831 Broadhead, ‘Colonization, Land Distribution and Veteran Settlement’, 154 
832 Livy, XLII. 4 
833 Livy, XXXIV. 53 
834 Livy, XXXV. 9 
835 Livy, XXXV. 9: “Three thousand infantrymen and 300 cavalrymen went there, a small number in view of the quantity of 
land available. Infantrymen could have been awarded thirty iugera per head, and cavalrymen sixty, but on the proposal of 
Apustius a third of the land was set aside to be used to enlist new colonists is that was wanted.” 
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actually established.836 In this case the land allotments offered by the state were even larger, 50 iugera 
per settler, clearly a way to attract potential recruits for the foundation, but even this was not enough to 
convince Roman citizens to settle there. By contrast, when two new Roman colonies, Parma and Mutina, 
were established in 183, there is no suggestion in Livy of any trouble in finding settlers even though the 
land allotments where far smaller (8 iugera at Parma, 5 at Mutina).837 The same problem occurred when 
Aquileia was founded in 181: settlers received large allotments of 50 iugera (for infantrymen, centurions 
received 100 iugera, while cavalrymen 140).838 There appears to have been a relationship between the 
success of the colony and the legal status its citizens would enjoy, as Roman citizenship appears to have 
become more valued. 
 
After around fifty years of silence, we have reports of new colonial settlements: Fabrateria Nova (125) 
on the site of Fregellae, Aquae Sextiae (124) in Narbonensis, the Gracchan colonies of Neptunia 
(Tarentum) and Minervium (Scolacium) (both in 122), Narbo Martius (114) again in Narbonensis, 
Dertona (109) and Eporedia (100).839 
 
After the foundation of Eporedia colonization entered into a new phase characterized by the 
predominance of colonies solely intended to settle demobilized soldiers, called coloniae militares by 
Velleius.840 Yet colonization and military service had been connected before the first century and 
Velleius’ coloniae militares. About a century earlier, Scipio had discharged veterans of the Spanish and 
African campaigns (probably between 45,000 and 50,000 men) with 2 iugera in Samnium or Apulia for 
each year of service.841 It seems that Scipio’s plans of distribution for his veterans met no objections – 
                                                 
836 Livy, XXXVII. 47 on the decision of founding two new colonies in Cisalpine, while Livy, XXXVII. 57 reports that only 
Bononia was actually established. 
837 Livy, XXXIX. 55 on the foundation of Parma and Mutina. 
838 Livy, XL. 34 on the foundation of Aquileia and size of land allotments, although Livy, XXXIX. 55 shows that there were 
discussions about the establishment of this colony (and about its legal status) since 183. 
839 On this new colonization wave see Velleius, I. 15. 3-5 
840 Velleius, I. 15. 5; also see Broadhead, ‘Colonization, Land Distribution and Veteran Settlement’, 158; Salmon, Roman 
Colonization, 128 
841 See Livy, XXXI. 4 and XXXI. 49 on the assignation of land to Scipio’s veterans. When Scipio received command of the 
operation in Spain (210), his army counted around 34,100 men between Romans and socii – see Livy, XXVI. 17 –, and part 
of them (maybe around 10,000 men) were the rest of the legions under the command of Scipio’s father and uncle. The African 
legions counted between 26,000 and 30,000 men between Romans and allies (see Livy, XXIX. 25). So, these soldiers served 
under Scipio for a period of nine years (from 210 to 202), meaning that the most experienced ones received 18 iugera of land, 
while those with less years of service, mainly the recruits for the African campaign, had only three years of service (from 204 
to 202) for a total of 6 iugera. 
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contrary to what will happened later with Marius.842 It may be that there were other viritim settlements 
for some of the soldiers discharged in the period between these two cases, but it was clearly not a standard 
reward for service. 
 
Some colonial settlements appear to have had a veteran element: colonies in which the settlers were 
divided into a military hierarchy – pedites, centuriones and equites – were established at Copia (3,000 
infantrymen and 300 cavalrymen), Bononia (3,000 colonists divided by Livy once again between 
infantrymen and cavalrymen), and Aquileia (3,000 colonists, divided between infantrymen, centurions 
and cavalrymen). Although these uneven distributions may have related to the prior social status of the 
colonists, military rank, certainly at Aquileia, is an equally or more plausible explanation for the different 
allotments. It is possible that the colonists of Bononia, for example, were veterans of the campaign 
against the Boii. The colonies of Copia and Valentia, on the other hand, were probably focused on 
increasing the Roman/Latin control over Bruttium in the aftermath of the Punic War, but, at the same 
time, they allowed the settlement of thousands of veterans of the Macedonian War. 
 
The connection between military service and land distribution is clear in the cases of colonization in the 
provinces. Italica, for instance, was founded for Scipio’ soldiers during the operations in Further Spain.843 
Corduba was an important town in Farther Spain, and, although the doubts on its establishment, its 
population, according to Strabo, was formed by: “picked men of the Romans and of the native Iberians” 
suggesting that it was originally established for Roman soldiers and Spanish auxiliaries.844 Valentia, 
founded in 138, was probably manned by the veterans of the campaigns against Viriathus, and Aquae 
Sextiae was established by consul Sextius Calvinus and proconsul Fulvius Flaccus after the successful 
campaigns of 124 in Southern Gaul.845 We might suggest that land distributions to veterans in the 
provinces involved other areas where Roman legions were involved during the second century: Greece 
and Macedonia after the Third Macedonian War and the Achaean War, and Africa after the Third Punic 
                                                 
842 Cicero, Balb. 48, while commenting Saturninus’ agrarian laws, does not mention any colonial foundation. Pliny, NH, III. 
VI. 80, on the other hand, suggests that Mariana, in Corsica, was the only colony established by Marian veterans. Also Livy, 
Per., 69 briefly mentions Saturninus’ agrarian laws. Broadhead, ‘Colonization, Land Distribution and Veteran Settlement’, 
159; Michael Crawford, The Roman Republic (London, 1992), 126-127 argues that Marius betrayed Saturninus only after he 
obtained from the senate the promise that his soldiers would receive land. 
843 Italica is mentioned in 206 by Appian, VI. 7. 38; other colonies founded in Spain – probably to settle veterans – were 
Gracchuris (179), Carteia (171), Palma and Pollentia on Majorca (122). 
844 Strabo, III. 2. 1; on the doubts on the establishment of Corduba, see Tweedie, ‘Missing Veterans’, 470 
845 On Valentia, see Dyson, Roman Frontier, 118; on the foundation of Aquae Sextiae see Livy, Per., 61; Strabo, IV. 1. 5; 
Pliny, NH, XXXI. 2. 4 and Velleius, I. 15. 4 
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War. These campaigns involved considerable number of legions, and after their discharge at the end of 
the wars, although there is no mention of land grants in the sources during these periods, it is possible 
that alternative solutions were applied. One is that veterans received land in the form of viritane grants. 
Tweedie also suggests that the veterans of the Third Macedonian War, in addition to the donatives were 
also rewarded with land donations.846 Finally, the lex Agraria of 111 mentions of the reorganization of 
the land of Corinth (1.96) and in Africa – under the lex Livia (1.81) –, and it is possible that the veterans 
of the campaigns of the mid 140s were rewarded with land on these newly won territories. 
 
Naturally, veterans were not settled exclusively in the provinces; as suggested by Tweedie, the discharge 
of veterans and subsequent land donations surely involved Italy as well.847 Furthermore, they were not 
involved solely in the establishment of new foundations: when discharged, veterans were probably 
involved in the supplement of existing colonies. The provision of land for colonial settlement was a 
consequence of imperial expansion and it seems likely that soldiers and veterans would, like the rest of 
the Roman population, benefit from land distributions. It seems very possible that the poorer elements of 
Roman society would have been more attracted by the prospect of new land in a distant corner of Italy 
or in the provinces. It may be that those at the lower end of the socio-economic spectrum, for whom 
service in the army was economically beneficial, would also be first in line for the colonial distributions. 
In some cases, however, it seems as if the connection between the soldiers and colonization or viritane 
distribution were more intimate. Land, then, should be seen alongside the stipendium, donatives, booty, 
as one of the potential benefits of military service. 
 
In this chapter we have carefully analyzed the connection between the army and the economy of the 
Roman Republic during the key period of the second century. We have started from the historiographical 
debate around the Italian economy during this period, argued the origin, development and role of the 
villae and, ultimately, suggested a closer connection between them and the army. We then moved to the 
different approaches to the demography of the countryside. Next we have analyzed the role of the army, 
the different strategies adopted by Roman citizens to counterbalance the absence of family members due 
                                                 
846 See Tweedie, ‘Missing Veterans’, 471 regarding the case of the veterans of the Third Macedonian War. She also mentions 
that the fact that Paullus retired to Velia (Lucania) suggests that he settled his veterans in this area (see Plutarch, Aemilius 
Paullus, 39). 
847 Tweedie, ‘Missing Veterans’, 467 she mentions the possibility of more veteran settlement in the ager Gallicus by the end 
of the 170s: “…given the large quantity of rich land available and the modest size of the allotments.” contra Toynbee, 
Hannibal’s Legacy vol. II, 204 
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to military service, how the army had a direct and also indirect impact in the economy, and finally, the 
role of colonization. 
 
After having re-examined how the army fitted into the economy of the Roman state, and how its direct 
and indirect affected the population, we might suggest a different approach toward its role during the 
second century. We should look at military service not only as a problem, but as a solution as well. The 
numerous campaigns of the second century forced male citizens to leave their homes and activities, 
apparently leaving their families exposed to economic difficulties. As we have showed, however, there 
was much more to it: while service in the legions provided employment, those left at home were not 
abandoned to their doom, as we have saw. Especially, the army was a potential source of wealth, or, at 
least, sustainment that helped, rather than damaged, the Roman peasantry class during this crucial period. 
The progressive reduction of the census requirement for military service in the course of the second 
century made the advantages offered by the army much stronger. Finally, it was the army that strongly 
increased the monetization of the Roman and Italian economy due to the massive movement of capital 
that it triggered from its most basic necessity: the pay of the soldiers. 
 
We should not look at the army simply as a cost for Rome, almost as a parasite, because it was actually 
one of the main source of income and employment for the Roman Republic during its expansion. It was, 
truly, an essential part of the complex mechanism that was the Roman economy. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The main purpose of this dissertation was to offer a detailed analysis of the impact of the Roman army 
on the economy of Italy during the expansion of the Republic with particular attention to the period 
between the Second Punic War and the end of the second century. In order to do so, we have focused our 
discussion on three main topics: military payment, recruitment and economic effects of military service. 
The study of the stipendium allowed us to understand how much Roman soldiers were paid by the state, 
and how military pay evolved during the Republic. By methodically examining the recruitment system, 
we were able to have a better grasp of its scale in terms of number of Roman citizens who served in the 
legions; by comparing these numbers with those suggested in the census figures by our sources, we are 
able to suggest plausible recruitment rates. The combination of all these data, together with our discussion 
of the economy of the second century – both the traditional approach, and the newer one – are the key to 
suggest an alternative and more complete analysis on the impact of the army on the economy of the 
Roman Republic during the key period of the second century. 
 
The study of the stipendium, the economic impact of the Second Punic War and the relationship between 
military service and the economy suggest a new and more positive role of the army. It is indisputable 
that the army was a cost for Rome, a cost that became progressively larger because of the increase of the 
number of legions in service that reached its peak during the Second Punic War. As we have seen, this 
war proved to be extremely expensive for Rome not only in terms of human lives, but also financially: 
between 218 and 200 the Roman state spent more than one billion asses in stipendia. After the war the 
number of legions in service decreased, and, as we have saw, the second century offered very wide-
ranging levels of recruitment rates from generally low to very high – although the levels of the Hannibalic 
War would not be reached until the Social War. 
 
However, we have argued that the army was also a very important source of income and employment for 
the Romano-Italian population, and an essential part of the economy. The necessity of giving monetary 
compensation for military service is one of the main factors that developed Roman coinage, and allowed 
its spread, and finally, the monetarization of the whole Roman economy. As we have showed, Rome 
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spent more than one billion asses in the Second Punic War just for paying the stipendia of the legions, 
but this was money was not wasted, as it entered in the economic circuit. This cash was given to Roman 
(and Italian) soldiers who, after their period of service, were able to reinvest it (in land, slaves, farming 
equipment, etc), thus completing this circle. At the same time, the massive monetary requirements of the 
Second Punic War are probably the event that definitely triggered Roman coinage production and 
circulation. 
 
At the same time, we have looked at the crucial role of the army as a source of employment, not only 
directly (those who served in the legions), but also indirectly with the civilian production of supplies for 
the army. Erdkamp already suggested the importance of food production for the army; the next step 
suggested in this dissertation is the development of a military industry that produced the military and 
non-military equipment that the soldiers needed. This started during the Second Punic War because of 
the vast increase of legions in service and, simultaneously, the reduction of the census requirement for 
service in the army allowed the recruitment of poorer citizens who couldn’t afford the full military kit. 
For this reason, military and non-military equipment had to be mass produced by the state – a process 
that began the standardization of Roman military equipment.  This offered employment for the urban 
masses, and also allowed the movement of vast quantities of goods and capital. 
 
I believe that we have offered an alternative view on the impact of the army during the second century 
that challenges the traditional negative role. Our detailed analysis of the military participation rates, 
allowed us to have a better understanding of the scale of military service; combining the recruitment rates 
with the discussion on the economy of the second century, and the result is a different outlook on the 
supposed burden of military service. Of course, the military participation rates and the economic survey 
cannot ignore the debate on the census figures, and the dualism between the “high” and “low” counters. 
A solution to this problem that we have suggested is to look at the “middle count” theory developed by 
Saskia Hin, and combine it with the importance of regionalism suggested by Witcher. In this way, rather 
than having the Italian countryside emptied of its peasantry, or crowded by masses of poor peasants, we 
are suggesting to look at Roman Italy as a mosaic of regional demographic and economic differences. 
 
This mosaic, however, was strongly influenced by a progressively important factor during the second 
century: the attractiveness of military service. This plays a problematic yet essential role in the 
understanding and reading of the census figures, thus of the whole demographic structure of Roman Italy. 
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We have examined in details cases of soldiers that joined (or re-joined) the legions when it was more 
convenient for them, and also the exact opposite. During the campaigns in the Hellenistic East or the 
Third Punic War, Roman citizens were more than eager to join the legions, as they were well aware of 
the potential economic benefits – later proved by the sources. The exact, but opposite pattern can be 
applied on the case of unpopular war; as suggested by Rich, the main reason why the census figures show 
a decline during the 140s and 130s is mainly because of the unwillingness of Roman citizen to be enlisted 
for the Spanish wars rather than a sudden demographic crisis. 
 
The fluctuations of the census figures caused by the appeal of military service are also well represented 
by our corrected census figures: if by 147, during the peak of the operations in Africa, Greece and 
Macedonia – hence the high number of soldiers in service –, we have suggested a total of 393,000 male 
citizens, we can see that this figure drops to 340,823 in 131 soon after the end of the Celtiberian War. It 
seems clear that such figures are strongly influenced by the army: the fall between 147 and 131 can be 
explained by a strong increase – as suggested by Lo Cascio – of the unregistration in the census figures 
in order to avoid being enlisted for the campaigns in Spain. The fact that by 125 the number of registered 
citizens increased to 433,236 also points to a strong return of previously unregistered citizens, other than 
a general growth of the population – within the limits suggested by the middle count. 
 
Our analysis of the economic impact of the Hannibalic War highlighted the possibility of strong 
economic benefits and even growth on certain levels. Among these positive effects there is the 
intensification of agricultural productivity due to increasing military demands, and we have suggested 
that this factor triggered the development of the villae. After all, as we have showed, surveys clearly 
show that villae were not archaeologically prominent before the third century, and started to really expand 
by the end of the second century and beginning of the first century. By rethinking the origins, the 
development, and even the role of the villas we have questioned the spread and impact of slavery during 
the second century. Jongman’ studies on Italian productivity emphasized the fact that Hopkins strongly 
overestimated the impact of rural slavery, especially in terms of its number, an argument followed by 
both Rosenstein and De Ligt. Therefore, we have suggested that slave ownership was quite common 
among the Roman peasantry (even small farmers), and that it was part of the strategies used by families 
to counterbalance the absence of their men due to military service. By combining all these elements, it 
becomes difficult to believe in the established notion of large villas whose fields were worked by large 
numbers of slaves before the late second century, and especially the first century. 
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Finally, by combining all these elements – the role of the army in terms of recruitment rates and 
direct/indirect involvement, the demographic and economic development of the Roman countryside – 
we were able to better understand the impact of military service and outline a completely different 
scenario in which the army played a positive and important role in the sustainment of the Roman peasants. 
 
We have highlighted different strategies that Roman families may have adopted to counterbalance the 
absence of their members in service with the legions. There is no doubt that the army was an essential 
part of the Roman economy – as a cost, but also as one of the main sources of income – on a macro-
economic level, but it played a fundamental part on a micro-economic stage as well. We believe that the 
case of Spurius Ligustinus is an indication that already by the second half of the second century – if not 
before – the transformation of the army into a force of volunteers was altering the relationship between 
military service and the population. The reduction of the census requirement opened the legions to 
multitudes of poorer citizens, for whom the benefits offered by the army represented a strong motivation 
to enlist. The most basic was the stipendium; as we have argued, 3 asses per day (so 1,080 asses per year) 
was not a large sum of money per se, but it was not negligible for a substantial part of the soldiery. The 
episode of Ligustinus also shows that soldiers were able to alternate short campaigns with periods of 
civilian live, probably to counterbalance periods of agricultural inactivity, unemployment or simply to 
offer additional income to their families. 
 
As we said, after all, the stipendium was only the first and most basic of the benefits that the army offered 
to the citizens. We have discussed the role of booty and donatives, and, of course, the possibility of 
receiving land as part of a state or army sponsored colonial foundation.  
 
Furthermore, we should combine these factors with marriage practices. Saller and de Ligt proposed that 
Roman men usually married after their period of military service. This implies that a significant 
proportion of recruits were younger or unmarried; second, by marrying after their service in the army, it 
seems that citizens were well aware of the benefits offered by the army, and tried to make the most of 
them before marrying. The return of married soldiers seems to highlight the role of alternative 
occupation/source of income. 
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The study of the Roman army has recently become object to new enquiries and reconsiderations, 
especially in terms of its impact. Works by historians like Lo Cascio, Erdkamp, de Ligt or Rosenstein 
have started to offer different paths to our understanding and interpretation on the role of the army of the 
Roman Republic. I believe that this dissertation offers a contribution to these theories, and it provides 
further alternative interpretations on the impact of military service. 
 
We have presented a complete and updated survey of the likely number of legions in service year after 
year from 218 to 125, so that it is possible to better comprehend the scale of military service, and its 
impact when comparing the recruitment rates with the census figures. From this we can say that the 
burden of military service for the population has been exaggerated. The Second Punic War, being a 
struggle for survival, was clearly an exception; between 200 and 125, the military effort grew closer to 
the levels of the Hannibalic War only in the period between 149 and 146. The rest of the second century, 
including the years of the Spanish campaigns, did not present unbearable recruitment rates. 
 
We were also able to offer estimates of the costs of the army for the Republic on different occasions. We 
have already looked at the example of the overall economic cost of the Second Punic War, but we have 
also offered cases during the second century presenting yearly costs during period of intense military 
activity (between 149 and 146) or moderate military activity (between 130 and 125).  
 
Finally, in order to fully understand the effect of the army on both the overall economy and especially 
on individual citizens, we have highlighted the direct and indirect contributions to the economy by the 
army. Citizens directly involved in the army were able to receive benefits such as regular payment, 
donatives, booty and land. Naturally, certain campaigns were more profitable than others, but on some 
occasions soldiers were actually able to gather considerable wealth. Indirect contributions are much less 
considered in the historiography of the impact of the army, although they are of crucial importance in the 
economic strategies. From the Second Punic War the state became more involved in the production of 
military and non-military equipment offering employment and income. 
 
The main purpose of this project is to furtherly develop an alternative view on the Roman army and its 
connections with the economy during the Republic, and particularly during the second century, by 
suggesting a more positive impact of military service contrary to the generally accepted negative one.  
The state, while sustaining the costs of paying the army, benefitted from the income and land expansion 
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generated by military campaigns. Service in the legions transformed from a duty/burden to an alternative 
source of employment for citizens who, at the same time, directly and indirectly benefitted from military 
service, and the business of supply the legions (from the production of food, military and non-military 
equipment to the transport and distribution). The Romano-Italian population, also supported by military-
related income, was thus able to invest its resources by buying land, goods (farming equipment, etc) or 
slaves. All of this caused the circulation of a massive quantity of cash in the economy. Furthermore, 
citizens were involved by both the state and the army in colonial foundations, of which we have 
highlighted the economic and demographic importance. 
 
On a final note, we should add that peninsular Italy was generally at peace during the second century, 
and that Roman wars were conducted in the provinces or outside the borders of the Republic. Between 
the end of the Second Punic War (201, but we might suggest by the time Hannibal left Bruttium, so 203) 
and the beginning of the Social War (91), Central and Southern Italy, the core of Roman territory, enjoyed 
a long period of peace that surely contributed to the demographic recovery and economic growth of the 
second century. 
 
In conclusion, it is undeniable that military service presented risks for Roman citizens and their Italian 
allies: they could get killed or injured, and long periods of absence might cause economic ruin to families. 
However, among the economic strategies adopted by the Romano-Italian families we have added military 
service as well because it is also undeniable that service in the army offered economic benefits that 
became progressively more important with the reduction of the property requirement for military service. 
At the same time, it is our belief that the absence of men has been overrated in terms of economic impact, 
as it completely ignores the role of women, extended family members or alternative sources of labour. 
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